On the Negative Consequences of British Command Policy in Karabakh for Resisting the Triple Aggression of Kemalist Turkey, the RSFSR, and Soviet Azerbaijan After August 10, 1920
Taking into account that the situation in southern Armenia cannot but concern the Allied Powers and may be misinterpreted with regard to Armenia, I have the honor to inform you of the following:
As you are aware, from the very outset, the Government of Armenia has warned representatives of the Allied missions in the Caucasus about the danger posed by the potential unification—through Armenian territory—of Bolshevik and Azerbaijani-Turkish forces, which threatens both Armenian and Allied interests in the East.
At that time, my government emphasized the critical importance of transferring the regions of Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan to Armenian control to prevent the planned merger of Bolshevik and Turko-Azerbaijani forces. It also stressed the urgent need for timely military and other assistance to Armenia from the Allies.
The decision of the British High Command in Transcaucasia to place Armenian Karabakh under Azerbaijani administration and to prevent Armenian forces from occupying the Zangezur region dealt a serious blow to Armenia’s ability to defend its borders against Bolshevik and Turko-Azerbaijani incursions.
Nevertheless, in early July of this year, under extremely difficult conditions—at a time when the promised arms shipment from England had not yet arrived—my government launched an immediate offensive in Vedi-Basar, Sharur, Nakhichevan, and Zangezur to obstruct the unification of Bolshevik and Turko-Azerbaijani forces.
Simultaneously, my government was compelled to wage war on nearly all of Armenia’s borders: against the combined Bolshevik-Azerbaijani forces, and on the Turkish frontier against the troops of Karabekir Pasha.
Despite these harsh conditions, Armenian forces first captured Vedi-Basar, then Sharur, repelled all enemy attacks on the Kazakh and Oltin fronts, took Penyak, and even temporarily seized Zangezur.
However, the deteriorating political and military situation at that time forced my government to halt further advances toward Nakhichevan. The attached brief report from the Commander of Armenian Forces outlines the key reasons for this suspension and explains why further operations in the Nakhichevan direction are temporarily impossible.
Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Ohandjanian Head of the Political Department, P. Yakulov Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 200, Inventory 1, File 588, Sheet 175. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 404. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)
📡 Telegram from RSFSR Plenipotentiary Representative in Armenia B. Legran to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin
On the Need to Link the “Main Question” of Establishing Direct RSFSR–Kemalist Turkey Communication with the Resolution of the Territorial Dispute Between Soviet Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia After August 10, 1920
In concluding the Agreement with Armenia on August 10, I proceeded from the preliminary resolution of the disputed territorial issues proposed by myself and Ordzhonikidze (telegram from Baku dated July 14, No. 4-37), and approved by you in telegram No. 663 and cipher No. 671, transmitted via Kirov, which stated:
“Received your inquiry regarding negotiations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Chicherin will welcome it if the Armenians accept this resolution. If they agree to immediately renounce all of Karabakh and recognize Zangezur as disputed, on the condition that Nakhichevan is recognized as theirs, Chicherin will be pleased with such an outcome. Your task is to secure this in Erivan.”
I believe this task has essentially been fulfilled, and the Armenian government is fully prepared to accept such a resolution.
Neither you, nor Ordzhonikidze—whom I met several hours before signing the Agreement—nor Kirov informed me about the narrow-gauge railway through Shahtakhty, nor about Moscow’s calculations regarding the vast food reserves of the Makinsky Khanate, which you mentioned to Comrade Ter-Gabrielyan during your direct wire conversation on July 20–August 22.
[…]
By the time of these negotiations, your final decision regarding the fate of the disputed territories must be in place.
I lean toward recognizing the Nakhichevan region as part of Armenia; Karabakh in its entirety as part of Azerbaijan. The issue of Zangezur is so closely tied to Nakhichevan that, if Nakhichevan is recognized as Armenian, Zangezur will likely have to be left to Armenia as well.
Dated by content. Saak Ter-Gabrielyan As in the document.
All this, of course, presumes favorable progress on the main question of transit. Otherwise, pressure must be applied to the Dashnaks, which—with the support of the XI Army, possessing both the inclination and the means—is entirely feasible.
[…]
In general, relying on the support of local forces—Azerbaijanis and the Revolutionary Military Council of the XI Army—in our policy toward Armenia would only be realistic if we were speaking of a conquest campaign into Armenia.
