
Letter from A. Mikaelyan, Representative of the Karabakh and Zangezur Fellowship, to the Diplomatic Representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia Regarding the Resistance of the Armenians of Karabakh to the Turkish Invasion and the Need to Support Them Tiflis, November 10, 1918
In addition to the information I have already provided to the Information Bureau at the Diplomatic Mission of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia, I hereby report the dire and catastrophic situation in Karabakh and humbly ask you to petition the Government of the Republic of Armenia to provide whatever material and moral assistance possible to the suffering Armenian population of Karabakh.
Until recent days, Karabakh has found itself in a state of literal siege. Total isolation from the outside world, the complete lack of communication routes, the absence of any kind of food supplies or currency—all have produced a dreadful anarchy. The lack of any military units and the resulting inability to establish a stable government, coupled with intensified and unstable Armenian-Tatar relations and the population’s panic-stricken condition, have rendered life for the long-suffering people of Karabakh unbearable and horrific.
Over the past 10–11 months of isolation from the world, only 1,050,000 rubles were allocated to meet Karabakh’s food and other basic needs—while the region required 11 to 12 million rubles. Even if this sum were split equally between Armenians and Tatars, the impoverished Armenian population would have received only 525,000 rubles. The contrast between the need for 12 million and the actual allocation of 525,000 rubles vividly illustrates the horrors of the region’s financial crisis.
The complete absence of food during last winter resulted in massive death rates. In certain villages of the Dizak district, up to 70 people perished of hunger in a single week. The same plight afflicted areas of Kachen and Varanda. Hunger is everywhere. Corpses of withered elders and the blue-stained bodies of our starving children litter the land.
The fate of Shushi was no better than the fate of the province. Death claimed Armenian lives in both town and countryside alike.
Add to all of this a Turkish-imposed levy of 111,000 rubles on the Armenian residents of the town—despite prior promises from Azerbaijan of 8,000,000 rubles to aid the region.
The arrival of Turkish forces has brought no improvement. As evening falls, life in the town freezes. The Armenian population remains subdued and uncertain. Only a week ago did the people of Karabakh begin to understand what is happening outside their homeland. A lack of newspapers and harsh censorship had kept them in utter ignorance. The Armenians of Karabakh have long awaited salvation from outside—hoping someone might help this forgotten land, hoping someone might remember that the once glorious and now proud Karabakh still exists.
Until the very last days, Karabakh held firmly to a pro-Russian orientation. The decisions of the Transcaucasian Commissariat were neither binding nor ever accepted. Karabakh consistently rejected separation from Russia…
To this day, the province continues to greet the Turks with fire and sword. Nothing—except hunger—can break Karabakh’s resilience and fortitude. Therefore, do not let this freedom-loving region perish. Both town and province are starving. The Dizak district is even lacking seeds for sowing. Help in any and every way possible.
Press Reports on the Arrival of 5,000 Askers in Shushi and the Disarmament of the Armenian Population
Published: November 13, 1918
According to Orizon, approximately 5,000 askers have arrived in Shushi. Their actions were swift: they declared martial law in the city, arrested Armenian community leaders, disarmed the population, and initiated conscription among the local Tatars.
Widespread dissatisfaction emerged among the Tatars regarding the mobilization. Desertion became frequent, even though the Turkish command resorted to executions—those who disobeyed were hanged. In the Armenian quarter of the city, one Armenian was executed for refusing to surrender his weapons.
The Armenian population was disarmed twice.
Martial law remains in effect. After 6 p.m., going out onto the streets is strictly forbidden.
The mayor, G. I. Melik-Shakhnazarov, plays a pivotal role as a mediator between the Armenians and the Turkish authorities. Most of the Turkish troops have now left the city, vacating all barracks, including the upper barracks, the Gukasian Girls’ School, and the barracks across from the Real School.
