REPORT By the Acting Uezd Chief of the Dzhevanshir Uezd, D. Baranovsky

REPORT By the Acting Uezd Chief of the Dzhevanshir Uezd, D. Baranovsky, To the Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia, von Plehve On the Causes of Robbery, Banditry, and Other Disorders in the Caucasus and Measures for Their Eradication November 23, 1903

Robberies, banditry, and other forms of unrest in the Caucasus have, in recent years, reached a level beyond which it is impossible to proceed. The cause of this lamentable state lies mainly in a fundamental misunderstanding of the internal political responsibilities of the region, which in recent times have been pursued in a manner diametrically opposed to what was required. In my deepest conviction, this policy should, in broad terms, proceed as follows:

Firstly, the adoption of the most severe and decisive measures against the Azerbaijani Tatars, Ingush, and other predatory groups to prevent them from committing theft, robbery, cattle rustling, and resisting authority. Simultaneously, measures must be taken—through education and other means outlined below—to civilize this semi-savage Muslim population. As they gradually absorb culture and Russian civic values—a process that will naturally require considerable time—administrative methods may be softened.

Secondly, toward the other ethnic groups inhabiting the Caucasus who are not marked by such predatory tendencies, such as the Georgians, Imeretians, Armenians, etc., the regional administration must adopt a calm and impartial attitude, demonstrating sympathy for their needs and satisfying them when possible. In doing so, the government will nurture a class imbued with civic consciousness, respectful of authority, loyal to the Sovereign, and truly viewing Russia as their homeland.

Based on this general view, the following core reforms are necessary for establishing full order in the Caucasus in the near future and for its gradual cultural development:

The foremost and most important measure is the reorganization of administrative institutions, to be expressed in the following major provisions:

Temporarily increase the power of all lower-ranking police authorities—that is, uezd chiefs, their assistants, and bailiffs—with respect to the population of all Caucasian provinces in general, and particularly over the semi-savage Tatar population. These authorities must be granted the right to punish, at their own discretion, all thieves, robbers, bandits, their accomplices, and all those who resist government directives. The scope of such authority should include the imposition of the following punishments: solitary confinement for up to three months and corporal punishment of up to fifty lashes.

The justification for these measures is as follows: few would argue that humane methods can reform a predatory wolf, jackal, or hyena. Apart from the human form and the gift of speech, the Azerbaijani Tatars inhabiting the Elisavetpol, Baku, Erivan, Tiflis provinces, and parts of Daghestan differ in no way from these beasts. They exhibit the same negative traits: predation, treachery, malice, vindictiveness, greed, insolence, boldness, idleness, etc., all vividly borne out in the criminal chronicles of the Caucasus.

Their only redeeming trait is a sensitivity to integrity and justice from governmental authorities and those with authority over them—a quality found mainly among the common folk. The so-called beks, or privileged class, are devoid of even this sense. One may confidently say there is not a single Tatar who does not bear the seed of a bandit within him, and if he is not officially counted among them at the moment, it is either because he has not yet been caught or has not yet had the opportunity to participate in a robbery.

The common people engage in robbery and banditry largely to maintain traditions, to demonstrate their daring and thereby earn the respect of their peers and be regarded as “brave men,” or due to poor economic circumstances. In such cases, a Tatar will seek out one or more companions, arm himself with a rifle, mount a horse, and—choosing a lively spot—set out on nocturnal raids.

In addition to these routine expressions of Tatar predation, the Caucasus also witnesses organized, professional acts of robbery and banditry. These are orchestrated primarily by the beks, who act as the chief planners and leaders of such operations. The beks devise schemes that are often remarkable in both scope and execution, entrusting the actual acts to their nukers (retainers) and individuals financially dependent on them—former peasants, servants, and others—whom they equip with weapons, horses, and even clothing.

When such crimes are uncovered, the beks serve as their protectors, providing them with alibis, standing surety for them, and, when witnesses are summoned by an investigator or to testify in court, they bribe those witnesses. This is easily done, for it is well known that for two or three rubles, one can procure dozens of Tatar witnesses for any case. These witnesses, claiming to be eyewitnesses to any event the situation requires, perjure themselves freely and take oaths with impunity, since within the existing judicial environment oaths hold no real weight for them. Naturally, the beks receive the lion’s share of the spoils.

All of the most notorious robberies in the Caucasus—for example, the 1880s robbery of the state stud farm at Dzhan-Yatag, during which the head of the depot, Actual State Councillor Vilman, was killed and tens of thousands of rubles were stolen; the 1893 robbery of the Guberniya doctor of Elisavetpol; or the 1895 attack in the Agdam gardens, where five judicial officials were killed in what became known as the “Khublarov Affair”—these are the handiwork of the beks from the Shusha and Dzhevanshir uezds of the Elisavetpol province. This has already been proven with irrefutable evidence in court. There are thousands of similar cases—some dismissed due to the alleged inability to identify the guilty parties, others brought to court but resulting in the acquittal of indisputably guilty individuals, due to the distortion of facts by bribed witnesses.