I shall limit myself to this message for now. I await your replies, which you are exceedingly reluctant to provide.
Legran Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), Fund 64, File 21, Sheets 99–100. Copy. Typescript. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)
Telegram from British Representative in Transcaucasia, Commander Luke, to Lord Curzon
On His Expressed Disapproval of the Armenian Government’s Consent to the Temporary Occupation of Disputed Territories—Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan—by Soviet Forces Tiflis, August 11, 1920 – Most Urgent
The Armenian government informed me that yesterday, August 10, it concluded an agreement in Tiflis with the Soviet representative Legran. As a preliminary step toward final peace negotiations, which are to continue in Erivan, Armenia agreed to the temporary occupation of Karabakh, Zangezur, and all of Nakhichevan south of Shahtakhty by Bolshevik forces. […]
I expressed to the Armenian representatives my astonishment at this complete reversal of their earlier position, which I reported in telegram No. 315 of July 6 (via Constantinople No. 229). I stated that their consent to Bolshevik occupation of Nakhichevan—which opens a route to Turkey and northwestern Persia—amounts almost to an act of opposition to Great Britain. This is especially regrettable at a moment when Armenia has just received British arms and ammunition.*
*Note: The Foreign Office endorsed Luke’s statement in telegram No. 280 dated August 19, 1920 (unpublished).
Source: Documents on British Foreign Policy. First Series, 1919–1939. Volume XII, London, 1970, pp. 633–634. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)
🗣 Excerpt from a Direct Line Conversation Between N. Narimanov and G. Ordzhonikidze
On the Possibility of Securing Karabakh and Zangezur for Azerbaijan by Pressuring the Armenian Population No later than August 15, 1920
I fully agree with you that Chicherin is hopelessly confused. Since Soviet power will be established there and our troops will be present, regardless of formalities, we will in practice be able to secure these territories for Azerbaijan… After all, no one in the world can prevent us from influencing the population of these regions to express support for unification with Azerbaijan, and to turn these areas into a base for Soviet agitation against Armenia—just as the Mensheviks and Musavatists are eager to do in the Zakataly district.
Source: Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (CPA IML), Fund 64, Inventory 2, File 5, Sheet 80. Copy. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 400. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)
⚠️ Telegram from Members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front, V. Gittis and V. Trifonov, to Commander of the 11th Red Army, M. Vasilenko
On the Inadmissibility of Army Command Resolving Political Issues August 16, 1920
Re: Telegram No. 356. The resolution of political issues—particularly matters of borders and the issuance of ultimata—does not fall within the competence of army command. Please report what considerations guided your actions in resolving the conflict with Armenia, and inform the RSFSR representative in our friendly Georgia. […]
Signed: Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front – V. Gittis, Trifonov Document annotations: “Telegram addressed to the Front Commander and RMC of the Front, signed by the Revolutionary Military Council. Vasilenko, Lukin.” “Comrade Ordzhonikidze: RMC of the XI Army requests to report to the RMC of the Front. RMC XI – Vasilenko.”
Source: RGASPI, Fund 64, Inventory 1, File 25, Sheet 90. Original.
🛑 Telegram from Armenian Foreign Minister A. Ohandjanian to RSFSR Plenipotentiary Representative in Armenia B. Legran
Demanding an End to Persecution of Armenians in Zangezur and Karabakh and the Withdrawal of Azerbaijani Troops and Armenian Communists from the Region August 22, 1920
[…] Based on the principle of neutrality in Karabakh and Zangezur, my government cannot accept the continued presence of Azerbaijani military units in the latter, who are venting their military failures on the peaceful Armenian population, nor of Armenian communists who are settling personal scores with that same population, which refuses to follow their political directives.
On behalf of the government, I therefore urgently request that you contact the appropriate authorities and insist:
- On the cessation of further persecution of Armenian public figures and their families in Zangezur and Karabakh;
- On the unhindered passage—if desired—of Armenian troops beyond the borders of their current deployment;
- On the removal of Azerbaijani military units and Armenian communist detachments from the aforementioned regions.
Please inform me of the steps you undertake in this regard.
