Report of the Karabakh Community Delegation of Tiflis

History

To the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, V. Lenin, on the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Necessity of Resolving the Issue of Its Self-Determination June 9, 1920

The citadel of revolutionary and socialist movements in the Caucasus has been the city of Baku, which continues to exert decisive influence not only over events in the Caucasus but across the entire East.

Baku’s revolutionary influence first manifested itself in Karabakh—specifically the mountainous regions of the Shusha, Jebrail, and Javanshir districts of the Elizavetpol Governorate. This phenomenon is explained by the class composition of the population, which consists almost entirely of land-poor peasantry living in barren mountainous areas and, as a result, largely migrating to Baku’s industrial zones for work.

The revolutionary movement of 1905 in the Eastern Transcaucasus found its echo precisely in Baku and Karabakh.

To properly understand the trajectory of the struggle in Karabakh, one must constantly bear in mind that the revolutionary peasantry of the highlands is predominantly Armenian, while the landowners—beys, khans, and aghalars—throughout Karabakh are, with few exceptions, Muslim Turks. Adding to this, the early 1900s in Transcaucasia were marked by intense conflict between the rising Armenian bourgeoisie and the declining Georgian-Tatar landowning nobility, which was losing both economic and political dominance. This context clarifies the policy of Russian autocracy in 1905, which sought to suppress the revolutionary movement in Eastern Transcaucasia by exploiting ethnic tensions.

With full agreement and active support from the landowners, the autocracy orchestrated pogroms in Baku and throughout Karabakh. The so-called Armenian-Tatar massacres of 1905, provoked by agents of the Russian autocracy, were one stage in the class struggle between the Armenian working peasantry and the landowning class.

Following the Great Revolution of 1917, the revolutionary movement in Eastern Transcaucasia (outside Baku) began on agrarian grounds in mountainous Karabakh and quickly spread not only to the relatively affluent Muslim peasantry of the plains but also to neighboring regions. However, the momentum of the land struggle was halted by the Turkish-German occupation.

The Musavat Party, representing the Turkish bourgeoisie and semi-feudal nobility, looked to imperialist Turkey as the sole protector of its class privileges from the outset of the revolution. The agrarian movement drove these classes into Turkey’s embrace. When the Transcaucasian Sejm—composed mainly of petty-bourgeois peasant representatives—decided to sanction the agrarian revolution with a land act on March 7, 1918, Musavat representatives declared that such a decision compelled them to turn to Turkey and insist on occupation without hesitation. Turkish pasha-led occupation forces, with active support from landowners, flooded into Transcaucasia. The balance of power shifted against workers and peasants.

Georgia’s petty-bourgeois government, where the large nobility had effectively ceased to exist and the threat of restoring noble landownership was negligible, was the first to capitulate, preferring German occupation. Its withdrawal from the struggle led to the capitulation of Armenia’s petty-bourgeois government, where the threat of noble landownership restoration was even less—there were fewer than ten landowners across all of Armenia.

Only proletarian Baku and revolutionary peasant Karabakh refused to capitulate. For them, the fight against the Turks was merely a new stage in the class struggle for land and revolution.

After seven months of heroic defense, the revolutionary citadel of Baku fell, and a torrent of Turkish forces, led by Azerbaijani landowners (beys) and their militias, surged into Karabakh. The peasantry, isolated and poorly equipped, nonetheless mounted a heroic defense at the approaches to mountainous Karabakh. The Treaty of Batum, signed between the Transcaucasian republics and Turkey, was never recognized by Karabakh’s peasantry.

It is essential to note that even Tatar peasants actively participated in the agrarian revolution. As Turkish-bey forces approached, they sought refuge in Armenian mountainous Karabakh—a fact of great significance, deliberately concealed by both Armenian and Tatar nationalists. Karabakh fell under the blows of victorious counterrevolution; peasants retreated to the mountains, resisting every enemy advance. The struggle continued until December, when news of the global armistice reached the region, prompting the Turkish forces to hastily evacuate Transcaucasia under the terms of the ceasefire, making way for the victorious Entente forces, particularly the British.

