The Battle of Gaugamela – Armenian Cavalry on the Right Flank

The expansion of the Greek world into the depths of the mighty Achaemenid Empire did not happen immediately. Strictly adhering to traditions, the Athenians, Spartans, and Greek colonists of the western coast of Asia Minor were wary of venturing far from their city-states. However, by the mid-6th century BCE, they were already contemplating seizing the wealth of the Persian state.

We have reached the first important part of our topic – the Greek world discovered the land of the Armenians for the first time. How did this happen?

After the defeat and death of Cyrus at the hands of Artaxerxes II, his brother, disciplined and well-trained Greek mercenaries, heading north, passed through Armenia, reached the Black Sea, and sailed to Greece. Xenophon, in his “Anabasis,” provided quite detailed information about Armenia and Armenian society of that time. Historians are well aware of these invaluable details from Xenophon, so without delving into them, it is worth noting that, according to Xenophon, it was already an established society with a clear social hierarchy, self-governance, and vast territory.

We can confidently assert that this campaign of Greek mercenaries served as a precursor to Greek expansion, the expansion into the vast expanses of the East, including Armenia.

Sixty-nine years later, having defeated the Achaemenid Empire, Alexander the Great opened a new chapter in history. For us, the line “Alexander the Great – Armenians” is undoubtedly the most important.

The battle of Alexander the Great’s army against the vast army of Darius III Codomannus at Gaugamela left a deep mark in history, and it is particularly noteworthy in Armenian history. Both ancient and later authors mentioned the participation of the Armenian army in Darius III’s forces. Modern historians, unfortunately, sometimes distort the accounts of Arrian, Plutarch, Diodorus, Polyaenus, and Quintus Curtius Rufus.

Let’s start with the fact that the Battle of Gaugamela (northern modern Iraq) took place literally next to Greater Armenia. According to Anania Shirakatsi, the southernmost ashkhar of Armenia – Korduk, lying south of Lake Van, was located north of the battle site. At the end of September 331 BCE, leaving the Euphrates and the mountains of Armenia to the left, Alexander approached the site of the historic battle.

Analyzing the Battle of Gaugamela and the participation of the Armenian army in it, we note that we take ancient authors as the main sources. Among Armenian historians, it should be noted, Alexander the Great is only mentioned by Movses Khorenatsi and Ioannes Drasxanakertsi.

Therefore, following the accounts of ancient authors, let’s examine the positioning of the Armenian army in Darius’s forces, try to more accurately locate their cavalry and infantry, determine their numbers, leaders, their direct combat actions, and whether they had any significance for the outcome of the battle.

Curtius Rufus indicated the specific positioning of the Armenian army in the Persian camp before the battle. Speaking of the composition of the left flank of Darius’s army, he noted: “…this entire formation was closed by 50 scythed chariots, to which Darius added foreign soldiers. Behind them were Armenians from the so-called Lesser Armenia, behind the Armenians – Babylonians, and behind both – Belites.”

Let’s note that Rufus clearly separates the Armenians from other “foreign soldiers,” Babylonians, and Belites. This indicates both the author’s awareness of Armenia and the good familiarity of Armenians to the Greek world. Regarding the “Belites,” the following can be assumed. If Rufus was aware of Bel-titan, according to Armenian legend slain by Hayk, or the Assyrian supreme deity Bel, then it is obvious that the author meant the Assyrians.

Speaking of the right flank, Rufus first mentions the Armenians: “…on the right stood Armenians from Greater Armenia, Cadusians, Cappadocians, and Medes.” Thus, on the right wing, the Armenians occupied the extreme right position, as they are mentioned first. This was undoubtedly advantageous for the Armenian army in terms of maneuverability in attack, convenience for flanking the enemy, which, as we will see below, subsequently happened.

But this part of the Armenian army, unlike the infantry from Lesser Armenia, was cavalry. Arrian directly indicates this: “…on the right wing, the Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry were positioned in front.” Arrian also mentions the Armenians first, confirming our assumption about the extreme right position of the Armenian cavalry on the right flank. However, Arrian says nothing about the Armenian infantry on the left flank.

Modern authors interpret the accounts of Rufus and Arrian, sometimes making serious mistakes. For example, the modern Armenian historian A.E. Khachikyan believes that “…the rulers of both satrapies of Armenia came with their army and fought on the right wing of the Persian army.”

Another modern historian, I.E. Shifman, believes that the Armenian cavalry was positioned in front of the right flank. It turns out that the Armenian cavalry was positioned in front of the right flank, whereas both Rufus and Arrian only spoke of the extreme right position on the right flank.

