Assessment by the Karabakh Armenian National Council

History

Assessment by the Karabakh Armenian National Council

of the Massacre of Armenians in Shushi and Surrounding Areas Organized by the Azerbaijani Authorities Tiflis, June 25, 1919

Having reviewed the tendentious account of events in Karabakh presented in Dr. Sultanov’s report, the Karabakh Armenian National Council finds it necessary to provide an objective account of recent developments.

The Fifth Congress of Karabakh Armenians, attended by delegates from across the region—including representatives from Gyulistan (Elizavetpol District)—unanimously reaffirmed its confidence in the National Council, rejecting its resignation. The Council’s strategy was likewise unanimously approved. It is evident that the National Council was not a gathering of emissaries, but rather the authentic voice of the people’s aspirations.

The Congress, having condemned the proposals of the Allied Command and once again categorically refused to recognize Azerbaijani authority, agreed to allow nomadic groups to pass through Armenian territory into the mountains. This decision reflected the Armenians’ general disposition toward peace, as they have always sought to live in harmony with their Muslim neighbors.

Throughout the years of war and revolution—during a time when the entire Caucasus was engulfed in conflict—even during the Turkish invasion, the National Council succeeded in preventing clashes by fostering ties with Muslim intellectuals and the broader population. This was achieved despite numerous adverse conditions, including provocations by Turkish agents, famine, anarchy, and isolation from the outside world. The facts clearly attest to the peaceful intentions of the Council and the Armenian population at large.

This peace would not have been disturbed had it not been for the arrival of Dr. Khosrov bey Sultanov.

With the arrival of Sultanov, an era of aggressive policy began. The fragile ties between the intelligentsia of both peoples—already weakened by the treacherous assassination of Karabakh’s most respected Muslim, engineer L. B. Bebutov—were severed. Sudden seizures of Armenian-populated areas such as Askeran and Khankendi commenced, accompanied by the ruthless destruction of Armenian property. Armenian peasants were barred from traveling along the main road. Attacks on Armenian villages intensified, carried out by thousands-strong bands and regular troops (e.g., in Khtsabert, Dolanlar, and others).

The region became a haven for Turkish emissaries of all ranks, with Turkish askers serving as instructors to the bands. Large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and money were sent to Sultanov’s native Kurdish district. All Kurdish men were mobilized, and Sultanov maintained a personal convoy of 500 Kurds. He imposed a harsh economic blockade on Armenians, closing all markets. In Armenian areas already suffering from grain shortages, famine began to take hold.

As in previous years, Armenians silently and peacefully allowed the nomads to pass. Yet Sultanov, deliberately provoking conflict during the seasonal migration, incited the nomads against the Armenians, falsely claiming that the latter had refused passage. This was his method of attempting to subjugate Karabakh—a strategy well understood by the National Council.

The Council, placing its hopes in the Allied Command, did everything within its power. It warned the Allied authorities, the Entente governments, and the Armenian delegation that a storm was brewing over Karabakh, that Sultanov’s Kurdish bands were preparing to transform the region into a Turkish Armenia, and that Karabakh risked becoming the final chapter in the tragedy of the Armenian people.

However, a group of Armenian informants, allied with Sultanov, persuaded General Shatelworth that the Council was a gathering of revolutionaries, and that the resistance to Sultanov was orchestrated by emissaries from Erivan. The names of these Armenians, blinded by personal motives, will be disclosed in due time.

It must be emphasized that the Armenian population of Karabakh consistently avoided any pretext for war and had only one demand: the establishment of a neutral zone in Karabakh under British administration. Events have proven the Council’s position to be correct.

By the end of May, Sultanov’s policies had taken on an overtly aggressive character. Turkish officer Kyazim-bey initiated military operations in the Dizak district. A ruthless economic blockade was enforced throughout Karabakh. In Shushi, Sultanov announced the relocation of Russian state institutions to the Tatar section of the city, evidently intending to provoke justified outrage among Armenians and incite conflict. Yet even this provocation was met with silence by the Armenian population.