Commander of the 1st Caucasian Turkish Division, Jemal Jevad Bey, now issues orders under the title Commander of the 1st Azerbaijani Division. Colonel M. Shakhnazarov and his units are stationed in Zangezur.
Telegram from the Armenian Diplomatic Representative in Azerbaijan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Regarding the Famine in Karabakh
Telegram No. 1933, November 23, 1918
Reliable sources report that the famine in Karabakh, particularly in Shushi, has reached horrifying proportions. Residents are selling everything they own—including clothing and bedding.
Bread is available, but there is no money.
Immediate financial assistance is urgently needed to save the population from certain death.
Report from the Officer Attached to the Headquarters of the Separate Armenian Division to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia on the Anti-Armenian Policy of Great Britain in Transcaucasia
Yerevan, November 25, 1918
Negotiations between the Baku authorities and the British began in the spring of this year. At the time, Britain expressed a strong interest in Baku, especially after their occupation of Enzeli. The talks proceeded successfully—initially, the British were prepared to land one brigade, and by September, they intended to increase their forces to 20,000–25,000. However, the Bolsheviks interfered. Until the final days of July, it was only possible to convince them to permit the arrival of Bicherakhov, who was regarded as the British vanguard. In July, Bicherakhov’s detachment of 1,500–1,800 men with light artillery landed in Alyat.
On July 29–30, the Bolsheviks relinquished power. The defense of the city was considered nearly hopeless, and the new authorities fled to Enzeli and Qazvin, pleading with the British to come to Baku to save the situation—without concluding a formal agreement. At this point, the British pretended to have no interest in occupying Baku, citing their supposedly difficult position in Persia, and reluctantly agreed.
In reality, the initiative to invite the British came from the Armenians (specifically, the Armenian National Council). In early August, the British deployed at least 4,000–5,000 troops to Baku; however, this was done exclusively to secure a favorable position without assuming any binding obligations toward the Baku authorities. This was easily accomplished, given the desperate need for their assistance.
However, they failed to honor their promise; by September 15, their forces numbered only 2,500, and of those, just 900 bayonets were sent to the front. One of the British command’s earliest political moves was a declaration of non-interference in Russia’s internal affairs. Yet even in this, a tendency toward political dominance in Baku was apparent. Step by step, they managed to take over virtually all command functions, including the appointment of Colonel Stokes, a British officer, as Chief of Staff.
On the eve of the city’s surrender, General Dunsterville proposed the consolidation of all authority under a single figure, nominating L. F. Bicherakhov—clearly acting as a British “agent.” But the British did not remain long in Baku, and it is difficult to say how easily they might have established complete control. They likely would have met serious resistance from the dictatorship and Centrocaspian forces, which were stronger than the British at that time.
However, after Baku’s fall, they concentrated their forces in the Russian port of Enzeli and, with no restraint in their methods, annulled the authority of the Russian representative, who until then had been the port’s sole administrator.
Beyond military control, they expropriated all civil power as well. In their latest declaration, they recognized only British authority—and for the Persians, the Persian government. As for the commercial fleet, they seized and detained between 30 and 40 ships in Enzeli.
Observations on British Anti-Russian Policy in Northern Persia and Transcaucasia
Yerevan, November 25, 1918
A striking characteristic of British conduct has been their overt effort to eradicate all traces of Russian influence, at least within northern Persia. Recalling the recent years of Anglo-Russian political rivalry over Persia, it seems England has found no more opportune moment to realize its long-cherished aspirations of peacefully conquering the East. The expulsion of Russian power, evidently, was meant to ensure that by the time of the Allied Conference, there would already exist a fait accompli—the full occupation of Persia.
Even before the fall of Baku, the British had turned Krasnovodsk into their military base. After Baku’s collapse, their attention shifted squarely to the Trans-Caspian region and Turkestan, where they joined Menshevik forces in active operations against the Bolsheviks. Recent intelligence, presented by Colonel Avetisov of the General Staff to L. F. Bicherakhov, reports that one brigade was redeployed from Qazvin and Enzeli to Krasnovodsk. According to representatives arriving in Petrovsk from the Trans-Caspian region, it appears the British secured favorable terms for railway usage from the local government. Their actions clearly point to control of the cotton market and to safeguarding India against perceived Russian threats.
