FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE ARMENIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY

History

FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE ARMENIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY ON THE MEETING OF GENERAL THOMSON WITH THE ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE ISSUE OF KARABAKH Yerevan, March 25, 1919

On March 25, 1919, General Thomson, commander of the British forces in the Caucasus, arrived in Yerevan and held a meeting with the Armenian government that same day to discuss a number of political and socio-administrative issues.

Regarding Karabakh, the Armenian government declared that the mountainous part of the region, populated by Armenians, was considered an inseparable part of Armenia. Consequently, they requested that it be governed by a National Council in accordance with the will of the population. Moreover, Azerbaijani forces were to be withdrawn from this part of Karabakh to ensure that administrative oversight could be conducted exclusively by a person of British nationality.

General Thomson responded that, for him, the issue of Karabakh was contingent upon ensuring the provision of food for refugees. Due to the abnormal conditions currently affecting the region, communication between Yerevan and Karabakh had become extremely difficult. For this reason, he considered the existing situation in Karabakh as unavoidable, believing it facilitated the delivery of food supplies. Accordingly, Dr. Sultanov had been appointed as the responsible figure to promote unimpeded communication with Karabakh; however, he was not authorized to act without permission from the British representative, Monck-Mason.

Thomson emphasized that this arrangement was temporary, and the presence of Azerbaijani military and administration in Karabakh by no means implied future territorial claims over the region. He added that reports of Azerbaijani troop movements had been greatly exaggerated and that orders had already been issued to prevent further advances.

Following a mutual exchange of views, General Thomson made the following commitments:

  1. To ensure that Azerbaijani troops would not move from their current positions and that their numbers would not increase.
  2. That Dr. Sultanov would not take any actions without authorization from Monck-Mason, the British representative.
  3. That the Armenian government could appoint a representative to liaise with Monck-Mason.
  4. That Zangezur would continue to be governed, as it had been, by the National Council.

After this exchange, the Armenian government reaffirmed its position: the mountainous part of Karabakh is an integral component of Armenia and should, at present, be governed by the National Council.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT HATISOV AND COMMANDER OF BRITISH FORCES IN TRANSCAUCASIA, GENERAL THOMSON, REGARDING THE POLITICAL STATUS OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH City of Yerevan, March 28, 1919

General Thomson began by stating that his visit was very brief as he had been urgently summoned to Tiflis; he had intended to remain in Yerevan for two days. Prime Minister Hatisov informed him of the situation in Karabakh and presented the government’s considerations on the matter.

Thomson explained that, for him, the question of Karabakh was tied to ensuring food supply for refugees and securing transportation routes. He cited Aghdam as an area of unrest along the road to Karabakh. General Mekhmandarov, stationed in Elizavetpol, was responsible for safeguarding the Yevlakh-Shushi route. Since no road connected Shushi to Yerevan, Thomson could not ask the Armenians to govern Karabakh. Zangezur was similarly cut off.

Engaging Muslim administrators, he clarified, did not determine the future status of these regions—it was done solely to aid refugees and maintain order. Thomson acknowledged Dr. Sultanov as a known Azerbaijani agent, a pan-Islamist and supporter of Turkey, yet deemed him capable. He believed that with proper instructions, Sultanov could serve effectively; Sultanov himself promised to follow such directives.

Thomson asked Bagratuni to appoint qualified administrative personnel for Karabakh—non-political individuals with management experience. However, those selected proved unsuitable. According to the British representative Monck-Mason, their activities within eight days had incited unrest rather than helped refugees; they were dismissed, and Thomson expressed dissatisfaction to Bagratuni.

He met with a bishop who pledged support. His latest meeting suggested that Sultanov was now working constructively. General Andranik had requested passage for his troops to Yevlakh, which was granted, but Andranik later declined and decided to travel to Yerevan, and then London.

Sokrat-bek had greatly assisted the Allies, and Thomson believed the situation in Karabakh could be resolved. He affirmed his awareness of Sultanov’s past and stated that should he fail to fulfill his duties, he would be held accountable.

Thomson had held talks with Andranik and the National Council to work towards a settlement. Some Armenians, he noted, had not supported him; among those who did, he named Dastakov.

Hatisov emphasized the government’s responsibility to both Parliament and the public, underscoring Karabakh’s strong desire for self-governance.

Thomson stated that Azerbaijani forces were ordered not to advance beyond Aghdam and Khankendi.

