No open source offers direct proof that Azerbaijani money shapes Donald Trump’s policy. What exists are two well-documented storylines that are often merged into one. The first is the Trump International Hotel & Tower project in Baku, which the Trump Organization pursued in 2012–2016 with the family of an influential Azerbaijani minister. The second is the sharp rapprochement between Washington and Baku in 2025–2026, from the August agreement involving Aliyev and Pashinyan to the signing of a strategic partnership charter. The link between the two remains critics’ conjecture, and in this article I try not to present it as fact.
The 33-storey, sail-shaped building stands in central Baku. Construction began in 2008 as a residential complex. In 2012 the Trump Organization signed a name-licensing agreement, and in 2014 it announced that the building would become a five-star hotel. The hotel never opened, then or later: journalists described an unfinished shell with dark windows and glowing TRUMP TOWER letters at the top, and a fire damaged it in April 2018.
The developer was Anar Mammadov, owner of the Garant holding. The Trump Organization neither built nor owned the building. According to its lawyer Alan Garten, the company only lent its name and agreed to manage the hotel, and Trump’s role was passive. For the licence he received at least $2.8 million, judging by the sparse public filings. Ivanka Trump handled the project: in 2014 she visited the construction site and wrote about it on her blog.
Anar’s father, Ziya Mammadov, headed Azerbaijan’s transport ministry for many years and was regarded as a close ally of President Ilham Aliyev. Ziya’s brother, Elton Mammadov, was a member of parliament. Anar founded the lobbying group Azerbaijan America Alliance in Washington and was for a time registered as a foreign agent under FARA.
The minister’s reputation in American diplomatic documents was poor. The New Yorker and Mother Jones quote an American diplomat who called Ziya Mammadov “notoriously corrupt even for Azerbaijan”. A leaked 2009 cable said the family was apparently a silent partner in road contracts that the ministry awarded to an Iranian company, Azarpassillo. American officials believed that money for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could have been laundered through those contracts. No formal charges were brought against either Ziya or Anar Mammadov.
In March 2017 the journalist Adam Davidson published the article “Donald Trump’s Worst Deal” in The New Yorker. He pointed to the oddness of the project itself: the hotel was to be built on an underdeveloped edge of the business district, at a time when Baku’s construction boom was over and luxury-hotel occupancy hovered around 35 percent. The piece (as retold by Mother Jones) also described cash handed to contractors in duffel bags.
The Trump Organization objected. Garten said the company had vetted its partners and found no red flags. Ziya Mammadov, he said, took no part in the project, so he was not vetted separately. The lawyer also argued that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) could not have been violated, since Trump did not own the building. Lawyers cited by journalists disagree with that argument, though there is no consensus among specialists either.
In response to the article, three Democratic senators demanded an investigation into possible FCPA violations, “willful blindness” about the partners, and compliance with sanctions on Iran. They also wrote that the Trump Organization appeared to have withdrawn from the project, but that questions about criminal liability remained. There are no reports that the inquiry ended in charges.
Anar’s lobbying campaign in Washington cost, by the New Yorker’s estimate, about $13 million. According to OpenSecrets data cited by RFE/RL, neither he nor his organization has spent anything on lobbying in public records since 2015. An investigation by RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani service found that Mammadov invested in British KFC restaurants: he owns at least twenty outlets in northwest England, a business he started through an anonymous offshore company.
In connection with the “Russia case”, the name of Emin Agalarov surfaced, a singer and businessman of Azerbaijani origin who, with his father, helped organize the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in 2013. That is more a Russian thread than an Azerbaijani one, and in the context of Aliyev’s money it has to be described with care.
Public registries show that by 2015 Trump had at least two companies with “Baku” in their names. They are DT Marks Baku LLC and THC Baku Services LLC, and they ended up at the centre of the Deutsche Bank leak discussed below.
The most direct documentary trail to date came from material published on 17 November 2026. Journalists on the Inside Deutsche Bank project went through more than 15 million of the bank’s internal documents, handed over by two whistleblowers. The investigation was coordinated by the South African nonprofit Barracuda Media with technical support from Berlin’s Data and Research Center; according to Il Foglio, more than 200 journalists from 56 outlets took part, among them Le Monde, the Financial Times and Spiegel. The data reached the Indian journalist Josy Joseph and the South African journalist Khadija Sharife in 2025, and they shared it with more than 50 media organizations. Sharife’s piece on Trump and Azerbaijani money came out on 17 November. As DW describes it, the trove includes more than nine million emails, plus reports, presentations and client lists going back to the early 2010s. The project’s findings reach well beyond Trump: according to the journalists, the bank kept doing business with Russian clients after 2014 despite internal warnings, processed tens of thousands of transactions for Colombian banks without the required anti-money-laundering reports, and sent regulators reports of suspicious activity on Jeffrey Epstein’s accounts worth almost $600 million. The next day, a German state data-protection regulator opened an inquiry into the bank over the leak.
