On the Expansionism of Soviet Azerbaijan and the Need to Maintain the Status Quo Regarding Disputed Territories
June 29, 1920
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The new state of affairs must be reflected in our plans for Transcaucasia and compel us to treat the offensive strategies of comrades Ordzhonikidze, Mdivani, Narimanov, and others with even greater caution. These comrades initially sought to impose Soviet rule by force in both Georgia and Armenia and were deeply disappointed when our Central Committee rejected this course. To this day, Comrade Narimanov continues to advocate in his telegrams for the immediate sovietization of all Georgia and Armenia.
Although the Baku comrades were forced to abandon this plan, they have nonetheless retained a strategy of offensive actions against Georgia and Armenia. We have had to expend considerable energy on near-daily interventions to restrain our comrades from such actions. The latest phase of this conflict is Azerbaijan’s assertion of claims over vast districts that have long belonged to Armenia and are currently under the control of the Armenian Republic.
The Azerbaijani government has laid claim to Karabakh, Zangezur, and the Sharur-Daralagyaz district, along with Nakhichevan, Ordubad, and Julfa. Most of these areas are in fact held by the Armenian Republic. There are two possibilities: either Azerbaijan must send its Muslim troops to seize these territories from the very askers who are rebelling against Soviet authority—which would be absolutely unacceptable and a grave crime—or we must reject such a course entirely. This is especially inadmissible now, as Turkish forces are advancing from the south into these very regions, and Azerbaijani Muslim units would immediately join them if deployed there.
The issue of these units is, in general, quite problematic. They are already rising in rebellion, and the Turkish advance will only intensify this tendency. The best solution would be to send them to Persia, though I am not sufficiently informed to know whether this is feasible at present. In any case, there can be no question of sending Azerbaijani askers against Armenians to seize territories that Azerbaijan has arbitrarily claimed.
Another path to satisfying Azerbaijan would be to have our own forces occupy all the named territories and then hand them over as a gift to Azerbaijan. This is precisely the scheme Narimanov envisions. Comrades arriving from the region report that the Muslim askers were to be withdrawn to the rear. The Baku Soviet government, whose domestic policies have led to sharp conflict with significant segments of the Muslim population, seeks to compensate and appease nationalist elements by acquiring for Azerbaijan the territories it now declares disputed.
To execute this scheme using Russian forces is entirely unacceptable. Our role must be absolutely objective and strictly impartial. It would be a fatal error for our entire Eastern policy if we were to base ourselves on one national element against another. To take parts of Armenia and transfer them to Azerbaijan by our own hands would cast a wholly false light on our Eastern policy. It would undermine the perception of our policy as purely disinterested and objective. In particular, it would inflict lasting and irreparable damage to the cause of communism in Armenia.
That is why the decision was made to occupy the disputed territories with Russian forces, subordinated to Russian occupation authority, so that these territories would not be awarded to either Azerbaijan or Armenia until a more favorable political moment arises and a peaceful, mutually satisfactory resolution can be found. The temporary occupation of these territories by Russian troops was intended to calm both Armenians and Muslims.
So far, however, only Shusha and Jebrail have been occupied by our forces, while the majority of the so-called disputed territories remain in the hands of the Armenian Republic. The Turkish advance now compels us to abandon further implementation of this plan. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic categorically states that it is impossible for our troops to occupy any new territories there. The Turkish threat forces us to focus on defending what we already hold, with primary attention to the defense of Baku. Our forces are insufficient to occupy new territories or advance deeper into Armenia.
Thus, it is clear that we must limit ourselves to the territories we have already occupied and refrain from seizing any new parts of Armenia, even those designated as disputed. Refraining from further occupation of territories under Armenian control will facilitate the conclusion of a treaty with Armenia. The Armenian delegation categorically refused to agree to the voluntary transfer of territories under Armenian control to Russian occupation, except for the Karabakh district.
Only on the basis of a military status quo can we hope to conclude a treaty with Armenia, which is essential for implementing our peaceful policy in Transcaucasia. Everything points to the necessity of refraining from occupying any additional territories there beyond those already held. We must strive to conclude a treaty with the Armenian Republic as soon as possible.