A Tatar fears neither prison nor even exile to penal labor or settlement. Having served their sentence and returned home, they are treated with a certain respect and esteem, much like someone who has completed a university education. Those sentenced to hard labor are entirely confident they will soon escape—and they are rarely mistaken. Thanks to their native cunning, shrewdness, and talent for flattery, they easily deceive the good-natured Russian guards who escort them on the long journey to penal servitude.

As a result, around 60% of those exiled to hard labor return home each year, and the first sign of their return is typically the systematic elimination—most often by ambush—of all their real and perceived enemies: victims whose testimony led to their conviction, witnesses who testified against them, elders or officials who exposed their crimes and reported them, and so on.

Catching such an escapee inevitably requires new sacrifices, as they never surrender voluntarily but resist arrest with arms until the last extremity. In such cases, the casualties are usually members of the police guard, and often also the bailiff, uezd chief, or their assistants.

So, what humane measures can be effective with people of this sort? The predatory elements of the Caucasus fear only three things: capital punishment, corporal punishment, and solitary confinement. It is self-evident that only these measures can have a real impact.

To anyone familiar with current affairs in the Caucasus, it is no secret that the recent judicial reforms were introduced far too early. On the one hand, the population’s low moral and cultural development means they are not yet ready to internalize the noble principles enshrined in the Judicial Statutes of Alexander II. On the other hand, because of the same conditions, members of the judiciary find themselves constantly placed in false, even humiliating positions—so much so that some dirty, half-wild Tatar may mock the court even during formal sessions, and the court is powerless to prevent such scenes.

Thus, the functions of the criminal judiciary fail to fulfill their purpose, and its authority has been fundamentally undermined. It is therefore urgently necessary to provide the courts with effective support.

It is evident that such a view was shared by both the former Grand Duke Viceroy and the senior civil administrators in the Caucasus—namely, Prince Dondukov-Korsakov and Adjutant General Sheremetev—who, at various times, successfully petitioned for the right (I shall not enumerate the imperial decrees on this matter, as they are held in the Ministry) to transfer cases of robbery, banditry, and armed resistance to state authority—particularly those remarkable for their audacity and impact—to the jurisdiction of the Military District Court, which, under its statutes, is authorized to impose the death penalty.

It must be added that this measure exerts a salutary influence on the population. In regions where public executions of criminals have been carried out, instances of robbery, banditry, and resistance to authority have ceased for extended periods. If this measure has been proven effective in practice, there is no rationale for applying it only in rare, exceptional cases; on the contrary, to achieve serious results, all cases of robbery, banditry, and armed resistance to authority should be removed from the jurisdiction of the civil courts and placed under military justice.

This is all the more necessary because, viewed from a broader and more far-sighted perspective, the execution of such criminals also safeguards countless innocent lives: victims of these crimes, witnesses who truthfully testified, individuals who uncovered the perpetrators, and others. Moreover, it protects the region from demoralization, whereby any person who values their life fears testifying against a villain—convinced, with reason, that the latter will sooner or later escape from penal labor and exact revenge from the shadows. With the implementation of capital punishment for the aforementioned crimes, the number of such offenses would decrease so significantly that they would become isolated incidents, and the murders of innocent people would be reduced to a minimum.

[…]

Furthermore, by the highest imperial orders outlined in the circular decrees of His Imperial Highness the Caucasian Viceroy and Commanders-in-Chief, governors were granted the authority to impose administrative detention of up to one year on individuals engaged in robbery or harboring bandits, when there was insufficient evidence for prosecution in criminal court, but when police intelligence indicated their unquestionable guilt.

This measure was, to some extent, effective and fulfilled its purpose, since, as mentioned above, a Tatar does not fear imprisonment if it involves common cells. To serve as real punishment, solitary confinement is required—albeit for a shorter term but with reduced provisions. The right to impose administrative detention should also be extended to uezd chiefs, who are far more attuned to the local populace than governors and are often placed in situations where the failure to take timely, decisive action leads to a total collapse of their authority. Once that authority is lost, such a district chief will never again maintain order in the uezd.

[…]

One cannot ignore another pressing issue that has surfaced repeatedly: the question of how to eliminate bandits who have escaped from penal labor and, upon returning to their homeland, become a scourge upon the population. While evading authorities, they live off the local people and commit robberies and murders nearly daily. The populace—either out of solidarity or fear for their own safety—refuses to disclose their whereabouts. But no conscientious uezd chief can stand by as a passive observer to such events.

[…]

Simultaneously with transferring cases of robbery, banditry, and the like out of the civil courts’ jurisdiction, it would be highly expedient to abolish justices of the peace and mediators, and instead establish an institution of zemstvo chiefs modeled on those in the interior provinces, albeit with modifications appropriate to the region. The statute for this institution must be developed with the participation of individuals deeply familiar with the Caucasus. Since Muslims possess their own adats, as well as the Qur’an and sharia—the essence of which is absorbed with their mother’s milk but whose principles often contradict those of our legal system—it is necessary that in cases governed by adats, zemstvo chiefs adjudicate with the participation of judges elected from the local population.

