LETTER FROM MEMBERS OF THE CAUCASUS BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(B)

LETTER FROM MEMBERS OF THE CAUCASUS BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(B), THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE AZCP, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 11TH RED ARMY TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(B) On the Necessity of Transferring Karabakh and Zangezur to Azerbaijan July 10, 1920 Top Secret

We consider it our duty to convey to the Central Committee a unified position on the issue of Zangezur and Karabakh, whose resolution in negotiations with Armenia is currently being approached in a provisional manner that contradicts the interests of the revolution in the Caucasus.

Under the Musavatist government, Karabakh was entirely part of Azerbaijan. The inseparable cultural and economic ties of Karabakh and Zangezur with Baku—which relies on tens of thousands of workers from these provinces—and their complete detachment from Erivan were vividly demonstrated in 1919 at the peasant congress of Armenian Karabakh. Despite the intolerable Musavatist regime and the provocative activities of Armenian agents, the congress decisively expressed support for full unity with Azerbaijan, provided that peaceful life for Armenians was guaranteed.*

Only from late 1919 and early 1920, especially following the Red Army’s victories over Denikin, the foundations of Dashnak and Musavatist rule were severely shaken. Under Entente directives, these forces provoked a brutal national massacre, establishing their bloody dominance. After the arrival of the Red Army, the Soviet coup in Azerbaijan, and particularly the Khanobek uprising and its exceptionally correct suppression, the national war in Karabakh ceased entirely, giving way to a broad revolutionary peasant movement.

During this process, the army of askers and the detachments of Dashnak General Dro disintegrated, with Dro fleeing without his army beyond Gerusy. The Armenian and Muslim poor, having established Soviet power and engaged in revolutionary resolution of the issue, have partially united on the basis of class interests and civil war, actively participating in the pursuit of Nuri Pasha’s bands. Karabakh and its mountainous region, shaken by civil war and the emergence of mass self-activity, are increasingly becoming a stronghold of Soviet construction and the forging of class consciousness among the masses of the East.

Despite the slowed advance of the Red Army in Zangezur, the echo of its presence and the civil war in Karabakh can be felt in Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan. Due to our passivity in Zangezur, remnants of Dashnaks and Dro have remained, brutally persecuting Soviet workers and sympathizers of the Red Army. As a result, new Armenian uprisings against the Dashnaks are emerging, and Soviets are being organized that gravitate toward Azerbaijan and Russia.

We have received numerous consistent testimonies of the population’s deep loyalty to Soviet power and their fervent anticipation of the Red Army. In northern Zangezur, in militant Kurdistan, Soviets have been half-organized on their own initiative. In other parts, the mood is entirely favorable. The division commissar who visited the area reports that the Kurds accept all conditions and orders of Soviet power. The militancy of our nomadic Kurds can easily be directed—once the Dashnaks are crushed in Zangezur—toward defending Azerbaijan’s borders.

Securing Zangezur under Soviet power will not only restore our connection and create a reliable rear for the revolutionary Turkish movement in the Nakhichevan region and Anatolia, but the Red Army’s advance into Zangezur will also be accompanied by a tremendous upsurge and, without coercion on our part, will deepen and expand the Soviet republic.

Any neutralization of Zangezur and Karabakh or their transfer to the Dashnaks—which would mean death to the Soviets, fire and sword to the working masses, and the restoration of national fronts and enmity—will be regarded as betrayal. Chauvinism will be revived, and Armenian masses, seeking support in national struggle, will rally behind the Dashnaks. The Muslim population, having lost the buffer of revolutionary Armenian regions fighting the hated Dashnaks and seeing the Dashnaks revived at close range, will take up arms with curses against Soviet power. By that time, they will be disarmed both physically by the Red Army and morally by Soviet agitation.

The Muslim masses will view this unexpected return to the old order and the Soviet power’s inability to preserve Azerbaijan’s former borders as betrayal, Armenophilism, or weakness. Either could provoke a tense uprising against Soviet power. The establishment of Dashnak rule in Zangezur and Karabakh will undermine the revolution in Turkey, deprive it of our support and connection, and create a threatening rear.

We warn the Central Committee against wavering on the issue of Karabakh and Zangezur, so as not to turn Azerbaijan into a cripple dependent on the Red Army and handed out to Armenians and Georgians, instead of forging it into a strong national center and source of class revolution in the East.