Karabakh’s peasantry believed that the Allies’ victory would bring liberation from bey domination. But while they waited in the mountains for their “savior”—England—the Musavat Party, as expected, found common ground with the British command. The British, executing the broader mission of their bourgeoisie, saw Musavat as their sole ally and viewed Karabakh’s revolutionary, Russophile peasantry as their most dangerous enemy.

Thus, the British command’s first demand was the complete disarmament of the peasantry that had risen against the Turks and Musavat, and their unconditional recognition of Musavat’s authority, including the incorporation of Karabakh into bey-dominated Azerbaijan. Despite their desperate situation, the working peasantry instinctively understood that the British plan supported their fiercest class enemies. They categorically rejected the British proposal and, at a series of peasant congresses (up to seven in total), resolved to defend their land and right to self-determination with arms in hand. In the worst-case scenario, they considered union with petty-bourgeois Armenia more acceptable than with bourgeois-landowner Azerbaijan. Moreover, Armenia’s peasantry viewed the forced annexation of Karabakh to Azerbaijan as an act of aggression and was prepared to support Karabakh in its struggle, urging its government to do the same.

Armed Resistance to the Entente Forces and the Escalation of the Karabakh Conflict

The Entente forces encountered armed resistance upon entering Karabakh. Their commander, British Colonel Shuttleworth, who arrived to demand submission, was arrested immediately upon stepping onto rebel-held territory. Only through the strenuous efforts of the more cautious faction among the insurgents was he spared from summary execution. Nevertheless, his vehicle was fired upon throughout his retreat.

This resistance, however, could not last long. The Entente’s armed forces occupied key positions in Karabakh, arrested several peasant leaders at Musavat’s request, and expelled them from the region. The remaining leaders, along with the insurgents, retreated into the mountains, where the Entente forces dared not pursue them. The heroic stand of the Karabakh peasants inspired hope among the entire peasantry of the Caucasus.

At the same time, a wave of massive political strikes erupted in Baku against Entente policies, forcing the British command to act with increased caution.

At Musavat’s request, the British appointed as governor-general of Karabakh one of the peasantry’s fiercest enemies—Khosrov-bek Sultanov, a prominent local landowner and former Turkish agent who had long paraded in a Turkish officer’s uniform. Backed by British troops, the command attempted to pacify and bribe the insurgents. These efforts failed, especially as international tensions among the Allies and domestic instability within Entente countries led to the withdrawal of British forces from Transcaucasia.

Freed from British oversight, both sides naturally prepared for renewed conflict, which soon erupted. Musavat and Sultanov launched a new campaign but were decisively defeated by the peasants.

At that time, the internal situation of the Musavatist Azerbaijani Republic was dire, due to a series of militant actions by Baku’s workers. Its international relations with Armenia, Georgia, and General Denikin’s White Army were equally strained.

These circumstances compelled Musavat to seek a temporary agreement with the insurgents. The peasants, isolated in the mountains, cut off from the outside world, nearly unarmed and exhausted by prolonged, unequal struggle, also agreed to a truce—on the condition that their homeland would be protected from actual Musavat occupation.

On August 22, 1919, both sides signed a temporary agreement. The peasants formally accepted Azerbaijani authority but retained de facto control through their National Peasant Congress and local administration. The agreement stipulated that Musavat’s armed forces would not enter the mountainous region and that the peasants would keep their weapons. (A copy of the agreement is attached.) This temporary accord became a truce. But in class struggle, truces are never long-lasting.

During the lull, Musavat worked to strengthen its position at the Paris Peace Conference and awaited spring to launch a final offensive. Spring was the only viable time—not just because mountain passes are impassable in winter, but because it coincided with the seasonal migration of Muslim semi-nomadic herders to the highland pastures (yaylag). This migration provided a powerful pretext to mobilize Muslim peasant masses against the highland Armenians.