When asked about the Zangezur National Council’s authority, Thomson replied that he had departed on March 10. Though cooperating with the British, the general lacked enough officers to send to Goris, as Zangezurians had requested.

Hatisov pointed out that Armenians did not harm Muslims and praised the disciplined conduct of Armenian forces.

Thomson urged that only logistical issues—primarily food supply—mattered to him. He was committed to ensuring the delivery of provisions to Shushi and beyond, hoping for successful cooperation with the Azerbaijani government. He anticipated that the Karabakh issue would soon be settled in Paris, and hoped implementation would not lead to bloodshed. The British, he assured, would take necessary measures.

Reports of Azerbaijani troop movements were, in his view, exaggerated. Forces were stationed in Khankendi because of available barracks and were closely monitoring Andranik’s movements. Should Sultanov falter, he would be held as accountable as Nuri-pasha had been for Baku.

Thomson spoke candidly, confident that the conversation would remain confidential. He said he avoided anything that might seem provocative. In a previous meeting with Papajanov, he had suggested preserving the status quo and pledged to maintain order.

Vermishev remarked that the local population did not wish to recognize Azerbaijani authority. Thomson responded that this situation was temporary and should be upheld for the time being.

Hatisov asked whether Sultanov’s authority extended only from Yevlakh to Shushi. Thomson answered that Monck-Mason was to monitor and ensure order, and that he must have his own administrator to manage future arrangements.

Tigranyan proposed that Sultanov be subordinate to Monck-Mason. Thomson confirmed that this was already the case, emphasizing it had been done deliberately to facilitate food delivery from Azerbaijan. He had extensive dealings with the Azerbaijani government and considered it mindful of its responsibilities. He reported 40,000 refugees in Karabakh—10,000 Muslims and 30,000 Armenians.

Hatisov clarified that for Armenia, the Karabakh question was not a humanitarian one, but a political issue. He then summarized his understanding:

  1. Azerbaijani forces would not relocate from their current positions.
  2. Sultanov could not act without Monck-Mason’s approval.
  3. The Armenian government would designate a liaison to Monck-Mason.
  4. Zangezur would continue to be governed by the National Council.

Thomson noted that Goris was cut off from Nakhichevan by mountains and Tatars. His main objective was to assist the population, and the Armenian government’s representative would support him in this mission.

Hatisov asked who actually governed the Armenian section of Karabakh.

Thomson accused Hatisov of underestimating British assistance to Karabakh’s refugees. He mentioned that rice had been sent a few days ago and stated his commitment to using every available means for humanitarian aid. Even if help from the widely disliked Sultanov was necessary, Thomson would accept it—but underscored again that this did not make the territory “Tatar.” The situation was dire, and all efforts were focused on saving lives.

From the Proposals of the Armenian Government on Karabakh, Presented to the Commander of Allied Forces

March 28, 1919

  1. Regarding Karabakh, the Armenian government requests that the mountainous part of the region, inhabited by Armenians, be excluded from the Azerbaijani Karabakh Governorate. Its administration should remain in the hands of the National Council, in accordance with the will of the local population, and Azerbaijani troops should be withdrawn immediately from Armenian Karabakh. The Armenian government considers this region—based on the reasons outlined in the attached memorandum—an inseparable part of Armenia. Any supervisory authority established by British command should be executed exclusively by an individual of British nationality.*
  • The referenced memorandum is not present in the archival file. ** The omitted section pertains to Kars, Sharur, Nakhichevan, Surmalu, and Basargechar. Source: Central State Historical Archive of Armenia (CSHA), f. 199, op. 1, d. 23, l. 141. Copy. Typescript. Published in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 87.

From the Memorandum of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Council of Ministers of Armenia on the Necessity of Constructing a Dirt Road to Ensure Uninterrupted Communication with Zangezur and Armenian Karabakh

No. 1557 – Yerevan, March 28, 1919

In response to the issue raised by the Military Commission of the Republic of Armenia regarding the defense imperative for maintaining permanent communication between Yerevan and Gerusy, and considering the government’s already established principles on the matter, I have the honor to submit the following proposals:

To ensure continuous and reliable communication between Yerevan, the Zangezur district, and Armenian Karabakh, it is necessary to construct at least a temporary dirt road between Keshishkend and Angelaout. The proposed route will pass through the villages of Malishka, Gerger, Gindevaz, cross the Kepchek Pass within the Zangezur district, and lead to the village of Basarchay, and from there to Angelaout, which lies on an existing dirt road running from Nakhichevan through the Bichaneg Pass to Gerusy.

