On the Desire of the Armenian Population of the Highland Part of the Karabakh District to Separate from the Tatars and Form an Independent District No. 12 — October 9, 1921 From a conversation with Comrade Stepanyan, who arrived at the Central Committee from the Karabakh District.
The population of the district is agitated by rumors concerning the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. To properly assess the significance of these rumors, it is necessary to understand the objective situation in the district.
The district is divided into two parts — highland and lowland. The highland part is populated by Armenians, who are almost universally land-poor: each person has approximately half a desyatina of land. In the lowland part, populated by Muslims, there are free lands which, however, have not yet been distributed. Because of the predominance of poor peasants in the highland, the population there is revolutionary in spirit, though not organized. In the lowland and in the Araks valley, the wealthier strata of the population express their sentiments through the flourishing of bandit gangs. Economically, the highland part is entirely dependent on the lowland. Supplies received from the center are distributed mainly among the lowland population.
Culturally, the highland population is more developed than the lowland, where religious fanaticism still plays an excessive role. Another characteristic feature is that the lowland population, unlike the highland, is largely armed.
All these factors have ultimately led the non-party Armenian masses to adopt a mood whose dominant issue is the desire to separate from the lowland Muslim part and to join Armenia.
Previously, Armenian party workers believed that the interests of the revolution required that these two nationalities not be separated, since a harsh division could foster national chauvinism. Therefore, they were entirely in favor of leaving the highland part within Azerbaijan. But the intensification of this issue has forced them to change their opinion. They now consider it necessary, without annexing Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, to separate it from the Muslim part and establish it as an independent district within Azerbaijan.
(CPA IML, fond 64, inventory 1, file 95, sheet 123. Original. Typescript.) The omitted sections of the report concern the geographical and economic situation of Karabakh.
On the Failure of the Propaganda Campaign in Favor of Including Nagorno-Karabakh in the Azerbaijan SSR No. 691 — October 10, 1921
The Karabakh question is one of the most acute issues of Karabakh’s reality. It is not a question of today alone, but arose already under the Dashnak-Musavatist government and was raised and discussed during eight congresses of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, though never resolved definitively.
It took on a particularly sharp character at the penultimate and last congresses, where distinct groupings with clear aspirations emerged to resolve the issue in one form or another…*
With the fall of the Baku Commune in 1918 and the Turkish invasion of Karabakh, it seemed the issue had been settled, but it re-emerged in acute form in 1919–1920. The last Karabakh congress split into two factions with defined platforms. The first, under Dashnak leadership, clearly (though covertly) advocated an uprising against Azerbaijan and union with Armenia. The second, under Communist leadership, regarded the highland part as an economically inseparable part of Azerbaijan’s territory, with the proviso that the population of Nagorno-Karabakh could link its fate to the existing government only if that government’s policies corresponded to and met the aspirations of the people. The balance was on the side of the Communists, but the Dashnaks managed to disrupt the congress, and as a legacy of the interethnic Dashnak-Musavatist war we inherited the devastation of 48 villages and the city of Shusha.
The April coup of 1920 ended the interethnic bloodshed, and the Karabakh question was temporarily pushed into the background by more urgent organizational and construction issues requiring immediate resolution. But the Sovietization of Armenia brought the question back to the agenda. Despite various declarations of annexation to one republic or another and the appointment of commissioners for Karabakh, the issue remains unresolved. Local organizations are at an impasse, uninformed in this regard, while the population awaits a concrete and definitive answer.
The orientation of the lowland population of Karabakh is purely Azerbaijani, while in Nagorno-Karabakh the sound part of the population has always defended and continues to defend union with Azerbaijan, since, as we have seen, the highland cannot be separated from the lowland due to geographic and, more importantly, economic reasons. The non-party masses, under nationalist influence and faced with the inactivity and negligent attitude of the local Soviet authorities, stand for union with Armenia — and this is the overwhelming majority.
There is also a middle current that favors union with Russia and the abolition of the small Transcaucasian republics; this has its historical justification. For centuries, under Russian protection, they lived peacefully with Muslims, and this is what they now seek. Thus, in connection with the announcement of registration and mobilization, some villages refused to submit lists of conscripts, openly declaring that they would present lists only to the headquarters of the 11th Red Army and would join only the ranks of the Russian Red Army.
Those who favor union with Armenia declare that until the Karabakh question is resolved, they cannot join the ranks of the Azerbaijani Red Army.
Frequent and periodic robberies, plunder, and killings, together with the indifferent attitude of local organizations, strongly contribute to the growth of chauvinistic tendencies among the non-party masses.
Responsible workers of the district are unequivocally for union with Azerbaijan, but under current circumstances they consider it more expedient, until the entire Transcaucasian question is resolved, to create from Nagorno-Karabakh an independent district within Azerbaijan, but in no case to annex Karabakh to Armenia. Nevertheless, they have no definite position, as they are insufficiently instructed on these matters by the center.
