
Letter of Welcome from the Karabakh Armenian National Council to Arsen Shahmazyan upon His Appointment by the Republic of Armenia as Governor-General of Zangezur and Karabakh
No. 296 — March 14, 1919
With heartfelt gratitude, we have learned that the Ararat Republic—until now inattentive to the fate of the nearly 300,000 Armenians of Karabakh—has chosen to extend substantial support to our region. Your appointment by the Ararat government as Governor-General has brought us immense satisfaction. We are confident that in the very near future we will establish a close relationship with you and, through joint efforts, advance the cause of our people.
Enclosed herewith is a memorandum addressed to the Republic of Ararat. We ask that you review its contents and, when possible, ensure its secure delivery to Erivan.
Chairman* Secretary* *Signatures absent.
Source: Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 200, Inventory 1, File 243, Sheet 52. Certified copy. Manuscript. Translated from Armenian. Published in the collection: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 72.
📣 Message from the Representative of the Karabakh Armenian National Council to the Tiflis Armenian Karabakh–Zangezur Association
Regarding the Protest by the French Mission Against the Appointment of an Azerbaijani Governor-General in Karabakh Baku — March 14, 1919
I inform you that intelligence received from Tehran indicates the French mission is vigorously protesting in Paris against the appointment of an Azerbaijani Governor-General in Karabakh.
Source: Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 252, Inventory 1, File 1, Sheet 17. Authorized typescript. Published in the collection: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 73.
📰 Press Statement on the Armenian Population’s Refusal to Submit to Azerbaijani Authority
March 15, 1919*
The Azerbaijani government is currently deploying large military forces toward Karabakh, already occupying several strategic points. The situation is becoming increasingly threatening. In this regard, the non-partisan newspaper Voice of the People, published in Shusha, writes:
“We have preserved peace in Karabakh throughout the entire war. And now, we have exerted all efforts to maintain that peace. We had hoped the decree of the British mission would protect us from Azerbaijani aggression. But the seizure of Zabukh, Khankendi, and Askeran by Azerbaijani garrisons, the presence of Turkish units in Karabakh, and the appointment of a Governor-General indicate that our neighbors, on one hand, disregard the Allied orders, and on the other, aim to create an illusion for external observers that Karabakh is subject to Azerbaijani control.
This will not happen. The will of the 300,000-strong Armenian population of Karabakh is clear and forceful: we did not send thousands of sons to the front, fight the Turks, and suffer famine just to surrender Khachen, Varanda, Dizak, and Javanshir to Azerbaijan.
We trust that the great Allied powers will not permit injustice. For the time being, until the conference reaches a decision, Karabakh must be governed by Armenians under the oversight and guidance of the British mission, without prejudging whether we shall join the reborn Russia or the Republic of Armenia.”
Source: Kavkazskoe Slovo (“The Caucasian Word”), March 15, 1919. (Emphasis added – Y.B.*)
- Publication date in the newspaper.
📰 Report from the Nor Kyank Newspaper on the 4th Congress of Armenians of Karabakh and Their Rejection of Azerbaijani Authority
March 16, 1919
We have received a copy of the Nor Kyank newspaper published in Shushi, which provides the following account of the Armenian Congress of Karabakh.
Initiated by the Temporary National Council and endorsed by the British mission, a congress of Karabakh Armenians was scheduled to take place. Delegate elections were held across all regions of Dizak, Khachen, and Jraberd without exception, while Varanda saw only limited representation. At the opening session, delegates attributed this regrettable circumstance to the local commander in Varanda, who failed to implement election directives and distribute circulars in a timely and precise manner.
A preparatory meeting of delegates was held on February 11 (new style), during which a credentials committee was elected. On February 12, the first official session convened at the diocesan school, focusing on validating delegates’ mandates. The verification showed the following participation: 6 delegates from Khachen, 10 from Dizak, 16 from Jraberd, and 3 each from the refugee communities of Maraga, Seisulani, and Karakshlak—totaling 41 delegates.
The congress was deemed valid, as 19 out of 25 organizations had sent representatives. A. Shakhnazaryan was elected chairman, Y. T. Esayan as vice-chairman, and T. Ter-Oganesyan and A. Arustamyan as secretaries.
By proposal of the chairman and resolution of the assembly, military commanders and members of the Temporary National Council were permitted to participate with advisory rights, while representatives of political parties and the National Party were excluded from both voting and advisory roles.
