“The Caucasian Word” on the Confirmation by a British Command Representative

📰 “The Caucasian Word” on the Confirmation by a British Command Representative of the Massacre of Armenians in Karabakh Orchestrated by Governor-General Sultanov

July 1, 1919

Colonel Cloterberg, dispatched to Shusha by the British command, personally investigated the events that had transpired in Karabakh. He submitted a damning report to General Shuttleworth regarding Sultanov’s activities. At present, we can share only excerpts, with a promise to publish the full report in the near future.

In the introduction to his report, Colonel Cloterberg presents a detailed account of the bloody events that occurred in Karabakh. He then states that, according to reliable information at his disposal, Kurds had been settled by Sultanov at a two-day distance from the city. Therefore, if Kurdish involvement in the Karabakh massacre is indeed factual, it must be concluded that the massacre was not accidental but rather premeditated by Sultanov. Acting on his orders, the Kurds moved into the vicinity of Kaibalikend two days prior to the events.

In conclusion, based on an impartial and objective investigation, Colonel Cloterberg asserts two key findings:

1. Sultanov was complicit with the Kurds who participated in the Kaibalikend massacre.
2. Had the Governor-General of Karabakh, Sultanov, wished to prevent the bloodshed, he had the means to do so.

Colonel Cloterberg ends his report by declaring that Sultanov must be brought to justice for his actions.

“The Caucasian Word,” July 1, 1919. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 189. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

📄 Report from the Armenian Diplomatic Representative in Georgia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic Regarding Sultanov’s Removal

No. 24, July 2, 1919

Korri reported that Sultanov will not return to Shusha.

Representative: Evangulov Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 276, Inventory 1, File 42, Sheet 199. Copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 191.

📜 Authorization for the Delegate of the Sixth Congress of Karabakh Armenians to Negotiate with Azerbaijan on a Temporary Modus Vivendi

No. 68, Shusha, July 5, 1919

The Temporary Commission, acting under the authority granted by the Sixth Congress of Karabakh Armenians, hereby authorizes Mr. Misak Ter-Danielyan, together with representatives of the Karabakh Armenian community in Baku and the Republic of Armenia, to conduct negotiations with the government of the Azerbaijan Republic regarding the establishment of a temporary modus vivendi in the disputed Karabakh zone, pending final resolution of the issue at the Peace Conference.

The results of these negotiations are to be reported by Mr. Ter-Danielyan to the Seventh Congress of Karabakh Armenians for review and approval.

Chairman of the Temporary Commission: [Sh. Gasparov] Secretary Party Archive of the Communist Party of Armenia, Fund 1022, Inventory 7, File 98, Sheet 8. Original. Manuscript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 194. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) Signature illegible.

📄 Memorandum from the Armenian Diplomatic Representative in Azerbaijan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic

On the Karabakh Armenians’ Consent to a Temporary Agreement with Azerbaijan Regarding the Karabakh Question July 7, 1919

With the bearer of this message—a special courier dispatched expressly for this occasion—I wish to urgently inform you of the negotiations I held yesterday with Mammad Yusif Jafarov during a lengthy, nearly three-hour conversation. I will write to you separately regarding other matters we discussed, but for now I wish to report on our talks concerning the Karabakh issue and ask that you convey the government’s position and provide me with instructions through the same courier, Vartan Zakaryan.

Having established that we are, in effect, in a state of war—especially following reports allegedly received yesterday by the Azerbaijani side about the destruction of four Muslim villages in Zangezur by Armenians—Jafarov proposed that we find a practical way out of the deadlock into which our peoples have been driven, becoming sacrificial victims of our diplomatic notes and maneuverings. He repeatedly emphasized that he was speaking to me not as a minister to a diplomat, but as an old and trusted acquaintance who believes in my sincere desire to help both nations escape this impasse.

