First Addendum to the Draft Peace Treaty between the RSFSR and the Republic of Armenia

Article XIV <…>

  1. Recognition by the ASSR and the RSFSR of the inviolable rights of the Republic of Armenia over the territories of the disputed districts—Nakhichevan and Zangezur—and the withdrawal from these districts of all military units under the command of the RSFSR and the ASSR. In the event of such recognition, the Republic of Armenia, for its part, renounces all claims to the so-called Karabakh region, both mountainous and lowland. <…> NA RA, f. 200, op. 1, d. 628, pp. 8–10. Certified copy. Typescript. Copy certified by the Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the RSFSR in Armenia, L. Schiffers. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

No. 555

Telegram from the Caucasian Front Headquarters to the Command of the 11th Red Army, Conveying the Contents of a Telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Lebedev, Dated 23 October 1920, Prohibiting the Deployment of Muslim Units in Territories Disputed Between Armenia and Azerbaijan 29 October 1920

To the Commander of the 11th Army… 29 October 1920. By order of the Front Commander, the following is transmitted for execution—a copy of the telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council, No. 6411/op.: “Moscow, 23 October 1920, 14:15. The Government of Armenia has repeatedly lodged complaints regarding the replacement of our units in the territories disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan with Muslim units. Therefore, I request once again that the Command of the 11th Army be categorically instructed not to deploy any Muslim units whatsoever in the aforementioned disputed territories. Please inform us of your orders. Report urgently on the measures taken for submission to the Chief of Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council.” No. 11. Chief of Staff of the Caucasus Front – Pugachev. Military Commissar – Pechersky. RGVA, f. 195, op. 11, d. 24, p. 43. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

No. 556

Letter from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, to the Plenipotentiary Representative B. Legran on the Political Motives Behind the Soviet Government’s Postponement of a Decision Regarding the Status of Disputed Territories 29 October 1920

<…> At present, it is especially important for us to maintain the friendly attitude of the left-wing public opinion in England, which supports us and serves as a serious counterweight to Churchill’s policies. Meanwhile, Armenia enjoys considerable popularity among the left bourgeois and trade unionist circles, and actions that portray us as aggressors toward Armenia are extremely detrimental. Precisely during the Turkish advance, it is even more crucial for us to refrain from belligerent actions that might give the impression of a military alliance with the Turks or that we are jointly launching hostilities. It is better to delay all current issues concerning Armenia than to provoke a crisis in our relations with her. Of course, securing transit through Armenia and detaching her from the Entente are of great importance to us, but these goals must not be pursued through threats or military posturing. Our demands for transit and a shift in Armenia’s orientation must be reiterated consistently, but in a friendly tone. <…> As for the occupation of disputed territories, naturally, they should be held by our troops, not Azerbaijani ones. When I wrote that the railway to Julfa was occupied by Turks and insurgents, I meant that they were there before our arrival and that it is impossible for us to dislodge the Turks or Armenian communists by force. As for the question of transferring the disputed territories we have occupied to either Armenia or Azerbaijan, we still consider it necessary to postpone any decision until a more favorable time, and in the meantime, to continue our occupation. RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, pp. 192–193. Copy; AVPR, f. 04, op. 51, p. 321a, d. 54870, pp. 10–10 verso. Draft. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

No. 557

Telegram from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Armenia, B. Legran, to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. Chicherin, on the Conditions of Armenia’s Consent to Military Transit 1 November 1920

Negotiations concluded with the Armenians agreeing to the military transit of troops via all railways of Armenia and in all directions. They also granted us communication lines. Armenia recognizes our friendly mediation in territorial matters concerning Turkish Armenia. Armenia’s conditions: first, the incorporation of Zangezur and Nakhichevan into Armenia and the withdrawal of our troops from these districts, accompanied by Armenia’s renunciation of claims to Karabakh. RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, p. 136. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Telegram from the Chief of the Operational Council of the Field Headquarters of the RVSR, Garf, to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin

