December 23, 1920 “…If we alienate the Turks, they will throw themselves into the arms of the Entente and adopt a policy of anti-Bolshevism and territorial compensation in the Caucasus, reminiscent of Turkish policy in 1918. Under such conditions, it will be extremely difficult for us to retain Baku…” Georgy Chicherin RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2655, l. 35. Original. Autograph.
December 26, 1920 “…When we pointed out the dire condition of the Armenian people and the risk of undermining the Communist Party’s authority among Armenian workers, we received the following response [from Lenin]: ‘We are temporarily compelled to sacrifice the interests of Armenian workers for the sake of the world revolution. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have met the same fate. You must understand that we did not hesitate to break with our Latvian comrades—some even left the Party. All we can do for Armenia now is provide food and funds, and deploy, as far as possible, a sufficient number of troops on Armenian territory to make Angora more amenable. But remember, comrades, we do not intend to go to war over Armenia with anyone, especially not with Kemal.’ … Therefore, we decided to keep Saak and Karinyan in Moscow to neutralize Stalin’s influence and to convince Lenin of the correctness of our position…” Source: Armenia. Political and Ethnic Boundaries. 1878–1948. Ed. Anita L. P. Burdett. Archive Editions, 1998, pp. 654–656. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)
December 1920 “…However useful it may be to have Dro in our ranks, I nonetheless consider it politically unacceptable to keep him at the head of the army. Brandishing arms against the Turks or showcasing Dro’s presence as a threat to them is politically shortsighted. The soul of the old government becomes the soul of the new. The Turks still claim that Soviet power exists only in words. I believe that, in the interest not only of Soviet authority but also of resolving territorial issues, Dro should be relegated to secondary roles. Narimanov would be absolutely right if tomorrow he replaced Karaev with Khosro Sultanov. The Ogandzhanian government must be brought to trial. I propose Gay as Dro’s replacement. Dro must be preserved, but we must not surrender ourselves to him.” Ordzhonikidze RGASPI, f. 85, op. 14, d. 35, ll. 27–27 verso. Original. Autograph. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)
Early January 1921 With a sense of fraternal admiration, the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia received news of the historic act by the Azerbaijani Soviet Government on November 30, 1920, concerning Zangezur, Nakhichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. This act serves as a living example of unprecedented relations between neighboring countries, where power is genuinely exercised by the working people themselves—not driven by the desire to expand borders through bloodshed and the tears of neighbors, but by the radiant idea of socialist construction. Soviet states resolve questions that once seemed insurmountable with ease and swiftness. The selfless act of the Soviet Azerbaijani Government has filled Soviet Armenia with a renewed sense of trust and readiness to extend a fraternal hand to its age-old neighbor. … The just resolution of a question which, in the hands of the ousted oppressors—the Dashnaks and Musavatists—had become a shameful and bloody instrument of mutual destruction, now lays a firm foundation for political and economic cooperation between the two republics. Chairman of the Armenian Revkom, Kasyan CGAORSS Armenia, f. 113, op. 3, d. 4, l. 13 verso. Typescript. Published in: Vestnik Arkhivov Armenii, 1989, No. 2, doc. No. 13, pp. 69–70. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)
Kars, January 8, 1921 “…Our conduct in this matter unsettles the Turks and reinforces their belief that we care only for Armenia’s interests, not Turkey’s—and even seek to use Turkey for Armenia’s benefit. These doubts are fueled by: the declaration by our representative in Erivan, on behalf of Russia, of the inclusion of Nakhichevan, Zangezur, and Karabakh within Armenia’s borders, with Azerbaijan’s recognition attributed to our influence; our overly cautious treatment of the Dashnaks, Turkey’s traditional enemies, some of whom were taken under Russian protection as a peaceful delegation with guarantees of full safety; the retention of the Armenian army in its previous form, with Lavrov (?), a sworn enemy of the Turks, appointed; and demands for Van, Bitlis, and Mush on Armenia’s behalf. All this seriously harms our alliance with Turkey. Among the masses—even children—hatred of Armenians, followed by hatred of the English, is deeply ingrained. Both the government and the military command are now under the sway of this entrenched anti-Armenian sentiment, and under this banner they have launched military action against Armenia…” January 8, 1921 Mdivani RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2203, l. 43. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)
Yerevan, January 29, 1921 “…Comrade Narimanov has carried out another important act of great significance for the relations between the two fraternal republics—Armenia and Azerbaijan. By a single declaration, he proclaimed that Zangezur, Nakhichevan, and Sharur are inseparable parts of Armenia, while granting Nagorno-Karabakh the right to determine its own political status. At the same time, he pledged substantial economic assistance to Soviet Armenia. This act eliminates the former border disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and thereby removes the causes that in recent years have led the working people of both republics into a series of military confrontations…” PAAF IML, f. 1, op. 1, d. 169, l. 1. Printed copy. Translated from Armenian. Published in: Vestnik Arkhivov Armenii, 1989, No. 2, doc. No. 4, p. 70. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)
January 29, 1921 “…The ideas of the Third International cannot but be welcomed by any sincere revolutionary… Unfortunately, certain provisions of the International’s program are not applicable in Turkey. It cannot be denied that communism contains a certain disregard for religion… I fully understand that in communism there can be no question of national-state borders… For example, Communist Azerbaijan voluntarily transferred part of its territory to Communist Armenia. In Turkey, national sentiments have emerged only recently, and are therefore especially strong. The people have set as their goal the defense of their independence within national borders. If Armenia were to request a portion of Turkish territory, the people, under the influence of youthful and vigorous nationalist feelings, would undoubtedly reject such a request and actively oppose it…” RGASPI, f. 544, op. 3, d. 46, ll. 40, 42, 44–46. Typescript. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)
February 3, 1921 “…The Armenian communists in Zangezur, numbering 1,200, betrayed us and joined the Dashnaks—using our own rifles. There is no Soviet power in Armenia at present. This angers our responsible comrades, who no longer trust those who remain. It is necessary to remove all Armenian officials working here, including Sarkis, who is stirring everything up*. I ask you to pay serious attention to Comrade Kaminsky’s statement. With communist greetings, N. Narimanov” RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 59, l. 1, verso. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) *As in the original text.