G.S. Yagjian, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Source: CSHA, f. 199, op. 1, d. 30, l. 103. Original. Typescript. Published in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 88.

Memorandum from the Diplomatic Representative of Armenia in Azerbaijan to the Prime Minister on the Need for British Recognition of the Armenian Karabakh National Council as the Local Authority as a Temporary Solution, Following the Example of the Zangezur Council

Yerevan, March 31, 1919

In agreement with General Thomson, Commander of Allied Forces in the Caucasus, the Armenian government is appointing its representative to liaise with the authorized British commander concerning the administration and affairs of Armenian Karabakh.

Since the British command already recognizes the Zangezur Council as the local governing authority in Zangezur, the Armenian government’s representative in Karabakh must take all necessary measures to ensure that the Karabakh Council is likewise recognized. This arrangement would provide a temporary resolution to the Karabakh issue—wherein the Azerbaijani Governor-General would govern Tatar-populated Karabakh, and the British authority, together with both councils, would oversee Armenian-populated Karabakh, maintaining a liaison with a representative from the Armenian Republic’s government.

In my opinion, this is the essence of the government representative’s mission. Mikayel Arzumanov Source: CSHA, f. 200, op. 1, d. 243, l. 78. Autograph. Published in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 89.

Appeal of the Zangezur and Karabakh Regional Council to the British Military Mission in Shushi and to the Acting Governor-General of Karabakh Regarding the Immediate Cessation of Violence and Persecution Against the Armenian Population Aimed at Forcible Subjugation to the Azerbaijani Government

[March] 1919

According to verified reports, mass beatings and acts of violence are being carried out against the Armenian population in Karabakh in order to forcibly subordinate it to the Azerbaijani government.

The Regional Council expresses hope that immediate measures will be taken by you to halt these events, since disputed territorial issues should not be resolved through local coercion or military force, but rather by the Peace Conference.

The Council solemnly informs you that if swift measures are not enacted to end the massacres and all hostile actions against Armenians, it will no longer be able to restrain the surge of the agitated masses, will relinquish all responsibility, and under such circumstances, the safety of the Muslim population in Zangezur may be endangered.

The Regional Council also urges you to take measures to reopen the Shushi–Gerusy highway. The crude act of road closures—beyond their broader dangers—will be regarded by us as a hostile measure targeting the Armenian population at large.

Chairman of the Regional Council [S. Melik-Stepanian] Secretary Source: Party Archive of the Communist Party of Armenia (PA CPA), f. 1022, op. 2, d. 760, l. 1. Copy. Typescript. Published in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 90.

Letter from General Andranik, Commander-in-Chief of the Armenian Forces in Zangezur, to the Commander of Allied Forces in Baku, Demanding the Restoration of the Violated Status Quo and Warning That the Armenian Population of Karabakh and Zangezur Cannot Recognize Any Azerbaijani Rights Over Their Territory

[March] 1919

My movement to Shushi in the previous year—1918—was halted by order of Major General Thomson. I was informed of the conclusion of the Great War with the victory of the Allied Powers, of which I am proud to count myself as a comrade-in-arms. It was promised that measures would be taken, and the possibility of troop movements, aggression, or persecution by Muslims would be relegated to the past.

I obeyed, returned to Zangezur, and gave my solemn word to make every effort to restore peace, tranquility, and the most benevolent relations with all peoples, regardless of nationality, within my jurisdiction.

Regrettably, I now witness military movements, troop concentrations, and the transfer of arms and materiel across Karabakh and Zangezur by Muslim forces.

I perceive in all this a breach of prior directives, detrimental to Armenian well-being and a provocation to the Armenians of Zangezur and Karabakh—and to myself. I therefore respectfully urge that measures be taken to restore the situation as it stood before mid-November, and that all military units be withdrawn from Khankendi and other locations, in order to calm the public and prevent a counterreaction from the Armenian side.

It is my duty to inform you that the Armenians of Karabakh and the vast district of Zangezur—including the regions of Kapan, Sisian, and Meghri, with a population exceeding 400,000 souls—cannot, under any circumstances, recognize any rights of Azerbaijan over their territory.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armenian Forces in Zangezur Major General Andranik Source: CSHA of Armenia, f. 370, op. 1, d. 39, l. 6. Copy. Manuscript. Translated from Armenian. Published in Herald of the Archives of Armenia, 1989, No. 1, pp. 88–89.