Including the text of a telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Front, Pugachev, to the Chief of the Field Headquarters of the RVSR, Lebedev, regarding the movement of a Turkish Rifle Regiment through Zangezur and Nakhichevan Moscow, 2 November 1920

<…> A Turkish Red Rifle Regiment has been dispatched from Gerusy via Engelayurt and Nakhichevan toward Bayazet, at the insistence of the Bureau of Turkish Communists and in accordance with directives from Comrade Ordzhonikidze, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front. The regiment is moving under the protection of our unit, which has been tasked with preventing ethnic massacres between Turks and Armenians. No. 1165/op. Caucasian Front Headquarters – Pugachev. Military Commissar – Pechersky. No. 6491/os. Operational Council – Garf. Military Commissar – Klim. RGVA, f. 6, op. 10, d. 303, p. 129.

No. 559

From a Letter by the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, to the Plenipotentiary Representative in Armenia, B. Legran, on the Potential Role of Armenia as a Barrier Against Possible Expansionist Policies of the Kemalists 3 November 1920

…An even more difficult task lies before us in Armenia, following its appeal for our mediation after the fall of Kars. At the moment of writing this letter, the key issues related to this matter remain unresolved. It is still unclear how far we should go in our demands if we assume the role of mediator, and how far we can extend the responsibility we are willing to bear. Both general political and specific military considerations are involved. We must assess our strength and determine to what extent our overall policy—and the role of Turkish nationalists within it—might be complicated by a decisive stance against them, should Armenia accept our terms. If, for instance, Armenia agrees to Sovietization, we will bear the responsibility and obligation to fulfill it. Precisely now, as a profound shift is evidently occurring in the Entente’s policy toward Turkey, and in the Turkish nationalists’ policy toward the Entente, we must weigh every step with utmost caution. At present, it is unclear whether the Turks are advancing under a Soviet orientation in an effort to draw closer to us, or whether they are acting on a shift in their policy and a covert agreement with the Entente, aiming to launch expansionist operations in the Caucasus reminiscent of 1918, as compensation for losses in the West. This uncertainty compels us to be extremely cautious. At the same time, this danger forces us to seriously consider the potential role of Armenia and Georgia as partners in countering a renewed Turkish offensive policy. By the time you receive this letter, you will undoubtedly already have in hand the results of the local consultations, conveyed via encrypted messages containing the final decision. —Chicherin RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, pp. 199–200. Copy; AVPR, f. 148, op. 3, p. 1, d. 5, pp. 9–10. Original; f. 04, op. 51, p. 321a, d. 54870, pp. 8–9. Draft. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Letter from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, to I. Stalin

On the Possible Shift in Kemalist Orientation and the Role of Armenia as a Barrier Against Expansionist Policies of Turkish Nationalists 5 November 1920

<…> In our relations with Armenia* and Georgia, we must never forget that, with a new turn of the historical wheel, these countries may prove necessary to us as barriers against the expansionist policies of Turkish nationalists who have changed sides. In our reliance on Muslim solidarity, we must constantly bear in mind that, as was already the case in Afghanistan, anti-Bolshevik tendencies may one day outweigh anti-British ones.

I have consistently warned—and continue to warn—against the one-sided reliance on Muslim solidarity, a position represented by Narimanov. At present, we advocate maintaining our current stance toward the Kemalists, so as not to lose what influence we still hold and not to push the wavering into the opposing camp*.

