EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE POLITBURO

EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(B) ON THE APPROVAL OF THE DRAFT INSTRUCTION TO MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE CAUCASIAN FRONT AND TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RSFSR IN ARMENIA, GEORGIA, AND TURKEY, INCLUDING THE TEXT OF THE INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE TEMPORARY OCCUPATION OF DISPUTED TERRITORIES WITHOUT INTERFERENCE IN THEIR ADMINISTRATION, WITH SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTION OF THEIR STATUS BASED ON THE ETHNOGRAPHIC PRINCIPLE No. 25 July 7, 1920 Top Secret

8. Instruction to members of the Revolutionary Military Council… Approve Comrade Chicherin’s draft for the Caucasian Front and our diplomatic representatives in Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey.

Secretary of the Central Committee July 4, 1920

To Comrade Krestinsky Dear Comrade, Having amended the draft of the Caucasian instruction in light of the latest decisions of the Central Committee, I once again request its approval. With Communist greetings, Chicherin

Instruction to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front

The RSFSR shall maintain peaceful and neighborly relations with the bourgeois states of Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey. Soviet authorities must refrain from any provocative or unfriendly actions toward these republics that could jeopardize good neighborly relations. Under no circumstances should attempts be made at present to introduce Soviet power in Georgia or Armenia. A practically viable modus vivendi must be established with the governments of these republics.
Given the current military situation, Russian forces are unable to occupy Karabakh, the Zangezur district, Nakhichevan, Julfa, or the Sharur-Daralagyaz district. Russian military authorities must limit themselves to holding those disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan that are already under their control—namely, Shusha and Jebrail—while preventing interference by the armed forces of neighboring republics, in accordance with the decision already made by the Russian government and communicated to Soviet authorities in the Caucasus. No Azerbaijani or Armenian authorities shall be permitted in these areas.

The responsibilities of Russian military units in these territories shall include: a) Maintaining general order; b) Preventing clashes between Tatars and Armenians, with particular attention to areas of mixed population where one of these groups constitutes a minority.

However, Russian military command must not interfere in the internal civil administration of these territories and should allow the local population to establish their own administration based on principles adopted independently, without direct or indirect involvement of our command.

Upon occupying the specified regions, Russian military command must explain to the broad masses of the local population—through proclamations, orders, and other means—that Russian troops are present to prevent interethnic strife; that the occupation is temporary, pending resolution of the territorial status of these regions; and that these disputes will be settled by a mixed commission chaired by a representative of Russia. This commission shall be guided by the ethnographic composition of the population and its expressed will.

[People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin] Archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU, File 44–3/3-a, pp. 67–71. Original. Typescript; RGASPI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 24428, pp. 1–4. Original. Typescript; also f. 17, op. 3, d. 92, pp. 6–8. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

TRANSCRIPT OF A DIRECT LINE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MEMBER OF THE CAUCASIAN BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(B) AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE CAUCASIAN FRONT, COMRADE ORDZHONIKIDZE, WITH THE PEOPLE’S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RSFSR, COMRADE CHICHERIN, ON RELATIONS WITH SOVIET AZERBAIJAN IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERACTIONS WITH THE TURKS Not earlier than July 7, 1920*

[Ordzhonikidze]: Greetings, Comrade Chicherin.

Nakhichevan, Ordubad, and the northern part of that region have been occupied by the Bayazet Turkish division, numbering 3,000 bayonets. According to verified information, we have already met with a delegation from this division. The withdrawal of Dashnak forces led by Dro from Nagorno-Karabakh is explained solely by the occupation of Nakhichevan and its surrounding areas by these Turkish units. <…>

[Chicherin]: The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic has informed us that it is impossible for our forces to occupy any further territories beyond those already held. According to this decision, our occupation is limited to Shusha and Jebrail. Therefore, Nakhichevan and the Sharur-Daralagyaz district are out of the question. We are not in a position to occupy them. The territories currently held must remain under the authority of our occupation forces. Resolving the dispute in favor of Azerbaijan at this moment is unacceptable, as it would render any compromise with Armenia impossible. <…> The Central Committee of Armenian Communists also considers this undesirable. Thus, we must maintain our position regarding the occupation of these areas by Red Army units and their subordination to our authorities.

Transferring the disputed territories we currently hold to Azerbaijan would serve two purposes:

To allow Armenian communist insurgents to live under Soviet rule—but this goal is already achieved by keeping these territories under our control.
To satisfy Azerbaijani Muslims as a reward for adopting the Soviet system. This must not happen, as two nationalist tendencies are in direct opposition there, and we cannot accept that. We must approach the situation from a position of objective strength. It is unacceptable to appease nationalist elements by yielding to their expansionist desires.

