Report by Prime Minister Hatisov to the Council of Ministers of Armenia

History

On the Deliberation of the Karabakh Issue at the Meeting with General Thomson, Commander of British Armed Forces in the Caucasus Tiflis, May 3, 1919

At 12 o’clock, I went with Evangulov to meet General Thomson. Present at the meeting were General Thomson, Beach, Brophy, and Davy, along with their chiefs of staff. The conversation was conducted in French.

Following General Thomson’s greeting, his Chief of Staff began reading Colonel Chatelworth’s report on Karabakh, which he had visited on April 26. The report consisted of 20 points:

  1. Armenian armed forces in Karabakh are commanded by officers from Armenia.
  2. The Armenian National Council of Karabakh has rejected nomadic movements, leaving Tatar nomads in a desperate situation.
  3. Shahmazyan declared in Zangezur that the Karabakh troops are part of the Armenian army and promised full support to the people of Karabakh.
  4. Armenians do not understand British policy and are puzzled why Britain supports Azerbaijan, an ally of Turkey.
  5. Armenians firmly stated they do not trust Sultanov, known for his pro-Turkish sympathies.
  6. Armenians claim there are rumors that the British will withdraw, leaving them alone with the Turks if they recognize Azerbaijani authority.
  7. Tatar nomadic movements have ceased, livestock is perishing, and the mood among Tatars is grim.
  8. Disarming Tatars is inadvisable, as Armenians may slaughter them (Monk-Masson’s opinion).
  9. Armenians declared they would not participate in the meeting if Sultanov is present.
  10. Dr. Sultanov himself admits he does not expect Armenians to accept Azerbaijani authority.
  11. In Karabakh, Shahmazyan is organizing an armed force on behalf of the Armenian government.
  12. The congress in Shushi included 43 delegates from Karabakh; there were no representatives from Zangezur.
  13. Chatelworth told Armenians that the British want to establish a provisional government until the Peace Conference makes a final decision.
  14. Sultanov named individuals who would gladly recognize Azerbaijani authority, blaming the Dashnaktsutyun party for obstruction and stating that his life is at risk.
  15. Chatelworth stated that the National Council in Goris is akin to the “Shura” previously formed in Kars.
  16. Chatelworth met Ishkhanyan, chairman of the National Council, who said Armenians might accept Azerbaijani authority.
  17. Socrat-bek M. Shakhnazarov told Chatelworth not to place significance on the National Council. Before the Turks arrived, Armenians and Tatars lived peacefully; the Council is now stirring unrest.
  18. Chatelworth met delegates who submitted written declarations refusing to submit to Azerbaijan and expressed no fear of threats.
  19. Chatelworth believes nomadic movement can be organized.
  20. Sultanov agrees that nomads may pass without Azerbaijani military escort.

Following the report, General Thomson made the following conclusions: Armenia’s involvement in Karabakh affairs resembles a declaration of war on Britain; Sultanov behaves appropriately; the local population remains peaceful and is only agitated by agents of the Armenian government. Consequently, the advance of British troops into Nakhichevan has been suspended. This movement can resume only if the following conditions are met:

  1. Shahmazyan and other agitator delegates must be recalled from Karabakh.
  2. A proclamation from the Armenian government must state that any opposition to Azerbaijani authority is unacceptable, and resistance will harm refugees.
  3. Nomadic peoples must be permitted to pass through.
  4. Upon fulfillment of these conditions, the movement to Nakhichevan will commence immediately.