Gai Maclin Rogers most fully and specifically indicated the position of the Armenian cavalry in his detailed scheme, from which it is evident that the Armenian cavalry occupied the extreme right position, and was not advanced in front of the right flank commanded by Mazeus.

Describing the disposition of Darius’s camp forces and the course of the battle, many modern authors do not mention Armenians at all in the list of tribes and peoples within the Persian army. In our view, this is a clear injustice, and perhaps even bias. As we will see below, the Armenian cavalry on the right flank, together with the Cappadocian cavalry, played a very important role in the course of the battle. And if it were not for the cowardice of the “king of kings” Darius III, the outcome could have been completely different.

Having established the exact location of the Armenian troops on the left and right flanks, let’s also touch on the question of their numbers. Ancient authors did not specify the number of Armenian infantry on the left flank of Bessus and cavalry on the right flank of Mazeus. However, modern authors here allow for free interpretation, citing specific and clearly inflated figures.

Thus, the highly respected and competent Armenian historian Eduard Danielyan in “The History of Armenia from Ancient Times to the Present Day” asserts that the Armenian army within Darius’s forces at Gaugamela numbered 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry. Without engaging in polemics with such an authoritative scholar, we must still pay attention to some circumstances.

According to Arrian, Alexander the Great had exactly the same number of troops before this battle. Yes, a coincidence, of course, could be, but where did such impressive figures regarding the Armenian army come from? The respected scholar’s assertion contains no references to sources. Meanwhile, Diodorus and Rufus cite approximately the same figures regarding Alexander the Great’s army.

In total, according to the named authors, who, by the way, are inclined, according to F. Schachermeyer, to exaggerate the number of the Persian ruler’s army, thereby elevating Alexander, Darius’s army numbered about 200,000 cavalry and 1 million (!) infantry.

Regarding the leaders of the Armenian army on the left and right flanks of Darius’s forces, we believe that the picture here looks confusing and contradictory. And this confusion primarily relates to the Persian commander named Mithren.

The well-known historian D. Lang believes that the Armenian cavalry on the right flank was led by Yervand II, the satrap of Greater Armenia. Mithren (according to Lang – Mihran) fought within Alexander’s forces. The author further asserts that Mithren was the son of Yervand II, who switched to the side of the Macedonian king, and thus, he fought against his father, who, according to the author, died in this battle. Agreeing with his opinion that Mithren was in Alexander’s ranks, we note that there is no information in the sources about the kinship of the satrap of Armenia Yervand and Mithren.

According to B. Ulubabyan, the Armenian cavalry on the right flank was commanded by Yervand, and the infantry on the left flank by Mitravst. Both of them, in his opinion, declared themselves independent kings of Greater and Lesser Armenia after the Battle of Gaugamela. This assertion contradicts the facts, ancient and later authors, since Alexander did not leave even the unconquered Armenia without his power – a satrap was appointed there by him.

Thus, many authors particularly note that immediately after the battle, Alexander appointed the Persian Mithren as “satrap of Armenia, which was yet to be conquered.” However, according to Curtius Rufus and Strabo, to control Bessus, Mithren, and Mazeus, appointed by Alexander as satraps of Syria, Armenia, and Babylon respectively, the Macedonian Neoptolemus was assigned. The latter, according to the Russian historian S.N. Glinka, “exercising oppressive power in Armenia, proved himself a tyrant,” and was therefore soon overthrown by Ordoates.

According to Arrian, “…the Armenians were commanded by Orontes (Yervand. – R.Z.) and Mitravst.” According to his information, which is considered among the most complete and objective regarding Alexander’s campaign, and the logic of his thought, Alexander appointed Mithren (here Arrian calls him Mitravst) as satrap of Armenia as a reward for a previous service – the commander of the garrison of the city of Sardis (Western Anatolia. – R.Z.) Mithren surrendered the city to him without a fight.

Curtius Rufus provides similar information: “…Armenia was given to Mithren, who surrendered Sardis to him.” Let us recall that Alexander captured Sardis, the capital of Lydia, immediately after his first victory at the Battle of Granicus in 334 BCE.

However, it must be acknowledged that such well-known ancient authors as Arrian, Diodorus, and Plutarch, whose accounts we also take as close to objectivity, often distort the name “Mithren” in various parts of their works. For instance, they write that “…on the way to Sardis, Alexander was met by Mithrin, who led the garrison of the local acropolis, and influential citizens. They surrendered the city to Alexander.”

Thus, the commander of the Persian garrison, Mithren, found himself in the close entourage of Alexander the Great, who took him along.