At the centre of the story are two Trump companies named after Azerbaijan’s capital: DT Marks Baku LLC and THC Baku Services LLC. The journalists cite Trump’s financial disclosures and court filings, which confirm that he owns both. They were not Deutsche Bank clients: the bank saw payments to them as a correspondent bank, that is, an intermediary between banks.
| Date | What the documents record |
|---|---|
| 21 August 2014 | The bank flags three transfers to DT Marks Baku as suspicious, sent by a client of Danske Bank’s Estonian branch; the relationship between the parties could not be established. A suspicious activity report (SAR) goes to US authorities. |
| April 2015 | The British firm Faberlex tries to transfer $141,261.82 to DT Marks Baku, and the payment is returned. On 28 April the same sum goes to THC Baku Services, marked “Invoice 2” in the statement. Trump would announce his candidacy on 16 June. |
| 2017 | The bank starts an internal inquiry, Project Broadway, tied to the “Trump family and their business with the bank”. SARs from 2017 cover DT Marks Baku transactions with entities the bank links to the Russian and Azerbaijani laundromats. |
| February 2018 | A payment between THC Baku Services and an entity linked to the Russian laundromat is added to a SAR. The entity is not named in the document. |
| April 2019 | A senior bank lawyer writes in a draft reply to US authorities that the bank knows of no Trump connections to Russia related to his business with Deutsche Bank. That same month the House Financial Services Committee demands that documents be preserved, including those on the Azerbaijani Laundromat. |
| 16 January 2020 | A new SAR names both companies as “suspects”. The grounds: adverse information on business practices, unidentified individuals and a link to the Azerbaijani Laundromat. |
| May 2020 | A memo by Brian Hagerty of the bank’s financial intelligence unit, subject line “Trump/Kushner”: 59 SARs covering 140 parties, more than $3 million in transactions with the two Baku companies. |
| January 2023 | The committee’s subpoena expires. The new Congress did not renew it. |
Faberlex is no random name in this story. According to OCCRP and Denmark’s Berlingske, as reported by Newslaundry, the firm was a prominent link in the Azerbaijani Laundromat: in 2012–2014 billions of dollars passed through a chain of shell companies and accounts at Danske Bank’s Estonian branch, and the journalists write that part of the money went to influencing European politicians on behalf of Azerbaijan’s authorities. The Faberlex statement for 2013–2015 shows almost a billion dollars coming in and exactly the same amount going out. According to iStories (“Vazhnye istorii”), as cited by DW, the firm was registered to a driver from Baku, its email was hosted on Mail.ru, and the shell companies connected to it received money from Russian metals groups, Rosselkhozbank and Rosoboronexport. The journalists claim that Faberlex was also used to pay European politicians who lobbied for Baku: the former PACE member Luca Volonte and two German lawmakers, Eduard Lintner and Axel Fischer. A European investigator who worked on the case told reporters that any company that received money from Faberlex is suspicious from the outset. The British money-laundering expert Graham Barrow called the payment activity in the memo “highly suspicious” and said it was hard to find a legitimate explanation for the money.
Another line concerns the bank itself. According to the documents, Deutsche Bank had known about the two companies’ transactions for years, yet in a 2019 draft reply to authorities it claimed there were no connections. DW, citing Der Standard, dates the internal review’s conclusion that Trump had no banking ties to Russia to 2018, and writes that by the bank’s own internal assessment the payments to the Trump-linked company came from structures in Russia and other former Soviet states. Dawson Law, a former senior US Treasury official, noted that omitting material details from a SAR counts as a violation and can bring penalties. The journalists also write that the bank ran a confidential policy for “covered clients” (Project Novus Ordo), a category that included the president, his advisers, relatives and close associates.
The limits of what the documents show are these. Hagerty wrote explicitly that Trump is not named as a SAR suspect and that neither company was a bank client. The memo does not explain what the money was for, and for one transaction it names neither sender nor recipient: the journalists themselves matched the amount to the Faberlex statement. According to the authors of the investigation, nothing in the material they reviewed connects Ziya Mammadov to the suspicious transactions. A SAR is filed on suspicion and does not by itself amount to a finding of wrongdoing. Deutsche Bank said banks are prohibited from commenting on SARs and on dealings with regulators, and Trump did not respond to a request for comment. Danske Bank, in its reply, repeated its regret over what happened and pointed to the 2022 settlement with Danish and US authorities.