No. 03, February 15, 1921 In addition to my report dated December 4, 1920, I submit the following: The political situation in Karabakh has further deteriorated following the withdrawal of the Red Army from Zangezur. In response, the Zangezur Dashnaks, having organized a peasant council with an “autonomous government” at its head, sensing our weakness, resolved to fulfill their long-standing ambition—establishing Dashnak rule over Zangezur and Karabakh. To this end, the Dashnaks, lacking the means to advance toward Kurdistan, launched an uprising in the 2nd Varanda sector of Shushi district, aiming to unite with the 1st Khankendi sector and completely sever Nagorno-Karabakh from the lowlands. The leader of this effort is Tevan, appointed jointly with Tarkhan from Zangezur, i.e., Nzhdeh. Tarkhan, thanks to measures I personally enacted, was apprehended and sent to Baku. Tevan, subsidized and instructed by the Zangezur Dashnaks, currently leads the uprising, which has engulfed nearly the entire 2nd sector. To date, there has not been a single instance of resistance from any village upon Tevan’s arrival. Party cells typically disband: some join Tevan, while others shamefully abandon their revolutionary posts and flee. There have been cases where our military units, advancing forward, were attacked from the rear—by those who had shouted “Long live Soviet power!” just a day earlier. Thus, the entire 2nd sector has become the enemy’s front. The Dashnaks, occupying this region, now threaten the Khankendi sector, where a similar uprising could easily be incited. Enemy operations show a weakening of focus on the left flank (around Shushi) and increased movement toward Askeran, confirmed by their advance toward Aghdam, occupation of territory up to the village of Yengikend (16 versts from Aghdam), and nighttime preparations near Askeran (picks, shovels, trenches under fire from night patrols). However, with the arrival of Comrade Karaev’s special detachment in Shushi, further advance on this front has temporarily ceased. The Dashnaks are now in a holding pattern, while Tevan has begun forcibly mobilizing the Armenian peasantry. Given that Comrade Karaev’s detachment is relatively small and will not remain in Shushi long, it is imperative to send additional military forces there. Meanwhile, the rear is also unstable. Were we confident in its stability, the threat on the front would be less severe. But the rear is a boiling cauldron whose splashes may scald the apparatus of Soviet power. Here, “rear” refers to northern Zangezur and all of Kurdistan. The former is in a state of complete anarchy and near lawlessness due to banditry and the weakness of the Zangezur district committee. The population, surrounded by bandits from the south and Dashnaks from the west and east, is in a helpless state, leaderless and unsure which authority to obey. Dashnaks repeatedly propose unification, which must be countered. Further north, in Kurdistan, the situation is even worse. In addition to the constant Dashnak threat, there is discord among the Kurds themselves. Kurdistan is divided into three camps: Minkend and Hajisamli (led by Sultan-bek Sultanov) are hostile to each other, while Pirdzhan is neutral. I have twice attempted to broker peace, but Minkend refuses to reconcile and displays anarchic and disruptive behavior toward Soviet governance. They kill dispatched communists or attack them, though they were once considered revolutionaries. Due to these tensions, I relocated the district committee from hostile Minkend to neutral Pirdzhan as a center for final reconciliation. Currently, no Kurd from Hajisamli can safely enter Minkend, and vice versa. Meanwhile, Sultan-bek Sultanov is constantly approached by Dashnak diplomatic agents proposing an alliance against Soviet power, offering to spare the Kurds and even release his arrested brother, Khosrov Sultanov. They appeal to him because he is seen as an authoritative leader, and they know all of Kurdistan would follow him. His influence is indeed great—except in Minkend. Therefore, to prevent Sultanov from joining the Dashnaks and, more importantly, to block the union of Dashnak-controlled Zangezur with the rebellious Varanda sector, it is necessary to use Sultanov as a military force, as was previously done by the 32nd and 28th Divisions. Chairman of the Shushi District Revkom, T. Makhmudbekov CPA IML, f. 85, op. 13, d. 71, ll. 1–2. Original. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, No. 430. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) *Copies sent to the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the People’s Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of Azerbaijan. By Narimanov’s directive, the report was forwarded to S. Ordzhonikidze.