The session adjourned at 2 p.m.
Later that day at 4 p.m., a second session was held under the chairmanship of A. Shakhnazaryan. Attendees heard his report on the council’s composition and activities. The report highlighted efforts to dispel British doubts about the Armenian people and expose Azerbaijan’s conspiracies. The congress called upon individuals and institutions to urgently submit financial accounts and send reports to Thomson, the Baku National Council, and Yerevan regarding Karabakh’s situation. It also established a legal commission to document the damage suffered by the Armenian population and maintain contact with General Andranik and local commanders.
Gratitude was expressed to the National Council for their selfless work.
The session ended at 8 p.m.
On February 13, the third session opened at 10 a.m. with 38 delegates present, led by Chairman A. Shakhnazaryan. Urban delegates were absent. Numerous questions were posed to the previous day’s speaker, all answered in detail. Delegates from every district voiced concerns over looting and confiscations, believing only the Supreme National Council could bring them to an end. Given sufficient funds for organizational needs, the region could sustain a local council and, through a progressive taxation system, secure the resources for autonomous self-governance.
This session was held behind closed doors and included a report from Baku National Council representative G. Balayan.
The fourth session on the same day had 38 attendees, including a delegate from Shushi’s third district. Presided over by T. Esayan, the session revisited the question of allowing party representatives with advisory rights and government members to attend. After debate, 24 votes approved one representative per party; however, government officials were again denied participation, even without voting rights.
A lengthy discussion followed on how the government should present its activity and financial reports. The decision was made to require a full report starting from the inception of its bureau, with financial disclosures submitted to an elected audit commission.
It was resolved that the damage commission must present not only a loss inventory but also an investigation into the causes and timing of harm done to certain districts. This would shed light on the legal, historical, and factual dimensions of the Karabakh question. How to fund such an enormous task was left to future deliberation.
The session adjourned at 3 p.m.
On the next day at 10 a.m., the fifth session commenced with 40 delegates present, including representatives from Chartar and Shushikend. The congress granted full voting rights to the recently arrived delegates from Baku: G. Balayan, L. Zarafyan, N. Nasibyants, and I. Mirzabekyants.
L. Zarafyan reported that the British missions in Baku and Shushi had pledged humanitarian aid to refugees in the form of bread and medicine. He emphasized the need for a commission to compile a detailed list of refugees with statistical data. The issue was referred to the National Council, with four members appointed to assist.
It was decided to solicit reports from district commanders, including an appeal to Sokhrat-bek.
An extensive discussion focused on establishing the legal framework for the future National Council. The congress resolved that it would serve as the legislative body, and the Supreme Council as the executive. If new legislation was required, a smaller delegation—the so-called “Small Council”—would be elected from the districts to operate alongside the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council was also entrusted with resolving Karabakh’s political status.
A commission was formed to define the interaction between the Supreme and Small Councils and to draft a constitution.
A commander from Varanda addressed the congress, describing the conditions under which the district organization was formed and resistance forces mobilized. He criticized the current political direction and the intelligentsia, accusing them of extinguishing rather than fueling the national spirit. He saw salvation in suppressing anarchy and establishing a unified government to which all would be answerable.
At the end of the session, the issue of sending a Karabakh delegate to the Peace Conference was raised.
The session closed at 3 p.m.
📨 Telegrams from the 4th Congress of Karabakh Armenians in Response to Azerbaijani Claims
In response to Azerbaijan’s claims over Karabakh, the congress sent telegrams to the Azerbaijani parliament, Allied representative General Thomson, General Milne, the Republic of Armenia, and Armenian delegates at the international Peace Conference:
“The 4th Armenian Congress of Karabakh, composed of delegates from Varanda, Dizak, Khachen, Jraberd, and Shushi, having reviewed the Azerbaijani government’s reply to the Armenian government, firmly protests against Azerbaijan’s assertion that Armenian Karabakh is part of its territory.
Upholding the principle of national self-determination, the Armenian population of Karabakh respects this right for neighboring nations, yet unequivocally protests before the world against the Republic of Azerbaijan’s attempt to violate this principle regarding Armenian Karabakh. Armenian Karabakh has never recognized, and never will recognize, Azerbaijan’s authority.