Troops and Kurdish bands under the command of Sultanov’s brother began to concentrate in the district of Khachen, which had been disarmed by Turkish forces. On May 3, the city was surrounded by military units and bands who occupied strategic heights—“Uchmykh” and Boulevard Hill—with machine guns. All communication between the Armenian part of the city and the district was severed, leaving only a narrow mountain path to the village of Dashalty.

On June 3, Tatar forces took up combat positions, while Armenians had no posts anywhere. Provocations within the city escalated: Armenians entering Shushi were stripped of their horses and weapons, which were never returned. The only instance of Armenians disarming an asker was investigated by the Council—both the weapon and horse were returned, and the perpetrator was detained.

At 10 a.m. on June 4, gunfire erupted in the city. It was definitively established that the first four shots were fired from the Boulevard position by Tatars. This was the signal: immediately, Tatars opened fire across the entire city. The first victim was an Armenian. The attacking forces—both troops and bands—used explosive “dum-dum” bullets almost exclusively. A constant roar of gunfire engulfed the city.

Armenian self-defense units took up positions and repelled the assault. The British mission informed the arriving Armenian delegates that an armed demonstration was underway. Sultanov declared he would halt the attack only if his ultimatum was accepted; otherwise, he would not be responsible for the consequences. The ultimatum primarily demanded the expulsion of several individuals. The mission promised to stop the shooting by 9 a.m. on June 5.

The ultimatum was accepted. The National Council, unwilling to shed the blood of women and children or to engage in war, ordered the withdrawal of reinforcements—up to 800 rifles—that had arrived from nearby villages. The Council resolved to relocate its headquarters to the district. All armed individuals and members of the intelligentsia left the city.

British Indian soldiers cordoned off the Armenian section, preventing Tatar advances with machine gun and rifle fire. During the skirmish, a British Indian soldier was killed by Tatar fire. From Boulevard Hill, Tatars fired upon the building housing the British mission, which was struck by numerous bullets.

From 11 a.m. on June 4, Armenians, following orders, did not fire a single shot. Tatars, despite the agreement, continued shooting until 1 p.m. on June 5. On the morning of June 6, a detachment of askers entered the Armenian section of Shushi, surrounded by a ring of British Indian troops, and occupied the barracks. Thus, under external pressure, Shushi was compelled to recognize Azerbaijani authority.

There is no doubt that the entire operation was orchestrated by Sultanov. The attacking forces consisted of askers from Shushi and Khankendi, along with Kurdish bands numbering up to 3,000. Local Tatars unanimously condemned Sultanov and the Kurdish gangs, who even plundered their own Tatar communities.

During this period, military units and bands attacked numerous villages across the district: Kaibalikend, Kirkijan, Pahlul, Jamilu, Khanipah, Khanabad, Dashkend, Katuk, Dashalty, Chartar, and others. The first four villages were completely destroyed and burned. In the remaining locations, the attacks were repelled, though with heavy losses.

The devastation of Kaibalikend defies description. After a valiant defense, Kurdish bands under Sultan’s command stormed the village, subjecting it to fire and sword. Only about 100 women and children survived—wounded, violated, and traumatized. Young women were taken captive and transported to the village of Khalifalu. A group of 55 villagers, driven toward Pahlul—where the sacred site of Surp Khach is located—were butchered by the Kurds, who claimed to be offering a sacrifice to the Christian God.

Even the village of Kirkijan, which had previously recognized Azerbaijani authority, was burned to the ground. Passengers traveling along the highway—except those from Aghdam and Khankendi—were brutally slaughtered. The total number of victims reached 580.

Despite these horrors, Armenians did not retaliate against Muslim communities. Even during these days of mourning, the seasonal migration of nomads proceeded peacefully.

The situation remains perilous. Despite appeals from the British mission in Shushi, Sultanov is still present in Karabakh. The parliamentary delegation that arrived gathered only one-sided information and did not travel to the district, where an objective investigation could have been conducted. Armenians are once again unable to work in the fields, as they are subjected to gunfire.

It must be understood: the subjugation of Shushi does not equate to the conquest of Karabakh. The Turkish invasion stands as a clear precedent. The British command must recognize that there can be no compromise between Armenians and Sultanov—the “hero of Kaibalikend.”

