From the Memorandum of the Armenian Representative to the British Military Mission in Shusha to the Minister of Internal Affairs Regarding the Military-Political Situation in Karabakh and the Position of the British Military Authorities Tiflis, May 27, 1919
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On April 25, I was received in Baku by General Shuttleworth, who categorically stated that the Armenian government—mentioning specifically Mr. Khatissian, Deputy Chairman of the Armenian Government—had given its consent through the British command to Azerbaijan for the temporary administration of Karabakh, with the final resolution to be determined at the Peace Conference.
As this statement was both new and unexpected to me, I requested the general to provide a written confirmation. I orally conveyed the instructions I had received from the Armenian government to General Shuttleworth, namely:
General Shuttleworth responded that the fourth point was inaccurate, as Karabakh and Zangezur were under a single authority—that of the Governor-General, supported by the British command. He further added that he was aware of Captain Shahmazyan’s role in forming military units against Azerbaijan, but that the Armenian government did not recognize Shahmazyan as its representative and that he must leave Zangezur. He permitted me to travel to Shusha but stated that my activities would be monitored.
Just as the Armenians had received Kars and Nakhichevan—regions populated exclusively by Muslims—so too, temporarily, Karabakh and Zangezur were to be administered by Azerbaijan, based on an agreement already reached between the Armenian government and the British High Command. Despite my repeated request for a written document confirming this agreement, I did not receive one.
On April 28, I presented my mandate from General Thomson to the head of the Shusha mission. It stated that I was appointed as the representative of the Armenian government to liaise with the British mission and that I had the right to receive complaints from the Armenian population of Karabakh and to submit petitions to the British command. I was permitted to open an office and accept petitions.
During our meeting, the head of the mission reiterated General Shuttleworth’s statement regarding the Armenian government’s consent to Azerbaijani administration of Karabakh and Zangezur. I replied:
Following my statement, the head of the mission telegraphed General Shuttleworth requesting a written document confirming the agreement. Until such confirmation was received, I was to operate within the mandate issued by General Thomson.
On April 29, at a private session of the Armenian Karabakh delegates’ congress, I delivered a report, conveyed the instructions from the Armenian government, and described my conversation with General Shuttleworth. I declared that the Armenian government would under no circumstances cede Karabakh and Zangezur to Azerbaijan, especially since the congress had resolved not to submit to Azerbaijani authority. Regarding the nomads, the Armenian government instructed the population not to associate their passage with recognition of Azerbaijani authority, but to allow them through with limited arms to prevent potential clashes.
On April 30, a meeting was held at the British mission in Shusha with Dr. Sultanov, who questioned the purpose of my visit and my instructions. He expressed surprise that the British command had approved my arrival and stated that he did not understand why the British made promises to Azerbaijan yet acted otherwise.
Our entire conversation was translated into English for the head of the mission.
On the night of May 2 in Gerusy, I received an official document from the head of the mission, a copy of which I sent to you via courier, stating that the Armenian government had agreed to the temporary administration of Karabakh and Zangezur by Azerbaijan.
On May 3, at a meeting attended by the heads of the Shusha and Gerusy missions, two British officers, a member of the Zangezur Council, Captain Shahmazyan, and myself, the head of the Shusha mission posed two questions:
After my statement, the meeting was adjourned, and Captain Shahmazyan was asked to remain for a private discussion with the head of the Shusha mission, who proposed that Shahmazyan travel with us to Shusha. Otherwise, he would be personally held accountable by the British authorities for any incidents in Zangezur.
Captain Shahmazyan replied that, as an officer, he could not comply with British orders without directives from the Armenian government. I proposed that Shahmazyan remain temporarily in Gerusy while I sent a special courier from Shusha to Erivan and telegraphed the government regarding his status. I promised that if the government requested him, I would escort Shahmazyan to Shusha and, under British guard, send him to Erivan. Major Monk-Mason, head of the mission, agreed to this proposal and to the temporary governance of Zangezur by the National Council until new authority was established.
On May 5, before departing Gerusy, Major Monk-Mason received the Zangezur Council’s written response:
This response had a strongly negative impact on the major, who asked me to report it to the Armenian government. I sent a telegram to Erivan requesting that the government instruct the Zangezur Council to allow the nomads through, as previously decided.
In response to my inquiry, the Armenian government, on May 7, under No. 1559, replied that it had not given consent to Azerbaijani administration of Karabakh and Zangezur. I officially informed the head of the Shusha mission, who was astonished by this reply.
Upon receiving instructions from the British mission for Shahmazyan’s departure to Erivan, I immediately informed him. Although I had promised Major Monk-Mason in Gerusy that Shahmazyan would travel via Shusha upon receiving government orders, the major did not insist and allowed Shahmazyan to leave Zangezur by any route he chose. As for the Zangezur National Council, it was temporarily recognized until further instructions were received.
On May 10, General Shuttleworth again informed me that the Armenian government in Tiflis, through Mr. Khatissian, had agreed to Azerbaijani administration of Karabakh and Zangezur, and that someone was pursuing a duplicitous policy and should be punished by death. When I relayed the contents of the government’s telegram, General Shuttleworth urged me to travel to Tiflis immediately to clarify the matter. My trip was postponed until May 16. I refused Shuttleworth’s order and decided to wait for Mr. Argutinsky’s arrival from Gerusy. General Shuttleworth threatened me three times with extreme measures, but when I offered to be arrested, he said he respected my past service and could not humiliate me.
On May 18, Prince Argutinsky arrived from Gerusy. On the morning of May 19, I departed for Yevlakh station, where I met General Shuttleworth, who issued me a certificate and stated that I would be accompanied to Tiflis by a British officer—the commandant of Yevlakh station—and that, under British protection, no one could harm me en route or at the border.
On May 20, at Akstafa station, Azerbaijani authorities led by Vice-Governor Sultanov, who had been specially dispatched for us, committed acts of violence. All our belongings, and we ourselves, were thoroughly searched. All documents, correspondence, revolvers, sabers, and even credentials issued by both British and Armenian authorities were confiscated. I protested in front of everyone, including a French officer, and asked the accompanying British officer to protest. He did not respond and merely stated that Azerbaijani authorities had the right to seize documents and correspondence.
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A certain modus vivendi had been established under which life in Karabakh could temporarily proceed without incident. Now, after my departure, tensions have escalated, as Armenian Karabakh does not recognize Azerbaijani authority, and the British mission does not recognize the Armenian National Council, which in practice governs Armenian Karabakh.
I believe that, at any cost, the Armenian government must restore its representation at the British mission—on one hand—and, on the other, maintain communication between the Armenian population, the British mission, and the Armenian government, even if by sending another representative. Otherwise, I consider bloodshed between Armenians and Tatars, especially during the passage of nomads, to be inevitable.
Lieutenant Colonel Arzumanian Representative of the Government of Armenia to the British Mission in Shusha
Source: Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 200, Inventory 1, File 309, pp. 121–123. Original. Typescript. Published in the collection: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 141. (Emphasis added by Y.B.) 312
Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”
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