In July of this year, after Armenia’s declaration of the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, Comrade Mravyan arrived from Armenia as Extraordinary Commissioner of Karabakh. A few days later Comrade Karaev arrived and established that the Karabakh question had not yet been definitively resolved, whereupon Comrade Mravyan returned to Erivan. Comrade Karaev remained in Karabakh as Commissioner for Karabakh. He convened a congress of executive committees of the highland part (Shusha district, 1st section). Another commissioner for Karabakh, Comrade Mirzoyan, was also present. The Karabakh question was put to discussion, but since the executive committees were not authorized on this matter, and since it had not been discussed by the responsible district workers, who were not informed, the congress reached no definite conclusion. The executive committees, partly misinforming the masses, led them to a mistaken understanding of the issue and stirred nationalist tendencies.
After this, Karaev continued his struggle against robbery and banditry, dismissing executive committees and appointing new ones, while nationalists took advantage of the unresolved and misinterpreted issue to begin their dark agitation. Thus, the Karabakh question remains open in all its sharpness.
(CPA IML, fond 64, inventory 1, file 95, sheets 126–129. Original. Typescript.) The omitted sections of the report concern the geographical and economic situation of Karabakh.
On the Losses, Trials, and Disillusionment of the Armenian Intelligentsia Leaving Karabakh October 19, 1921
The intelligentsia is the first to grow weary and disillusioned. For them, the destruction of Shusha created an especially difficult situation. They have suffered numerous human losses, lost their homes and cultural-educational institutions, been deprived of many former opportunities to use their scientific potential, endured the blows of fate…* and, exhausted and worn out, abandon everything and flee their native land.
This flight of Karabakh’s intellectual forces is a widespread phenomenon. The bourgeois intelligentsia flees, the Dashnaks flee, the moderate socialists flee, and even the communists flee.
The intelligentsia that remains in the region, unable for the time being to leave, either withdraws in disillusionment into the cares of daily life, or, with insufficient strength, engages in activity without faith or support…
…Let us not forget that in the last decade Nagorno-Karabakh constituted half of Armenian culture, if not more, and gave the Armenian people its finest intellectual and moral forces…
Now, weakened and morally decapitated, it seems to promise nothing more.
Yet the vivid picture of Karabakh’s recent past, the resilience and perseverance of the Armenian peasantry, combined with its diverse abilities, inspires hope that the present neglected condition of Karabakh’s working people is but a temporary phenomenon, and that Karabakh will be reborn anew.
(Kommunist, Baku, October 19, 1921. Translated from Armenian. Emphasis ours – Yu.B.) Ellipses as in the newspaper.
On the Policy of State Terrorism Conducted in Karabakh October 21, 1921
HEARD: 2. Report of Comrade Karaev on the situation in Karabakh.
RESOLVED: Proceeding from the necessity of establishing peace and order in Karabakh, dictated by the general situation, the conference of responsible workers of Karabakh resolves:
NOTE: The conference of Karabakh workers considers it inexpedient to separate Nagorno-Karabakh into a distinct autonomous region, and holds that all measures indicated in the above resolution constitute the resolution of the Karabakh question.
Chairman: Buniatzade.
(PAAF, IML, fond 1, inventory 125, file 174, sheet 1. Published in: On the History of the Formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijan SSR. Documents and Materials. Baku, 1989, pp. 88–90. Emphasis ours – Yu.B.)
Containing the False Assertion that the Karabakh Question Was Resolved According to the Will of Its Armenian Population February 24, 1922
National Peace
Comrade Ordzhonikidze further noted that with regard to internal life, it was necessary to concern oneself not only with consolidating genuine national peace, but also with the restoration of national peace within the republics.
In the Transcaucasian republics there are up to 6,500,000 inhabitants. At the same time, each republic contains many nationalities. Under the Mensheviks these nationalities engaged in desperate struggle among themselves. <…> The same was true in Azerbaijan. Under the Dashnaks, the city of Shusha was devastated, and the Armenian part of the city was completely wiped off the face of the earth.
<…>
Soviet power resolved the difficult national question. Caucasian communists can proudly say that in Georgia the tangled national question was successfully resolved. The same in Azerbaijan, where there was not a single clash with Armenians. The question was sharper in Karabakh. The resolution of this question was entrusted to the population itself. <…>
(Bakinskii Rabochii, February 24, 1922. Emphasis ours – Yu.B.)
On the Implementation of the Resolution of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) Regarding the Granting of Autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh No. 9 — June 5, 1922
Heard: 1. On the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Resolved: To instruct the Secretariat to appeal to the Transcaucasian Regional Committee with a reasoned request to implement the resolution of the Caucasian Bureau granting autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of Azerbaijan.