In the coming days, the Sixth Congress will convene to reassess its stance toward Azerbaijan. For now, the district of Varanda has once again declared its categorical refusal. At present, Karabakh is calm. The composition of the National Council has been revised to include representatives of the peasantry from across the region.

Karabakh Armenian National Council June 21, 1919

Head of the Information Bureau of the Armenian Diplomatic Mission in Georgia Melik-Karamyan

Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, f. 200, op. 1, d. 309, pp. 179–180. Certified copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. no. 180. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

From the Letter of the Acting Diplomatic Representative

of Armenia in Azerbaijan to the Diplomatic Representative in Georgia Regarding Azerbaijan’s Aggressive Intentions in Karabakh and Zangezur No. 396 — Baku, June 26, 1919

[…] The mood among the Tatars is notably elevated, and they evidently consider the Karabakh question resolved. Serious preparations are underway for an offensive against Zangezur, and according to Armenian parliamentary deputies, Sultanov does not shy away from military action—even against the government of Armenia—in order to settle the complex Karabakh issue once and for all.

Sultanov’s belligerent stance enjoys support and encouragement from influential circles. They believe that what cannot be achieved through diplomacy may be resolved by force of arms, and that current conditions are favorable for such a course of action. […]

Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, f. 276, op. 1, d. 42, p. 103. Original manuscript. Translated from Armenian. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. no. 181. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Resolution of the Sixth Congress of Representatives

of the Armenian Population of Karabakh on the Peaceful Settlement of the Karabakh Question Shushikend, June 30, 1919

The representatives of the Armenian population of Karabakh, convened at the Sixth Congress on the initiative of the Armenian Municipal Commission and with the knowledge of the British Mission, gathered with the primary aim of formulating conditions for a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh question through negotiations, pending its final settlement by the World Conference.

In the spirit of fostering good neighborly relations, the Armenian population of Karabakh welcomes any attempt to peacefully define a temporary status quo in the region. It had hoped to resolve the matter at the June 28 session, with the participation of representatives from the Azerbaijani Republic, the British Mission, and the Armenian Municipal Commission.

However, for reasons unknown to the Congress, the aforementioned representatives failed to appear on the appointed day, thereby depriving the Congress of the opportunity to fulfill its principal task. Given the urgency of the agricultural season, the Congress cannot afford to wait further for their arrival.

Expressing deep regret over this setback, the Congress—acting in the interest of all residents of Karabakh, regardless of nationality—deems a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh question essential and is prepared to take all necessary measures toward its peaceful settlement at the next Congress, which can only be convened after the completion of fieldwork.

To this end, the Congress instructs all organizations and officials within Armenian Karabakh to make every effort to preserve good neighborly relations locally, establishing normal interactions as already seen in Ala-Oglat, Gogakh, and other areas.

The Congress expects that appropriate steps will be taken in this direction before the next session, and that the authorities of the Azerbaijani Republic will exert all efforts to restore peaceful and normal relations between Armenians and Muslims—especially along the border, where agricultural work remains impossible.

In this regard, special attention must be drawn to the dire situation of the devastated villages in the Askeran district (Pirjamal and Khankendi), which are entirely deprived of the means to harvest anything.

Simultaneously, the Congress finds it necessary to lodge a formal protest against the clashes organized by Azerbaijani authorities in the city, the destruction of five Armenian villages, the massacre in Kaibalikend, and other atrocities. It demands a thorough investigation to identify and prosecute the perpetrators and to compensate for the damages incurred, as such events eliminate any possibility of peacefully resolving the core issue.

Chairman of the Sixth Congress: G. Khachaturyants Secretary: E. Kamalyan

Party Archive of the Communist Party of Armenia, f. 1022, op. 7, d. 98, p. 5. Original manuscript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923

Resolution by the Authorized Representatives of the Presidium

of the Sixth Congress of Armenians of Karabakh on the Terms of a Temporary Agreement with the Government of Azerbaijan After June 30, 1919

A commission composed of the authorized representatives of the Presidium of the Sixth Armenian Congress of Karabakh—M. Ter-Danielyan, R. I. Shakhnazaryan—and representatives of the Karabakh Armenian community in Baku—S. A. Melik-Yolchyan and N. D. Pirumov—acting upon repeated and insistent proposals from the British Command in the Caucasus and the resolutions of the Sixth Congress regarding the urgent need to prevent developments that could worsen Armenian-Tatar relations in Karabakh, where both peoples have lived peacefully side by side for centuries, entered into negotiations with the Government of the Azerbaijani Republic with the aim of establishing a temporary modus vivendi in the mountainous part of Karabakh.