And instead of him, Asander, the son of Philotas, who, as we know, was the son of Parmenion, one of Alexander’s main commanders, was appointed satrap of the wealthy and flourishing Sardis.

Therefore, we believe that “Mithren-Mitravst” could not have commanded the Armenian infantry on the left wing of the Persian army, as Quintus Curtius Rufus and some modern historians write. The main arguments of this thesis are the following circumstances.

Firstly, as we have established, Mithren was not in Darius’s camp during the battle but in Alexander’s entourage.

Secondly, the possibility of appointing “Mithren-Mitravst,” a Persian commander who fought against him, as satrap of Armenia, who as an enemy of Alexander was undoubtedly associated with Darius himself, contradicts both common sense and all the deeds of the Macedonian king. After all, there is no information in the sources about Mithren being captured by Alexander, whether he was in the Persian king’s camp. It should be recognized that Alexander could not have appointed the captured Mithren as such. Yes, he did so with Bessus and Mazeus, Darius’s main commanders who surrendered to him later, but only because they voluntarily recognized his authority.

Thirdly, the authoritative and eminent author Quintus Curtius Rufus undoubtedly contradicts himself – after all, he previously directly indicated that Mithren switched to Alexander’s side back in Sardis, at the beginning of his campaign. Later, he somehow asserts that Mithren commanded the Armenian infantry on Darius III’s side at Gaugamela.

But could it be that Mithren-Mihran-Mithrin-Mitravst are different individuals? Obviously not. The logic of events and the specificity of the named authors’ accounts convince us otherwise.

Unfortunately, the mistake made by Quintus Curtius Rufus was not noticed by modern Armenian scholars either. For instance, according to Professor E.L. Danielyan, the Armenian cavalry on the right flank was commanded by Yervand II, and the army from Lesser Armenia on the left flank was commanded by Mitraustas. Here we see another distortion of the name of the new satrap of Armenia.

We will return to Mithren, the first Macedonian satrap of Armenia, but now let’s consider the course of the battle, trying to single out the actions of the swift Armenian cavalry.

Having a favorable position for a flanking attack, the Armenian cavalry, together with the left “neighbor” – the Cappadocian cavalry, like a hurricane, attacked the left flank of Parmenion, crushed their ranks, and broke through to their rear in a fierce melee. Here we must note the following circumstances.

It should be acknowledged that the sources, in relation to the course of the battle, do not use the words “Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry,” but only speak of the “right wing of the Persian army, which broke through to Parmenion’s rear.” But as we established above, the cavalry of the Persian right wing consisted precisely of Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry. Moreover, it is quite possible that the Armenian cavalry could have resorted to a flanking maneuver. In our view, the strategy and tactics of cavalry combat, the extreme right, convenient for flanking position of the Armenian cavalry most likely determined this maneuver.

If we consider the latter circumstance, it is obvious that the Armenian cavalry played the most important role in this breakthrough. Firstly, Cappadocia, then directly bordering Armenia to the west, was for Armenian warriors like “their own,” that is, close in spirit and method of cavalry combat. We can even assert that it was due to their neighborhood that Mazeus, commanding Darius’s right wing, placed them next to each other.

Secondly, in Darius’s vast multilingual army, the Cappadocians, as neighbors by country, were more understandable and closer to the Armenians than, say, the Scythians from the left wing or the Greek mercenary hoplites from the center.

Thirdly, Armenian horses and cavalry were famous at that time. According to Strabo, “…this country (Armenia. – R.Z.) is so abundant in horses that even the Nisaean horses, which served the Persian kings, were bred here.” In his “Anabasis,” Xenophon mentions Armenian horsemen trying to prevent them from entering Armenia, and the quality of Armenian horses. He particularly notes that “…Armenian horses are smaller than Persian ones, but more spirited.”

Fourthly, all the aforementioned ancient and modern authors wrote about the breakthrough of the Persian cavalry on the right flank, that is, the Armenians and Cappadocians.

Thus, the Armenian cavalry on swift horses, though not without significant bloodshed, together with the Cappadocians, managed to crush the battle-hardened Thessalian and allied cavalry of Parmenion and break through to their rear.

In other words, the left flank of the Macedonians under the command of the experienced Parmenion was facing the threat of defeat. We can confidently say that this was indeed the case. For, according to Arrian, “…the left flank of Alexander’s army was facing imminent destruction.” According to Curtius Rufus, the cavalry of the Persian right flank, having crushed the enemy, had already outflanked the Macedonian left, but Parmenion urgently requested help from Alexander, and he did not delay.