Our proposal to the Central Committee is therefore to continue providing them with subsidies and, depending on the course of their policies, even to send them arms. In this latter regard, of course, we must be extremely cautious and prudent, and continue arms shipments only while closely monitoring their actions. <…> Any demand for the Sovietization of [Armenia], in whatever form it may be presented, will entail serious responsibilities and obligations on our part, which we would be compelled to fulfill. If we issue such a demand and it is accepted, we will have to intervene decisively against the Turks. You recall our debates on this issue and understand why a decision cannot be made immediately, given the complexity of the matter. You will also remember how, during earlier discussions in the Central Committee, the situation was so unclear that it was difficult to formulate a definitive resolution. It is possible that, under the influence of Armenia’s appeal for assistance and mediation, the Central Committee will adopt a clearer position. In any case, for us to agree to mediation, we must demand both transit through Armenia and its renunciation of alliance with the Entente. <…> AVPR, f. 04, op. 39, p. 232, d. 54987, pp. 42–44. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) *This sentence is underlined in the original document.

No. 562

Telegram from I. Stalin and Member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, G. Ordzhonikidze, to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin On the Unacceptability of the Territorial Settlement Proposed by Legran in the Draft Treaty with Armenia Baku, 5 November 1920

Legran arrived with a draft treaty; no ultimatum was presented to the Armenian government. The draft treaty grants Armenia the districts of Nakhichevan and Zangezur; in return, we gain the right to transport arms to Turkey, etc., provided the Turks, under our pressure, withdraw to the 1914 border. The draft cannot be signed immediately and requires* thorough review and substantial revision. Legran should travel to Moscow to provide clarification. No. 159. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 5224, p. 1. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) *The document mistakenly reads “begins.”

No. 563

Telegram from I. Stalin to V. Lenin Outlining Political Arguments Against Settling the Territorial Dispute Between Soviet Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia Based on Retaining Nakhichevan for Armenia Baku, 5 November 1920, 22:15

Note: “via the duty political controller.” Message No. 3 …** For orientation:

  1. <…>
  2. The situation in Turkey is unclear and may become dangerous if Kemal reaches an agreement with the Entente, as neutralizing Kemal would facilitate an Entente advance on Baku. Without thorough reconnaissance and clarification of the situation in Turkey, no treaty with Armenia should be signed that would grant Armenia—i.e., the Entente—a strategically vital region with a Muslim population and draw us into conflict with Turkey. For now, the treaty with Armenia should be delayed, while we maintain the appearance of seeking a peace favorable to Armenia, and later we shall see. —Stalin RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 1987, p. 1. Original. Autograph. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) **Ellipsis in the original text.

No. 564

Radiogram from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Armenia, B. Legran, to the Soviet Mission in Erivan Explaining the Motives Behind Stalin’s Group’s Negative Stance Toward the Proposed Treaty’s Resolution of Disputed Territories Baku, 6 November 1920

Marked “Extremely urgent. Out of turn.” At the Baku meeting attended by Stalin, a negative attitude toward our treaty was revealed. First, due to concerns over complications with the Turks regarding the withdrawal of their troops to the 1914 border. Second, because of the disputed territories, which are considered highly important for influencing developments in Persia. At the same time, it is believed that we are practically unable to take any action regarding the Turkish advance, although our stance on this remains sharply negative. Formally, Turkey is not bound by any treaty with us, and we cannot make demands of it. Moreover, it is believed that if peace is concluded with Armenia, the Turks could easily secure transit themselves. Granting Armenia the disputed territories in exchange for transit is seen as too high a price. <…> RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, p. 203. Certified copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Memorandum Transmitted via Direct Line by the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Armenia, B. Legran, to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. Chicherin

On the Opposition by Azerbaijan and Stalin’s Group to the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Armenia and to Russia’s Mediation in the Turkish Withdrawal to the 1914 Border 7 November 1920

<…> The treaty faces objections: first, due to fears of mutual complications with the Turks in connection with the demand for their withdrawal to the 1914 border; second, regarding the transfer of the disputed regions of Zangezur and Nakhichevan to Armenia. <…> The situation has become extremely difficult. From the standpoint of our policy, I still consider the conclusion of a peace treaty and our mediation—with the aim of halting Turkish military operations and securing the evacuation of territory to the 1914 borders—as the only acceptable solution. <…> RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, pp. 214–215. Copy.