It was easy to provoke conflict by claiming that the highland residents refused to allow nomads access to summer pastures. Under this guise, Musavat could rally nomadic peasants under the banners of the beys. Yet despite the near-constant warfare, Armenian highland peasants consistently informed their Muslim counterparts each spring that the mountains were open to them and allowed their livestock to pass freely—an act of class solidarity.

Thus far, Musavat’s struggle against Karabakh’s peasantry had only drawn support from askers (a regular, forcibly conscripted army led by Russian White Guard generals and some Turkish officers) and scattered landowner militias. The broader Muslim peasantry not only refused to join the war but sympathized with the Armenian peasants—secretly supplying them with food, selling them weapons and equipment, and even deserting from the bey-led army to join the rebels in the mountains.

As previously noted, Musavat’s winter offensive with askers and bey militias ended in complete failure and was crushed by the peasants. For the next offensive to succeed, they had to wait for spring, exploit the migration issue, provoke widespread Muslim support, and rally them under Musavat’s banner against the highland peasants. Only by fracturing peasant unity could victory be assured.

By then, the objective situation had begun to favor the insurgents. Denikin’s White Army had been utterly defeated and dissolved like a soap bubble. The victorious Red Army was approaching the borders of landowner-dominated Azerbaijan. The Baku proletariat had regained its strength and was ready to strike at Musavat at any moment. Karabakh’s peasantry looked northward with justified hope, believing that this time, victory was within reach.

This situation forced Musavat to accelerate its plans—to secure its rear before the Red Army reached its borders, neutralize Baku (its capital), and crush Karabakh (its eternal enemy). Baku was placed under martial law, a governor-general was installed, and emergency measures were enacted against the workers. All labor press was shut down, workers’ organizations—including cultural and educational clubs and reading rooms—were destroyed. Labor movement leaders, trade unionists, and even members of moderate socialist parties were arrested. Several young Communist Party activists, especially Muslim workers, were murdered by police agents with the government’s full support (including Musavi Aliyev and Gogoberidze; Ali Bayramov, chair of the workers’ conference, was severely wounded).

With an iron fist, the Musavat government attempted to crush the proletarian movement in Baku. Simultaneously, asker units were dispatched to Karabakh, violating the August 22 agreement—which, incidentally, had already been breached in several areas by Musavat. The peasantry was ordered to disarm immediately and unconditionally.

This campaign began in March, at the onset of spring, and thus could rely on support from nomadic herders. Agitators were sent to villages, urging people to seize the vital summer pastures by force.

The Karabakh Uprising and the Soviet Ultimatum

On March 21, armed hostilities began. The peasant insurgents seized the mountain pass known as the Askeran Gorge, located on the final ridges of the Karabakh Mountains, and laid siege to the asker garrisons in the city of Shusha, the principal city of Karabakh. With the Red Army approaching from the north and the growing unrest among Baku’s proletariat, Musavat’s position became increasingly precarious. A “holy war” was declared against the resisting peasantry. The bourgeois press, serving vested interests, raised an outcry over the Karabakh uprising, accusing the Bolsheviks of instigating it to strike from the rear and thereby ease the Red Army’s capture of Baku.

For the bourgeoisie, it became imperative to crush Karabakh swiftly and decisively. Musavat concentrated nearly its entire army near Askeran, led by White Guard generals Mehmandarov and Shikhlinsky, hoping to deliver a short but devastating blow to the insurgents, secure its rear, and then focus on the northern Baku front, which still seemed manageable.

This situation was closely monitored by left-socialist and communist groups, who never abandoned the rebellious population. It was decided to formalize the spontaneous movement, reveal its true class nature, and draw Musavat’s forces away from Baku and the northern front, thereby giving Baku’s workers a chance to seize power. Several actions were taken in this direction, and both the Soviet military headquarters in the North Caucasus and Baku’s workers were informed via urgent courier.