In response to Thomson’s report and speech, Mr. Hatisov delivered a lengthy address lasting one and a half hours, presenting the following 11 points:

  1. The Armenian government recognizes Karabakh as an integral part of the Republic of Armenia, but pending the decision of the Paris Peace Conference, believes administration should be entrusted to a British governor of English nationality, supported by Armenian and Muslim National Councils—the first governing Armenian Karabakh, and the second governing the Muslim region (from Askeran eastward).
  2. The Armenian government cannot expel anyone from Karabakh as it does not administer the region.
  3. The government has only two official representatives in Karabakh: Arzumanyan and Shahmazyan.
  4. Armenian National Councils in Karabakh must maintain their own armed forces, which are not part of the Republic of Armenia, and thus the Armenian government cannot issue them directives.
  5. The Armenian government may advise the National Council of Zangezur to allow Muslim nomads into the mountains, provided they are accompanied by British forces and monitored by Armenian and Muslim observers—but it has neither the authority nor ability to enforce this.
  6. Under current British-imposed conditions, the Armenian government cannot be held responsible for events in Karabakh, lacking administrative presence. Should the British command wish to assign responsibility, it must first hand over the region’s administration, as it did in Kars.
  7. The Armenian government has not sent and does not maintain agitators in Karabakh. The presence of Armenian officers or local activists advocating non-recognition of Azerbaijani authority reflects the genuine will of the 300,000 residents of Karabakh. Attempting to alter this will provoke unrest and rebellion, contrary to British principles.
  8. Preventing Nakhichevan refugees from returning and linking their resettlement to the Karabakh issue equates to Turkish policy—holding innocent parties accountable for the actions of others, in this case the presumed conduct of the Armenian government.
  9. The Armenian government’s stance on Karabakh is shared by all political parties in Armenia, not only the Dashnaktsutyun.
  10. Advancing troops and refugees to Nakhichevan is necessary for four reasons: a) The unbearable condition of refugees—8,000 of 18,000 have already died b) Army morale may lead to excesses c) Tatar attitudes may shift unpredictably d) The current situation hinders military planning

Printing the proposed appeal to Karabakh residents is impossible for three reasons: a) The government disagrees with its content b) The population rejects it c) National dignity and honor forbid it Therefore, the Armenian government will comply with the instruction not to advance on Nakhichevan, but will not endorse or sign the proclamation.

  1. The Armenian government’s representative traveling to Shushi, Argutinsky, is tasked only with communicating the above and hearing General Chatelworth’s statements; he is not authorized to make decisions or respond independently.

After Mr. Hatisov’s address, General Thomson made further remarks concerning Shahmazyan, whom he had requested be removed several times, and about the nomadic issue, which he stressed must be resolved.

Hatisov replied that Shahmazyan had already been summoned from Zangezur to report to the government, and that the issue of nomadic migration would be resolved, but nomads must comply with rules established by the Armenian government.

Following consultations with his generals, General Thomson gave the following response: “I have considered everything and decided that your responses reflect reality; I hereby withdraw my demand to halt the advance of Armenian troops and refugees to Nakhichevan.”

Afterward, the general spoke about the general situation in the South Caucasus, complaints from Azerbaijan regarding pro-Armenian tendencies among the British, the transfer of Nakhichevan to Armenians, etc.

Subsequently, telegrams were sent to Dro and Charles, authorizing them to proceed.

Report No. 9

From the Representative of Armenia to the British Command in Karabakh To the Prime Minister of Armenia On Karabakh and Zangezur’s Non-Recognition of Even a Temporary Azerbaijani Governorship May 4, 1919

I hereby inform you that General Chatelworth, during our meeting in Baku, stated that the Government of Armenia had agreed to Azerbaijan’s temporary administration of Karabakh and Zangezur. He did not provide me with any written documentation, but Major Monk-Masson, head of the Karabakh Mission, wrote to me in Goris, where we traveled together on May 1 and from which we returned today.

There, he declared that, on the basis of an agreement with Armenia, he does not recognize the National Council in Goris nor Captain Shahmazyan, whom the Government of Armenia has refused to acknowledge.

I respectfully request clarification on this matter, as it is highly unlikely that either Karabakh or Zangezur would consent to Azerbaijani governance.

Signed: Arzumanov

Source: Central State Historical Archives of Armenia (CSHA), Fund 199, Inventory 1, File 38, Sheet 30. Autograph. Published in the collection Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 120. 301

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

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