From the Report of People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, at the Meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee

History

On Russia’s Peacekeeping Role in Territorial Disputes Between Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan June 17, 1920

Moreover, we act as peacemakers and impartial arbiters in these countries, mediating territorial disputes between hostile nationalities. All parties have agreed that our troops may occupy the disputed territories and that mixed commissions, chaired by us, shall resolve the questions concerning these territories.

(Source: Transcript of the report by G.V. Chicherin, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, June 17, 1920. Published in Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy, Vol. II, Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958, pp. 638–661.)

📰 From the Bulletin of the Armenian Consulate in Batumi

On the Statement by the Command of the Caucasian Army of the RSFSR Regarding the Entry of Troops into Karabakh and General Dro’s Response June 18, 1920

On May 21, General Dro telegraphed from Karabakh that representatives of Ordzhonikidze—the Chairman of the Military Council of the Caucasian Army—had arrived from Shushi: Ter-Gabrielyan, Kaidalov, and Parnaki. On behalf of Ordzhonikidze, they declared that Soviet authorities intended to deploy Russian Red Army units into Karabakh, up to the Akera River.

Dro replied that such a matter must be addressed to the Government of Armenia, as he lacked the authority to negotiate. He added that the demand to transfer Karabakh to Azerbaijan contradicted the principle of national self-determination.

On May 31, Foreign Minister Ohandjanian sent a note to Moscow, addressed to Commissar Chicherin (with a copy to Levon Shant, head of the Armenian delegation), protesting the demands made by Ordzhonikidze’s envoys. The note stated:

“Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh, having defended its integrity against Turks, Kurds, and Tatars throughout the World War, adopted categorical resolutions at eight successive peasant congresses to join its native Republic of Armenia. On April 20 of this year, the Ninth Congress reaffirmed its unwavering desire to unite with Armenia and categorically rejected any recognition of Azerbaijani authority—even after the political shift and establishment of Soviet rule there.”

Despite this, the Armenian government, wishing to avoid further military suffering for Karabakh’s population, repeatedly proposed peaceful resolution to Azerbaijan, which sought to impose its rule by force.

Now, as our delegation is in Moscow to establish friendly relations between Armenia and Russia, the demand by Commissar Ordzhonikidze that Karabakh be considered part of Azerbaijan—against the clearly expressed will of its people—is entirely incomprehensible.

The Armenian government does not know on whose behalf Ordzhonikidze speaks—Soviet Russia or Soviet Azerbaijan. We reaffirm our willingness to let the people of Karabakh decide their own fate, as they have done ten times already.

We urgently request that the advance of Soviet troops into Armenian Karabakh be halted and that forces be withdrawn from the Hasan Rza Jevanshir district, which lies within the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

🗞 Further Developments in Karabakh, May 23–28, 1920

Reports received from Karabakh on May 23 indicate that Bolshevik activity and propaganda have intensified. The regions of Khachen, Jevanshir, and Gulistan, where Russian troops have entered, have already proclaimed Soviet authority. According to the same sources, Varanda and Dizak also show no intention of resisting the entry of Russian forces.

Subsequent political developments compelled General Dro to withdraw from Karabakh and relocate to Zangezur. On May 28, he entered the town of Goris.

Due to uprisings in the villages of Khezrak and Parnaut, Dro dispatched a detachment to suppress the unrest. The instigators of the rebellion were either killed, arrested, or fled.

(Source: Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 368, Inventory 1, File 5, Sheet 182 and verso. Original typescript. Translated from Armenian. Published in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 350.)

📡 Telegram from Chairman of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee N. Narimanov, Member of the Caucasian Regional Executive Committee Mdivani, Member of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party A. Mikoyan, and Member of the Armenian Committee of the Russian Communist Party P. Nuridzhanyan

To People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR G. Chicherin (Copy to G. Ordzhonikidze) Containing Misleading Information to Justify the Political Line of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze June 19, 1920

The Dashnak government continues its offensive against Azerbaijan in the direction of Kazakh and Kalabek, with the immediate goal of threatening the railway. Armenian comrades who retreated into Azerbaijan alongside Muslims are now fighting against the Dashnaks. Armenian regular forces under General Dro have abandoned Karabakh due to the advance of our troops. Nuri Pasha has retreated to the Persian border and is currently in Jabrayil. Following Dro’s departure, the Armenian population of Karabakh and Zangezur proclaimed Soviet power under Commander Ambartsumyan, who has already established contact with our extraordinary commissioners in Karabakh—Bunyat-Zade and Karaizov. In Armenia, thousands of communists have been arrested and hundreds executed; dozens of rebellious Armenian villages have been suppressed by the Dashnaks. Massacres have occurred in Muslim-populated villages. Over two thousand Armenian refugees have found shelter in Azerbaijan, while others have fled to the mountains. Armenia is effectively at war with Azerbaijan. As for the allegedly disputed territories of Zangezur and Karabakh, which have already been incorporated into Soviet Azerbaijan, we categorically declare that these areas are indisputably Azerbaijani and must remain within its borders. The Julfa and Nakhichevan districts are entirely populated by Muslims, who for over a year have defended themselves against the Dashnak government with the support of local forces. For both military and strategic reasons—including direct access to Turkey—these areas must be occupied by our forces and annexed to Azerbaijan. We consider any negotiations with the Dashnak government, as well as the issue of Turkish Armenia proposed by you, to be untimely. In resolving these matters, we ask that you rely solely on information from local organizations and responsible comrades.