For nearly three weeks, the insurgent peasantry held out against vastly superior forces. Without any external support, having exhausted their ammunition and lacking artillery, the rebels held off the large army of Tatar beys and their militias at Askeran. Claims that the Armenian government supported and sustained the movement are inaccurate. Under pressure from Armenia’s working masses, the government did issue several diplomatic protests to Musavat, demanding a halt to military operations and even attempted limited armed demonstrations. But it refrained from further involvement, unwilling to tie its fate to Karabakh’s “Bolshevik” uprising and under pressure from the Entente, which—alongside the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia—viewed the Karabakh revolt as a disruption to the anti-Soviet Caucasian coalition’s rear.

The revolutionary peasantry could rely only on its own strength and, beyond the region, on the Red Army—though it remained stationed in Dagestan. Baku was restless but did not openly rise, and the insurgents’ forces began to dwindle. In early April, the Askeran passes were captured by the bey-led army, which rushed along the highway to relieve the besieged Shusha garrison. Horrific pogroms were carried out in and around Shusha. The city and approximately 18 villages were reduced to ashes, and the population fled with the insurgents into the mountains.

The insurgents were defeated, but they had bought time and created a favorable situation for Baku. In the course of this fierce struggle, Musavat was forced to divert nearly all its military resources and energy to Karabakh. The Red Army’s crossing into Azerbaijan and the uprising of Baku’s workers caught Musavat off guard. Power was wrested from its hands, and the banner of Soviet authority was raised over Baku.

News of Baku’s capture sparked indescribable jubilation—not only among the insurgents but also among the entire Armenian working population.

After immense sacrifice, the Karabakh peasantry believed itself finally saved.

However, for reasons unclear, the first act of the Revolutionary Committee (Revkom) of the Soviet Azerbaijani Republic was an ultimatum. It implied that the peasantry’s resistance to the landowners was being interpreted as a counterrevolutionary interethnic war and demanded the categorical incorporation of Karabakh into the Azerbaijani Republic.

The policy of forced and ultimatum-based annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan had previously been the policy of Turkey, the Entente, and Musavat.

The Revkom’s brief, unsubstantiated ultimatum—indirectly endorsed by Comrade Ordzhonikidze, a representative of the central Soviet authority—echoed Musavat’s demands, even as asker units and their reactionary generals still occupied Shusha and held positions in the mountains. This naturally provoked deep anxiety among the insurgent peasants, to the point that many initially viewed the ultimatum as a provocation.

After three years of desperate struggle against the landowners, the Karabakh peasant government had come to equate Musavat with the Azerbaijani Republic. Forced annexation to a republic dominated by landowners had, for twelve years, been the policy of their class enemies—Russian autocracy, imperialist Turkey, the Entente, and Musavat.

In the minds of the broader insurgent circles, anyone pursuing such a policy was seen as an enemy to be resisted.

The Revkom’s ultimatum provided ample fuel for nationalist and anti-Soviet agitation, dampened the morale of the insurgents and the peasantry at large, and pushed them toward nationalist factions.

For the sake of Soviet authority’s prestige in Transcaucasia and throughout the East, to undermine the growing influence of emboldened nationalist provocateurs, and in the interest of the heroic peasantry fighting for land, it is essential to grant the peasantry of Nagorno-Karabakh the right and genuine opportunity to shape their lives according to their own will—to grant true self-determination to the working people.

Any other decision, made without the consent of this peasantry, will be regarded as violence and a denial of the right to self-determination that they have defended for three years under the harshest conditions against all their enemies.

S. Pirumov A. Erzinkyan PAAAF IML, f. 1022, op. 5, d. 53, pp. 2–11. Copy. Typescript. Published in the collection: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. No. 343. 449

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

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