[Ordzhonikidze]*: He reports that he welcomes our offer to mediate in determining the borders with Armenia. He further notes that Turkey intended to put an end to Armenia’s inhumane policies and had even decided to issue an order for the mobilization of the Eastern Army to occupy key strategic points. This extreme measure has been postponed for now. Apparently, our diplomatic note played a role, and we hope that going forward we can satisfy Turkish advances into Armenian territory.

Our commission in Turkey has set as its goal to vigorously demand that the Turkish government refrain from any military actions along the former Russo-Turkish borders. And I believe your concern that the Bayazet Turkish division will break into Armenian regions and massacre the Armenian population is not entirely justified, especially since from the source…**

[Chicherin]: The economic pull toward Baku is in no way disrupted by the Russian occupation. Since we have not occupied any new territories, we must refrain from further advances. The current situation compels us to pursue a policy of compromise. Our occupation signifies a postponement of resolution until a more favorable moment.

We are well aware that the time will come for the sovietization of Armenia as well, but now is too early to pursue that. The most we can achieve at present is the declaration of Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed territories—and for that, we need the consent of the Azerbaijani government. This is essential.

We absolutely must conclude a treaty with Armenia; the global situation demands it imperatively. And for that, Karabakh and Zangezur must be declared disputed—nothing more.

[Ordzhonikidze]: We have agreed with them that upon arrival in Baku, we will discuss this matter with Narimanov in that spirit. As you can see, there is no ambiguity or misunderstanding here. I can assure you that we have a clear understanding of our peaceful policy and are implementing it.

But I am convinced—deeply convinced—that to strengthen Soviet power in Azerbaijan and retain Baku, it is necessary to annex Nagorno-Karabakh. As for the lowland part, that is out of the question. It has always been Azerbaijani Karabakh. Zangezur should also be annexed to Azerbaijan.

I personally guarantee the safety of the Armenian population in that region. We will declare autonomy there and organize the Armenian population without introducing Muslim units. This reflects the current desire of the population in these districts, who have formed councils under the leadership of Armenian communists.

Any other resolution of this issue would destabilize our position in Azerbaijan and yield no gains in Armenia. I fully understand that it is not impossible that, under certain political circumstances, Armenia may… [be needed to us]***

[Chicherin]: Who, I believe, would not be inclined to underestimate the Turkish threat. Specifically, from the Armenian government we have received information regarding the Turks on the Armenian front: so insignificant that they would not dare cross the border.

Please inform us whether you have confirmation of the Turkish occupation of Nakhichevan. Aside from Mdivani’s telegram, which lacks a source, we have no other information. Please report who currently controls Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur. Are there Armenian units present?

[Ordzhonikidze]: Comrade Chicherin, in view of the extreme intensification of national tensions in the Caucasus—where nationalist tendencies often hide beneath a communist veneer—and on the other hand, due to the absolute necessity in the near term to adhere to a policy of compromise with bourgeois national governments, a decision has been made to occupy Zangezur with Russian forces. [Decide]* as you deem necessary. We will carry out whatever is instructed, but allow me to inform you that such a stance toward Azerbaijan severely compromises us in the eyes of the Azerbaijani masses and creates highly favorable conditions for our opponents.

RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 17, pp. 56–63. Telegraph tape. Draft handwritten in pencil. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

MEMORANDUM FROM COMRADE ORDZHONIKIDZE

Member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front To V. Lenin, I. Stalin, and People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR G. Chicherin In Support of the Annexation of Karabakh and Zangezur to Azerbaijan to Preserve Soviet Power There Rostov-on-Don, not earlier than July 7, 1920**

Nakhichevan, Ordubad, and the northern part of that region have been occupied by the Bayazet Division, numbering 9,000 bayonets***. According to verified information, we have already met with a delegation from this division. The withdrawal of Armenian forces led by Dro from Nagorno-Karabakh is explained solely by the threat of occupation of Nakhichevan and its surrounding areas by these units. <…>

As is evident, there is no ambiguity or misunderstanding here. I can assure you that we have a clear understanding of our peaceful policy and are implementing it. However, I am convinced—and this is my deep conviction—that in order to consolidate Soviet power in Azerbaijan and retain control over Baku****, it is necessary to annex Nagorno-Karabakh. As for the lowland areas, that is out of the question. They have always been Azerbaijani and Zangezuri. Azerbaijan guarantees the safety of the Armenian population in this region with its own authority. We will declare autonomy here and organize the Armenian population without deploying Muslim military units.