Source: RGASPI, Fund 6, Inventory 2, File 21, Sheets 83–84. Copy; AVPR, Fund 148, Inventory 3, Item 1, Sheet 23. Copy. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)
📡 Telegram from RSFSR People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin to Plenipotentiary Representative in Armenia B. Legran
On the Need to Pursue Transit Through Armenia by Diplomatic Means and to Cancel the Decision to Occupy Armenian Territory in Violation of the August 10, 1920 Agreement August 22, 1920 – 18:45
Transit through Armenia must be pursued by diplomatic means. The landings by Wrangel’s forces and the Kuban uprising have convinced us of the impossibility of going beyond the agreement of August 10. Therefore, the decisions made during Sergo’s presence here regarding a change of course have been revoked. Inform him accordingly.
Chicherin RGASPI, Fund 64, Inventory 1, File 21, Sheet 74. Copy.
⚠️ Telegram from RSFSR People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin to Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front G. Ordzhonikidze
On the Need to Adhere to the RSFSR–Armenia Agreement and to Cease Red Army Violence Against the Armenian Population in Disputed Territories August 23, 1920
The agreement of August 10 with Armenia must be strictly observed. I am conveying to you, for full and unconditional guidance, the instructions of the Central Committee regarding Armenia: the decision to Sovietize has been revoked. It is essential to avoid any military clashes with Armenia, dictated both by the general military situation and the developments in Kuban.
Further advances beyond the line established by the agreement—particularly toward Shahtakhty—must be immediately halted. Report on compliance.
In the areas occupied by our forces, especially Zangezur, executions and violence against the Armenian population have occurred without necessity. Such actions not only prematurely complicate our relations with Armenia but also foster hostility toward Russians, which will hinder our future efforts in Armenia.
A strict directive must be issued to all military units to treat the population with tact. Regarding the abuses in Zangezur, an immediate and thorough investigation is required. Report the findings to us urgently.
No. 2521/279sh – Chicherin RGASPI, Fund 64, Inventory 1, File 25, Sheet 140. Certified copy. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)
🛑 Telegram from Armenian Foreign Minister A. Ohandjanian to RSFSR Plenipotentiary Representative in Armenia B. Legran
Demanding the Immediate Removal of “Tatar” (Azerbaijani) Bands from Areas of Soviet Troop Deployment in the “Neutral” Zones of Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan August 25, 1920
On behalf of my government, I insist on the immediate removal of Tatar bands from the areas of your troop deployment in Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan—designated as neutral zones—and on the adoption of all necessary measures to guarantee Armenia’s protection against similar violations of the agreement’s terms, whether by your forces or other armed detachments currently present in these regions.
RGASPI, Fund 64, Inventory 2, File 11, Sheet 89. Copy. Typescript. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.)
🔐 Cipher Telegram from Deputy Chairman of the Republic’s Revolutionary Military Council E. Sklyansky to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front
(Copy to RSFSR People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin) On the Unacceptability of Political Interference by the 11th Red Army Command and the Need to Adhere to the August 10, 1920 Agreement with Armenia Moscow, August 26, 1920
Plenipotentiary Representative in Armenia, Comrade Legran, reports a sharp divergence between the conduct of army command and our overall policy toward Armenia. He specifically points to the ultimatum issued to Armenia on August 2, signed by RMC member Lukin—not only without coordination but without the knowledge of the Plenipotentiary Mission, which learned of it from the Armenians themselves. He also notes the Revolutionary Military Council’s message to Comrade Kirov regarding intentions to launch an offensive against Armenia.*
I must emphasize the impropriety of such actions, which contradict the decision of the Republic’s Revolutionary Military Council to refrain from hostile measures against the Ararat Republic and to adhere to the preliminary agreement concluded on August 10.
I propose decisive measures be taken to prevent such occurrences in the future and, in general, that no actions affecting foreign policy be undertaken independently of the central authority or without contact with our plenipotentiary representatives in the Caucasian republics.
*11th Army **See document dated August 6, 1920
RGVA, Fund 109, Inventory 1, File 40, Sheet 57.
🕊 Report from the Diplomatic Representative of Armenia in Azerbaijan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
On the Use of Russian Bolsheviks by Turkey and Soviet Azerbaijan for Aggressive Aims Against Armenia Baku, August 27, 1920
[…]
It is difficult to find other regions where neighboring states have territorial disputes spanning such vast areas as those between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The aspiration of Musavatist Azerbaijan and Ittihadist Turkey to create a unified Turkish state stretching from Constantinople to Baku has by no means disappeared. The objectives of Soviet Azerbaijan and “revolutionary Red Anatolia” are identical. What was once pursued under the banner of Turkic unity is now being advanced under the slogans of the workers’ and peasants’ revolution and the struggle against England.
