It is necessary to briefly address the question of the number of Armenian armed forces. Only based on their numbers can a correct understanding be formed of the duration and continuity of Armenian combat traditions, as well as the influence of the Armenian army and the system of values passed down from generation to generation on the mindset, psychology, and ideology of ancient and medieval Armenian society.
Let’s turn to information from the earliest period. Based on numerous reports of wars fought by the kingdom of Hayasa in the 13th-14th centuries BC against the Hittite state, it can be confidently asserted that the size of the Armenian army was no less than 10,000, and possibly much larger.
The existence of a contemporary regular army in Armenia for its time is confirmed by the fact that the Armenian army had chariots, which were only available in limited numbers even in the most powerful army of Assyria at that time.
The high level of development of the Urartian army (kingdom of Ararat) is evidenced by the hierarchy of its command structure, the emergence of positions such as commander-in-chief, his first and second deputies, regiment commander, and commander of fifty.
This hierarchy developed over the following centuries. The Urartian army, that is, the Armenian kingdom of Ararat, probably for the first time unified all the existing armed forces of the country, which numbered at least several tens of thousands of warriors.
For example, one of the surviving inscriptions reports that the Urartian army, conducting a campaign in the northern direction, included 66 chariots, 4,430 cavalrymen, and 15,760 infantrymen.
During the time of the Orontid dynasty, the size of the Armenian army was quite significant. The Roman author of the 1st century BC, Quintus Curtius Rufus, reports that in the famous battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC, the right wing of the allied forces led by the Persian king Darius III consisted of 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry of the Great Armenian army (which, by the way, performed brilliantly: fighting until late evening and retreating in an organized manner only when it became clear that the Persians in the center and on the left flank had suffered a crushing defeat).
Rufus does not report on the size of the army of Lesser Armenia fighting on the left flank. Nevertheless, it is obvious that this 47,000-strong army did not represent all the armed forces of Great Armenia, as Gaugamela was quite far from the borders of Armenia, and at least the same number of troops had to remain in the country, primarily to ensure the security of the perpetually restless northern and northeastern borders.
This conclusion is supported by Xenophon’s report that only half of the Armenian troops were sent to the common Aryan army.
Significantly, in the 9th (or 7th) century BC, the rapidly moving part (by modern terminology, the “expeditionary corps”) of King Aram’s army (Arame) also consisted, according to Movses Khorenatsi, of “approximately 50,000” warriors.
And again, these 50,000 should not have included the fortress and border garrisons or at least part of them, which did not leave their permanent locations.
Interestingly, the number of this corps coincides with the total number of cavalrymen of Tigranes the Great, which, according to Plutarch, numbered 55,000 cavalrymen (17,000 of whom were armored).
According to Khorenatsi, subsequently, strengthening the country’s security, Aram added 40,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry to the already existing army (i.e., to the 50,000), and with this combined 92,000-strong army he went on a campaign to the west, to Caesarea.
The exceptionally high quality of the Armenian armed forces and their constant combat readiness is confirmed by the single fact that almost half of the Armenian army (a very high percentage even for modern developed countries’ armies) was capable, if necessary, of conducting distant and swift campaigns outside the borders of Armenia, although, as we know from the above-mentioned report by Pavstos, this was not at all to the liking of the Armenian warrior.
Thus, in the 2nd and 1st millennia BC, during the reigns of the kingdoms of Hayasa, Urartu, and the Orontids, the size of the Armenian army reached several tens of thousands, and during the reigns of the Artashesians, Arshakuni, and Bagratuni, according to reliable historical information, the size of the Armenian regular army ranged from 100,000 to 120,000 warriors.
The size of the army of the Armenian Cilician kingdom during wars exceeded 60,000 warriors. These data allow us to assert that in the earliest, ancient, and medieval times, the place, role, and significance of the Armenian armed forces in Armenian society were of the utmost importance and central.
Therefore, the code of honor of the Armenian armed forces, with all its ideological, moral, and psychological values, has over the centuries left an indelible mark on the national character, psychology, and worldview of the Armenian people.
The exceptional combat capability of Armenians has been noticed and documented by many foreign authors. Let me provide just two examples. According to the Byzantine historiographer Procopius of Caesarea in the 6th century, until 474 AD, Roman emperors “considered the merits of individuals and gave preference to Armenians when selecting their bodyguards.”
Another Byzantine historiographer, writing about an Armenian military commander named Manuel who served in the Byzantine army in the first half of the 9th century, states: “Manuel was a very brave man, well known to all enemies, as he was Armenian by birth.” Thus, in Byzantium, the terms “Armenian” and “brave” were synonymous.
Codes of military honor are not only a phenomenon of the distant past. Cadet and officer schools in modern developed countries necessarily use specially developed codes of honor in the ideological and moral-psychological training of their cadets.
It is necessary that we, the heirs of the rich and original traditions of national Armenian military-patriotic upbringing, develop a code of honor for the modern Armenian warrior, which should form the basis of the ideological and moral-psychological education first for the students of the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense, and then for the entire Armenian army.
Patriotic and civic education is one of the main means of uniting Armenian society, thereby strengthening Armenia’s national security. The Armenian army, as it was centuries ago, is destined to become a forge of generations, wholly devoted to the Motherland.
Excerpt from the book “The Value System of the Armenian Warrior” by Armen Ayvazyan.
