From the Memoirs of a Member of the Russian National Council in Baku (1918–1919), Regarding the Circumstances of the Turks’ Creation of the Genocidal Azerbaijani State and Its Policy Toward Armenians
The Azerbaijani government had virtually no clear idea how to govern Baku, which it had occupied, nor the other territories over which it had extended the sovereignty of its “newly minted” republic. Only two objectives seemed clear to it: to intensify the struggle against the Armenians and to instill its own brand of nationalism.
Let me begin with the latter. In April or May of 1918, the National Assembly proclaimed the separation of two former Russian provinces—Baku and Elizavetpol—and the formation of an independent Azerbaijani Republic with Baku as its capital. This Assembly was formed by withdrawing all Muslim deputies (about 42) from the Transcaucasian Seim. As these included representatives from Batum, Adjara, Erivan, and other regions unrelated to the territory of the proclaimed republic, individuals with no actual ties to the land nonetheless became its lawmakers.
To grasp who conceived this new state and what their intentions were, one must consider how this republic appeared in the historical context. These two provinces had never constituted a single political entity, nor had they shared a common name—much less the name “Azerbaijan,” which had always referred to a northern province of Persia bordering, in part, Baku, Elizavetpol, and sections of the Erivan province.
The appropriation of a geographical name belonging to another country and region became one of the key reasons Persia initially refused to recognize this republic or engage in diplomatic relations with it. In truth, the territories of the Baku and Elizavetpol provinces (formerly known as the Caspian and Shemakha regions) had once been vassal provinces of Persia, comprising khanates such as Quba, Baku, Lankaran (Talysh), Shirvan (Shemakha), Sheki (Nukha), Karabakh (Shusha), and Ganja (later Elizavetpol).
Over the years, through protracted wars and diplomatic treaties, these khanates—along with the Erivan Khanate—were ceded to Russia. These semi-independent, often antagonistic states caused endless unrest for both Persia and the newly annexed Georgia, which joined Russia in the early 19th century. They routinely plundered neighboring lands and had no unifying structure, often fighting among themselves.
In such conditions, it is evident that the legitimacy of the newly formed state lacked any historical foundation, and even less justification for adopting a name not its own.
The emergence of this state across the weakened expanse of postwar Russia—fractured further by Bolshevik dissolution—was made possible by the convergence of German and Turkish military goals, the rise of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, and a favorable ideological climate driven by Woodrow Wilson’s and the Petrograd Soviet’s rhetoric of “national self-determination.”
For Turkey—under the sway of German power—the dream was a vast empire encompassing prewar Ottoman territories, the Caucasus, Transcaucasia, Lower Volga, Central Asia, Khiva, Bukhara, Persia, and beyond. For Turkic nationalists—often political opportunists like Enver Pasha or provincial figures like Topchibashev or the late Khan Khoyski—this presented alluring chances to play the role of state-builders.
The creation of the Azerbaijani Republic was actively led—with Turkish assistance—by leaders of the Musavat Party, which styled itself the “Turkic Musavat Party.” It was they who announced political acts, while the broader populace remained silent.
As early as spring 1918, the newly assembled Azerbaijani government prioritized the nationalization of governance structures. As later events would show, this proved entirely unfeasible. Yet the anti-Russian stance was overt, despite claims to the contrary.
In contrast, war was openly declared on the Armenian population. There was no pretense—any form of Armenian civic participation or competition in any field of activity was deemed intolerable. Nationalist hardliners such as Dr. Khosrov bey Sultanov (Minister of Agriculture and State Property) openly stated that Armenians would either be expelled or reduced to the status of Turkish “rayah” (disenfranchised subjects). “Armenians have no place here; let them leave,” proclaimed the more zealous of these nationalists.
From the outset, Armenian property—private as well as communal institutions like charities—was plundered. The grand Mailov Brothers Theatre was declared state property without compensation. The finest printing press in the city, owned by Chr. A. Verishev, was likewise confiscated.
We could name many more examples similar to those mentioned above. Commercial and industrial enterprises owned by Armenians were looted—not only those left unattended after their owners and managers fled Baku for fear of violence during the city’s capture, but even those whose owners remained present.
I personally had to intervene in the case of one firm: a major enterprise that was essentially Russian, as the majority of shares were owned by Volga-based Russian merchants, but had an Armenian executive director who fled Baku on the night of September 1st. Gathering all the relevant documentation, I went to B. Kh. Jevanshir, the Minister of Internal Affairs as well as of Trade and Industry, and demanded action to protect this multimillion-ruble property (warehouses, piers, vessels, etc.). Jevanshir, after hearing that one of the principal shareholders was Commercial Adviser I. F. Skrepinsky, denied my petition on the grounds that Skrepinsky was involved in many Armenian ventures and was “a friend of the Armenians,” and therefore “the Azerbaijani government could offer him no support.”
I cite this as a vivid example of the prevailing attitude among the leaders of the newly declared “Azerbaijan” toward Armenians. The homes of wealthy Armenians were requisitioned, furnishings and all, for use by ministers and senior government officials.
In essence, the Tatars—those in power—adopted a Bolshevik-style approach in their treatment of Armenians and their property. But what was even more horrific were the methods they began to use to personally eliminate Armenian bourgeoisie and intellectuals.
Mass killings of Armenians, carried out by uncontrolled mobs in the early days after Baku’s capture (early September 1918), officially ceased only after a series of protests from foreign consuls and prominent community members of other nationalities (Russians, Jews), and upon receiving news from Tiflis of public outcry there—including from the City Duma.
Yet prominent Armenians began disappearing without a trace, one after another: city figure D. D. Arutyunov (Deputy Mayor and Council Member), doctors T. Zakharian and Agamirzov (the latter practiced almost exclusively among Tatars), engineer S. Amirov, and many others—all widely known and respected in Baku. Being personally close to Amirov (a fellow member of the Kadet Party), I began an active search for him.
Minister Jevanshir professed total ignorance and referred me to the Minister of Justice, who likewise disclaimed knowledge. Jevanshir then remarked that the Turkish military authorities must surely be informed. When I approached Mursal Pasha—together with the late A. Leontovich—he told us to believe that neither he nor the Turkish command had any involvement and urged us not to trust the Azerbaijanis, who had made a habit of blaming the Turks for anything inconvenient.
Eventually, we learned that S. Amirov had been arrested and was being held by Begaeddin Bey, head of political police (a Turkish officer who had joined the Azerbaijani administration and was Jevanshir’s right-hand man). This time, Jevanshir, unable to deny his connection in front of me and Leontovich, adopted a more familiar tone and remarked, “Why are you Russians meddling in Armenian affairs?” He promised to look into the reasons behind Amirov’s arrest. A few days later, however, we were informed that Amirov and the other detained Armenians had been executed.
Armenian travel by rail was extremely dangerous. Armenians were pulled off trains and executed. Many were deported from Baku to other parts of Azerbaijan, imprisoned, or sent to forced labor in unhealthy regions.
The Armenians were utterly subjugated; they could not count on any form of national representation. Most stayed confined to their homes, and those who could tried to flee Baku altogether.
From the above, it is evident that even representatives of other ethnic communities could do little to assist. The unrefined nationalism triumphing in Azerbaijan created a grim and poisonous atmosphere.
—B. L. Baykov, “Memoirs of the Revolution in Transcaucasia (1918–1920),” published in The Archive of the Russian Revolution, vol. IX, Berlin, 1923 (Publisher: G. V. Hessen). See also: “Voice of Armenia,” April 6, 2005. (Emphasis added by us – Y.B.) 230
Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”
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