Telegram from Member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee

History

Telegram from Member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, G. Ordzhonikidze, to Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, E. Sklyansky

(Copy to: People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin; Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Armenia, B. Legran; Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Red Army) Regarding the observance by Red Army units of the agreement with Armenia dated August 10, 1920 Rostov, August 27, 1920 No. 757/encrypted. I once again confirm that the Army Command has received a categorical order to observe all agreements concluded with Armenia on August 10, and that no ultimatum has been presented to Armenia after that date. No. 741. RGVA, f. 109, op. 1, d. 40, l. 56. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.) Response to the telegram from E. Sklyansky dated August 26, 1920.

No. 534

Appeal from Commander of the Eastern Front of the Turkish Army, Kazım Karabekir, to the Command of the 11th Red Army requesting permission to destroy Armenia in pursuit of a “common goal” August 31, 1920 …In his letter addressed to the Grand National Assembly, Chicherin stated that the issues concerning borders between us and Armenia would be resolved through the mediation of Soviet Russia. From this reply, I discerned a hint that he would prefer we not engage in combat with the Dashnaks. The same sentiment—i.e., the desire of Soviet Russia to avoid conflict between us and Armenia—was conveyed in your letter dated July 4 to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. For this reason, I have thus far refrained from serious operations and limited myself to defensive skirmishes.

However, I am convinced that the Dashnaks are undoubtedly supporters of the Entente, as evidenced by their continuous active resistance against us. Therefore, I respectfully request permission to eliminate this Dashnak obstacle in coordination with Russian and Azerbaijani Red forces. This is essential for accelerating the achievement of our common goal and resolving the Eastern Question. I earnestly appeal to the XI Army for this authorization. Commander of the Eastern Front, Kazım Karabekir RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 104, l. 22. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.) Note: The original text uses “desire,” though the context suggests “reluctance.”

No. 535

Record of conversation between Member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, G. Ordzhonikidze, and Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR, N. Narimanov, revealing a conspiracy between Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Narimanov against recognizing Armenia’s territorial rights and the position of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, favoring a military solution through Soviet forces No later than September 1, 1920 <…> Comrade Narimanov speaking. Greetings. Bread is still available, issued roughly every other day at 2 rubles. We have a ten-day reserve. Before convening the congress, it is necessary to strengthen Azerbaijan’s political position. I say this in light of Chicherin’s recent telegrams, the contents of which you are aware. I ask you to come immediately to discuss this matter, as we are sending representatives to the center in the coming days. The decision of the Central Committee has completely disarmed us. We are left now only with the force of arms, not the power of words. The provocations by the Musavatists are intensifying. I find your presence here essential. I currently have a telegram for Comrade Lenin. Could you transmit it now?

Chicherin’s latest telegram indicates that after our occupation of this territory, the center declares it neutral, which already suggests that Azerbaijan is losing this territory at present. I am still wondering—will you be here soon? I would like to consult with you before sending our representative to the center. I also ask that you speak directly with Comrade Stalin and identify the source of all this. We have decided to disperse all Armenian groups here and in the center within four to five days. I have nothing further. Agreed. A response must be given to Shakhtakhtinsky. Farewell.

[Ordzhonikidze] Of course, I fully agree with you that Chicherin is hopelessly confused, since Soviet power will be established there and our troops will be present. Regardless of formalities, we will be able to secure these territories for Azerbaijan. After all, no one in the world can prevent us from influencing the population of these regions to express support for unification with Azerbaijan, and to make these areas a base for Soviet agitation against Armenia—something the Mensheviks and Musavatists strongly desire. Establishing the Zakatala district, of course, does not contradict the directives you outlined in your telegram. Awaiting your reply <…> RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 17, ll. 79–81 verso. Telegraph form.

From the Report of the Headquarters of the Commander of Armenian Forces

On the Deterioration of the Situation for Armenians in Karabakh and Zangezur Following the Capture of Askeran, Shushi, and Khankendi by Russian-Azerbaijani Troops September 1, 1920

…Following the occupation of Askeran, Shushi, and Khankendi by Azerbaijani forces, the condition of the Armenians in Karabakh significantly worsened. More than 30 Armenian villages were devastated, their inhabitants exterminated, with only a small number managing to escape into the mountains and thereby save their lives. The arrival of Russian Bolsheviks in Karabakh did not improve the Armenians’ situation; on the contrary, it worsened, as they were stripped of their last possessions.

While it had been possible to resist the small irregular Azerbaijani detachments, it was sheer madness to attempt the same against the Russians, whose numbers in Karabakh reached up to 15,000—well-trained and battle-hardened troops. The Armenians had no choice but to submit and resign themselves to fate.

However, the Russians did not stop at Karabakh and attempted to advance into Zangezur, where they encountered resistance from local Armenians who had not yet been influenced by Bolshevik ideology. After being repelled, the Red forces began concentrating significant troops along the borders of Zangezur. The following units were deployed: the 1st Regiment of the 28th Division, the 281st and 299th Infantry Regiments, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Regiments, and 12 artillery pieces—amounting to a total of 6,000–7,000 bayonets and 800–1,200 sabers.

