Telegram from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin

Telegram from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, A. Ogandzhanian

On the RSFSR Government’s Intent to Ensure the Armenian People Access to Sufficient Territory for Their Development and on the Purpose of Occupying Disputed Territories Between Azerbaijan and Armenia July 19, 1920

All actions undertaken by Soviet Russia in the Caucasus are aimed at providing friendly assistance to the peaceful and stable development of the Armenian people, as well as to neighboring peoples and other nations of the Near East.

Soviet Russia acts as a disinterested friend to the working people of all nationalities. The occupation by Russian units of those areas which, in the course of conflict between neighboring peoples, have become disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is intended to prevent bloody clashes that could lead to unforeseeable and disastrous consequences for all parties involved. It is also designed to create conditions conducive to a calm and impartial discussion of territorial disputes.

The friendly relations that the Soviet government seeks to establish with the Turkish national government in Asia Minor are being used, among other things, to ensure that the Armenian people may acquire territory in Asia Minor sufficient for their development, and finally emerge from the cycle of fatal enmity with the neighboring Muslim population.

Soviet Russia will continue along the path of impartial and friendly relations with the working people of all nationalities. The Armenian people may firmly rely on its unwavering friendship and on its assistance, within its means, to prevent new bloody disasters threatening the Armenian nation.

Sources: AVPR, f. 148, op. 3, p. 1, d. 2, l. 5. Original, edited by G. Chicherin; AI RA, f. 276, op. 1, d. 219, l. 9 verso. Certified copy. Published in the collection: The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia, Yerevan, 1957, doc. no. 262, pp. 373–374; CGIA of Armenia, f. 200, op. 1, d. 581, l. 203 verso. Certified copy. *Unclear text. **The note was published in the newspaper Slovo on July 25, 1920. The note in the newspaper is dated July 21.

Letter from the Chairman of the Karabakh Revolutionary Committee, Asad Karaev, to the Gerus District Revolutionary Committee

On the Impossibility of a Military Solution to the Territorial Dispute and the Need to Resort to Bribery Using Allocated Funds July 19, 1920

Annotations: “Copy of a copy.” “Top secret.”

Comrades!

Your successes bring us great joy. We have no doubt that the approximately 100 million allocated from Baku will be put to good use. May Allah bless the power of money, which accomplishes more than strong armies. Those who understand the psychology of Armenians will always dominate them. There is no Armenian who would not sell everything for money. This nation has recognized no sanctity other than money. This explains the large number of Armenian spies and agents—nowhere else can money achieve what it does among Armenians. This is a fact. The unfortunate Jews are wrongly accused of this.

I write at length to convince you and all comrades that your previous policy—military occupation of Karabakh and Zangezur—was deeply mistaken. We know our troops were defeated and retreated, but now, instead of soldiers, our money works miracles. I repeat my advice again and again: spare no expense, raise salaries, offer rewards—give them whatever they want.

The government has allocated 200 million rubles for the annexation of Karabakh and Zangezur to Azerbaijan. We must act quickly. Circumstances may change suddenly—England is not asleep.

There are doubts and speculations in Baku that England may draw Turkey to its side. If this happens before Zangezur is annexed to Azerbaijan, Zangezur may be considered lost once again. So may Allah bless you—do your utmost, time does not wait.

With comradely greetings, Asad Karaev Translated (signature)

Source: RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 19, l. 9. Certified copy.

Letter from the Chairman of the Karabakh Revolutionary Committee, Asad Karaev, to the Gerusin District Revolutionary Committee

On the Necessity of Arrests, Abductions, Killings, or Deportations of Armenians, and the Organization of Red Army Murders for Political Provocation July 21, 1920

Annotations: “Copy of a copy.” “Top secret.” Organizational-Instructor Department

  • On the letterhead of the Karabakh District Revolutionary Committee (Shusha). ** Stamped: “November 16, 1920. Incoming No. 6s.” Certified copy by clerk Ukolov. *** On the letterhead of the Karabakh Provincial Revolutionary Committee. **** Stamped: “November 16, 1920. Incoming No. 7s.” Certified copy by clerk Ukolov.

Comrades!

Visiting comrades report that 90% of Zangezur’s villages remain armed. This is regrettable. But even more regrettable is that the Armenian leadership in Zangezur has not yet been decapitated. Its intelligentsia and military leaders are still in the villages. In the event of an uprising, they will lead it—and they will drive our forces out of Zangezur.

