Report on the Attack on Yerevan to the Commander of the 11th Red Army – 1920

Having investigated the areas of Zangezur, Nakhichevan, Sharur-Daralagez, and Yerevan (the main arena of military operations), it is necessary to draw the following conclusion. The entire territory of the alleged hostilities is occupied by mountains with a height of 5-7 thousand feet which are separated by mountain rivers, forest valleys, and flooded places.

The road to Yerevan is a mountainous one, which is difficult for infantry. In autumn and winter, some passes are covered with snow, as a result of which movement in this area stops for 2-3 months.

In terms of transport and production, the area is poor and quite far from the railway. Residents, in turn, are hostile.

Thus, the proposed area of the military actions does not allow carrying out demonstrative actions to force the Armenian side to deviate from the position that is advantageous for us and the weakest for them from a strategic point of view. An attack along this road is possible only in the case of small partisan equestrian groups that may be deployed in Nakhichevan or Engelurt.

Despite the natural obstacles, nevertheless, both for the forced attack and for the demonstrative actions and the defeat of the Armenian forces, I make the following considerations.

The provision of the divisions moving to Yerevan should be carried out by the supply brigade, for which it is necessary to equip it with transport. In addition, each regiment must have a hundred donkeys.

The division will not be able to serve itself without outside support even if it uses the entire transport of this area. We cannot ignore the need to evacuate sick comrades.

Concerning communication – the Baku-Shusha line is repaired. Then, it is necessary to urgently repair the telegraph line between Gerus and Nakhichevan in order to establish direct communication with Baku. Until the telegraph is repaired, keep in touch with Yerevan by flying mail and telephone.

On the right side of the front where there are no technical means, communication will be provided through horsemen. Since the division cannot find any information regarding Iran because of the problem with enlightenment in Karabakh and due to the lack of steps to solve this problem, the question remains open until the elimination of the Karabakh counter-revolutionary gangs in the area up until the Araks coast.

Chief of the 28th Division Nesterovsky, Military Commissar Berezhnoi, Chief of Staff of the Division Krupennikov

David Fidanyan