Having assembled sufficient forces and dispatched agitators in advance to various regions of Zangezur, the Reds launched an offensive on July 5, supported by Tatar bands. Initially, the Armenians mounted a determined defense and inflicted serious losses. However, the lack of ammunition, food supplies, and reserves forced them to surrender. A small group, unwilling to recognize Azerbaijani communist authority, retreated toward the borders of Daralagiaz and, joining government forces, took up positions from Kushibilyak to the Kobchek Pass.

The Bolshevik occupation of Zangezur and Sisian threatened to cut off Daralagiaz from the rest of Armenia and enabled them to link up with the Sharur-Nakhichevan Tatars—an outcome that would undoubtedly worsen and complicate Armenia’s situation. In response, the commander stationed at Kushibilyak launched a swift counteroffensive on August 1, and within three days recaptured all of Zangezur, driving the Bolsheviks and Tatars back to Zabug.

However, the small detachment, isolated from its base and lacking sufficient ammunition, food, and reinforcements, could not withstand the superior forces of the Russians and Tatars for long. On August 8, it again withdrew to the Daralagiaz border and resumed its previous position. The Bolsheviks’ attempt to advance further failed, and soon thereafter, under an agreement between the Armenian government and RSFSR representative Legran, Karabakh and Zangezur were temporarily ceded to the Bolsheviks.

Acting Chief of Staff of the Commander of the Forces, Colonel Vekilov For the Chief of Operations, Staff Captain Agarov Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, f. 200, op. 1, d. 427, l. 182 verso. Printed copy. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. no. 408. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)

No. 537

Dispatch from People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, to Plenipotentiary Representative in Georgia, S. Kirov, Regarding the Need for at Least a Temporary Resolution of the Territorial Dispute Between Soviet Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia September 4, 1920

<…> Postpone the resolution of the Transcaucasian question; for now, this is the only way to escape the dilemma.

Tell Legran: the only serious disagreement with the Armenian government was the issue of border delimitation with Azerbaijan. A temporary resolution of this matter would allow for the establishment of peaceful relations with Armenia. <…> RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2104, l. 7. Copy. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)

Telegram from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Armenia, B. Legran, to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin and V. Lenin

On the Unacceptability of Annexing Zangezur and Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan in Violation of the RSFSR–Armenia Agreement of August 10, 1920, and on the Need to Secure Transit Through Armenia by Diplomatic Means Tiflis, September 23, 1920

<…> Secondly — must we unconditionally insist on securing both routes: the Sarykamysh route and the Nakhichevan–Shakhtakhty–Bayazet route? In my report sent with Kirov, I emphasized how problematic it is to expect an agreement with Armenia regarding the second route, and how little it offers us in terms of direct access to Anatolia. The persistent efforts of Azerbaijan and the Revolutionary Military Council to seize this route are driven by a desire to firmly occupy the disputed territories of Zangezur and Nakhichevan and to secure their annexation to Azerbaijan.

Thirdly — what territorial concessions are we prepared to make to Armenia in exchange for transit rights? I believe we should not fear transferring Zangezur and Nakhichevan to Armenia. First, these territories would only be of use to us as launching points for independent operations in eastern Turkey and toward Tabriz—an idea which, given the current state of our military and Soviet forces in Azerbaijan, is pure utopia. Second, Zangezur is genuinely an Armenian region, where our authority currently amounts to a hostile occupation, as clearly demonstrated during the events in Gerusy. Third, we cannot accommodate Azerbaijan’s territorial claims, because if we offer Armenia nothing, we cannot expect any concessions from them on the transit issue.

Any decision by Moscow on the territorial question, if grounded in objective political calculation, will undoubtedly be acceptable to Azerbaijan. As for Karabakh, we may insist on its annexation to Azerbaijan. If the positions I have outlined are accepted, the prospect of reaching a peaceful agreement becomes more or less likely. Otherwise, I would consider our efforts to resolve the transit issue with Turkey through peaceful means to be entirely hopeless. <…> RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 143–144. Copy; also in f. 5, op. 1, d. 2127, l. 7. Copy. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)

No. 539

Letter from People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, to the Plenipotentiary Representative in Armenia, B. Legran On the Difficulty of Resolving the Disputed Territories Issue September 24, 1920

Dear Comrade, Comrade Ter-Gabrielyan wanted an immediate response from us on the extremely complex issue of the conditions you proposed for negotiations with Armenia regarding transit. You are well aware of the enormous difficulties surrounding the question of territorial ownership and the fierce attacks we are facing from the other side on this very issue. Making a decision in the sense you propose is not easy and in any case requires negotiations and careful deliberation.