Signed: Chair of the Revolutionary Committee Narimanov, Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP(B) Mdivani, Members of the Central Committee of the AZCP Mikoyan, Naneishvili, Members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Red Army Vesnik, Levandovsky, Mikhailov**

*Note: This refers to the resolution of the 7th Congress of Karabakh Armenians on August 22, 1919, regarding a “Temporary Agreement with the Azerbaijani Government on Nagorno-Karabakh.” However, this resolution is misrepresented here, as it contains no mention of “full unity with Azerbaijan.” See Document No. 348.

The authors of this letter completely ignore the historical rights of the Armenian people and the “Instruction” of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) dated July 7, 1920. Guided by the principle of exporting revolution, Azerbaijani national communists, in deference to the aggressive ambitions of Musavatist-Turkish circles, attempt to justify their expansionist plans with fabricated arguments—namely, to conquer historically Armenian regions with the help of Russian Bolsheviks and hand them over to Azerbaijan, which has already adopted a “red” façade.

Telegram from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Georgia, S. Kirov, to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin and V. Lenin

On the Possibility of Convening a Conference with Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan to Resolve All Disputed Issues Tiflis, July 12, 1920 Marked: “For Lenin Only” No. 19

On July 12, through my mediation, an agreement was reached between the Armenians and Azerbaijan to convene a conference in Kazakh in the coming days to resolve all disputed issues between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

This agreement has now been undermined by reports received here that negotiations between Armenia and Russia have stalled. I urgently request information on the status of negotiations with Armenia, if an agreement has indeed been reached. Please communicate its substance.*

No. 1239 RGASPI, f. 80, op. 4, d. 54, l. 1. Copy from a document held in GARF, f. 130, op. 19, d. 44, l. 138. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

  • The date on the document is incorrect and clarified based on content.

Report from the Operations Department of the Headquarters of the 11th Red Army to the Operations Directorate of the Caucasus Front

On the Urgent Request of the Commander of the Turkish Eastern Front for the Red Army to Occupy Karabakh No. 01919/r July 12, 1920

Turkey: The contents of a letter from the commander of the Turkish Eastern Front to the commander of the 11th Red Army were conveyed verbally by courier Lieutenant Sharif Yusuf of the Turkish service, who departed from Trebizond on June 27 and arrived in Baku on July 9 via Tuapse. The letter itself was thrown into the Black Sea by the courier after the ship he was traveling on was intercepted by the British submarine “Dodge.”

The letter stated:

“Turkey has initiated military operations against capitalists and imperialists, and open actions against the British have already begun on the Western Front. Regarding the structure of local governance: a month ago, a courier arrived from Russia, and based on his report, we understood that each region’s population must build its own authority. Therefore, we would like Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to resolve territorial issues under Russia’s chairmanship (this was already agreed upon with the previous courier. Kuatim has already returned to Moscow).

In accordance with the order of the Grand National Assembly, I began mobilization and launched an offensive, for which sufficient forces were available. The goal of the offensive was to seize key strategic points on the Armenian front. However, after the arrival of your courier from Moscow, it became clear that our actions were premature, and we postponed further operations.

Kazim Karabekir Pasha urgently requests that the Red Army occupy Karabakh to put an end to fratricidal conflict and establish contact with them. The request is extremely pressing.”

Signed: Chief of the Operations Department of the 11th Army – Voronkov Military Commissar – Babaev CGASA, f. 195, op. 3, d. 945, l. 123. Transcript. Typescript. Published in the collection: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. No. 370. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR G. Chicherin

On the Continuation of the Aggressive Policy of the Musavat Government by Soviet Azerbaijan, the Complicit Position of Soviet Russia, and the Demand for the Withdrawal of the Red Army from Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur No. 4192 July 12, 1920

Contrary to your assertions in telegrams No. 130 and No. 427 regarding the friendly attitude of the Russian Soviet Government toward the Republic of Armenia and its readiness to assist the Armenian people in the severe trials they have endured, Russian Soviet troops have occupied Armenian Karabakh and are now advancing toward Zangezur, an indisputable part of the Republic of Armenia.

This movement of your forces fundamentally violates the principle of national self-determination and the assurances previously given by your government, and cannot but sow doubt among the Armenian people regarding Soviet Russia’s goodwill toward them.