February 16, 1921
Dear Vladimir Ilyich,
A Turkish delegation is traveling to Moscow, accompanied by our representative Beibut Shakhtakhtinsky. I have spoken at length here with the Turkish delegates. I have no doubt whatsoever that the Angora government sincerely* wishes to bind its fate to ours in opposition to England. The most delicate issue for them is the Armenian question; on this matter, they have exerted maximum effort to secure a favorable outcome. […]
They are unequivocally opposed to the Entente; they are prepared to fight alongside us against England to the last man. But if Moscow alienates the Angora government over the Armenian** question, they may, in despair, throw themselves into England’s embrace. What then?
[…] I must warn you: Comrade Chicherin is mismanaging the Eastern question. He is overly absorbed in the Armenian question*** and fails to consider the full consequences should a rupture with Angora occur precisely over this issue. I categorically declare that, given the current situation in the Caucasus (Dagestan and Georgia), if we wish to retain Azerbaijan, we must conclude a firm alliance with the Angora government at all costs****. […]
N. Narimanov
Annotations and marginalia on the letter:
RGASPI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 24501, ll. 1–2. Original. Autograph. Lenin’s notes and signature in red ink and black pencil. Original signatures of Krestinsky, Serebryakov, Radek, Rykov, Kamenev, Bukharin.
February 1921
[…] Based on the data presented above, the final judgment must be made by the central authorities, taking into account the following considerations: […]
Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Representative of the Azerbaijani SSR (signature)***
AVPR, f. 04, op. 39, p. 232, d. 53001, ll. 76–77. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)
On Joint Discussion with the Azerbaijani SSR Regarding the Transfer of Disputed Territories to Armenia February 23, 1921
[…] Chicherin: We should now exchange views on the progress of our work. Technical and military matters should be set aside; you should meet with Sklyansky, Kamenev, and Lebedev. The outcomes must not be committed to paper and will remain confidential. On the other hand, we must examine the Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood, determine which articles to add or amend in the original draft, and so forth. Finally, we must dispel all misunderstandings. To that end, we propose inviting a representative of Azerbaijan, which, as a Muslim republic, ought to inspire your full confidence. Moreover, Azerbaijan plays a specific role in the Caucasus. I have learned that the transfer of territories from Azerbaijan to Armenia has caused you some concern. We will therefore hold three separate consultations. […] AVPR, f. 148, op. 39, p. 232, d. 52998, ll. 1–15. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)
Justifying the Renewal of Territorial Claims by the Azerbaijani SSR Against the Armenian SSR and the Georgian Republic No. 12, Moscow, March 1, 1921
Given the newly established order in the Caucasus, we are now faced with the challenge of creating conditions for peaceful coexistence among the working populations of the Transcaucasian republics and their accession to the Russian Federation. The time has come for this idea to take concrete form. All conscious elements harbor the hope that the Sovietization of the Caucasus will mark a turning point—one that will lead to the decline of mutual national passions and a transition from perpetual conflict to resolution of the region’s entangled situation.
To resolve this issue accurately, it is essential to examine the disputes, territorial conflicts, and economic relations among the Transcaucasian republics. Accordingly, I have listed separately the territories that are the subject of disputes between the aforementioned republics and which give rise to the most acute tensions.
The new order in the Caucasus imposes upon Soviet Russia the obligation to fairly resolve all territorial, economic, and other disputes among the newly formed Transcaucasian republics. This is an extremely difficult task—sometimes even impossible—because territories with mixed populations allow for broad interpretations of the principle of national self-determination. Since the principle of self-determination cannot be fully applied everywhere, the republic that finds itself at an advantage invokes new “principles”—historical rights, economic conditions, border security, the concept of natural boundaries, and so forth.*
Even relatively reasonable forms of these disputes may offend not just one republic, but all of them collectively, leading to dissatisfaction, protests, and ultimately a shift in orientation toward England, Turkey, and others.
In my considered view, among all possible forms of resolving territorial, economic, and other disputes in the Caucasus, the most beneficial, acceptable, and expedient solution is the unification of all Transcaucasian republics—including Dagestan and its mountain peoples—into a single Caucasian republic and its accession to the Russian Federation.
Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Representative of the Azerbaijani SSR B. Shakhtakhtinsky
P.S. Naturally, I will not insist on the inclusion of Dagestan in the Caucasian republic if there are objections or if its implementation proves difficult. Shakhtakhtinsky
B. Shakhtakhtinsky PAAF IML, f. 1022, op. 5, d. 56, l. 1. Copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, No. 433. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) 656
Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”
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