By occupying Krasnovodsk, the British aimed to secure their flank and maintain dominance over the oil market. This necessitated attention toward Baku, where they would tolerate no competition. Combined with Bicherakhov’s view that Baku must be “neutralized,” the September negotiations with Azerbaijan and the transfer of Baku to British control now come into clearer focus. The British intend to assert mastery over Baku. As one officer from Thomson’s staff remarked: “From this war, Britain will gain—at the very least—Turkestan.”
It seems likely that once Britain secures its grip on Persia, it will turn to the Caucasus—though probably not by forcefully driving out Russian elements, but rather by creating a buffer between Persia and the future Russia. This would consist of several minor Transcaucasian republics, whose internal disputes could be stoked to maintain “political equilibrium in the Caucasus,” just as Britain has done in its eastern colonies.
A key consideration for Britain in the Caucasus is the large Muslim population, with whom it seeks to avoid antagonism. Even while in Baku, General Dunsterville issued an appeal to Muslims, citing Britain’s historical protection of Muslim communities and encouraging their loyalty to the Crown. He invited them to join the Baku defense against the Turks, who he claimed had been misled under German influence. Dunsterville, in general, avoided harsh rhetoric against Baku’s Muslim population.
In late September, General Thomson sent the steamer Arkhangelsk from Enzeli to Baku, carrying Muslim refugees—among them prominent Azerbaijani figures. It later emerged that Britain was already engaged in negotiations with Azerbaijan, apparently with Bicherakhov’s knowledge; he confirmed this in Petrovsk. The outcome of those talks was clear: despite the possibility of a successful campaign toward Baku, Britain not only refrained from preparing such an operation, but explicitly forbade the Lankaran detachment from conducting offensives against Salyan or elsewhere.
At the same time, the British proposed relocating Bicherakhov’s forces to Krasnovodsk. Though Bicherakhov “refused” the offer—and it’s doubtful the Armenian troops that made up three-quarters of his detachment would have agreed anyway—he offered little resistance and withdrew to Petrovsk with barely a struggle.
All of this makes it abundantly clear that the British were deliberately courting Azerbaijani favor—at the expense of Russian, and by extension, Armenian interests.
On September 9, during my formal presentation to General Dunsterville, I briefed him on Armenia’s financial, economic, and military state. I highlighted the operations of Armenian units following the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Caucasian front, with detailed emphasis on the battles of Karaklis and Sardarabad, where Armenian forces demonstrated remarkable resilience and courage under extremely difficult conditions.
I concluded by appealing urgently for military supplies and financial aid. According to orders from the commander of the Yerevan detachment and Major General Bagratuni, I specifically requested the delivery of one airplane. At the time, General Dunsterville expressed principled agreement with the need to support the Yerevan detachment. Regarding covert military actions, he considered such steps unquestionably desirable.
The next issue to be resolved was financial aid to prevent famine among Armenians. Although General Dunsterville lacked substantial funds, he asked that one of the Caucasian banks be designated for processing payments at British command, routed through neutral states.
Report by Captain Kolmanyants on British Policy Toward Armenian Refugees and Military Formations in Northern Persia
Yerevan, circa late 1918
Following the fall of Baku, the British no longer felt the need to support the Armenians and showed little intention of offering assistance. General Thomson, who arrived to replace General Dunsterville, through his representative Colonel Shuttleworth, demonstrated no particular interest in the Armenians, especially those from Erivan.
Initially, the 5,000 refugees arriving from Baku were provided with food (up until September 26), but even that aid was later discontinued. The British displayed brutal indifference: passenger steamships carrying sick and dying refugees were left anchored offshore for several days before being turned back to Petrovsk, allegedly due to military concerns. Their overall approach to the refugee crisis was heartless.