Official Announcement of the British Command in Baku to the Population of Zangezur and Karabakh Regarding the Appointment of Sultanov as Governor-General for Administrative Organization Until Territorial Disputes Are Settled at the Peace Conference

April 3, 1919

The British Command hereby informs all residents of the Shushi, Zangezur, Jebrail, and Jevanshir districts that:

  1. By decree of the Azerbaijani government dated January 15, 1919, Dr. Sultanov has been appointed Governor-General of the Shushi, Zangezur, Jebrail, and Jevanshir districts, and enjoys the support of the British Command.
  2. In accordance with current laws, a council composed of six knowledgeable representatives—three Armenians and three Muslims—will be organized under the Governor-General to meet the needs of the population.
  3. An officer from the British mission may join the council as a representative of the British Command.
  4. Salaries for all employees within the Governor-General’s jurisdiction, along with other expenses, will be covered by the Azerbaijani treasury.
  5. All disputed issues will ultimately be resolved at the Peace Conference.
  6. Any movement of military units within the territory of the Governor-General must be reported in advance to the British mission.
  7. Through this announcement, the British Command emphasizes that all orders and measures issued by the Governor-General and his administration—concerning the maintenance of peace and order—must be obeyed unconditionally. The British Command provides full support for all lawful actions taken.

Colonel D. Shuttleworth Commander of British Forces in Baku Source: CSHA Armenia, f. 200, op. 1, d. 244, l. 4. Certified copy. Typescript. Published in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 93.

Report of the Colonel of the 39th British Brigade to General Beach on the Armenian Population’s Refusal to Recognize Azerbaijani Authority in Karabakh and British Assurances of Non-Support for That Authority if It Does Not Act Peacefully

Baku, April 3, 1919

In reference to your dispatch No. 1/1497 of March 28: Major Monck-Mason departed for Shushi on April 1 and left no written report. His assessment is as follows:

The Armenians of Karabakh, under the leadership of Dashnaks, are firmly opposed to allowing Azerbaijan to establish control over purely Armenian territories. They refuse any affiliation with the Azerbaijani-appointed Governor-General.

For example, Sultanov appointed an Armenian police chief in Khankendi, but since the appointment was made under Azerbaijani authority, Armenians did not acknowledge it.

Historically, Armenians and Muslims coexisted more peacefully in Karabakh than elsewhere and could likely sustain neighborly relations with moderate councils on both sides. So far, Sultanov has acted prudently and with moderation. However, Armenians remain deeply suspicious of him, basing their objections more on anticipated future actions than his present conduct.

If Dashnak leaders—nearly all of whom are extremists—are replaced with moderate figures, Armenian public opinion may adopt a more reasonable outlook.

The only immediate risk of conflict occurs annually when Tatars drive their herds from lowlands to mountain pastures. Blood is shed every year. This year, tensions are high; both sides are armed. It’s possible Armenians will not allow Tatars into the mountains, which could spark clashes. Dr. Sultanov guarantees that calm will be maintained.

Major Monck-Mason is carrying a proclamation, a copy of which will soon be forwarded to you. It declares that the British Command supports Sultanov in all measures aimed at regional development, provided no territorial disputes are provoked. Armenians should clearly understand from this proclamation that so long as Sultanov governs properly, he has British backing—and further opposition will not be tolerated.

Concerns arose over the arrival of Azerbaijani troops in Shushi. Monck-Mason inquired about their numbers and locations. Sultanov replied that the forces report directly to the Minister of War, who has refused to provide directives. Therefore, Sultanov claims he does not know the size or deployment of the troops.

We have warned the government that Sultanov is held responsible and will be accountable for any military movements. In truth, the concerns about troop concentrations have been greatly exaggerated. One battalion with one squadron was stationed in Khankendi; two companies, later withdrawn, were present in Shushi.

As for the presence of Kazim Bey and other Turks, Sultanov reports that Kazim is not Turkish but Circassian. He holds no significance, but if persecuted, he could become a folk hero. Sultanov has promised to send Kazim to Baku and ensure his safety. The remaining Turks—around ten individuals—live peacefully in villages and are subject to the same considerations.

Sultanov has pledged a thorough inspection of roads and telegraph lines. Monck-Mason has now returned with directives to make it unequivocally clear to Armenians that British support for Azerbaijan continues only if they act peacefully and moderately—and that further disruption will not be tolerated.

Colonel Clotherburgh Source: CSHA Armenia, f. 200, op. 1, d. 309, l. 11–12. Copy. Typescript. Translated from English. Published in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 94. 285

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

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