In the 60s and 50s BCE, the balance of political and military power in Western Asia gradually changed. Armenia was forced to abandon its expansionist policies and external conquests. From then on, and for many centuries, its primary task became the protection of the territorial integrity that had been achieved with great difficulty.
The Romans had already absorbed a substantial part of Asia Minor and the western part of the Seleucid legacy up to the Euphrates. The next step was to confront the Parthians. However, the Parthian state did not intend to retreat before the Roman onslaught: it had its own plans for conquest.
Armenia was geographically situated between these two powers. In such a situation, a policy of neutrality, most beneficial for Armenia, was unacceptable to either of the two states. Both demanded Armenia’s participation in their military enterprises, seeing it as a key element of their success, or turned its territory into an arena for their conflicts, bringing untold suffering to the people.
This situation, which began in the mid-1st century BCE, continued for many centuries. In 60 BCE, the so-called “First Triumvirate”—a political alliance of three of the most powerful figures in Rome, Julius Caesar, Gnaeus Pompey, and Marcus Crassus—was formed, with each pursuing their own goals.
Caesar desired to extend his power in Gaul, Pompey to rule in Spain, and Crassus aimed eastward. The greedy warrior-merchant, who had ruthlessly crushed Spartacus’s uprising, now not only wished to conquer and plunder Parthia but also dreamed, like Alexander the Great, of reaching “the Bactrians, the Indians, and the sea beyond them” (Plutarch).
In 54 BCE, Crassus arrived in Syria and rejected the peace proposals of the Parthian king’s envoys. The Armenian king Artavasdes II (55–34 BCE), son and heir of Tigranes II, came to Crassus, for according to the 66 BCE agreement, Armenia was a “friend and ally of the Roman people.”
He came with his guard of 6,000 horsemen and promised Crassus an additional 10,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry for the planned campaign, provided the Romans advanced through the southern mountainous regions of Armenia, rather than the Mesopotamian plains, which were very favorable for the Parthian cavalry’s operations.
Thus, Artavasdes sought to protect Armenia from a Parthian counterattack. Crassus ignored his advice and in 53 BCE crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma. Artavasdes returned to Armenia, effectively withdrawing from Crassus’s doomed expedition. What Artavasdes feared happened: Armenia was immediately overrun by Parthian troops led by King Orodes himself. Another Parthian army, led by General Surena, intercepted Crassus.
Artavasdes had no choice but to come to terms with Orodes, which was sealed with an alliance and cemented by a marriage between the Parthian prince Pacorus and the Armenian princess. Meanwhile, Crassus and his army reached the city of Carrhae in Mesopotamia. On May 6, 53 BCE, a battle took place there, which several generations of Romans would later recall with horror.
The Roman army was defeated, with 20,000 soldiers falling, including Crassus himself. Surena, the victor over Crassus, mockingly held a mock triumph in Seleucia on the Tigris, and sent Crassus’s head with a messenger to Orodes, who was in Armenia.
However, Surena was soon killed by Orodes’s order, who envied his fame. Prince Pacorus was appointed head of the Parthian army, with the Armenian general Vasak as his advisor, accompanied by an Armenian contingent. In 51 BCE, the army crossed the Euphrates and invaded Syria. This campaign, however, was not aimed at conquest, but was a test of strength.
In the civil war between Caesar and Pompey’s supporters, which followed their recent alliance, Caesar emerged victorious. Soon he began preparing for a campaign to the east, but his assassination in 44 BCE spared Parthia and Armenia from serious danger. A new civil war between the Caesarians Octavian and Antony on one side, and the Republicans on the other, temporarily tied the Romans’ hands again.
In 40 BCE, Parthian troops, led by Prince Pacorus and assisted by an Armenian contingent, once again invaded Syria and captured the city of Apamea. Here the army split into two parts: one, under the command of the Roman Republican emigrant Labienus, advanced into Asia Minor and reached its western regions, while the other, led by Pacorus, moved south along the Mediterranean coast. The cities of Syria and Phoenicia, with few exceptions, willingly opened their gates to the conquerors, so hated was Roman rule.
In 39 BCE, Antony sent one of his talented generals, Ventidius Bassus, against the Parthians. In a decisive battle, the Parthians were defeated, and Prince Pacorus, the son-in-law of the Armenian king Artavasdes II, was killed. Antony decided to campaign against the Parthians. Naturally, Armenia was a desired ally for him.
Essentially, Artavasdes had no choice, the Armenians could not avoid participating in the campaign, for this time its route went through Armenia: Antony chose the route that Artavasdes had once suggested to Crassus. The campaign began in 36 BCE.
Antony’s army consisted of 100,000 soldiers and a large amount of siege equipment. Antony hastened to reach Atropatene and capture its center, Phraaspa. He accelerated the movement of the main forces, leaving only two legions to cover the slowly advancing siege equipment.