In response, General Bagratuni and National Council Chairman Gyulhandanyants sent a telegram to Nubar Pasha describing the dire conditions of the Armenian refugees. This telegram appears to have had a positive impact, as the British began showing modest concern for improving the refugees’ living conditions by early October.
Upon the Armenians’ arrival in Enzeli, it was decided—to prevent the dispersal of Armenian military personnel—to regroup them in Persia and form a separate brigade that could, if needed, advance through Julfa toward Erivan. General Bagratuni submitted a memorandum to General Thomson with this proposal. At a military conference in early October, attended by Chief of Staff for the Eastern Front (from Baghdad) General Gilman, Generals Beach and Andrus, and Colonel Shuttleworth, the British announced their decision to cease operations in Northern Persia and, citing technical difficulties, rejected the formation of an Armenian brigade.
At that time, a provocative British radiogram regarding the fall of Baku surfaced, in which Armenians were accused of betrayal and treachery.
By early August, it became clear to the Armenians in Enzeli that Britain was not to be relied upon. Back in the spring, the British had disarmed 60,000–70,000 Van refugees and a force of 6,000–7,000 men. Units arriving from Baku in Enzeli were also disarmed at Britain’s request. Only after General Bagratuni’s intervention was their confiscated weaponry handed over to the National Council—but even that was later transferred to Bicherakhov at British insistence.
The intent was clear: Britain did not want any witnesses in Persia—not even at the Russian-controlled port of Enzeli.
Meanwhile, the British were eager to recruit Armenian labor units—engineers and non-combatant corps—demonstrating a preference for their “Indian model” of managing colonial forces. These colonial ambitions should be carefully watched. Thus, invitations to British instructors, advisors, and agents must be avoided entirely—they must be kept from interfering in Armenian internal affairs.
Based on communications from Nubar Pasha’s representative, Armenians can expect support from Versailles, and more importantly, from Washington, where expansion of British influence in the East is considered undesirable.
In addition to the initial telegram sent to Paris, General Bagratuni issued another one to Nubar Pasha refuting the British radiogram’s claims about the fall of Baku and Britain’s apathetic treatment of Armenian refugees.
According to recent reports from Tehran, these telegrams have had favorable results. Attention was drawn to the situation in both Paris and by President Wilson. As a result of his influence, British repression of Armenian refugees ceased.
British routes into the Caucasus may follow one of three paths: via Baku, Batumi, or Julfa.
Appeal of the Armenians of Karabakh to the Republic of Armenia for Protection from the Tyranny of Turkish-Azerbaijani “Specialists in the Extermination of the Armenian Nation”
December 12, 1918
On December 12, 1918, we, the undersigned residents of the villages of Bank, Dovshalu, Bazarkend, Ballugaya, Kazanchi, Kolatak, Chor-Manly, Shakhmansur, Hasan-Riz, Kizil-Kaya, Kozlu, Orashach, Yayja, Eyvanlu, Kasapet, Dumurly, Uratag, Mardagirrd, Kichi-Karabek, Ulu-Karabek, Chardakhly, Lulasaz, Madagis, Tonashen, Dastagir, Turus, Talyshi, V-Chayly, N-Chayly, Maragaly, Gulyashag, Dzhanyashag, Usadzhig, and others of Jevanshir District, Elizavetpol Province, convened a county assembly to discuss the dire economic and political situation brought upon us by the Turkish invasion and constant attacks from bands of the Azerbaijani Republic.
We resolved:
- To appeal to the government of the Ararat Republic with the following plea: For two years, the Armenian population of Jevanshir District has been cut off from the outside world. Muslim communities controlling the roads and railways have blocked our access to them, and we have barely been able to protect our physical existence in the mountains of ancient Gandzasar.