I replied that until now, every time I attempted to intervene in the Karabakh matter, I received a note stating that it was an “internal affair” in which I had no right to interfere. However, if the Azerbaijani government now considers my involvement both necessary and acceptable, I am at its disposal: I am prepared to enter into negotiations and will await concrete proposals from them, which I can then relay to my government and receive appropriate instructions.

I am also aware that Azerbaijani representatives who traveled to the aborted Sixth Congress of Karabakh Armenians deemed it necessary to bring back two authorized delegates from the congress to negotiate the terms of an agreement. They have already preliminarily outlined some of its foundations. I am sending you a copy of these terms. From it, you will see that the Karabakh Armenians agree that “the disputed parts of the Jevanshir, Jebrail, and Shusha districts shall be considered temporarily within the borders of the Azerbaijani Republic.”

This appears to be the central point of the agreement sought by Sultanov and his associates. The remaining terms are largely favorable to the Karabakh Armenians, seemingly negotiated as compensation for this concession. A meeting was scheduled today between the Karabakh Armenians—who insist on negotiating directly with government representatives rather than solely with Sultanov—but Sultanov has announced its postponement until tomorrow.

Personally, I am skeptical about the productivity of these negotiations. However, since Azerbaijan itself desires them and has even privately approached me for assistance, I believe we have no grounds to refuse—especially given that the Karabakh Armenians themselves are eager to establish a ceasefire, at least to allow for the harvesting of this year’s exceptionally abundant crops.

Thus, Alexander Ivanovich, it is likely that Jafarov will soon approach me with proposals for practical measures to establish a temporary modus vivendi. I urgently seek the government’s position: if Azerbaijan and the Karabakh Armenians reach an agreement based on the aforementioned temporary “recognition of being within Azerbaijan’s borders,” should I enter these negotiations as your official representative, or leave the matter entirely to them?

The Karabakh Armenians insist that their proposal be sanctioned not only by the Seventh Congress but also by the Armenian government, and they even demand my official participation in the negotiations. I have categorically refused this until I receive your instructions, which I now await.

Jafarov and I agreed to meet informally at first—just a few of their ministers and myself—to discuss matters. If we see a path forward, he will formalize his proposals and submit them to me for reporting to you.

The purpose of sending this courier is to obtain your position in advance so I know how to proceed. My personal view is that if Karabakh itself agrees to a temporary modus vivendi, we have no moral right to obstruct its implementation while offering no assistance. I await your response.

With sincere regards, Yours, T. Bekzadyan

Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 200, Inventory 1, File 309, Sheets 210–211. Autograph. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 196. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

📜 Letter from Two Representatives of the Karabakh Armenian National Council to the Chairman of the Government of Armenia

On the Necessity of Concluding an Interstate Agreement for the Temporary Regulation of the Karabakh Question Tiflis, July 10, 1919

As you are aware, a delegation of Karabakh Armenians is currently engaged in negotiations with the Azerbaijani government regarding the establishment of a temporary modus vivendi in Karabakh. The basis of these negotiations is the recognition of Azerbaijani authority in the Armenian zone of Karabakh, while the Armenians seek only guarantees to safeguard their rights.

We consider negotiations conducted not between authorized government representatives, but rather between representatives of the local population, to be extremely detrimental to the cause, for the following reasons:

1. It undermines the Karabakh Armenians’ sense of unity and cohesion with Armenia, and generally diminishes the prestige of the Armenian government, suggesting that each branch of the Armenian people constitutes a self-sufficient entity.
2. In such negotiations, the parties involved are not equals, but rather a victorious state and a panicked population—an imbalance that would not exist in talks between two governments.
3. Any agreement resulting from negotiations between local representatives and Azerbaijan would bear the characteristics of a domestic act, subject to alteration through internal legislation. In contrast, an agreement between your government and Azerbaijan would constitute an international act, and thus be protected by the guarantees of international law.
4. The Armenian government’s non-participation in the negotiations places it in the position of an uninterested third party. Following the conclusion of such an agreement, Azerbaijan could cite Armenia’s absence as grounds to treat the Karabakh issue as a purely internal matter.
5. The conclusion of an agreement between two governments regarding a disputed territory does not in any way compromise the contested nature of that territory—especially since the agreement would be temporary, pending resolution by a higher authority. However, recognition by the local population of one of the claimants constitutes a strong argument against the claims of the unrecognized party.
6. In conducting negotiations, the government could secure the establishment of institutions in the region that visibly reflect its disputed status—something that representatives of the population, by their very nature, are unable to achieve.

