Conveying Turkish disapproval of the Azerbaijan SSR’s renunciation of disputed territories in favor of Armenia and his “arguments” for reconsidering this decision First half of March 1921*
<…> Karabekir candidly told me that it would be a grave misfortune for Turkey and undoubtedly disadvantageous for Russia if mutual understanding between them were not achieved…
Karabekir was deeply troubled by the decision of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee to cede Zangezur and the Nakhichevan region to Armenia, especially following Mustafa Kemal’s telegram expressing profound satisfaction with Azerbaijan’s finalized status and pleading, on behalf of the Grand National Assembly, to preserve this status so as not to provide material for enemy provocation. While Karabekir refrains from overtly condemning the act, he believes that, for tactical reasons, the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee should not have rushed to resolve the issue—at least not before the conclusion of the conference—since the act is perceived as being influenced by Russia.
In my considered opinion, the following steps should be taken: <…> Establishing the independence of this region under Russian protection would likely satisfy the Turks. It is possible that in the near future, circumstances may compel us to initiate moves toward Persian Azerbaijan on behalf of an autonomous Nakhichevan region—but such actions must never be undertaken by or in the name of Armenia.
Due to Turkish propaganda, Armenia is currently unable to receive grain from the Makinsky Khanate, but the situation would change entirely, and Armenia would receive grain and other supplies if Nakhichevan were autonomous.
Furthermore, it must be noted that if Nakhichevan is annexed to Armenia, the Turks will immediately respond by seizing the Makinsky Khanate, which would be detrimental to us in every respect.
B. Shakhtakhtinsky RGASPI, f. 85, op. S/Turkey, d. 31, pp. 1–2. Original. Autograph. (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.) *Dated by content.
First half of March 1921*
<…>
The Nakhichevan region, being of strategic importance, must under no circumstances be placed under Turkish protection. Likewise, it must not be annexed to Armenia at present, for two reasons: first, the local population opposes it; second, the Turks will not accept it. Therefore, for now, the region should be transformed into a self-governing entity under Russian protection. This approach would shift the Turkish position and would not fail to satisfy Armenia.
If we establish this region as a self-governing unit under Russian patronage, we can immediately begin trade through it with the wealthiest Persian provinces and will be able to feed not only Armenia but also our military units stationed there—thus relieving the center of all provisioning concerns regarding Armenia. It is possible that certain circumstances may compel us to initiate actions from the autonomous Nakhichevan region toward Persian Asia, or perhaps even against Turkey—but such actions must never be undertaken by or in the name of Armenia. Finally, we must bear in mind that if Nakhichevan is annexed to Armenia, the Makinsky Khanate will immediately declare itself part of Turkey, which would be disadvantageous to us in every respect.
<…>
Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Representative of the Azerbaijan SSR B. Shakhtakhtinsky RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 104, pp. 97, 97 verso. (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.) *Section on the situation in Azerbaijan omitted.
On the Deployment of an Azerbaijani Red Army Detachment to Karabakh to Suppress the Armenian Population’s Liberation Movement under the Pretext of Combating Counterrevolution March 2, 1921
Heard: …II. Comrade Vezirov’s report on the situation in Karabakh.
Resolved:
PAAZF IML, f. 1, op. 74, d. 124, p. 49 verso. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, No. 434.
On the Territorial Claims of the GNAT Government to All of Armenia under the Pretext of “Unity of Interests” Between Turkey and the RSFSR March 4, 1921
<…> The Turkish delegation speaks extensively of its revolutionary aspirations and unity of interests with us against imperialism, but in practice it puts forward excessive demands: beginning with the inviolability of the National Pact and the Treaty of Alexandropol, which in effect means the transfer of Batum and all of Armenia to Turkey—partly overtly, partly covertly. <…>
Chicherin RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2117, pp. 1–2. Copy. (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.) *On official letterhead: RSFSR. Cipher Department of the Office of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
Presenting the Position of the Russian Bolshevik Leadership at the Soviet–Turkish Conference in Moscow March 4, 1921
<…> Armenia will undoubtedly have to adhere to Lenin’s principle of the greatest national sacrifices. It will have to renounce not only the imperialist Dashnak ambitions and the idea of a Greater Armenia, but possibly even the more modest desire to unite those lands that have always been considered Armenian. <…>
“Life of the Nationalities,” March 4, 1921. (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.)
Supporting Azerbaijan’s Claims to Nakhichevan March 6, 1921, Kremlin
<…> 4. On the question of Nakhichevan, the final word is to be given to the representative of Azerbaijan.
RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 824, p. 8. Original. Autograph.
On the Interlinked Resolution of the Batum Question in Favor of Georgia and the Nakhichevan Question in Favor of Azerbaijan March 10, 1921
Regarding the territorial agreement with the Turkish delegation:
The Turkish delegation agrees to transfer Batum along with the territory we requested under the suzerainty of Georgia, on the condition of broad local administrative autonomy for the population, recognition of Muslim rights in the spheres of culture, religion, and land ownership, and the provision of free transit for goods and all types of merchandise with Turkey, exempt from duties and taxes, including the right to duty-free use of the harbor. <…>
Nakhichevan will be recognized as an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, on the condition that Azerbaijan does not transfer this protectorate to any other state.
All of the above stipulations are essential conditions of the agreement with Turkey and have therefore been accepted by me. <…>
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin RGASPI, f. 5, op. 2, d. 315, p. 24. Original. Autograph.
On Turkey’s Refusal to Allow Future Changes to the Armenian-Azerbaijani Border in Nakhichevan March 12, 1921
<…> The Russian delegation noted that the border between Nakhichevan and Armenia might be considered provisional. Should any changes be agreed upon in future direct negotiations between these two states, such changes should not be interpreted as a violation of Azerbaijan’s commitment not to relinquish its protectorate. A final resolution of the issue is deemed difficult due to significant recent population movements in both countries.
The Turkish delegation insisted that this matter is of critical importance for the security of Turkey’s eastern frontier and must be resolved definitively, excluding any possibility of future negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the subject.
The Russian delegation responded that, in such a case, the border previously proposed by Azerbaijan itself should be upheld, as it is impossible to alter the demarcation line from Moscow without consulting the concerned government and population.
At the proposal of the Turkish delegation, it was decided to assign the Sharur-Daralayaz district to the territory of Nakhichevan. As for the disputed section of the Erivan district, the border—beginning at Kemurlu-Dagh (elevation 6930), Mount Sarai-Bulak (8071), and Ararat Station—shall be subject to rectification by a joint commission composed of Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Turkish representatives. <…>
RGASPI, f. 298, op. 1, d. 106, pp. 75–83. Copy; AVPR, f. 04, op. 39, p. 232, d. 52998, pp. 48–56. Original. A similar French-language version appears on pp. 57–60, indicating that the protocol was signed by G. Chicherin, D. Korkmasov, Yusuf Kemal Bey, Riza Nur Bey, and Ali Fuad Pasha. (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.)
Providing for the Transfer of Armenian Territory to Turkey and Azerbaijan in Violation of This Very Principle and Without Armenia’s Consent March 16, 1921
The Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, sharing the principles of fraternity among nations and the right of peoples to self-determination, recognizing their solidarity in the struggle against imperialism, and acknowledging that any hardship inflicted upon one of the two peoples worsens the condition of the other, being wholly inspired by the desire to establish enduring cordial relations and an unbreakable sincere friendship based on mutual interests, have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood and have appointed the following plenipotentiaries:
For the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic: Georgy Chicherin, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs and member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and Djelal-Eddin Korkmasov, member of the same Committee.
For the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey: Yusuf Kemal Bey, People’s Commissar for National Economy and deputy for Kastamonu; Dr. Riza Nur Bey, People’s Commissar for Education and deputy for Sinop; Ali Fuad Pasha, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador and deputy for Angora.
Having exchanged credentials found to be in proper and lawful form, the plenipotentiaries agreed to the following:
Article I Each Contracting Party agrees in principle not to recognize any peace treaties or other international acts that may have been imposed by force upon the other Contracting Party. The Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic agrees not to recognize any international acts concerning Turkey that are not recognized by the National Government of Turkey, currently represented by its Grand National Assembly. The term “Turkey” in this Treaty refers to the territories included in the National Turkish Pact of January 28, 1920 (1336), formulated and proclaimed by the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in Constantinople and communicated to the press and all governments.
The northeastern border of Turkey is defined as follows: beginning at the village of Sarp on the Black Sea, passing through Mount Khedismta, following the watershed line of Mount Shavsheti and Mount Kanni-Dagh, then along the northern administrative boundary of the Ardahan and Kars sanjaks, and along the thalweg of the Arpa-Chay and Araks rivers to the mouth of the Lower Karasu. (A detailed description of the border and related issues is provided in Annexes I(A) and I(B) and on the attached map signed by both Contracting Parties.) <…>
Article III Both Contracting Parties agree that the Nakhichevan region, within the boundaries specified in Annex I(C) of this Treaty, shall constitute an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, on the condition that Azerbaijan shall not transfer this protectorate to any third state. <…>
Article XV Russia undertakes to take the necessary steps with respect to the Transcaucasian Republics to ensure their mandatory recognition, in treaties they may conclude with Turkey, of the provisions of this Treaty that directly concern them. <…>
USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy. State Publishing House for Political Literature. Moscow, 1959. Vol. III, pp. 597–602. (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.)