Signed: Chairman of the Azerbaijan Revkom N. Narimanov Member of the Caucasian Regional Executive Committee Mdivani Member of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party A. Mikoyan Member of the Armenian Committee of the RCP P. Nuridzhanyan (RGASPI, f.17, op.84, d.72, l.8)

📨 Request from G. Ordzhonikidze to G. Chicherin

To Confirm the Position on the Karabakh and Zangezur Issues Vladikavkaz, June 21, 1920

Guseinov has just relayed from Baku that Narimanov received your telegram yesterday regarding Karabakh and Zangezur, which speaks of the annexation of these regions to Azerbaijan. I urgently request confirmation: is your telegram of June 19, No. 168/174, still in effect?

— Ordzhonikidze (CPA IML, f. 64, op. 2, d. 5, l. 32. Telegram form)

🗳 Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)

On the Need for Eastern Officials to Align Their Actions with Existing Politburo Decisions and for the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to Draft Special Instructions No. 22, June 22, 1920

  1. On Caucasus Policy Propose that the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs formulate precise instructions for our most responsible officials in the East, based on existing Politburo resolutions and their implications. Require the military department, upon Politburo approval, to issue these instructions to all responsible military personnel, with a warning that they must strictly align all actions with these directives. Similar instructions should be given to all members of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee. Assign the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to send the instructions to comrades Kirov and Legrand.

— Secretary of the Central Committee (Archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU, d. 44-3/3-a, ll. 52–53. Certified copy. Typescript)

🧭 Communication from the Caucasian Front Headquarters

To the Command of the 11th Red Army Regarding the Order from Commander-in-Chief S. Kamenev, Chief of Staff Lebedev, and RVS Member Danishevsky to Occupy Disputed Territories Between Armenia and Azerbaijan for an Extended Period June 23, 1920

To Commander of the XI Army: By order of the Front Command, I transmit the following telegram for execution: “Moscow, June 22, 1920, 17:00. In communication No. HP 11/580 dated June 19, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs indicated that, due to the extremely complex political situation in Transcaucasia, it is necessary for Russian forces to occupy for an extended period the disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan—namely: Zangezur, Karabakh, Shusha, Nakhichevan, Ordubad, and Julfa—while maintaining Russian authority and allowing local soviets to function concurrently.” I order the XI Army to accelerate its advance to occupy the specified territories and retain them under our control, in accordance with the task set by the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. No. 3751/op/72b/Sh. Commander-in-Chief S. Kamenev RVS Member Danishevsky Chief of Staff Lebedev

— Caucasian Front Headquarters: Pugachev — Military Commissar: Pechorsky (RGVA, f. 195, op. 11, d. 24, l. 25)

🗣 From the Record of a Conversation Between People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin and G. Ordzhonikidze

Member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front On the Need to Postpone the Decision Regarding the Ownership of Disputed Territories June 26, 1920

Insist categorically that the disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan be occupied by Russian forces, not Azerbaijani ones. The question of ownership of these disputed territories must be postponed until a more favorable political situation is established.

(GARF, f. 130, op. 4, d. 496, ll. 115–116 verso. Original. Authenticity confirmed by notation.)

📨 Letter-Telegram from Chairman of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee N. Narimanov to V. Lenin

Appealing for a Revision of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs’ Policy on Karabakh [With Reference to Support from Stalin’s Group] and Threatening the Collapse of Soviet Power in Azerbaijan June 27, 1920

Dear Comrade Lenin, From Comrade Chicherin’s telegram, it is evident that the Center’s information is one-sided. The Center has succumbed to the influence of those who continue to act in concert with Denikin’s forces against Soviet power in Azerbaijan. If the Center wishes to sacrifice Azerbaijan and retain only Baku, its oil, and abandon Eastern policy altogether, let it do so—but I must warn: Baku cannot be held without the entirety of Azerbaijan, especially when surrounded by traitorous Dashnaks and Georgian Mensheviks. I also wish to understand how the Center views us—Muslim communists—and how such critical decisions could be made without our involvement. The Center may distrust us, but even responsible figures like Ordzhonikidze and Mdivani disagree with its decision. Frankly, the Center has disarmed us. Its decision on Karabakh has strengthened and legitimized Musavat’s provocations, which claim that Muslim communists have sold Azerbaijan to Russia—a Russia that simultaneously recognizes the independence of Armenia and Georgia, and now considers previously undisputed territories as disputed. Comrade Chicherin speaks of submission to the Center, but does the Center realize it is turning us into a mere façade? The counterrevolution has been suppressed, but it still breathes and is ready to flare up anew, because the Center has placed us in conditions where soon we will no longer be able to act with words, but only with weapons. That is the tragedy of our situation. What a month ago allowed us to counter Musavatist provocations has now been taken from us. We are told we cannot secure for Azerbaijan territories that are entirely undisputed, while we speak of liberating the East. We will, of course, obey the Central Committee’s resolution, but we must declare: we are losing influence among the masses. We once held enormous sway and could implement all decrees regarding the unification of the two republics without resistance—but now this can only be achieved by force. Our representative is departing, and therefore I ask and implore you to temporarily suspend the Center’s decisions regarding Azerbaijan.