Moreover, in its final months, the Musavatist government appeared willing to make certain concessions from its maximalist program (while clearly reserving its full implementation for the future). In contrast, Soviet Azerbaijan deems even these temporary compromises unnecessary and seeks to resolve the matter immediately. To this end, it envisions two paths: first, the establishment of a Soviet Armenia; second, the immediate establishment of a corridor to Turkey via Nakhichevan and Surmalu. In both cases, it has at its disposal the ideological framework and slogans of Russian Bolshevism, as well as the support of Armenian communists.
The decision of the Moscow government to extend a hand to all forces opposing Britain can now be realized most swiftly and directly through Turkey—if Soviet troops advance from Baku through Shusha and Goris, then via Nakhichevan, Sharur, and Surmalu to reach Bayazet. However distant this plan may be from practical feasibility or tangible results, it holds symbolic value for the Bolsheviks, as it creates the global impression of Bolshevism’s expansion and the spread of world revolution.
Yet, for Azerbaijan, this bold maneuver carries very real implications: it would definitively annex Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur, link them to Nakhichevan and Sharur, and establish a bridge to Turkey.
To implement this strategy, they rely on the Soviet Red Army and a significant portion of Armenian communists, who propagate the notion that Karabakh and Zangezur are economically inseparable from Azerbaijan. Armenian communists—almost uniquely—have publicly supported another goal aligned with Tatar ambitions: using Western Azerbaijan as a base, they attempted to enter Armenia through Kazakh with arms, aiming to incite internal uprisings and Sovietize Armenia. This would mean dismantling its military strength, disarming the population, economically crippling the country, and thereby paving the way for a future Turkish invasion.
Armenia stands as a barrier to these ambitions. It has thwarted the organization of an internal coup and has begun reclaiming its territories that had risen against it. Zangibasar, Vedi-Basar, Sharur, and Nakhichevan have been retaken, and the Red Army was forced to withdraw from Zangezur. These blows—devastating to Azerbaijani communists and pan-Turkist agendas—appear to have permanently destroyed the only appeal Soviet Azerbaijan held for the people: the claim that Soviet Russia would facilitate the realization of their national goals. Had these events occurred under Musavatist rule, one can be certain that the remaining Armenians in Azerbaijan would have been completely annihilated.
[…]
Our diplomatic failures in Azerbaijan are also rooted in the economic imbalance between the two countries. These relations, at least until now, have been entirely one-sided: we are wholly dependent on Azerbaijan, while it is not dependent on us. Without Baku’s oil and kerosene, Armenia’s railways, factories, bakeries, bathhouses, and more would come to a halt, and the population would be left without light.
[…]
From a demographic standpoint, our position is also weaker compared to Azerbaijan. The Turkic population within Armenia’s administrative borders is negligible, whereas within the administrative and military reach of Azerbaijan, the Armenian population numbers between 300,000 and 400,000. In Baku alone, Armenians are concentrated in large numbers and play a vital role in trade and industry. A significant portion of the population consists of Armenian professionals—doctors, engineers, lawyers, technicians, architects, and skilled workers. Azerbaijani Armenians, especially those in Baku, own movable and immovable property worth billions of rubles. In contrast, the Tatars in Armenia are insignificant in number, wealth, and especially in intellectual capital.
[…]
As a transit corridor, Azerbaijan—under the Musavatists and even more so now—holds greater importance for Armenia than Armenia does for Azerbaijan. While we rely on Azerbaijan to connect with Russia, Transcaspia, and Persia, Azerbaijan connects through Armenia only to northern Persia—and even in that regard, it seeks independence by controlling the Alat–Julfa railway.
All the facts related to this issue clearly demonstrate the extent of Armenia’s dependence on Azerbaijan. This is why Azerbaijan can afford to disregard all our appeals with impunity. It can hold our entire population here hostage, prohibit Armenians from exporting their property and wealth, withhold oil for our railways, oppress returning refugees, and even conscript Armenian youth into its army. It can arrest all prominent Armenian public figures here—while Armenia is in no position to respond in kind.
[…]
Diplomatic Representative Harutyunyan Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, Fund 278, Inventory 1, File 30, Sheets 28–33. Copy. Typescript. Translated from Armenian. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, Document No. 406. (Emphasis added – Yu.B.) 533
Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”
Artatsolum
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