The congress demands the protection of its rights by the Allied representative in the Caucasus and the Peace Conference.”
Source: Mshak, March 16, 1919. Translated from Armenian. Reproduced from: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 76. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)
📜 Letter from the Authorized Representative of the Karabakh Armenian National Council — the Supreme Governing Body of All Regions of Armenian Karabakh — to the Council of Ministers of Armenia
March 17, 1919
The Karabakh Armenian National Council, as the supreme governing body of all parts of Armenian Karabakh, has authorized me to acquaint you with the grave situation currently facing Armenian Karabakh, and to request urgent assistance.
According to reliable information received by the Council, the Azerbaijani government has resolved to conquer Armenian Karabakh and Zangezur at all costs, in order to facilitate the annexation of Nakhichevan, Sharur, and Surmali.
Concrete steps have already been taken by Azerbaijan toward this objective. Key strategic locations in Armenian Karabakh—Askeran, Khankendi, Zabukh, and the Muslim quarter of Shushi—have been occupied by regular Azerbaijani forces numbering several thousand soldiers, including cavalry, artillery, and infantry equipped with machine guns. Supplies and ammunition continue to be delivered to Aghdam and Karyagino.
At present, Armenian Karabakh is effectively besieged on three sides. Once the nomads ascend into the mountains—which is expected imminently—a fourth front will be established, completing the encirclement.
General-Governor Sultanov, appointed by the Azerbaijani government, is now stationed in the Muslim sector of Shushi. He is attempting to extend his authority by bribing village elders and notable figures, paying salaries to Armenian officials, and promising to deliver inexpensive goods to Armenian villages that recognize Azerbaijani rule. These efforts, however, have met with little success. Except for a few border villages adjacent to Muslim Karabakh, the entirety of Armenian Karabakh refuses to recognize his authority. Consequently, Sultanov has threatened to resort to military force in the near future.
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that, as shown in Document No. 2, the British mission has undertaken efforts to implement Azerbaijani governance over Armenian Karabakh and Zangezur.
The Armenian population of Karabakh has firmly resolved not to recognize Azerbaijani authority, regardless of the form it may take (see Documents Nos. 1, 2, and 3)*.
At the same time, the Armenian National Council is doing all it can to avoid armed conflict, fully aware that in the event of war, a defeat is highly possible. Armenian Karabakh can mobilize between 10,000 to 12,000 riflemen, but lacks a robust military organization, an authoritative military leader, funding, and—most critically—sufficient ammunition, which is scattered among the peasantry. This is the reality even as key strategic positions have already fallen under Azerbaijani military control.
The siege-like conditions and the stance of the British mission are causing acute anxiety among the Armenian population of Karabakh. With each passing day, the situation grows more dire, and the likelihood of armed confrontation increases rapidly.
In light of the above, the Armenian National Council of Karabakh appeals for immediate assistance. This assistance may include:
- Diplomatic pressure exerted by the Armenian government through its allies to abolish the position of Governor-General over Armenian Karabakh and Zangezur and to withdraw Azerbaijani troops, thereby preventing military action.
- Immediate material aid to restore administrative, judicial, and other government institutions; to organize militia regiments; and to locally acquire ammunition and supplies.
- The release of 3-line rifle cartridges and other military provisions for Armenian Karabakh.
- The discreet appointment of a strong, authoritative military leader to organize defense efforts in Armenian Karabakh.
- Measures to prevent General Andranik’s departure from Zangezur.
- The rapid reinforcement and deployment of regular Armenian troops to Zangezur and Basargechar, ensuring Zangezur becomes an indisputable part of the Republic of Armenia.
- Support for sending a representative of Karabakh Armenians to Europe to join the Armenian delegation’s council.
Enclosed are copies of Documents Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.**
Delegate of the Karabakh Armenian National Council, Levon Zaraflyants
Source: Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 201, Inventory 1, File 41, Sheets 6–7. Original. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 77. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)
\* See Documents Nos. 49 (Feb 19, 1919), 59 (Feb 27), and 54 (Feb 24) \\ See Documents Nos. 65 (Mar 8), 62 (Mar 1), 58 (Feb 26), 61 (Feb 28), and 55 (Feb 24) from the same collection.