The dispute with Capital One, Trump’s bank, is also relevant. In March 2021 Capital One closed 366 of his accounts after a four-year internal review, Project Safeguard; the bank cites money-laundering risk. Trump’s lawyers argue in their Miami lawsuit that the review confirmed all transactions were proper and that the accounts were closed for political reasons.
DW retells a separate episode from the Financial Times. In 2017, during Trump’s first term, Deutsche Bank mistakenly sent about 1,500 pages of his tax documents to another client’s accountant. The accountant reported the slip and deleted the file. The bank’s current chief executive, Christian Sewing, learned of it and called it a “terrible mistake”, but the bank did not tell the White House. The episode has no direct bearing on Azerbaijan, but it shows how the bank handled a client it placed in a special category. On 17 November, answering a reporter’s question in Manila, Trump said he pays enormous taxes, and added that the bank should not have done this and that it was illegal.
The bank’s position is as follows. Deutsche Bank said the events described happened in earlier years and that the bank has since undergone a “fundamental transformation”: from 2019 to 2025 it invested seven billion euros in internal controls, strengthened risk management and changed its corporate culture. It added that it had conducted investigations and cooperated with regulators. Its shares fell about 4.5 percent at the start of trading on 17 November, the sharpest drop since April 2025. The project’s partners promise more publications in the coming days, including on payments to a member of Qatar’s ruling family.
For our subject these materials change a lot, but not everything. What was known before was the partnership with the Mammadov family and questions about vetting the partners. Now there are bank documents about money flowing to two Trump companies from structures that the bank linked to the Azerbaijani laundromat. What stood behind those payments, and whether Trump himself knew of them, the documents do not say. The period in question is 2014–2015, and these materials bear no direct relation to the decisions of 2025–2026.
By the time Trump returned to the White House, the Baku project had long been dead. In the materials I was able to find, there is no confirmation that the Trump Organization or Trump’s family have made new deals in Azerbaijan in 2025–2026. But several notable events have taken place around Azerbaijan itself.
On 8 August 2025 in Washington, Trump hosted Aliyev and Pashinyan. The agreement provided for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) through Syunik: according to ANCA, the US gets a 99-year lease and exclusive development rights over the corridor. The same day Trump extended the waiver of Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act, which has restricted American aid to Azerbaijan since 1992. Every president since 2002 has signed such a waiver, but this time it came amid a major deal and a public ceremony. Aliyev thanked Trump and called the decision symbolically important. A memorandum creating a working group on a strategic partnership charter was also signed.
Events then unfolded as follows. In January 2026 Aliyev accepted an invitation to become a founding member of the “Board of Peace” and met Trump in Davos on 22 January. On 10 February 2026 Vice President Vance signed the strategic partnership charter in Baku. On 1 June Aliyev posted a photo of a commemorative copy of the memorandum extending the Section 907 waiver, handed to him with a personal note from Trump. In August 2026 ANCA condemned the administration’s intention to extend the waiver again.
Critics, chiefly the Armenian diaspora in the US and a number of Democrats, describe a policy that rewards an authoritarian leader while Armenian prisoners remain in Azerbaijan. Some writers add Trump’s past business in Baku as a possible factor. There is no documentary confirmation of such a link in open sources.
Supporters of the policy explain it by strategic reasons: Azerbaijan gives Washington access to energy and transit, a counterweight to Russia and Iran, and a partnership with Israel. Republicans have gone further than the waiver itself: in December 2025 Congresswoman Anna Paulina Luna, who is close to Trump, introduced a bill to repeal Section 907 permanently. Arguments unrelated to money work and explain a lot, though they do not imply that personal interest is ruled out.
It is unknown on what terms the Trump Organization left the project, or what stood behind the payments to its Baku companies: those payments are recorded in bank documents, but their purpose is not stated there. The company has not published the results of its vetting of partners. Allegations that the Mammadovs had ties to the IRGC rest on American diplomatic cables and journalistic investigations, but no court has examined them. There is no evidence that Trump’s decisions on Azerbaijan were made because of money, and no evidence that such influence was absent: what can be examined here is only what is publicly known, and that is limited to an old project and the current course.
When speaking of “Trump’s Azerbaijani money”, it is worth keeping this boundary in mind. There was a partnership with a family that American diplomats considered corrupt. There was an investment in a hotel that made little sense to the market and never earned anything. Now two states are drawing closer, and that has a geopolitical logic of its own. All of this exists side by side, but not in a single causal chain that could be considered proven.
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