No. 566

Record of a Direct-Line Conversation Between the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, and the Plenipotentiary Representative in Armenia, B. Legran On Stalin’s Rejection of the Draft Treaty with Armenia and the Decision to Leave the Status of Zangezur and Nakhichevan—and Therefore Karabakh—Unresolved Baku, 7 November 1920

L[egran]: I await your response to the memorandum. Ch[icherin]: Stalin’s cipher No. 164 has not yet been decrypted. L[egran]: Comrade Chicherin, I am requesting a response to my memorandum, not to Stalin’s cipher. Legran on the line. Ch[icherin]: Comrade Chicherin on the line. Listen, here it is: Stalin’s cipher No. 164 is still not decrypted. Ciphers 158, 159, and 160 are distorted and do not provide the full draft. Your draft treaty with Armenia is outdated. Events have overtaken it. Only mediation remains, to halt the Turkish advance. Once the Turks stop, we will discuss the rest gradually. <…> The conditions for the Armenians are addressed in more detail in a cipher that has not yet been delivered to you. The question of Zangezur and Nakhichevan must remain open. <…> RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, p. 207. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

No. 567

From Protocol No. 2 of the Joint Session of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Baku Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, and the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) On Stalin’s Position Regarding Azerbaijan as a De Facto Part of Soviet Russia 8 November 1920

Stalin: Now, regarding Azerbaijan. There is an independent Azerbaijan that voluntarily entered into an agreement with Russia. You are surrounded by bourgeois states that are spreading propaganda claiming that the Russians have taken everything here. It is now advantageous for us to demonstrate Azerbaijan’s independence. True independence of communists from communists is impossible. <…> RGASPI, f. 85, op. 13, d. 85, p. 5. Original. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) *Present: Members of the Central Committee—Narimanov, Kaminsky, Egorov, Kuliyev, Sarkis, Buniatzade, Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Stasova, Pavlovich, Legran, Mdivani, Gabrielyan, and others.

No. 568

Telegram from the Chief of the Operational Council of the Field Headquarters of the RVSR, B. Shaposhnikov, to the Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, E. Sklyansky (Copy to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin) On the Participation of a Turkish Regiment in Combat Operations Against Armenia in Zangezur Urgent. Secret. Moscow, 8 November 1920

By order of the Revolutionary Military Council Headquarters, I report that according to the Caucasian Front Headquarters, the Turkish regiment dispatched to Gerusy and Nakhichevan reached Karakilisa (25 versts west of Gerusy) in combat on 5 November, where it engaged significantly superior enemy forces. After exhausting all ammunition during the battle, the Turkish regiment retreated to Gerusy under enemy pressure on 6 November. No. 6600/op. Signed: Chief of Operational Council – Shaposhnikov Military Commissar – Klim RGVA, f. 6, op. 10, d. 303, p. 126.

No. 569

Transmission via Direct Line of the Text of a Secret Memorandum from Member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, G. Ordzhonikidze Via Secretary of the Revolutionary Military Council and Military Commissar of the Caucasian Front, Gelman, to Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, V. Trifonov On Preparations for a Red Army Offensive Against Armenia Under the Pretext of Defending It from the Kemalists 9 November 1920

(Gelman): On the line—Operational Commissar and Secretary of the Revolutionary Military Council, Gelman. By order of Comrade Trifonov, please explain the situation. (Mirazbekyan): Receive and transmit the memorandum to Secretary Comrade Trifonov. <…> In connection with Kemal’s* advance on Armenia, it is highly likely that we will have to intervene to save Armenia, and it will have to be Sovietized, for which cavalry will be primarily needed. Such an order may be issued to the Front by the Commander-in-Chief within a few days. Speak with Gittis and report what can be redeployed. <…> Awaiting response. —Ordzhonikidze Awaiting response on the line. Secretary Mirazbekyan. RGVA, f. 109, op. 3, d. 80, p. 278. 570

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

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