(PAAF IML, fond 1, inventory 2, file 3, sheet 6. Original. Typescript.)
On the Report of the Commission on the Karabakh Question No. 15 — July 21, 1922
…*
(CGARSS Armenia, fond 112, inventory 1, file 57, sheet 71. Certified copy. Typescript.) *The surname is distorted; it should read: Buniatov.
On the Organization of a Special Committee for Nagorno-Karabakh Affairs No. 9 — Baku, December 14, 1922
Heard: 8. On the implementation of autonomy in Nagorno-Karabakh (Comrades Khanbudagov, Atoyan, Rustamyan, Mamedkhanov, Ambartsumyan, Babaev, Mikich, Mirzoyan, Narimanov, and others).
Resolved:
Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP(b): Myasnikov.
(PAAF IML, fond 1, inventory 2, file 10, sheet 70. Certified copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, No. 462.)
On the Approval of the Commission and Committee for Nagorno-Karabakh Affairs and Their Duties December 15, 1922
Heard: 1. On Karabakh. (Resolution of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP).
Resolved:
Secretary of the Central Committee of the AKP: Khanbudagov.
(PAAF IML, fond 1, inventory 2, file 10, sheets 77 and verso. Certified copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, No. 463.)
On the Autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh No. 84 — December 22, 1922
Heard: 16. On the implementation of autonomy in Nagorno-Karabakh. Resolved: a) To establish under the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan a Committee for Nagorno-Karabakh Affairs, with the right of direct entry into the Central Committee of the AKP and direct communication with the Committee for Karabakh Affairs located in Shusha; b) To create in Shusha a Committee for Nagorno-Karabakh Affairs composed of seven persons: the chairman and members — the chairmen of the Shusha, Javanshir, and Karabakh district executive committees, plus one representative from each of the mentioned districts; c) To appoint Comrade Karakozov as chairman of the committee mentioned in point “b,” instructing him urgently to designate three representatives from the districts; d) To form the committee mentioned in point “a” with Comrades Kirov, Musabekov, and Karakozov; e) To propose that the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan allocate the necessary funds for the needs of the Armenian population of Karabakh; f) To implement this resolution within one week.
Deputy Secretary of the Union Council: Orlov-Malakhov
(CGARSS Armenia, fond 113, inventory 3, file 90, sheet 80. Certified copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923. Yerevan, 1992, No. 464.)
Justifying His Thesis on “Great-Power Chauvinism” of Dominant Nationalities in the Soviet Republics, for the Report to the XII Congress of the RCP(b) March 7, 1923
To Comrade Trotsky, Copy to all members of the Politburo, Comrade Molotov.
<…> At the same time, I think it necessary to mention the great-power chauvinism of dominant nationalities (Bukhara, where Uzbeks act as great-power chauvinists toward Turkmens and Kyrgyz; Turkestan, where Kyrgyz act as great-power chauvinists toward Uzbeks and Turkmens; Georgia, where Georgians act as great-power chauvinists toward Armenians, Abkhazians, Adjarians, and Ossetians; Azerbaijan, where Tatars act as great-power chauvinists toward the Karabakh Armenians, etc.). This tendency, of course, is not as dangerous as the tendency toward Russian great-power chauvinism, but it is nonetheless sufficiently dangerous, and in my view it cannot be omitted from the theses.
J. Stalin No. 11666/c March 7, 1923
(RGASPI, fond 50, inventory 1, file 1, sheet 77. Emphasis ours – Yu.B.)
“On National Aspects in Party and State Construction” at the XII Congress of the RCP(b), Referring to the ‘Great-Power Chauvinism’ of Dominant Nationalities March 1923
… This legacy consists, finally, in the excesses of nationalism among a number of peoples who also endured the yoke of national oppression and have not yet freed themselves from the sense of old national grievances. The practical expression of these survivals is a certain national estrangement and lack of full trust on the part of formerly oppressed peoples toward measures coming from Russians.
However, in some regions containing several nationalities, this defensive nationalism often turns into offensive nationalism — into entrenched chauvinism of the stronger nationality directed against the weaker nationalities of these republics. Georgian chauvinism (in Georgia), directed against Armenians, Ossetians, Adjarians, and Abkhazians; Azerbaijani chauvinism (in Azerbaijan), directed against Armenians; Uzbek chauvinism (in Uzbekistan and Khorezm), directed against Turkmens and Kyrgyz — all these forms of chauvinism… are a great evil, threatening to turn certain national republics into arenas of strife and squabbles. Needless to say, all these phenomena hinder the actual unification of peoples into a single state union.
<…>
(RGASPI, fond 50, inventory 1, file 10, sheet 40.) 702
Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”
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