This is currently the desire of the population in these districts, who have formed Soviets under the leadership of Armenian communists. Any other resolution of this issue would destabilize our position in Azerbaijan and yield no gains in Armenia. I fully understand that under certain political circumstances, Armenia may become necessary to us.

Decide as you see fit. We will carry out whatever is instructed, but allow me to inform you that such a stance toward Azerbaijan severely compromises us in the eyes of the Azerbaijani masses and creates extremely favorable conditions for our opponents.

Ordzhonikidze GARF, f. 130, op. 4, d. 496, p. 141. Copy; RGASP, f. 85, op. 3s, d. 2, pp. 8–9. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

TELEGRAM FROM COMRADE ORDZHONIKIDZE

To N. Alliluyeva Requesting Transmission of His Memorandum to V. Lenin and I. Stalin In Support of Transferring Karabakh to Azerbaijan as a Political Concession July 7 or 8, 1920*

Nadya, have you delivered my memorandum to Zinoviev in Petrograd? Tomorrow at midnight I depart for Baku.

If my memorandum has not yet been sent to Chicherin, please make a copy and give it to Vladimir Ilyich. Where is Stalin currently?

Tell him that my proposal must be accepted. I am very interested—and so are all of us—in his opinion on this matter. Although we know that he himself is not particularly concerned with it. Tell him that Chicherin and Karakhan are once again putting me in an impossible position here. Please deliver his response before my departure. Farewell for now.

Ordzhonikidze RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 4018, pp. 1–2. Copy; GARF, f. 130, op. 4, d. 496, p. 142a. Photocopy of the original with Stalin’s autograph. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

TELEGRAM FROM I. STALIN

In Response to Comrade Ordzhonikidze’s Request to Express His Position on the Territorial Disputes Between Armenia and Azerbaijan Moscow, July 8, 1920, 20:00

My opinion is that we cannot endlessly maneuver between the sides; we must clearly support one of them—in this case, of course, Azerbaijan and Turkey. I spoke with Lenin, and he does not object.

Stalin GARF, f. 130, op. 4, d. 496, p. 139. Copy. Text certified with the official seal of the RSFSR Council of People’s Commissars; same in: CPA IMA, f. 558, op. 1, d. 4018, p. 1. Telegraph form. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

EXCERPT FROM A DIRECT LINE CONVERSATION

Between Comrade Ordzhonikidze and Kvirkeliya On Coordinating the Actions of Stalin’s Anti-Armenian Group Regarding Karabakh and Zangezur Not later than July 8, 1920

[O]: Hello, what do you have?

K: Why are Comrade Perumov and others going to Moscow? For this nonsense? There’s no point in going to Moscow—Zangezur and Karabakh do not have an exclusively Armenian population. According to the 1917 census, it’s about half and half, if not more. In any case, Moscow won’t deal with the Karabakh question, right? Besides, you have a direct line to Moscow and can relay everything to them?

[O]: Nonsense, nonsense, you’re not aware of what’s happening in Moscow right now. Ik ukve zavi shekres* with Tiflis—don’t mention this to anyone yet. I’ve always been against it and protested as much as I could, but there’s nothing to be done. Whom do you propose for the Revolutionary Military Council 10?

[O]: Under no circumstances can he be appointed, since he’ll have to remain in Pyatigorsk. Like it or not, you’ll have to be introduced as the Zangezur representative <…>

[O]: …Coordinate with Mikhailov so he can inform the center about the situation in Transcaucasia and present the regional committee’s view on Karabakh and Zangezur. I think that to deprive the Georgian and Armenian governments of their last common ground, we must act cautiously on this issue. In my opinion, a delegation should be sent to clarify this disputed matter. It is especially unacceptable to send askers [armed units] against them. Such a measure would finally deprive the Georgian Mensheviks of their last tool to mislead the masses about the alleged imperialist ambitions of Soviet power and its collusion with Turkish pashas. <…>

RGASPI, f. 85, op. 5s, d. 5, pp. 1–5. Telegraph tape. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Telegram from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin

To the Plenipotentiary Representative in Armenia, B. Legran On the Armenian Delegation’s Rejection of the Proposal to Transfer Karabakh to Azerbaijan and Recognize Zangezur as Disputed July 9, 1920

Negotiations with the Armenian delegation have reached a deadlock. Your proposal—accepted by Azerbaijan—that Karabakh be transferred to Azerbaijan, Zangezur be recognized as disputed, and all remaining territory remain with Armenia, is unacceptable to the Armenian delegation.

