II.
3. The Ministers expressed their deep concern over the continuing escalation of the armed conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, which has resulted in increasing suffering and a growing number of civilian casualties. They held a broad discussion on possible ways and means to end the conflict, mindful of the consequences its continuation and further expansion could have for regional and international security. They called upon all parties to exercise restraint.
4. The Ministers once again most resolutely called for an immediate and effective ceasefire, with the active involvement of responsible commanders on the ground in its implementation. They appealed for the restoration of an atmosphere of trust and conditions conducive to constructive dialogue, including the cessation of economic and political pressure measures.
5. The Ministers reviewed current CSCE activities and, in general, endorsed the decisions taken by the Committee of Senior Officials. They expressed their appreciation to the Acting Chairman of the CSCE for the steps he had taken in this regard and emphasized their readiness to provide him with all possible assistance if necessary.
6. The Ministers welcomed the complementary efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member states, the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and, in particular, the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. They requested the Acting Chairman of the CSCE to maintain close contacts with the United Nations in this respect and to organize regular exchanges of information.
The Ministers agreed that the CSCE should play an important role in developing a peace process regarding this conflict. They concurred that the situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh requires further action by the CSCE.
7. The Ministers instructed the Acting Chairman of the CSCE Council of Ministers, Mr. Jiří Dienstbier, to visit the region in the near future in order to contribute, in particular, to the achievement and maintenance of an effective ceasefire, as well as to the creation of a framework for a comprehensive peaceful settlement.
8. The Ministers expressed their firm conviction that a conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the CSCE would provide a permanent forum for negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement of the crisis, based on CSCE principles, commitments, and provisions. In this connection, the Ministers requested the Acting Chairman of the CSCE Council of Ministers to convene such a conference as soon as possible.
9. The Ministers further agreed that the participants in this Conference, to be held in Minsk, will be Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, Turkey, France, the Czechoslovak Federal Republic, and Sweden. Elected and other representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh will be invited to the Conference by its Chairman as interested parties, following consultations with the participating states. The Acting Chairman of the CSCE Council will appoint the Chairman of the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under CSCE auspices.
10. The Ministers strongly urged all CSCE participating States and all interested parties to take all necessary steps to ensure that humanitarian assistance is provided to all those in need, through rapid and effective means, including safe corridors placed under international control.
11. The Ministers took note of the commitment by Armenia and Azerbaijan to provide full support to the mission of the Acting Chairman of the CSCE Council in the region, as well as to other actions agreed upon by the CSCE Council, and called upon both countries to actively fulfill this commitment with the aim of achieving a lasting peaceful settlement.
III.
12. The Ministers agreed to hold the Stockholm meeting of the Council on 14–15 December 1992.
7 May 1992
At the invitation of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Acting President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Mr. Yaqub Mamedov, and the President of the Republic of Armenia, Mr. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, arrived in Tehran to hold bilateral talks and to discuss regional issues. Taking advantage of this opportunity, and at the initiative and proposal of the Iranian side, within the framework of diplomatic efforts aimed at normalizing the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, and at bringing positions closer together in order to reduce tensions in the region, the two Heads of State met on 7 May 1992 and held negotiations.
The Parties first expressed their gratitude to the Islamic Republic of Iran, to international and regional organizations, and to other states for their efforts directed toward the peaceful settlement of the conflict in the region, and voiced the hope that peaceful intentions and goodwill would contribute to peace and stability.
With the aim of developing bilateral relations and ensuring security in the region, the Parties agreed to organize meetings between representatives of both states at the highest level, as well as periodic meetings between district leaders and responsible military representatives.
The Parties expressed their desire to resolve, by peaceful means and at various levels, all issues related to the normalization of bilateral relations, on the basis of CSCE principles and international law.
Basing themselves on international legal norms and the Charter of the United Nations, the Parties emphasized the necessity of ensuring peace and stability along the borders and in Nagorno-Karabakh, noting that this would benefit both states and the region as a whole.
Respecting human rights and minority rights, the Parties jointly drew attention to the need to address the problems of Armenian and Azerbaijani refugees.
The Parties agreed that within one week of the arrival in the region (Baku, Yerevan, Nagorno-Karabakh) of the Special Representative of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. M. Vaezi, and following consultations with the interested parties, and with the support of the Heads of State of Azerbaijan and Armenia, a ceasefire would be implemented and, simultaneously, all communication routes would be opened to meet economic needs.