The former Musavat government of Azerbaijan, which for two years attempted by force of arms to impose on the Armenian peasantry of Karabakh and Zangezur a hated and alien Azerbaijani authority, was compelled to retreat before the unwavering will of the Zangezur and Karabakh peasantry. At eight congresses of their peasant deputies, they adopted categorical resolutions affirming their decision to join their native Republic of Armenia. In late April of this year, the Ninth Congress of Peasant Deputies of Karabakh reaffirmed this decision.

Now, under the guise of Soviet Russian authority and with the support of its armed forces, the government of Soviet Azerbaijan intends to implement on a broader scale the long-standing Musavat plan to sever Armenia’s historical lands, extending its claims not only to disputed territories but also to indisputably Armenian regions such as Zangezur.

In this intent, the Armenian government also sees an effort to realize another cherished Musavat goal: to connect with the imperialists of Turkey through the living body of Armenia.

Faced with this new threat emanating from Azerbaijan, my government cannot remain passive. Consistent in its peaceful disposition, immediately upon the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, my government proposed convening a special Armenian-Azerbaijani conference to peacefully resolve all disputed border issues. Only after two proposals did the Azerbaijani government finally agree.

At this moment, the entry of Russian Soviet troops into Armenian territory can only be regarded by my government as a violation of Armenia’s sovereign rights and the Armenian people’s right to free self-determination. We are prepared to interpret this movement solely as a result of the Russian command’s lack of awareness regarding the actual situation and Armenia’s borders.

On behalf of my government, I therefore request that you urgently issue an order for the withdrawal of Russian Soviet troops from Zangezur and Nagorno-Karabakh, thereby allowing the Armenian government to calmly address border disputes with Azerbaijan at the upcoming conference.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia A. Ohandjanian

Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia A. Ohandjanian to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR G. Chicherin and Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Georgia S. Kirov

On Hostile Actions by the Red Army in Armenian Territory and the Disputed Region of Karabakh July 13, 1920

Thirdly, despite the agreement of July 2, your forces continue military operations in the regions of Armenian Karabakh and Zangezur, undermining the very significance of the agreement reached.

I therefore urgently request that you issue orders to cease all hostile actions in the specified regions and to withdraw your troops from the territory of Armenia and the disputed areas of Karabakh, which are to be addressed at the forthcoming Armenian-Azerbaijani conference.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia A. Ohandjanian

Statement of the Diplomatic Representative of Armenia in Azerbaijan to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR, S. Kirov

On the Advance of Azerbaijani Troops into Zangezur and Karabakh July 13, 1920

I take this opportunity to inform you that, according to newly received reports, the movements of Azerbaijani Soviet troops in the latter region* and its surroundings continue. This is causing great anxiety among the Armenian population and military forces, who cannot remain silent observers for long. Should they shift to active engagement, it would threaten incalculable disaster for the working classes of both nations—Armenia and Azerbaijan. Preventing such developments is the duty of all who wish to avoid them.

In reporting this to you, Mr. Representative, I trust you will not fail to exert the full weight of your influence on the Azerbaijani government to halt these attempts to penetrate Armenian territory—attempts that will meet the most resolute and vigorous resistance from the troops and population of Armenia.

Diplomatic Representative Acting Administrator Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, f. 278, op. 1, d. 38, l. 123 verso. Certified copy. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. No. 371.

Telegram from G. Ordzhonikidze (Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) and Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front) and B. Legran (Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Armenia) to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin

Proposing a Resolution to the Territorial Dispute Between the Republic of Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan Baku, July 14, 1920

Marked: “Military, urgent, via political controller.” “Ask who received it and report time of transmission [illegible] affix tape.”

We consider the following resolution necessary, which may partially satisfy Azerbaijan: Karabakh is to be fully and unconditionally annexed to Azerbaijan; Zangezur is to be declared disputed; the remaining regions (Nakhichevan, Sharur, Daralaghez, Ordubad) are to remain with Armenia.

HP 4/37 Ordzhonikidze, Legran RGASPI, f. 85, op. 13, d. 51, l. 1. Original.

Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan

On the Annexation of Karabakh to the Azerbaijan SSR as a Condition for Peace with Armenia Baku, July 15, 1920

Present: Comrades V. Egorov, A. Mikoyan, A. Karaev, M. Guseynov, N. Narimanov, D. Buniatzade, Kasimov, V. Noneishvili, G. Ordzhonikidze, E. Stasova, representative of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army, representative in Armenia Legran.

Agenda: Peace with Armenia.

Resolved:

  1. Karabakh and Zangezur must be annexed to Azerbaijan.
  2. Nakhichevan and other regions to be relinquished; propose occupation by Russian forces.
  3. Temporarily, until full information on the situation in Armenia is received, instruct Comrade Legran not to sign the peace agreement.
  4. Propose that Armenia suspend all military operations during negotiations.

Member of the Central Committee Secretary PAAz. FIML, f. 1, op. 74, l. 46. Published in: Toward the Formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, Baku, 1989, doc. S. 57.

Telegram from G. Ordzhonikidze (Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) and Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front) to V. Lenin, G. Chicherin, and I. Stalin

Proposing That Peace with Armenia Not Be Concluded Without the Participation of Soviet Azerbaijan and Conveying Turkish Requests to Permit Massacres of Armenians in Nakhichevan July 16, 1920

Via political controller. Report time of delivery. To: Moscow, Kremlin – Lenin, Chicherin, Stalin From: Baku, July 16, 1920

I consider it absolutely necessary to delay peace with Armenia until the arrival of the Azerbaijani representative, who is traveling in response to Comrade Chicherin’s invitation. Peace with Armenia without Azerbaijan’s participation is causing serious unrest among comrades here.*

In the Nakhichevan region, a massacre between Armenians and Tatars is inevitable. It can only be avoided by our advance and occupation of the Nakhichevan region. We attempted reconnaissance in that direction*, but the Commander-in-Chief, acting on orders from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, prohibited such movement.

Couriers from the Turkish division are besieging us with requests to permit the massacre. I repeat: massacre is inevitable. We have sufficient forces for occupation. Request urgent instructions.

HP 472 Ordzhonikidze GARF, f. 130, op. 4, d. 496, l. 154. Original.

*Note: In a similar telegram from G. Ordzhonikidze preserved in his personal archive, the phrase “During my month-long absence, a significant shift toward nationalism occurred” is crossed out. See RGASPI, f. 85, op. 14, d. 5, ll. 3–6. Autograph.

Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR

On the Immediate Withdrawal of Azerbaijani Troops from Zangezur and Karabakh No. 4287 July 17, 1920

Contrary to the July 2 agreement and your assurances regarding the cessation of executions of Armenians by your troops—who have unlawfully invaded the territories of Karabakh and Zangezur—Armenian officers captured by those forces have been executed. Such an act constitutes a gross violation of international law and simultaneously undermines the very significance of the agreement concluded between the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On behalf of my government, I express a categorical protest against the unlawful actions of your troops and once again urge you to take all necessary measures for the immediate withdrawal of your forces from the territory of Zangezur and the disputed regions of Karabakh. I also request that you instruct your troops to strictly adhere to the July 2 agreement. Otherwise, my government will consider itself released from the obligations assumed under the aforementioned agreement.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia A. Ohandjanian Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, f. 200, op. 1, d. 581, l. 167. Transcript. Typescript. Published in: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. No. 376.

Telegram from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Georgia, S. Kirov, to G. Ordzhonikidze, Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front

On the Position of the RSFSR’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Territorial Disputes Between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan SSR July 17, 1920

<…> Chicherin urgently requests that Azerbaijani comrades be persuaded to moderate their claims regarding the Armenian question. He appears inclined to recognize Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed territories, and to concede the Nakhichevan district and Ordubad to Armenia. Chicherin has repeatedly emphasized the need to resolve this issue as soon as possible.

Please confirm receipt of this message. No. 560 Kirov RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 17, l. 297. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

*Note: In the continuation of this telegram preserved in G. Ordzhonikidze’s personal archive, the following appears: “However, the statement from the Revolutionary Military Council indicates insufficient forces in this region. The political situation demands that we prevent a massacre in the Nakhichevan district, which is inevitable without our intervention. I believe reconnaissance can continue. I will contact Chicherin today, and if he disagrees, we will withdraw our reconnaissance. I repeat, reconnaissance is essential.” (RGASPI, f. 85, op. 14, d. 5, ll. 3–6) 480

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

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