Melik… Count Bagaturov* Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 200, Inventory 1, File 309, Sheet 216. Original. Manuscript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 199. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) Signature illegible.

📄 From the Report of the Armenian Diplomatic Representative in Azerbaijan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

On the Azerbaijani Government’s Propaganda Campaign Preparing a Military Advance Through Karabakh and Zangezur Toward Nakhichevan to Establish a Link with Turkey Baku, July 18, 1919

[…]

Azerbaijan continues feverish preparations to extend its authority over the regions of Zangezur and Nakhichevan at any cost. The outbreaks of unrest in Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan are fundamentally interconnected and are unfolding according to a premeditated and well-developed plan. Undoubtedly, these actions are directed against the Armenian government and aim to encircle the Armenians with a Muslim—specifically Tatar—ring by reinforcing Muslim dominance.

To this end, Turkish-Azerbaijani clandestine political organizations, through their agents, are working to intensify hostile sentiments among the Muslim population in Armenian-controlled areas, supplying them with funds, weapons, and military equipment.

Intense anti-Armenian propaganda is being conducted not only in the provinces but also in the Azerbaijani capital—Baku—particularly among Muslim workers in industrial districts. This propaganda threatens to erupt into a general massacre of Armenians. The local Turkic-language press portrays recent events in Zangezur and Nakhichevan in inflammatory tones and distorts facts in a tendentious manner, fostering extreme hostility among the uninformed Muslim masses and inciting them to express their sentiments through public demonstrations scheduled for today, the 18th.

The hostility toward Armenians among Azerbaijan’s ruling circles is so pronounced that it encourages unidentified agents to continuously organize rallies in Baku’s mining and industrial districts, adopting resolutions aimed at launching a campaign through Karabakh and Zangezur toward Nakhichevan. The goal is to devastate Armenian communities along the way, extend Azerbaijani sovereignty to the old Russian frontier, and establish a direct connection with Turkey. This reflects the prevailing mood within Azerbaijan’s political circles.

To clarify their intended objectives, Turkish-Azerbaijani leadership has developed the following course of action. According to the information available to us, Azerbaijan is making serious preparations for an advance through the Araks Valley via Ordubad toward Nakhichevan. The only obstacle to the successful execution of this plan is Meghri and its surrounding Armenian villages, which, occupying a difficult-to-penetrate gorge, effectively block Turkish movement.

[…]

Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 200, Inventory 1, File 50, Sheet 12. Original. Manuscript. Translated from Armenian. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 203. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

📜 Letter from the Prime Minister of Armenia to the Commander of British Armed Forces in the Transcaucasus

Regarding the Return of Sultanov to Karabakh Contrary to His Assurances of Resignation from His Interim Post July 24, 1919

According to irrefutable reports in my possession, Dr. Sultanov is returning to Karabakh.

As this information contradicts Your Excellency’s letter dated June 30, 1919, addressed to the Armenian diplomatic representative in Georgia, Mr. Evangulov, in which you stated that Mr. Sultanov would not return to his previous post, I have the honor to request that Your Excellency clarify whether Dr. Sultanov is indeed returning to Shusha and whether you have approved his reinstatement.

Prime Minister of Armenia

Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 276, Inventory 1, File 42, Sheet 198. Certified copy. Typescript. Translated from English. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 204.