By agreement, in addition to observers from the Islamic Republic of Iran, CSCE observers and others will be involved in implementing the agreements reached.
The Parties, positively assessing the work of the high-level meeting in Tehran, agreed that all issues related to bilateral relations should be resolved through meetings and consultations of responsible officials at various levels and through negotiations.
The Heads of State, highly appreciating the efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran, expressed the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue its efforts until the establishment of lasting peace and stability in the region.
Islamic Republic of Iran Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
Republic of Azerbaijan Yaqub Mamedov
Republic of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan
(Circulated by Armenia as an official UN document) Stepanakert, 20 September 1992
To the President of the Republic of Armenia, Mr. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Mr. R. Hovhannisyan
The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic requests you to present at the session of the UN General Assembly and to circulate as an official document the following statement of the Presidium:
The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the NKR is prepared to begin bilateral negotiations with the Azerbaijani side regarding the status of the NKR.
The basis for such negotiations may be the conclusion of an independent commission of experts, composed on a mutually agreed basis, concerning the international and constitutional-legal foundations of the establishment of the NKR.
We have every reason to affirm that the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has never had an international legal foundation. Chronologically, the last universally recognized international legal act concerning Nagorno-Karabakh was the legal act of cession in 1920–1921, under which Azerbaijan renounced its unlawful claims to Nagorno-Karabakh, thereby agreeing to the will of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, expressed in the decisions of the Congresses of plenipotentiary representatives of its population and of the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh, as the legitimately elected authorities.
The annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh was subsequently carried out on the basis of a decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP(b) — an unconstitutional, party organ of a third party — which had no legal force.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is the result of our many years of liberation and anti-colonial struggle, and it became a reality on the basis of the USSR Law “On the Procedure for Resolving Issues Related to the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR,” being recognized as a subject of law, authorized to independently decide its status in the event of the dissolution of the USSR.
Today we are defending ourselves against the aggression of the Republic of Azerbaijan, aimed at destroying the statehood of the NKR through the extermination of its population.
The measures we have taken for individual self-defense were duly communicated to the UN Security Council and its Secretary-General.
We regret that peacekeeping efforts within the framework of the CSCE are being carried out without regard to the international legal foundations of this conflict. Convinced that this is precisely the reason for the failure of peace initiatives within the CSCE, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the NKR requests the General Assembly to condemn the armed aggression against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and to assist in the establishment of an independent international expert commission on the international legal foundations of the Karabakh issue.
Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council of the NKR G. Petrosyan
Stepanakert, 20 September 1992
On the basis of the results of the nationwide referendum held on 10 November 1991 in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic concerning the status of the NKR, the Supreme Council of the NKR, on 6 January 1992, confirmed the proclamation of the NKR as an independent state.
The NKR declares its readiness to establish equal relations with all states of the world.
The NKR seeks to create a democratic state founded on respect for the norms of international law.
The NKR expresses the hope that the establishment of its independent statehood will contribute to ending bloodshed, protect the civilian population from the threat of physical annihilation, and calls upon the countries of the international community to support the peacekeeping efforts of the NKR.
Striving to become a member of the world community, the NKR will conduct its activities on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and other norms of international law.
To safeguard the civil rights and freedoms of its population, the NKR has adopted a Declaration of Human Rights as the foundation of its legislation and declares its readiness to accede to all documents recognized by the international community that regulate legal relations in society.
The Supreme Council of the NKR appeals to the United Nations, to the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, and to all parliaments and governments of the countries of the world with the proposal to recognize the NKR and to establish diplomatic and other relations with it.
(as presented in the Ambassador’s memoirs)
“The Place of Armenia in Russia’s Policy.” That was the title of my memorandum, which began with the words: “I consider it my duty to report the following.” The text continued as follows:
“Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh hold key significance for Russia. They are a stone barrier against pan-Turkism, which scarcely conceals its claims to extend influence over the entire Transcaucasus, relying on pro-Turkish circles in Azerbaijan (the Caucasian Tatars, in the person of Elchibey, openly proclaim their course toward the ‘Turkification’ of everything susceptible to such a policy), and from there toward the North Caucasus, the Volga region, Central Asia, the Altai, and beyond. Even the Chinese have already understood that the disappearance of the Armenian-Karabakh barrier would pose a threat to the Turkic-speaking regions of China.