However, as Arrian writes, Parmenion was saved by the indiscipline of the cavalry that broke through his ranks, part of which, instead of developing their success, began looting the baggage train. Responding with frustration to Parmenion’s call, Alexander, according to Plutarch, exclaimed: “Parmenion must be out of his mind… if he has forgotten that one must die with glory,” and with his elite units – the hypaspists and hetairoi – was forced to come to the rescue.

The Persian cavalry that broke through (Armenians, Cappadocians. – R.Z.) was tightly surrounded. Moreover, the pezhetairoi – “foot companions,” that is, the two left divisions of the famous phalanx, formed in a square, under the command of Craterus and Amyntas, advanced on them like a powerful wall, with their left front. The fate of this breakthrough cavalry of Darius was sealed.

It is evident that almost all of them perished.

But Arrian writes that part of the Persian cavalry managed to break through and escape. An important thought was expressed about this by the well-known classical scholar, Fritz Schachermeyer. In his opinion, when coming to the rescue, Alexander tried to destroy the Persian cavalry from Darius’s right flank that had broken through Parmenion’s flank. But they, with desperate fury, broke through, “achieving victory even in their retreat.”

We will not speculate on who these Persian cavalrymen who broke out of the encirclement were. In our view, they could undoubtedly have been Armenians and Cappadocians, as they broke through Parmenion’s front from the “allied and Thessalian cavalry,” as we established, it was indeed them.

But could it be that the Armenians broke through to the rear not here, but through the center? Or was it not them at all, but other cavalrymen? Specifically, the Median cavalry under the command of Atropates, the mounted detachments of the Parthians and Saka, and the Hyrcanian cavalry under the command of Phrataphernes, positioned to the left of the Armenians and Cappadocians?

Obviously not. For to the right of Parmenion’s flank were the formidable, monolithic units of the pezhetairoi (phalanx) under the overall command of Craterus. The possibility of a frontal breakthrough by the Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry, formed on a militia basis, through the crushing ranks of these well-trained, machine-like professionals, in our opinion, was unlikely.

Therefore, it is evident that the Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry broke through precisely the left wing of the Macedonians, consisting of more vulnerable parts than the phalanx: the allied Greek cavalry of Coeranus, the mercenary cavalry of Andromachus, the Thracian cavalry of Agathon, and the Greek mercenary infantry.

As for the Median, Parthian, Saka, and Hyrcanian cavalry of Darius III Codomannus’s army, led by Atropates and Phrataphernes, we note the following. They were all positioned to the left, almost in the center, next to the Greek mercenary hoplites (center). At the very beginning of the battle, attacking the Thessalian and Greek mercenary cavalry of Parmenion, they were engaged in battle with them. Thus, they could not have broken through Parmenion’s left flank. Meanwhile, all ancient authors speak only of the breakthrough of the right wing, where, as we established, the Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry were located.

However, in our view, there is one inconsistency in the assertions of both Rufus and Arrian. At the cost of significant bloodshed, breaking through the powerful wing of Parmenion’s warriors to the rear, the Persian cavalry, which we identify here as Armenian, according to the named authors, suddenly abandoned everything and began looting the baggage train. Was this really the case?

We are far from thinking of presenting the Armenian cavalry as the most noble part of the Persian army. But the facts speak otherwise. Firstly, we have already cited the opinion of historians about the bias of ancient authors regarding the number of “barbarians.”

Secondly, we have already noted the confusion in the accounts (even in the names) of such an objective author as Arrian.

Thirdly, looting the baggage train in the midst of a fierce cavalry battle would have meant the inevitable downfall of the “looters” – the well-trained, professional units of Parmenion’s army would have easily crushed the cavalrymen engaged in looting, who would have been in no position to fight.

Fourthly, we must once again draw attention to the bias and distortion of facts by ancient authors. For instance, Quintus Curtius Rufus claims: “The ranks of the Persians on the right flank thinned: the Bactrians left to attack the baggage train.” It is clear that the famous ancient author was clearly confused – before this, he asserted that the Bactrian cavalry was on the left flank. Or perhaps Rufus is referring to the Bactrian infantry? No, neither he nor any other ancient author, nor later authors, mention Bactrian infantry at all. It is evident that there was only Bactrian cavalry on the left flank of Bessus, which is being referred to here.

Justifying the failure of Parmenion’s wing, Curtius Rufus attributes the hurricane attack of the Armenian cavalry solely to their desire to attack the baggage train in the rear of the Macedonians. But the fact remains – the Armenian cavalry clearly outperformed Parmenion’s cavalry, that is, the tactics of the mercenary cavalry of Coeranus, Andromachus, and Agathon, as they allowed them to break through.