Refraining from further occupation will not remove all obstacles to the treaty’s conclusion, as the Armenian delegation insists that we define the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This would require us to immediately cede each territory either to Azerbaijan or to Armenia. We cannot do this now without causing immense harm to our policy toward either side. Therefore, we must do everything possible to avoid the obligation of defining the borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
RGASPI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 332, ll. 1–3 verso. Original. Autograph. (Emphasis added by Y.B.)
On the Suspension of the Movement of Soviet Troops into Armenia No. 24 — June 30, 1920
3. On halting the advance of Russian troops into Armenia It is proposed that Comrade Chicherin issue a directive instructing Russian military units not to proceed further into Armenia. In connection with this, Caucasian comrades should be urged to exercise extreme caution to avoid provoking a Turkish offensive.
Secretary of the Central Committee Archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU, file 44–3/3-a, pp. 54–59. Original. Typescript. CPA IML, General Department, Sector 6, file 44-3/3-e, pp. 54–58.
On the Need to Halt the Further Advance of the 11th Red Army into Armenian Territories, Following Instructions from the RSFSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs July 1, 1920
Ref. No. HP 3751/op/726/Sh
The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has stated: “In modification of previously issued instructions regarding the occupation of Karabakh, the Zangezur district, Ordubad, Julfa, and Nakhichevan, the Commissariat proposes to suspend further advances of units into the specified regions.”
I hereby order the immediate cessation of the advance of the 11th Army units into the aforementioned regions. All units are to remain in their current positions and report in detail on their deployment.
Commander-in-Chief S. Kamenev Member of the Revolutionary Military Council: Kursky Chief of Staff of the RVSR: Lebedev RGVA, file 195, op. 11, d. 24, p. 24.
To the Diplomatic Representative of Armenia in Georgia On Disagreements Revealed During Peace Negotiations with the RSFSR Regarding the Composition of Disputed Territories July 1, 1920
Initial meetings have revealed that the sole obstacle is the border with Azerbaijan, as efforts from Baku are actively obstructing the conclusion of the treaty. They first attempted to persuade the central authorities that Armenia was on the verge of becoming Soviet and should be occupied by military force. The center, however, refuses to take such a step, guided by international considerations and reports from its Caucasian military command, which assess our military strength and resolve to resist Bolshevism.
Thus, the outcome essentially depends on our defensive capacity and determination to confront both internal enemies and external aggression. It can be said that our demands are considered just, and the central party organ has already decided to conclude a treaty with us. Nevertheless, they cannot entirely disregard the will of the Baku Bolsheviks—especially now, when some troops are being withdrawn from the Caucasus, and Baku insists that the Musavatist propaganda succeeds precisely through concessions made by the Armenians.
After prolonged deliberations, the government here finally communicated its decision to us last night. In essence, it reflects Baku’s demand: to consider Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhichevan, and Sharur-Daralagyaz as disputed territories, to occupy them with Russian troops until the dispute is resolved, and to have a mixed commission in the Caucasus determine the final borders.
We categorically reject the disputed status of all these regions except Karabakh. They will now relay our response to Baku and have asked us to inform you of their decision.
In our view, there are three possible courses of action:
Of these three options, we consider the first to be the lesser evil—if you deem the treaty absolutely necessary. Please telegraph your decisions and instructions urgently via wire and radio. Also send the contents of the documents in which the Musavatists declared only Karabakh as disputed.
The unification of Turkish Armenia is, in principle, accepted in the treaty without reference to specific regions. They wish to assume the role of mediator between Kemal and us.
Chairman of the Armenian Delegation: Levon Shant PAAF IML, file 4033, op. 3, d. 42, pp. 1 and verso. Certified copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. No. 363. (Emphasis added by Y.B.)
To Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front, G. Ordzhonikidze On Azerbaijan’s Unfounded Claims to Armenian Territories and Armenia’s Recognition of Only Karabakh and Zangezur as Disputed July 2, 1920
We must reach a compromise with the Armenian Dashnak government. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani government has declared not only Karabakh and Zangezur but also the Sharur-Daralagyaz district as disputed. The latter has never been considered disputed by anyone—not even the Musavatist government, which consistently recognized it as part of Armenia. Without it, Armenia is left with virtually nothing.
After prolonged resistance, the Armenian peace delegation agreed to recognize Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed, hoping that a significant portion of these territories would eventually be awarded to Armenia. However, they categorically refuse to consider Sharur-Daralagyaz as disputed.
On the other hand, we must also reach an understanding with the Azerbaijani government to ensure that our treaty with Armenia does not contradict Azerbaijan’s demands. Given your considerable influence in Baku, we ask you to use it to persuade the Azerbaijani government to recognize only Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed, excluding Sharur-Daralagyaz.
Simultaneously, the insufficiency of our military forces and the emergence of threatening Turkish detachments near Nakhichevan compel us to abandon any plans to occupy new territories held by the Armenian Republic. Our forces currently hold Shusha and Jebrail; we have had to abandon plans to occupy Nakhichevan and Julfa.
RGASPI, f. 85, op. 3c, d. 2, pp. 3–4. Copy from RGASA, f. 4, op. 1, d. 158c, p. 256. (Emphasis added by Y.B.)
To G. Ordzhonikidze, Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front On the Urgent Need to Conclude Peace with Armenia and Find a Compromise in the Territorial Dispute with Azerbaijan July 3, 1920
We have not yet received your response regarding the disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is imperative that we find a compromise acceptable to both sides. Our troops have been ordered not to advance beyond the territories currently held by Armenia. Our forces are too limited, and the Revolutionary Military Council categorically rejects any further advance.
The Armenian delegation agrees to recognize Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed but categorically refuses to include Sharur-Daralagyaz, Nakhichevan, Ordubad, and Julfa. I repeat my request: use all your influence to persuade the Baku comrades to recognize only Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed and to refrain from pressing claims to the other territories.
We must resolve this conflict at all costs, as concluding peace with Armenia is essential.
RGASP, f. 85, op. 1c, d. 2, pp. 3–3 verso. Certified copy. (Emphasis added by Y.B.)
To People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin Proposing the Annexation of Karabakh and Zangezur to Azerbaijan as Autonomous Regions to Prevent Massacres, in Exchange for Azerbaijan’s Renunciation of Other Territorial Claims Not earlier than July 3, 1920
Ordzhonikidze: Please call Comrade Chicherin and inform him that I received his telegram today and am now sending my reply through you. Transmitted via direct line through N. Alliluyeva.
To Comrade Chicherin: I received your telegram on the disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan only last night. The situation is as follows: Azerbaijan insists on the immediate and unconditional annexation of Karabakh and Zangezur. In my view, this must be done, as both districts are economically oriented toward Baku and completely cut off from Erivan—especially now, with the Bayazet Division driving a wedge into the region.
If these territories are left disputed, they will inevitably be occupied by the Turks, and the entire Armenian population will be massacred. We have no means to prevent this. Their annexation to Azerbaijan would provide Azerbaijani communists with a powerful advantage and open the way for nomadic populations.
According to Ter-Gabrielyan, the Armenian delegation will undoubtedly accept this. If resolved in this manner, Azerbaijan can be compelled to relinquish claims to the remaining territories.
My position: Karabakh and Zangezur should be immediately annexed to Azerbaijan. I will ensure that Azerbaijan declares these regions autonomous, but this must come from Azerbaijan itself and must not be mentioned in the treaty.
I have summoned Narimanov to the apparatus. Please share your thoughts.
Ordzhonikidze: … Nadya, please ask Chicherin whether I should wait for a reply at the apparatus, and return to the line immediately. Ordzhonikidze.
RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 17, pp. 66–71. Original. Autograph. Also: f. 85, op. 3c, d. 2, pp. 6–7. Copy from GARF, f. 130, op. 20, d. 17, p. 131. 469
Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”
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