I repeat again and again: time does not wait. Work day and night. Ensure that all prominent and influential Armenians are arrested. Deportation and abduction are no great matter. Days will pass, the situation will change, and they will return to their country.

Abandon humanitarianism. One cannot build a state, conquer lands, or live in peace with it. Local comrades are dissatisfied with the Armenian members of the Gerusin Revolutionary Committee. Try to reelect the committee, and during this process, select only Muslims and Russians known to us.

Armenak Karagezyan will arrive in Gerusin in the coming days. His delay is due to awaiting funds. Until he received 22 million rubles, he did not depart. Is he not Armenian? A fine time to get rich—why shouldn’t he take advantage? But let him enjoy what our government gives him. He promises to annex Zangezur to Azerbaijan within seven days. We have no doubt that he will soon delight us with news of Kapan’s annexation.

If you lack force, you have money. Why delay the conquest of this rebellious region? You speak of some “Ashda Pasha” (a reference to Nzhdeh). Use the blessed means. What Armenian would not accept three million rubles to deliver you this man’s head?

If you need money, telegraph us—we will send it.

With greetings, Asad Karaev

P.S. In areas known for their military presence, to weaken the Armenians, kill one Russian soldier and blame the Armenians. You know what the Russians will do. Leave no decent person or wealth in Zangezur, so that this cursed tribe may never rise again. That is how it was done in Russia, and that is how you must act.

Asad Karaev

Source: RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 19, l. 10. Certified copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Dispatch from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Armenia, B. Legran,

to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin and Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front, G. Ordzhonikidze On the Need to Terminate Negotiations with the Armenian Delegation in Moscow and Transfer Them to the Caucasus to Increase Pressure on the Government of the Republic of Armenia Aghstafa, July 21, 1920

The resolution of territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, among other factors, is significantly complicated by the conduct of the Armenian government, which continues hostile actions against Turkey—namely, attacks in the regions of Olti and Zangibasar, and the recent advance of Armenian forces toward Nakhichevan in connection with the occupation of the Nakhichevan district by the Bayazet Division.

Information on Armenian military operations in Olti and Zangibasar has been received, among other sources, from the commander of the Eastern Front of Kemalist Turkey. The advance toward Nakhichevan has been confirmed by Armenian Foreign Minister Ogandzhanian in an official telegram to the Azerbaijani government.

The agreement we reached with Ordzhonikidze regarding territorial issues will, naturally, provoke persistent opposition in Baku and can only be successfully implemented under the following conditions:

  1. A firm appeal from your office to the Armenian government demanding the immediate cessation of all hostile actions against Azerbaijan and Turkey, supported by the actual advance of our forces toward the Turkish-Azerbaijani border in the Nakhichevan region to prevent any border clashes and to exert pressure on the Armenian government.
  2. The termination of peace negotiations with Shant’s delegation in Moscow, which have proven fruitless, and their transfer to the Caucasus, where local conditions can be more effectively taken into account. An official delegation from the Republic of Azerbaijan must be invited to participate. Vladikavkaz could be designated as the location for these negotiations.

[…]

Certified: Secretary L. Shiffers RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, pp. 17–19. Certified copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Telegram from the Command of the Caucasus Front

to the Command of the 11th Red Army On the Directive from Chief of Staff of the RVSR, Lebedev, to Take Measures “to Protect Azerbaijan” from “Dashnaks” in Karabakh and Zangezur July 21, 1920

July 21, 1920. No. 8571/s. By order of the Front Command, the following copy of the telegram from the Chief of Staff of the RVSR is transmitted for execution:

“Moscow, July 20, 1920. […] The Commander-in-Chief has ordered measures to be taken to protect Azerbaijan from the Dashnaks, without exceeding the boundaries specified in telegrams No. 3751/op/726/sh and No. 4289/op/912/sh—namely, the regions of Karabakh, Zangezur, and the areas designated for Azerbaijani occupation: Nakhichevan, Ordubad, and Julfa. No. 4336/op/926/sh. Chief of Staff of the Republic’s Revolutionary Military Council, Lebedev. For the Military Commissar of the Staff: Lazarev.” No. 8627/s.

Chief of Staff of the Caucasus Front: Pugachev Military Commissar: Pechorsky RGVA, f. 195, op. 11, d. 24, p. 19.