It is strange to demand an instant answer over the direct line on such a complicated matter. We are still under constant attack over the August 10 agreement, and now you are proposing steps that go even further. <…> RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, l. 145. Copy; AVPR, f. 04, op. 51, p. 321a, d. 54870, l. 13. Official copy. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)

No. 540

Letter from People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, to the Plenipotentiary Representative in Armenia, B. Legran On the Decision to Leave the Issue of Disputed Territories Temporarily Open October 2, 1920

Dear Comrade, This time, Ter-Gabrielyan’s conversations over the direct line could not yield the desired results immediately, because he raised an extraordinarily complex issue. If you recall the tragedy in Baku caused by the question of disputed territories, you must understand that it is impossible to give a five-minute answer regarding the transfer of disputed areas—particularly Zangezur and Nakhichevan—to Armenia.

The prevailing mood in Azerbaijan is such that any such transfer could lead to a catastrophe. We were forced to discuss this matter at length and with great difficulty over many days, and ultimately reached a clear conclusion: at present, it is not possible to transfer the disputed territories to Armenia, and in general, the issue must remain open for the time being. <…> RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 158–158 verso. Copy; AVPR, f. 04, op. 51, p. 321a, d. 54870, ll. 12–12 verso. Official copy.

Letter from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Armenia, B. Legran, to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. Chicherin

On the Connection Between the Invasion of Armenia by Kemalist Allies of Russia and the Escalation of Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations October 8, 1920

The presence of Turkish nationalist expansionist ambitions toward Kars, Alexandropol, and possibly Ardahan, Adjara, and Batumi is more or less indisputable.

The Turkish invasion of Armenia, in any case, marks a sharp intensification of national hostility and further complicates the already acute issue of Armenian–Tatar relations.

In the interest of our national policy in the Caucasus, it is imperative to bring this armed conflict to an end as swiftly as possible. RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 168–171. Copy. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)

Telegram from Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Ohandjanyan

To People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin; Plenipotentiary Representative of Russia in Armenia, B. Legran; and Head of the Armenian Mission in Georgia, T. Bekzadyan On the RSFSR Government’s Violation of the Temporary Neutralization Agreement for Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan, and Its Complicity in the Invasion of Karabakh by Azerbaijani and Turkish Forces, Resulting in Violence Against the Armenian Population October 10, 1920

Under the agreement of August 10 of this year, concluded in Tiflis between the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR and representatives of the Government of the Republic of Armenia, the regions of Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan were recognized as neutral and subject to temporary occupation by Russian Soviet forces as a neutral power, pending resolution of border disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The very notion of neutrality naturally imposed upon the Soviet authorities the obligation to strictly ensure that this neutrality was not violated—neither by the entry of forces hostile to the Republic of Armenia into these regions, nor, even more so, by the actions of Soviet troops themselves.

However, from the very beginning of the Soviet occupation of these regions, Azerbaijani forces and Kurdish–Tatar bands were granted broad access to the territories of Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan. Simultaneously, similar access was granted to Turkish nationalist forces and their operatives, led by Halil Pasha. These forces, while touring Armenian villages in Zangezur and other areas, threatened total annihilation and coerced Armenian peasants into signing declarations of their alleged desire to join the Republic of Azerbaijan. Villages that refused to comply were attacked and burned with the support of Russian Soviet troops and the participation of Azerbaijani forces and Kurdish–Tatar bands. Community leaders were executed.

In the past few days, the following villages in Zangezur have been devastated: Khachetakh, Khvert, Channy, Khotanan, Khlvad, Artsevanik, Udjanis, Sevatakh, Aladoarlar, Kavart, Barabatum, Gyutgyum, and others. The assault and shelling of surviving Armenian villages in the Kapan region continues to this day.

In other areas, forced conscription of Armenians into Azerbaijani forces is underway, and units formed from these conscripts are being deployed against their own fellow villagers.

The Government of the Republic of Armenia cannot remain silent in the face of such a flagrant violation by the Soviet authorities of the obligations they assumed under the August 10 agreement. At a time when the Armenian government is expecting the arrival of your plenipotentiary delegation in Yerevan to continue negotiations on a treaty of friendship—and when Armenia is defending nearly its entire border with Turkey against the advancing forces of Mustafa Kemal Pasha—the actions of Soviet authorities in Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan, allowing Turkish nationalist forces and their operatives, as well as clearly hostile Azerbaijani troops and Kurdish–Tatar bands, into neutral zones, can only be interpreted by the Armenian Government as Soviet complicity with Armenia’s military adversaries during wartime.

Such actions do little to foster the conditions necessary for establishing friendly relations between the peoples of Russia and Armenia.

On behalf of my government, which sincerely seeks to establish such relations, I urgently request that you issue immediate orders to halt the further destruction of Armenian villages located within the territory of the Republic of Armenia occupied by your forces under the August 10 agreement, to cease all acts of violence and forced conscription of Armenians into Azerbaijani forces, and to remove from these territories all hostile Turkish and Azerbaijani nationalist units led by Halil Pasha. AVPR, f. 148, op. 3, p. 1, d. 1a, ll. 22–22 verso. Certified copy; Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, f. 200, op. 1, d. 581, l. 332 verso. Typescript. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.) 543

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

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