As Turkish forces advanced victoriously toward Alexandropol and reached Elizavetpol Province, local Tatars rose up in arms to purge Jevanshir of Armenians and integrate it into the Azerbaijani Republic. Tatars in nearby villages began claiming Armenian homes and women as spoils, shamelessly declaring their intent.
Every day, delegates were sent to pressure us to disarm and submit to their rule, insisting that the Turks had already conquered the Caucasus and were marching on the Terek region.
In September, as Turkish-Azerbaijani forces approached Shushi, we Armenians of Jevanshir convened an emergency assembly and unanimously declared: from the eldest to the youngest, we will fight to the last drop of blood, never disarm, and never surrender to these barbarians, who massacred Armenians indiscriminately—men, women, children—looted our possessions, destroyed cultural buildings, and set everything ablaze.
As the troops marched toward Shushi, thousands of local Tatars followed, aiming to plunder surrendered villages and the city itself. Upon capturing Shushi, military commanders were appointed in Khan-Kendy and Askeran, who systematically stripped Armenians of their belongings and money, and subjected women to invasive searches in private chambers.
Armenian villages were also pillaged, with relentless demands for forage and provisions—eventually escalating to demands for Armenian girls and women.
Given these atrocities by Turkish and Azerbaijani forces in the captured Armenian settlements, we, the Jevanshir Armenians, once again resolved to die with dignity rather than surrender.
After the fall of Shushi, a Turkish-Azerbaijani detachment with machine guns advanced toward the Armenian village of Mardagirrd. The Armenian forces there engaged and decisively routed the attackers. Leading this gang were Provincial Physician D. Lemberansky, a Wild Division officer named Shirin-Bek, and the notorious bandit Shahmali. During their retreat, they abducted and brutally murdered three Armenian subjects from Sarov.
During the disarmament of the village of Lower Chayly, prominent individuals were first arrested, then sent to the Terter station—where the main headquarters was located—where they died under torture intended to extract information about Armenian forces and weaponry.
Based on all the above, and in light of the Allied presence in the Caucasus to restore peace and order, we unanimously resolve to ask the government of Armenia—as our kindred nation—to advocate at the upcoming peace conference before the representatives of the great powers that the Armenian population of Jevanshir District be joined to the Ararat Republic. We categorically oppose being left under the yoke of the Azerbaijani Republic. Such a decision would be against our will, and we vow never to surrender alive to these “specialists in the extermination of the Armenian nation.”
Other provinces of Elizavetpol are in similar conditions and share our desire and resolve.
- To authorize Semen Pogosov, a warrant officer from the village of Vank in Jevanshir District, to deliver this secular resolution and report on our county’s condition, needs, and requests to the Council of Ministers of the Ararat Republic, along with a verbal briefing on our economic circumstances.
In witness thereof, we hereby sign.* *322 signatures in total.
Official Notification from the British Military Mission to the Population of Zangezur and Karabakh on the Appointment of a Temporary General-Governor by the Azerbaijani Government
January 15, 1919
The British Command hereby notifies all residents of the districts of Zangezur, Shushi, Jevanshir, and Jebrail:
- On January 15, 1919, by order of the Azerbaijani government, Dr. Sultanov is appointed Temporary General-Governor of the districts of Zangezur, Shushi, Jevanshir, and Jebrail. He enjoys the support of the British Command.
- ……* is appointed Assistant General-Governor for Civil Affairs. (*Name not specified.)
- A council comprising six experienced Armenians shall be formed under the chairmanship of the General-Governor to improve and address the needs of all nationalities.
- One British officer may be included in the council as a representative of the British Command.
- The Azerbaijani Treasury shall allocate all necessary funds for the maintenance of personnel within this governorate.
- All disputes shall be resolved finally at the forthcoming Peace Conference.
- All troop movements within the boundaries of the new governorate must be reported to the British Mission.
- The British Mission affirms that all lawful orders of the General-Governor must be carried out precisely. The British Command will approve and support any measures taken by the General-Governor to restore lawful order. 241
Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”
Artatsolum
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