  • As in the original text.

From the Letter of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Georgia, S. Kirov,

to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin On Supporting Soviet Measures Regarding Disputed Territories July 26, 1920

[…] The measures we have initiated concerning Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhichevan, Ordubad, and Julfa are, in my view, the only viable course under the current circumstances. I believe that only under these conditions can we expect a resolution to the entire issue. However, I strongly doubt that Legran will succeed in implementing our plan in Erivan, especially given that the negotiations in Moscow have yielded no positive results. The coming days will show what we can realistically expect here. […]

Source: RGASPI, f. 80, op. 4, d. 12, p. 4. Copy of a copy.

Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, A. Ogandzhanian,

to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin On the Military Actions of the Red Army Against the Republic of Armenia in Coordination with Soviet Azerbaijan and Kemalist Turkey, as Incompatible with the RSFSR’s Role as a Neutral Mediator July 27, 1920

Acknowledged receipt of your telegram dated July 20, No. 751.

Both the Armenian government and the Armenian people are sincerely grateful to the Russian government for its expressions of friendship and its declared intention to support the peaceful and stable development of a free Armenia.

Regrettably, my government must note that these friendly assurances are, in practice, contradicted by the actions of local Soviet authorities and the command of your forces in Azerbaijan, which have taken the form of continuous hostile military operations against Armenia in the regions of Kazakh, Karabakh, and Zangezur.

As a result, Armenia is compelled to maintain a significant military presence along its border with Azerbaijan to defend its territory against Azerbaijani incursions—incursions that are supported, in these matters, by Russian Soviet forces. This burden falls heavily on the shoulders of the Armenian peasantry, depriving them of the opportunity to engage in peaceful agricultural labor and to restore their livelihoods devastated by the Turkish invasion.

Thus, the presence of Russian Soviet troops in disputed—and in this case, indisputably Armenian—territories such as Zangezur not only fails to prevent bloody conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but rather contributes to their escalation.

At this moment, when my government has initiated peaceful negotiations with Azerbaijan to resolve all disputed issues at the upcoming Armenian-Azerbaijani conference, the continued presence of your forces in the aforementioned regions can only hinder the creation of conditions necessary for calm and impartial discussion of territorial questions.

In light of this, my government expresses its firm hope that you will take all necessary measures to immediately cease hostile actions against Armenia and to withdraw your forces from the regions mentioned above. […]

Sources: RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, pp. 21–22. Typed copy; AVPR, f. 148, op. 3, p. 1, d. 2, pp. 7–7 verso. Certified copy; same archive, d. 3, p. 9. Copy. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Note from People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin,

to an Unidentified Recipient On the Turkish Occupation of Nakhichevan and Their Proposal to Deploy Soviet Troops There, in Violation of the Territorial Integrity of the Republic of Armenia July 28, 1920

The Turks, having taken Nakhichevan, have established Soviet authority there. They propose that our troops be sent in. The order for our forces to occupy the area has long since been issued […] but in the future, it is not for the Turks or any other nation to decide where and in what numbers our troops should be deployed. No. 1088. Chicherin

Decoded by the secretary of the Plenipotentiary Mission in Armenia (Shiffers) Source: RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, p. 40. Copy.

Authorization Granted to B. Legran to Conduct Negotiations on the Conclusion of an Armistice and Peace Between the Republic of Armenia and the RSFSR, Acting Both as a Belligerent Party and as an Impartial Mediator in the Settlement of Territorial Disputes

July 28, 1920

AUTHORIZATION

Citizen of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, Boris Vasilievich Legran, is hereby authorized by the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic to conduct negotiations for the conclusion of an armistice and peace with the Government of the Republic of Armenia.

*Part of the document is missing. Reconstructed based on context. **The document, issued on the official letterhead of the Council of People’s Commissars, bears two seals: one of the Council of People’s Commissars and one of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR.

B.V. Legran is empowered to conclude and sign both an armistice agreement and a peace treaty with the aforementioned State. The peace treaty shall be subject to subsequent ratification by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers’, Peasants’, and Red Army Deputies.

Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars V. Ulyanov (Lenin) Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs L. Karakhan

Source: RGASPI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 14825, p. 1. Original. Autograph.