To the Central Committee of the RCP(B), G. Chicherin, I. Stalin, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Republic, Assessing the Borders Established by the Moscow Treaty as Endangering the Armenian People with Extermination in the Event of War with Turkey Not earlier than March 16, 1921
<…> To summarize, it must be emphasized that the new borders of the Transcaucasian republics create an extremely favorable strategic situation for a Turkish invasion into Transcaucasia, to the detriment of its defense and vital centers.
The defense of Transcaucasia would thus be reduced to defending the approaches to Tiflis and Baku, which would necessitate the evacuation of the Erivan and Aleksandropol districts—amounting to a renewed extermination of the remnants of the Armenian working people.
RGASPI, f. 85, op. S/Turkey, d. 29, pp. 32–34. Original. (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.)
Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front, To G. Atarbekov, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Cheka in Azerbaijan and Armenia, Regarding the Policy of Terror Against the Population of Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur March 18, 1921
According to reports from numerous comrades, senseless executions are being carried out in your area of operations—prisoners are being shot, and so on. I categorically insist on extreme caution and that under no circumstances should prisoners be harmed. In general, I consider the method of terror and wholesale intimidation of the population to be absolutely unacceptable.
Please report what is happening and to what extent these reports are accurate. Indicate how many have been executed during the military operations.
Ordzhonikidze RGASPI, f. 85, op. 14, d. 74, pp. 1–2. Original. Autograph. (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.)
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, To G. Ordzhonikidze, Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front, And to M. Orakhelashvili, Member of the Georgian Revolutionary Committee, On Turkey’s Claims to the Role of Protector of the Azerbaijan SSR April 4, 1921
<…> The treaty with Azerbaijan must reproduce Article III of the Russo-Turkish treaty. Special attention must be paid to ensuring that the treaty with Azerbaijan does not contain the unacceptable and inadmissible provisions found in the draft developed by the Turks with Shakhtakhtinsky, in which Turkey effectively assumed the role of protector over Azerbaijan. The Turks are inclined to claim the role of protector over all Muslims in all countries. This must not be tolerated under any circumstances, and Azerbaijan in particular must firmly defend its independence against any Turkish attempts to assume the role of guardian of Muslims in other countries. <…>
Chicherin RGASPI, f. 298, op. 1, d. 106, pp. 3–3 verso. Copy. (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.)
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, To M. Guseynov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Regarding the Erroneous Transfer of Part of the Erivan Province to Azerbaijan Along with Nakhichevan April 12, 1921
<…> There is an issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning Nakhichevan. The article on a tripartite commission of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to clarify the border in the triangular zone arose as follows: when it was decided that Nakhichevan would come under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, the Turks defined the borders of the Nakhichevan region according to the Treaty of Alexandropol—that is, they annexed in favor of Nakhichevan the southern triangular portion of the Erivan province. Due to an oversight by military experts, and without our knowledge, this was accepted by a special commission of military experts on borders.
Therefore, when the matter returned to the conference, the only thing we could do was to protest the direction of the border in the southern triangular area. After a long struggle, it was decided that a commission of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey would definitively clarify the border in this area.
Previously, when Shakhtakhtinsky discussed Nakhichevan with us, he considered the extreme limit of the Nakhichevan region to be the Wolf’s Gate. However, the triangular zone—that is, the southern triangular portion of the Erivan province—lies beyond the Wolf’s Gate, thus exceeding even Shakhtakhtinsky’s own claims.
Please discuss this in advance and report where, in your view, the border between Nakhichevan and Armenia should properly run. This border must be preliminarily established so that the Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives know what position to take in the tripartite commission with Turkey.
According to the Turkish proposal, the border touches the Araks River at the confluence with the Middle Karasu and at Ararat Station. This border specifically includes the triangular zone in favor of Nakhichevan. Clarify jointly with Armenian and Georgian* comrades where this border should most appropriately be drawn, and then it will be possible to pursue this line in the tripartite commission.
On a broader note, I must point out that the Turks are inclined to play the role of protectors of Muslims in all countries… ** <…>
Chicherin AVPR, f. 04, op. 39, p. 232, d. 53001, pp. 52–56. Copy. (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.)
Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”
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