Therefore, this issue can only be resolved through direct negotiations with the Armenian government. *“An agreement has already been reached there” – translation from Georgian.

The delegation in Moscow considers itself unauthorized to make such significant territorial concessions. Negotiations with them in this direction are hopeless. We must achieve everything directly in Armenia. <…> RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, p. 12. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Telegram from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin

To Comrade Ordzhonikidze, Member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front Condemning Support for the Annexationist Aspirations of Azerbaijani National Communists in Karabakh and Zangezur July 9, 1920

We have repeatedly been told that keeping Karabakh and Zangezur under our temporary occupation rather than transferring them to Azerbaijan would undermine Soviet power in Baku. Please clarify the situation precisely.

If this is about indulging the annexationist ambitions of Muslim nationalists, it is a misguided policy. Such a course will only foster nationalist instincts, and we will end up resembling the Musavatists—thus aiding them.

If the goal is to expand the sphere of Soviet power, that can be achieved through Russian occupation as well. If there is a concealed inclination toward Musavatist orientation, it must be rejected as fundamentally incompatible. CPA IML, f. 64, op. 2, d. 5, p. 52. Copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. no. 365. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Telegram from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin

To Comrade Ordzhonikidze On the Position of the Commissariat in the Territorial Dispute Between Armenia and Azerbaijan July 9, 1920

The Armenian delegation has stated that it agrees to recognize only Karabakh as disputed, not Zangezur or any other territory.

I spoke with Gabrielyan just before his departure, and he told me that the Armenian delegation had finally agreed to recognize both Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed. However, this referred to recognition of disputed status—not immediate or full transfer.

Of course, if Legran succeeds in reconciling the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments, that would be a brilliant outcome. In that case, Legran should consult with us before any final decision is made.

Still, I believe Gabrielyan’s optimism is based on a serious misunderstanding. I strongly protest the accusation that I consider only one side and not the other. Our goal is to act as an objective higher authority, which is precisely why the decision was made to occupy the disputed territories with our forces. <…> RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 25, pp. 252–252 verso. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Direct Line Conversation Between S. Kirov and Commander of the 11th Red Army, Levandovsky

On the Military Situation in the Disputed Regions of Karabakh and Zangezur July 10, 1920

(Levandovsky): Levandovsky speaking. Who is calling?

(Kirov): Comrade Kirov here. Hello, Comrade Levandovsky. Did you receive my telegram? I’ve just received a new note from Armenia stating that Azerbaijani forces, advancing on Zangezur, have occupied Gerusy. Please report the actual situation.

(Levandovsky): Hello, Comrade Kirov. According to the directive from the Commander-in-Chief, it was our units—not Azerbaijani ones—that occupied Gerusy. Further advancement beyond Gerusy has been halted per the same directive. I will provide the order numbers shortly.

The directive states that due to the disputed status of Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Commander-in-Chief ordered prolonged occupation of the disputed regions—namely Zangezur, Karabakh, Shusha, Ordubad, and Julfa—by Russian forces, maintaining Russian authority while allowing local Soviets to function.

This was Order No. 375 1/op 226/Sh dated June 23, 1920, under which the units began their advance on July 1, 1920. A subsequent special directive from the Caucasus Command, No. 79/l, based on new instructions from the Commander-in-Chief dated July 1, No. 3957/op 791/Sh, ordered an immediate halt to further advancement and retention of forces in the specified areas. RGVA, f. 195, op. 3, d. 296, pp. 8–10; CGASA, f. 195, op. 1, d. 296, p. 9. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. no. 366. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Telegram from Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Front, Pugachev, and Military Commissar Pechersky

To Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, E. Sklyansky, and Chief of Staff of the RVSR, Lebedev On the Anti-Armenian Objectives of the Turkish Bayazet Division July 10, 1920

To Deputy RVSR Comrade Sklyansky, Chief of Staff RVSR. On July 7, Commander of the 32nd Division reported that a delegation from the Turkish Bayazet Division, stationed in the Ordubad–Nakhichevan area, arrived in Gerusy.

The delegation came to explore the possibility of joint operations with the Red Army, according to a personal statement by Halil Pasha.

The Bayazet Division was not deployed to advance against the Bolsheviks, but rather to counter Armenian advances against us under the influence of the Entente.

Accordingly, the Commander of the 11th Army was instructed to treat both the delegation and the division with utmost friendliness. … No. 8345/s. Chief of Staff of the Caucasus Front, Pugachev; Military Commissar Pechersky. July 10, 14:45 RGVA, f. 33988, op. 2, d. 293, p. 4. (Emphasis added – Y.B.) 480

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

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