Azerbaijani President Elchibey aims to seize Nagorno-Karabakh, which was Armenian land long before the Turks appeared in the Transcaucasus, which initiated reunification with Russia at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, which never submitted to the Turks and never allowed itself to be fully Turkified. The seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijani Turks is possible only through the suppression of its defenders, the expulsion of the indigenous population (a process begun ‘peacefully’ in the 1920s, carried out openly with the support of the Soviet army in 1990–91, and continuing now with the help of weapons captured by Azerbaijanis and Slavic mercenaries). If Elchibey’s plan succeeds, all who can will leave Armenia, and those who remain will be forced to kneel before the Turks and the Americans. Russia’s positions in the Transcaucasus will be finished. Our positions in the North Caucasus and beyond will also be struck.
Russia’s interests in the Transcaucasus do not coincide with those of either Turkey or the United States. Our interests depend on whether the Armenian-Karabakh Christian enclave, which has bound its fate to Russia and repeatedly suffered for it at the hands of the Turks (up to the genocide of the late 19th century and especially 1915–1920), will remain there or not.
At present, virtually all strata of Armenian society and all political forces, including the opposition, cannot imagine Armenia’s future without union and shared life with Russia. The entire scientific and intellectual potential of Armenia (not insignificant, if one considers the real contribution of Armenians to the science and culture of Russia and the USSR) is ready to serve this union, to serve its own people and the people of Russia, as nations with centuries-old traditions of spiritual and human ties. Preserving this capital of shared destinies and interests is the duty of every conscientious Russian concerned with the fate of Russia. Armenians are our most loyal ally in preserving and multiplying the fundamental foundations upon which Russia’s revival is still possible.
To neglect this alliance is to neglect Russia’s future. To help Armenia is to demonstrate to all that alliance with Russia corresponds to the most fundamental national interests of its partner, for it grants privileged status within Russia’s system of international relations. Only in this way can others be drawn to Russia’s side—not by playing games with them at the expense of allies.
In a detailed annex, I painted a picture of Armenia’s dire economic situation, which ended 1992 in a state of profound crisis, caused primarily by the transport and energy blockade. I noted the interesting fact that the republic was saved from famine by a radical land reform, the essence of which was the shift to private ownership, resulting in increased production of grain, potatoes, and vegetables—mainly thanks to private peasant farms, which produced 80 percent of all agricultural output. But livestock farming was in poor condition: herds had declined. Industry, transport, and scientific institutions were also in distress. The number of unemployed was expected to rise to 200,000, mostly people with higher education. Prices soared, especially for gasoline. People lived on bread, potatoes, and… reserves.
I then described the inter-party struggle, but devoted primary attention to Armenia’s foreign and military policy in light of the Karabakh conflict and Azerbaijan’s policies, so that our own policy in the Transcaucasus could be built with full understanding. The memorandum set out in detail my assessment of the situation and my attitude toward it. Later, I mainly developed and refined my position. Here are some excerpts from what I wrote at the time to the Security Council under the Russian President, to the overseer of the Transcaucasian direction in the government, and to the MFA leadership in January 1993:
“Throughout the year, Azerbaijan continued attempts to resolve the Karabakh problem by military means. Armenia assisted the self-defense forces and the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, whose independence was proclaimed on 7 January 1992 on the basis of the convincing results of the referendum held on its territory on 10 December 1991. Without officially recognizing the NKR, the Armenian leadership provided political support to the lawful authorities of the NKR within the CIS and on the international stage. At the end of the year, Acting Foreign Minister of Armenia A. Kirakosyan confirmed the official position: ‘Armenia will always support the interests of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. We cannot abandon our compatriots to their fate.’ He reminded that for settlement of the Karabakh problem, representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan must sit at the negotiating table, while Armenia may participate in the process only as an interested party.”