Thus, we have established that part of the Armenian cavalry (possibly with their leader – satrap Yervand), having broken through, retreated to the north, to their harsh mountains. But it is evident that the majority of them perished here – they were doomed, finding themselves between the ile, that is, Alexander’s “personal guard” under the command of Black Cleitus, the hetairoi of Philotas, the hypaspists of Nicanor, the relentless onslaught of the phalangites of Craterus and Amyntas, and the revived mercenaries of Parmenion.

A question may arise regarding the fate of the Armenian infantry from the left flank of Bessus. Alas, their fate was also tragic, as indicated by indirect accounts from Diodorus, Arrian, Rufus, Plutarch, and Justin.

But let us note that objectivity is paramount for us. Therefore, we must pay tribute to Alexander’s genius as a commander. Let’s return to the beginning of the battle. It began on Alexander’s right flank, and the decisive actions unfolded precisely here.

Without attacking, the Macedonian king began to shift his right flank under the command of Nicanor, son of Parmenion, even further to the right. Fearing a flanking maneuver, Darius began to shift the left flank of Bessus to the left, following him. This continued until a gap formed in the Persian ranks between the center and the left wing.

According to Diodorus, Alexander immediately moved the heavily armed cavalry – the hetairoi of Philotas – formed in the famous wedge formation into this gap. Simultaneously with them, the phalanxes of Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, and Polyperchon advanced. The latter two units, crushing everything in their path, went straight for Darius’s headquarters. Having crushed Darius’s mercenary Greek cavalry, the cavalry of the Susians and Cadusians, the phalangites and hetairoi cut off the entire left wing of Bessus.

Nicanor’s cavalry swiftly enveloped them from the flank. The entire massive, panicked left wing of Darius found itself trapped between the four deadly pezhetairoi, singing the paean, the hetairoi of Nicanor, and the mercenary Greek cavalry of Menidas. Therefore, it seems unlikely to us that the surrounded Armenian infantry, among others, managed to escape.

Speaking of the losses on both sides, we must note that all ancient authors provide implausibly low losses for Alexander’s army – from 100 to 500 men – and enormous losses for Darius – from 40,000 to 90,000. For instance, according to the clearly biased accounts of Diodorus of Sicily, the entire cavalry of the “barbarians” was destroyed, and 90,000 infantrymen fell. At the same time, contradicting him, Quintus Curtius Rufus asserts that “…the barbarians and their horses were protected by armor. Alexander had a small number of heavily armed shock cavalry.”

Carefully analyzing the course of the battle, renowned classical scholars B. Gafurov and D. Tsibukidis concluded that far more of Alexander’s warriors fell than the ancient authors indicated.

It is also important to note that the bias of some ancient authors in describing Alexander’s deeds already aroused distrust among historians at that time. In particular, Polybius, in his “Histories,” sharply criticizes the account of the Battle of Issus given by Callisthenes, Alexander’s biographer during his campaign. Strabo held a similar opinion regarding the description of Alexander’s deeds.

We must also not overlook the fact that after the defeat at Gaugamela, as Arrian writes, Darius fled to Armenia: “He left the battlefield for Media, heading towards the Armenian mountains.” However, to quickly reach Media from the Gaugamela area, fleeing Alexander’s pursuit, he would have had to move east, not north “towards the Armenian mountains” (south of Lake Van and west of Lake Urmia), where the southernmost part of Greater Armenia – Korduk – lay.

It turns out that Darius decided to flee to Media through Armenia. In our view, this can be explained by the following circumstances. Before ascending to the Persian throne as the last king of the Achaemenid dynasty, from 344 to 336 BCE, under Artaxerxes IV, Darius was the satrap of Armenia. This gives reason to believe that he hoped for assistance from local rulers or simply wanted to “disappear” in the rugged mountains of Armenia.

Ancient authors explain the fact of Darius’s flight to Armenia, rather than directly to Media via the shorter route, in different ways. According to Diodorus, “…Darius, taking advantage of the dust clouds that served as his cover, devised a special plan of escape and rushed in the opposite direction from the other barbarians.” Plutarch, on the other hand, writes that Darius fled on a mare that had recently foaled, as his chariot, stuck in a heap of corpses, could not move. The mare carried him to where her foal was.

In conclusion, we must note the role of Alexander the Great in the subsequent historical path of Armenia. This role was immense. Following the collapse of the despotic Achaemenid regime, Hellenism came to Armenia for nearly three centuries. It left a deep and vivid mark on the history of Greater Armenia. Some magnificent examples of the culture of that era can still be seen today. However, the most impressive historical fact is that all those empires are gone today, but Armenia, great Armenia, remains.

R. Zinnurov (Ufayetsi), Doctor of Law

Artatsolum

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