The siege of Phraaspa, however, dragged on, and in the meantime, the Parthians attacked the abandoned two legions and destroyed the siege machines. This event forced Artavasdes to decisively withdraw from the hopeless and very dangerous venture and recall his troops from the Roman army. If the continuation of Armenian participation in the expedition was in Rome’s interest, Armenia’s interests required the opposite.
Unable to engage in battle with the approaching Parthian army, Antony began a retreat, which, under the continuous attacks of the pursuing Parthians, turned disastrous. The Romans lost 35,000 soldiers during the campaign. Antony blamed Artavasdes for the failure of his expedition, although the latter had covered his retreat.
From Armenia, Antony went to Alexandria to Queen Cleopatra, whom he was married to. He made several attempts to lure Artavasdes to him, but in vain—Artavasdes did not go. Soon, as Roman historians recount, Antony, at the head of a large army, marched into Armenia.
His legions approached Artashat, and then Artavasdes was forced to appear before him. Antony put him in chains and set a ransom. Then, under the pretext of collecting the ransom, he occupied several fortresses, intending to gradually take over Armenia. However, resistance grew in the country. Artashes, the son of Artavasdes, at the head of part of the Armenian troops, began to fight the Romans but, having been defeated, fled to Parthia.
During the triumph arranged by Antony in 34 BCE in Alexandria in honor of his victory over Armenia, he presented the chained Artavasdes and his family to Queen Cleopatra. Artavasdes, as ancient authors admire, did not behave humbly, and an enraged Cleopatra ordered him to be thrown into prison.
Three years later, he was beheaded. During this period, the king of Atropatene, relying on a Roman auxiliary detachment provided by Antony, tried to seize Armenia. Soon, however, Antony, concerned with the upcoming decisive clash with Octavian, recalled this detachment. The decisive naval battle between them, which took place at Actium in 31 BCE, ended with the complete defeat of Antony and Cleopatra, and they committed suicide.
Taking advantage of the favorable circumstances, Prince Artashes, who was in Parthia, accompanied by a Parthian auxiliary force, entered Armenia, defeated and captured the king of Atropatene who was there, and in 30 BCE, established himself on the Armenian throne.
After defeating Antony, Octavian, who became the sole ruler of Rome, proclaimed himself Emperor Augustus. Now Rome, freed from internal strife, posed an even greater danger to neighboring countries, including Armenia. Artashes II, having established himself on the throne and supported by the Parthians, ordered all the Roman garrisons remaining in the Armenian fortresses to be killed. With this act, Armenia firmly declared its independence.
During the reign of Artashes II (30–20 BCE), Armenia was not involved in wars. The Romans, not resorting to military actions for the time being, began to encircle Armenia with their allies. After some preparations, Emperor Augustus decided to place a ruler favorable to Rome on the Armenian throne.
General Tiberius advanced on Armenia with large forces, taking with him Tigranes, the brother of Artashes II, who had been raised in Rome and was intended to be the king of Armenia. Before this military demonstration, the pro-Roman faction in Artashat conspired against Artashes II, and he was killed in 20 BCE. Armenia lost an energetic and strong king.
Armenia during the Roman-Parthian War
This text holds significant historical importance as it details the geopolitical dynamics and conflicts in Western Asia during the 1st century BCE, particularly focusing on Armenia’s strategic position between the Roman and Parthian empires. Here are some key points of historical significance:
- Geopolitical Context: The text highlights the shifting balance of power in Western Asia, with Armenia caught between the expansionist ambitions of Rome and Parthia. This period marked the beginning of Armenia’s long struggle to maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty amidst powerful neighboring empires.
- Roman-Parthian Rivalry: The text provides insight into the Roman-Parthian rivalry, with Armenia often becoming the battleground for their conflicts. The involvement of key figures such as Julius Caesar, Pompey, Crassus, and later Antony and Octavian (Augustus) underscores the importance of Armenia in their strategic calculations.
- Armenian Diplomacy and Military Strategy: The actions of Armenian kings like Artavasdes II demonstrate the delicate balancing act Armenia had to perform to navigate the pressures from both Rome and Parthia. Artavasdes’ attempts to protect Armenia from Parthian retaliation by advising Crassus on the campaign route and later forming alliances with Parthia illustrate the complexities of Armenian diplomacy.
- Impact of Roman Civil Wars: The text also touches upon the impact of Roman civil wars on Armenia. The internal conflicts within Rome, such as the power struggles between Caesar and Pompey, and later between Octavian and Antony, had direct repercussions on Armenia’s political landscape and its relations with Rome and Parthia.
- Cultural and Political Legacy: The period described in the text is crucial for understanding the cultural and political legacy of Armenia. The alliances, conflicts, and diplomatic maneuvers of this era shaped the future of Armenian statehood and its interactions with neighboring powers.
Overall, this text provides a detailed account of a pivotal era in Armenian history, highlighting the challenges and strategies of a small kingdom striving to maintain its independence amidst the ambitions of larger empires.