The commission, while reaffirming the natural desire of the Armenian population of Mountainous Karabakh to join the Armenian Republic, and recognizing that all territorial disputes among the Transcaucasian republics must be resolved by the Peace Conference, and that the dispute over Mountainous Karabakh could lead to bloody clashes between two neighboring peoples—an outcome highly undesirable for the working classes of both nations—proposes the following terms for a temporary agreement to the Government of the Azerbaijani Republic, in the interest of strengthening good neighborly relations:

  1. This temporary agreement shall remain in force until the conclusion of the Peace Conference, whose decisions shall be equally binding on both parties.
  2. The disputed parts of the Shushi, Jevanshir, and Jebrail districts shall be considered temporarily within the boundaries of the Azerbaijani Republic until the Peace Conference concludes.
  3. These disputed territories shall form a separate administrative unit.
  4. A council of six members—three Armenians and three Muslims—shall be established under the Karabakh Governor-General.
  5. A representative of the Allied Command shall serve on the council ex officio.
  6. The Armenian members of the council shall be elected by the Congress of the Armenian population of Karabakh.
  7. All orders issued by the Governor-General shall require the council’s approval.
  8. The council shall have oversight over the Governor-General’s administration and the right of initiative on all matters of governance.
  9. A deputy position shall be created under the Governor-General, to be filled by an Armenian.
  10. The Congress shall nominate two candidates for deputy, one of whom shall be confirmed by the Azerbaijani government.
  11. In areas populated exclusively by one nationality, all positions shall, where possible, be filled by members of that nationality with the council’s consent.
  12. In mixed-population areas, senior positions shall be held by members of the majority nationality, and deputy positions by members of the minority.
  13. The local militia and guards in mixed areas shall be composed of both Armenians and Muslims.
  14. No military units shall be stationed or quartered in the disputed territories.
  15. Any movement of military units within the disputed areas shall require the consent of the Armenian council members and the Allied representative.
  16. Armenians shall enjoy the right to cultural self-determination.
  17. This right shall be exercised through the Karabakh Armenian National Council.
  18. No one shall be persecuted for political beliefs, either administratively or judicially; searches and arrests for such reasons shall be prohibited.
  19. Armenians expelled by administrative order shall have the right to freely reside within the designated areas and shall not be restricted in their rights.
  20. Disarmament and confiscation of weapons shall not occur in Armenian areas.
  21. All destroyed Armenian and Muslim villages shall be restored at government expense, and damages from recent events shall be compensated.
  22. Martial law and states of emergency shall be lifted and may only be reimposed with council approval.
  23. All officials in Armenian areas shall remain in their posts.
  24. To better regulate interethnic relations, an Armenian-Muslim congress shall be convened.
  25. This agreement shall enter into force upon its adoption by a specially convened congress.

Party Archive of the Communist Party of Armenia, f. 1022, op. 7, d. 98, pp. 11–12. Copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. no. 185. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

From the Report in the Newspaper Morning of the South

on the Armenian Government’s Request to Establish a Temporary British Governorship and Self-Governance in Karabakh June 30, 1919*

The Government of Armenia sent a note of protest to the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Erivan, categorically condemning the violent and bloody actions of the Azerbaijani government, which trample upon the rights of Armenian Karabakh and its Armenian population to free self-determination and peaceful cultural existence.

The Armenian government appealed to the British Command with a request to establish, pending the decision of the Paris Peace Conference, a British governorship in Karabakh and self-governance through national Muslim and Armenian councils in their respective parts of the region.

Morning of the South, June 30, 1919 (Date of publication in the newspaper)

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

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