📜 Letter from the Tiflis Branch of the Karabakh Armenian National Council to the U.S. Representative in Karabakh

On Acts of Violence Committed by Azerbaijani Authorities Against Armenians [July] 1919

The bloody events of June 4 and the massacre of Armenians did not come as a surprise to those closely acquainted with the Armenian population of Karabakh. It has been known since February 1919 that the Armenians of Karabakh have persistently refused to recognize the authority of the Azerbaijani Governor-General Sultanov. Since May of this year, Sultanov’s actions toward the Armenians have taken on an overtly aggressive character.

Under Sultanov’s orders, a harsh economic blockade was imposed on the Armenians, with the closure of all markets and roads. This led to a sharp rise in food prices and the onset of famine. Simultaneously, attacks began across Karabakh on Armenian villages—livestock was stolen, crops destroyed, and these raids were accompanied by killings and the abduction of civilians. In April and May alone, 41 such attacks were recorded, with the villages of Khdzapert, Dolanlar, and others suffering particularly severe assaults lasting two to three days. In all cases, the attackers were either organized Azerbaijani military units—often under the command of Turkish officers—or Kurdish bands led by Sultan-bek and Iskander-bek Sultanov, brothers of Governor-General Sultanov.

From June 2, Sultanov began preparing for an assault on the Armenian quarter of Shusha. He attempted to provoke the Armenians by relocating all government institutions to the Muslim quarter, but the Armenians endured this humiliation with composure. He then summoned Kurdish bands to the city—up to 3,000 fighters and 1,500 nomads—whom he falsely informed that Armenians were allegedly blocking their passage to the mountains. In fact, the Fifth Congress of Karabakh Armenians had resolved to allow the nomads to pass peacefully, and there had been no incidents of attacks or livestock theft by Armenians.

On June 4, beginning at 10 a.m., shooting broke out in the city under Sultanov’s orders, targeting Armenians and resulting in the seizure of Armenian trenches and the Akulis Church. Up to 50 Armenians who were in the Tatar quarter on business were brutally slaughtered by Kurdish forces, with only three surviving. Armenian travelers captured on the highway were likewise killed. The remainder managed to escape to Aghdam and Khankendi.

In Shusha, Tatars fired continuously on June 4 and 5 using explosive “dum-dum” bullets. During the exchange of fire, several Armenians were killed or wounded, and one Indian sepoy was killed by the Tatars. Thanks to military measures taken by the British mission and the exceptional restraint of the Armenian population—who refrained from deploying Armenian forces into the city—the violence in Shusha was contained and halted. However, according to Russian and Armenian witnesses in the Tatar quarter, Sultanov had authorized the bands to invade the Armenian quarter and subject it to looting and massacre.

On June 4 and 5, Sultanov’s forces attacked the villages of Kaibalikend, Jamilya, Pahlul, and Kirkijan. All four were burned and devastated, and their populations mercilessly slaughtered. In Kaibalikend alone, there were up to 400 victims, mostly women and children. Some residents were taken captive toward the village of Khamsaralu and subjected to various forms of abuse. The total number of Armenian victims in these recent events is no fewer than 600. Major silk-weaving factories belonging to the Arunov and Nersesov families were also burned. Further attacks were carried out on the villages of Khanband, Dashkend, Khanatsakh, and Dashalty.

At present, Muslim bands are preventing Armenians from harvesting fields along the border zone, which serves as Karabakh’s breadbasket—posing a serious threat of famine. We respectfully request that an inquiry and on-site inspection be conducted to verify the truth of the above and to respond to the just demands of the Karabakh Armenian population for the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops and administration from the Armenian zone.

Tiflis Branch of the Karabakh Council

P.S. We have repeatedly warned the British mission that the deployment of Azerbaijani troops and the presence of Turkish forces pose a clear threat to peace and the physical survival of the Armenians. The known Turkish agent Sultanov and his aggressive conduct will inevitably lead to massacre. Regrettably, no measures have been taken in the spirit we have advised.

Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 252, Inventory 1, File 1, Sheet 64 and verso. Copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 209. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) 348

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

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