— Narimanov

🖋 Lenin’s Resolution on Narimanov’s Letter

“To Comrade Chicherin! Return this to me with two words of response. Can peace be made with Narimanov? — 29.VI. Lenin”

🗣 Response from G.V. Chicherin

“No one is taking anything from Azerbaijan. Karabakh and the so-called disputed territories are temporarily occupied by Russian Soviet forces, and we are not handing them over to either Armenia or Azerbaijan. This does not offend either side. Any other decision would place us on the false path of favoring one side to the detriment of the other. I have discussed this extensively with representatives of the Armenian group of the Third International, with members of the Armenian Communist Central Committee who have arrived here, with Eliava, Kirov, and others. Our decision is the only viable one. Karabakh is historically Armenian, but after massacres in the valleys, Tatars settled there, while Armenians remained in the mountains. We are not handing this district to the Armenians so as not to offend the Tatars. But we are not giving it to the Tatars either, as that would be a deeply erroneous step, contradicting our essential peacekeeping policy. Narimanov seeks to appease the expansionist ambitions of Baku’s Tatars. This is unacceptable. Moreover, Narimanov opposes our policy of compromise with bourgeois Georgia and bourgeois Armenia. The Central Committee rejected the sovietization of Georgia and Armenia because it exceeds our current capabilities. The Mensheviks and Dashnaks will not surrender without fierce resistance. We have chosen the path of gradual decomposition, which is already showing results. Trotsky has even reproached me for excessive enthusiasm for Eastern policy. Members of the Armenian Communist Central Committee say that on May 1, the mood among the masses in Armenia was strongly pro-Soviet—but on that very day, Azerbaijan issued its ultimatum on Karabakh and Zangezur, and everything changed: the Dashnaks immediately gained strength. Narimanov’s policy of indulging Muslim tendencies, combined with the offensive stance of Ordzhonikidze and Mdivani, leads to the strengthening of the Dashnaks, bloody conflicts, and deepening crises. Halil Pasha told our people there that if Armenians stand in our way, they can be exterminated. This indulgence of Muslim ambitions leads directly to such bloody escalations. The only solution is our role as an objective third party. The moment for the sovietization of Georgia and Armenia is approaching—then all of this will be resolved.”

— Chicherin

Lenin’s final resolution:

“To the archive.”

(RGASPI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 14516, ll. 1–2 verso. Original. Autograph.)

🧾 From the Report of the 11th Red Army Command to the Caucasian Front Headquarters

On the Military Actions of Sultanov’s Kurdish Detachments Against Armenians and Their Willingness to Support the Red Army No. 01618, June 28, 1920

On June 23, Zardivshtadiva of the 32nd Division departed for Kurdistan with a political delegation along the route Shusha–Khalifali–Mykhtukyan Mountains–Pichanys (5–12 versts east of Shusha). Near Pichanys lies the residence of Sultanbek Sultanov. Personal negotiations revealed that Sultanov’s detachment is stationed in Kurdistan and consists exclusively of Kurds—up to 2,000 sabers, equipped with Lewis machine guns (number unspecified). Sultanbek Sultanov maintains a front against the Armenians from Abdalyar to Adjilyar (25–35 versts southwest of Shusha). Due to a lull in fighting, 400 foot and mounted Kurds are currently deployed against the Armenians. Sultanov has no information on the regular Armenian forces opposing him but knows that troops of the Ararat Republic are present. The Kurds are well-disciplined, skilled marksmen, excellent horsemen, and highly resilient. Prior to the delegation’s arrival, the Kurds were wary of the Red Army, but after clarifying certain issues and ideas of Soviet power, up to 150 representatives from various villages expressed a desire to establish similar governance in Kurdistan and assist the Red Army—even to the point of joining its ranks. Sultanbek Sultanov stated that if manpower is needed from Kurdistan, he could mobilize up to 5,000 armed Kurds.

— Commander of the 11th Army: Voronkov — Military Commissar: Daikovsky (CGASA, f. 195, op. 3, d. 494, l. 200 verso. Certified copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Doc. No. 358) 460

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

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