📜 Letter from the Karabakh Armenian National Council to the General Commissioner of Zangezur and Karabakh
On the Political Situation in Artsakh, Azerbaijan’s Expansionist Plans, and the Position of the Republic of Armenia Shushi, March 19, 1919
As you are aware, since mid-February (New Style), the Azerbaijani government, with the consent of General Thomson, commander of British forces in Baku, appointed Dr. Khosrov Bek Sultanov as Governor-General of Karabakh and Zangezur. At the same time, the IV National Congress of Karabakh Armenians was convened in Shushi, which vigorously protested against Azerbaijani encroachments—addressing the British mission locally, telegraphing General Thomson, the Azerbaijani government, the Baku Armenian National Council, and the Republic of Ararat.
The Congress clearly declared in its protests that the Armenians of Karabakh have never submitted to Azerbaijani authority. Even the regular Turkish army failed to break the resolve of the peasantry.
In four districts of Karabakh, a chain of events brought forth new forces that assumed leadership over military units and provided protection for Armenians against impending threats. The commanders in Dizak, Varanda, Khachen, and Jraberd effectively concentrated authority in their hands and governed the population prior to the arrival of the British mission. These commanders acted under the instructions of Major General Andranik. When Andranik advanced toward Karabakh with his army, the people eagerly awaited their hero, yearning to receive him in their midst. Yet, in response to requests from the Azerbaijani government, General Thomson immediately dispatched a special mission to halt Andranik’s advance at the banks of the Aghari River.
Thereafter, the British command announced to the Armenian and Tatar populations of Karabakh that its mission was to restore order and peace, forbidding any troop movements along the borders and instructing both sides to cease hostilities. The Armenians of Karabakh, true to their law-abiding nature, strictly observed this Allied mandate. Meanwhile, the local Tatars and the Azerbaijani government continued their provocations. Demonstrations led by Turkish officers were organized daily along the borders of Armenian districts, accompanied by individual killings, robberies, and repeated assaults on Armenian villages such as Khtsaberd, Kyuratag, Chartar, and others. These aggressions were met with vigorous written protests from both the commanders and the National Council addressed to the British mission and General Thomson.
All our protests have echoed unheard, like a cry in the wilderness. Neither the temporary national council that functioned from December last year to February, nor the current council elected by the IV Congress, were able to send representatives to Yerevan to inform the Republic of Ararat about the unfolding situation here. It must be acknowledged that the Republic of Ararat to this day has displayed a criminal and reprehensible indifference toward Karabakh—an Armenian region whose population is over 90 percent Armenian. The Republic of Ararat failed to grasp the urgency of the moment and did not send a representative with necessary financial resources. It should have understood that no administrative control is possible without funding, especially in a region that, due to unfavorable conditions, is not directly subordinate to it.
Karabakh has institutions and enterprises that need to be revived. As previously stated, without financial support, these cannot be consolidated under Armenian administration. Today, we observe how Azerbaijan has gained control over central Karabakh without bloodshed simply through monetary influence, and it will likely attempt to seize the surrounding districts next.
Up to now, Armenian officials have received salaries from the treasury, assuming those funds did not belong to Azerbaijan. It was previously stated that these payments came from liquidation reserves of the former Caucasus Commissariat. Now, however, the situation has dramatically changed. The Azerbaijani Governor-General has forbidden salary payments to those who refuse to recognize his authority, and has retroactively collected signatures from officials claiming they have been in Azerbaijani service since June 1 of last year and promising to serve “with diligence and devotion.”
It is common knowledge that Azerbaijan did not occupy Karabakh—only the Turks briefly held Shushi and Khankendi from October 8 of last year (New Style). Upon their retreat, Azerbaijan lost all capacity to govern the region. Hence, it resorts to blatant falsification. The Council must therefore lodge an emphatic protest with the British mission and General Thomson.
📜 Letter from the Karabakh Armenian National Council to the General Commissioner of Zangezur and Karabakh
On the Republic of Armenia’s Inaction, Azerbaijan’s Militarization, and the Threat to Artsakh March 19, 1919 – Shushi
For the past three months, the Armenians of Karabakh have looked expectantly to the Republic of Ararat, hoping it would undertake decisive measures to extend its influence over Karabakh. Yet those hopes appear shattered. The Republic of Ararat has all but forgotten Karabakh, delaying the establishment of a General Commissariat in Karabakh and Zangezur to such an extent that the damage is considerable. Azerbaijan, which has not rested, has seized on our vulnerabilities and—in a sudden night raid at the end of January—occupied the town of Khankendi with four hundred troops of the Wild Division.