Memorandum from People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)

On the Necessity of Sovietizing Armenia to Enable Transit of Arms and Ammunition to the Defeated Kemalists July 30, 1920

It is necessary to take advantage of Comrade Sergo’s presence to resolve the Armenian question in connection with the situation of the Kemalists. The latter are on the verge of collapse due to a lack of armaments. They have manpower and leadership, but their supply of weapons is nearly exhausted, and they are critically short of ammunition. This renders their position dire.

Sending them arms is only possible via transit through Armenia. Three months ago, the Armenians agreed to grant us transit rights, but due to Azerbaijan’s obstinacy over border disputes, the agreement stalled. Now the Armenians are defeating the Turks and have grown exceedingly arrogant.

According to Kirov, the Dashnaks have received ammunition from Wrangel (more accurately, from the Entente via Wrangel). According to Comrade Sergo, any attempt to obtain from the Dashnaks unrestricted transit rights through Armenia is now hopeless.

Comrade Sergo asserts that Sovietizing Armenia would not require a large military force. He has spoken with the Commander-in-Chief and confirmed that such forces can be made available. In that case, the Sovietization of Armenia becomes urgently necessary. Without it, we lack a direct connection with Turkey. The collapse of the Kemalists would deal us a severe blow in the East.

People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Source: AVPR, f. 04, op. 51, p. 321a, d. 54875, p. 33. Copy.

Report from the Diplomatic Representative of Armenia in Azerbaijan

to the Minister of Foreign Affairs On the Implementation by Azerbaijani National Communists of a Pan-Turkist Program for the Annexation of Armenian Territories Baku, July 31, 1920

The central focus of Azerbaijan’s current policy is the faint and remote possibility that, as a result of Russo-Armenian negotiations, Zangezur and Karabakh might be transferred to Armenia. In response, the entire Revolutionary Committee, Tatar activists, and a significant portion of Armenian communists have been mobilized to bombard Moscow with special delegations, notes, and similar appeals. This diplomatic pressure has accelerated the occupation of Zangezur.

Several motives converge here: foremost is the Pan-Turkist plan—to create a corridor toward Turkey via Nakhichevan, Sharur, and Surmali. This program, which had seemingly been abandoned during the final days of Musavatist rule, has now been revived on a massive scale and with considerable momentum. It is evident that in Moscow and among socialist circles, the implementation of this program is justified by the perceived necessity of connecting with “Red” Anatolia. This is further facilitated by the Russian-Turkish alliance, and morally supported by a strong current among Armenian communists who, based on economic considerations, deem it expedient to annex Karabakh and Zangezur to Azerbaijan.

These converging circumstances have led to the occupation of Zangezur. To defend their position in Moscow, a full delegation was dispatched—composed primarily of non-communists and led by Mamed-Hasan Hajinski. This delegation has been instructed to demand the implementation of its territorial program in Moscow, arguing that the only way to win the sympathies of Azerbaijan’s Muslim population is to annex not only Karabakh and Zangezur, but also Nakhichevan, Sharur, and Surmali.

Maps reflecting this vision now adorn the offices of the chairman and secretary of the Revolutionary Committee. For the same purpose, Guseinov has also departed suddenly for Moscow.

Diplomatic Representative M. Arutyunyan

Source: Central State Historical Archive of Armenia, f. 200, op. 1, d. 4, p. 24 verso. Original manuscript. Translated from Armenian. Published in the collection: Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918–1923, Yerevan, 1992, doc. no. 386. (Emphasis added – Y.B.)

Telegram from People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin,

to Member of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front, G. Ordzhonikidze On Territories Disputed with Soviet Azerbaijan Late July 1920

The Armenian delegation informed us that it agreed to recognize only Karabakh as disputed, not Zangezur or other territories. I spoke with Gabrielyan just before his departure, and he told me that the Armenian delegation had finally agreed to recognize both Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed—but this referred to recognition of their disputed status, not to immediate or full transfer.

Of course, if Legran succeeds in reconciling the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments, it will be a brilliant achievement. In that case, Legran should consult with us before any final decision is made.

However, I believe Gabrielyan’s optimism is based on a serious misunderstanding. I strongly protest the accusation that I am considering only one side and not the other. Our goal is to act as an objective higher authority, which is precisely why the decision was made to occupy the disputed territories with our forces.

People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin

Source: RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 25, pp. 252–252 verso. Copy. 505

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

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