Alongside the aforementioned stringent, yet entirely practical measures—which will, without doubt, yield swift and tangible results in the fight against predation in the Caucasus—it is essential to implement steps aimed at steering this semi-savage population toward enlightenment and culture. Government measures can only succeed if their executors—in this case, administrative officials—are equal to their responsibilities. In the Caucasus, more than anywhere else, due to the region’s unique circumstances, there is a pressing need for experienced, honest, disciplined, and self-sacrificing officials—and they must be Russian.

[…]

It is of utmost importance that the direction of internal policy in the Caucasus be developed by the highest imperial authority, in consultation with truly knowledgeable individuals, based on the current reality and the historical background of the region. Furthermore, political directives must emanate solely from the central government, so that even the top local officials cannot dismantle an administrative structure shaped by time without express sanction. For, with every change in leadership, policy is almost always reversed—often becoming the exact opposite of what came before—and as a result, the region’s development stagnates for long periods. The officials become disoriented, and the population itself no longer knows whom to trust or what to follow. This is evidenced by the fact that the Persian provinces annexed to Russia in the Caucasus have advanced very little along the path of civilization in nearly a century.

[…]

The entirety of these measures, as outlined, cannot fail to bring about prompt and beneficial change for the proper governance of the Caucasian region, finally freeing it from the lawlessness and plundering under which it currently suffers—and without which its boundless wealth cannot possibly be utilized. IV

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

Read Also:

• Ancient and Medieval Sources on Artsakh (Karabakh) as Part of Armenia’s State Territory
• Message from Gandzasar Catholicos Esayi to Peter I August 10, 1716
• Memorandum Issued to Ivan Karapet Along with the Imperial Letter to the Armenian People Regarding Russia’s Readiness to Take the Armenians of Karabakh Under Its Protection June 3, 1723
• Decree of Peter I to the Armenian People Regarding Russia’s Willingness to Offer Protection to the Armenians of Karabakh
• On Armenian Hopes for Russian Assistance
• Report of Minas Vardapet to Peter I
• Contents of the Secret Letters from the Armenian Assembly and the Armenian Army of Karabakh to the Russian Emperor and Chancellor August 1724
• Contents of the Secret Letters from the Armenian Assembly and the Armenian Army of Karabakh to the Russian Emperor and Chancellor August 1724
• State Charter of Peter I On the Acceptance of the Armenian People Under the Protection of the Russian State and Their Resettlement from Karabakh to Newly Acquired Persian Provinces November 10, 1724
• Letters from the Catholicos and the Meliks of Karabakh
• Charter of Catherine I Addressed to the Armenian Assembly
• Message General Mkhitar—to the Russian Government
• The Armenian Assembly’s Request for Military Assistance June 19, 1727
• Result from Russia’s failure to fulfill its promises of assistance to the Armenians March 1736
• On the Issuance of the Decree Appointing Panah Khan
• Letter from General Potemkin to Prince Argutinsky with questions about the liberation of Armenia
• Appeal of Gandzasar Catholicos Hovhannes to Catherine II
• Letter from Melik Apov Iosifov to Provide Assistance to Russian Military Forces for the Liberation of Enslaved Karabakh
• Report of Prince G. Potemkin to Catherine II
• Request of General P. Potemkin to Prince G. Potemkin
• Letter from Archbishop Joseph Argutinsky to General P. Potemkin
• Memorandum to Catherine II on the Project for the Restoration of the Armenian Kingdom
• Decree of Paul I to General Count I. Gudovich
• Letter from Archbishop Joseph Argutinsky
• Report by State Councillor P. Kovalesky
• The Khan’s Vizier, Mirza Jamal Javanshir Karabakhsky
• From the Report of General Marquis Palluci to Alexander I
• The Gulistan Treaty – An Interstate Act of Iran’s Cession of the Karabakh Territory to Russia
• Report of General A. Yermolov to Alexander I Requesting the Waiver of Tax Arrears for the Karabakh Khanate
• LETTER FROM GENERAL A. YERMOLOV TO MEHTI-KULI KHAN
• Directive from General A. Yermolov to General I. Velyaminov
• Letter of Metropolitan Sarkis Hasan-Jalalyan To General A. Yermolov
• Letter from General I. Paskevich
• TREATY CONCLUDED BETWEEN RUSSIA AND PERSIA AT TURKMENCHAY
• Russian Military Historian V. Potto on the Essence of the Treaty of Turkmenchay
• Order of General I. Paskevich to Colonel L. Lazarev
• STATEMENT ON THE DIFFERING ATTITUDES OF ARMENIANS AND TATARS TOWARD THE ANNEXATION OF KARABAKH TO RUSSIA