The Temporary National Council at the time requested an explanation from the British mission, only to receive a vague reply. What has become unmistakably clear is that Azerbaijan will exploit every opportunity to gain control of Karabakh.
In this critical moment, the departure of Major General Andranik from Zangezur only hastens Azerbaijan’s advance. Every effort must be made to prevent his exit, as we face unforeseen developments. It is likely Azerbaijan will resort to military force to subdue Armenian Karabakh. Not only must Andranik remain in Zangezur, but steps should be taken to ensure he advances into Karabakh—regardless of opposition from the British mission. We are confident that should General Andranik enter Karabakh, the British mission will not attempt to remove him. It must not be forgotten that after the Turkish invasion, when the district rose in defiance, it was General Andranik who inspired the peasantry. This is a matter of fact.
Moreover, it is imperative to note that Karabakh’s armed forces lack unified command. None of the district commanders in Dizak, Varanda, Khachen, or Jraberd is capable of leading all Armenian fighters. Each struggles to maintain control within their own district, and since the arrival of the British mission, self-defense organization has markedly deteriorated. During the Turkish advance, the commanders rallied the masses due to the public’s psychological need for a single leader. This momentum has since dissipated, a reflection of our people’s tendency to tie their hopes to one figure. With the arrival of the British mission, that collective surge waned as hopes were placed in their protection.
To date, the Republic of Ararat has sent no leadership presence capable of inspiring unity—especially now, when irresponsible individuals, favored by the mission, are sowing discord among defense forces. There is no harmony or coordination among the military leaders. Thrust into their roles by circumstance, they now seem more consumed by internal disputes than the success of our common cause.
It is not too late. An experienced officer—if not a general, at least a colonel—must be sent to bring order. You can be absolutely certain: without such a leader, uniting our active forces is impossible. It is evident to us all that our focus must shift to self-defense—that is, mobilizing the region’s real strength to assert our will.
The Karabakh Armenian National Council, elected by the IV Congress of Armenians of Karabakh and recognized as the sole authoritative body representing the will of the people, declares that Karabakh’s union with the Republic of Armenia—our only and heartfelt aspiration—can only be realized if the Republic takes concrete action.
The Republic of Armenia must:
- Immediately dispatch a military leader to unify the fragmented yet viable forces.
- If General Andranik cannot be sent or retained in Zangezur, then at least a regiment must be deployed there.
- Most urgently: transfer substantial financial resources to Karabakh to organize armed forces and administration, and to revive institutions—schools, commissariat, treasury, judiciary, etc.
The Council wishes to know whether the Republic of Armenia genuinely intends to pay any attention to Karabakh, which remains the only Armenian region untouched by Turkish or Azerbaijani devastation.
According to the Council’s sources, Major General Andranik plans to leave Zangezur—furthermore, we understand the Republic itself is hastening his withdrawal. We stress: if he retreats, it will have disastrous consequences for Karabakh. Should he be obliged to leave, a regiment must first be deployed in Zangezur.
The Republic must realize that even if the Peace Conference decides Karabakh’s fate in Armenia’s favor, Azerbaijan will not accept the outcome and will provoke conflict. Preventive action must be taken now.
Azerbaijan is amassing new forces and weaponry in Khankendi daily. This is part of a coordinated, deliberate campaign, while the Republic of Armenia remains inactive. Despite General Thomson’s orders, Azerbaijan continues troop movements and aggressive acts—while Armenia maintains complete silence. The British command has bound our hands, and we are left helpless, prisoners of legality.
Given all this, we are certain: if Andranik enters Karabakh, the British mission will not obstruct him. The British turn a blind eye, while Azerbaijan—shrewd and strategic—pursues its anti-Armenian policies. Even now, it is fortifying Khankendi in preparation for a push into surrounding areas within a month.
It is still not too late for the Republic of Armenia to act decisively and prevent Azerbaijan’s advancement. If silence persists, the Armenians of Karabakh will perceive it as betrayal.
Chairman: E. Ishkhanyan Secretary: M. Esayan
Source: Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 200, Inventory 1, File 243, Sheets 55–57. Original manuscript. Translated from Armenian. Published in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 78. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) 272
Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”
Artatsolum
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