“From Azerbaijan’s side, only one thing was observed: in its effort to suppress the resistance of Nagorno-Karabakh, it provoked a series of border conflicts with Armenia, with the aim of drawing Armenia into open military confrontation and providing a pretext for direct, massive intervention by Turkey. Against the natural right of the Karabakh people to liberation from Azerbaijan’s essentially colonial protectorate and to the realization of political self-determination, Azerbaijani rulers have never had, and cannot have, any serious arguments. There is only the overt pan-Turkist drive to Turkify all peoples who, by the criminal will of the Bolsheviks, found themselves within the borders of the Azerbaijani Republic that appeared in the Transcaucasus in 1918.”
I reminded how this republic “liberated itself” from Armenians under Soviet rule, fully Turkifying Nakhichevan and beginning a similar process in Karabakh and its surroundings, and how this process reached its paroxysm in the Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan in 1988–90, in the vile “Ring” operation, and in the war against the NKR.
“Despite Azerbaijan’s superiority in weaponry, they lost the city of Shushi on 9 May 1992, and a few days later the Lachin corridor. A new ‘injection’ of arms (…) enabled them to drive Armenians out of the Shaumyan and Martakert districts of the NKR. The Azerbaijanis acted with their characteristic extreme brutality toward the civilian population—massacring, burning alive, mutilating, and taking peaceful residents hostage, including women and children. If in Khojaly in March 1992 they did not spare even their own compatriots for the sake of an anti-Armenian and anti-Mutalibov provocation, then the inhabitants of Armenian villages could expect no mercy. The summer offensive of the Azerbaijanis forced another 80,000 refugees into Armenia and Russia—in full accordance with the directive of the ‘Azerbaijani Popular Front’ and its inspirer, the ‘democrat’ Elchibey: to resolve the Karabakh problem within two months by exterminating or expelling citizens (Armenians) who did not comply with the constitution of Azerbaijan, but in reality resisted the pan-Turkist ambitions of the Azerbaijani president. This directive was not fulfilled: the defenders of the NKR held their ground and continued to resist despite the trials. Azerbaijan lost 10,000 soldiers killed (according to their official, typically understated figures—5,000), and its army is experiencing moral collapse.”
“…The Armenian government continues to believe that the CSCE has ‘by no means exhausted itself’ in addressing the Karabakh problem. At the CSCE Stockholm Conference in December 1992, the Armenian delegation proposed including in the final document a provision stating that ‘the continuation of military actions and a military solution to the problem are considered by the parties to be futile, and they see no alternative to peaceful negotiations.’ Turkey and Azerbaijan rejected this proposal. Yet they failed to impose upon the conference a condemnation of Armenia ‘as the aggressor…’”
“At the same time, in Yerevan it is believed that the only guarantee of life in Nagorno-Karabakh remains self-defense, since no one, including the CSCE, offers any other guarantee.”
“Azerbaijan’s program of conquering Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as Zangezur and the eastern shore of Lake Sevan, has the undisguised pan-Turkist aim of linking Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, and through it with Turkey, thereby opening the way for the realization of the idea of Greater Turan—initially implying the strengthening of Turkish influence toward the North Caucasus and the Volga, and through Central Asia toward the Altai and China.”
“The conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan would endanger Armenia’s independence and pro-Russian orientation, forcing it to seek protection from the United States and to reckon with Turkey’s claims. Armenia can resist this tendency only by relying primarily on Russia, and also on Iran. Without Russia this tendency cannot be overcome, and if it triumphs, Russia will lose its positions throughout the Transcaucasus—and not only there.”
“G.V. Chicherin saw the Azerbaijani-Turkish danger in 1920, when he objected to depriving the Armenians of ‘those regions to which Azerbaijan suddenly decided to lay claim’ (his own words). ‘If it is a matter of indulging the annexationist aspirations of Muslim nationalists,’ said G.V. Chicherin, ‘this is bad policy; on this path we will only contribute to the development of nationalist instincts.’ Chicherin was right. Moreover, the notorious tradition of Russian diplomacy—taking account of the Turkish factor even to the detriment of Russian interests—was inherited by Soviet diplomacy, which failed to understand that the Turks could not but take account of Russia. This led to Soviet Russia’s loss in 1918–1921 of the old Russian border with Turkey, ceding Kars and Ardahan, and it even managed not to reclaim these lands in 1945, when the Turks were compelled to yield without a fight. Shall we now repeat these gross errors of totalitarian power and hand over the Karabakh Armenians to Azerbaijani Turks, who seek to trample them, though they desire the fulfillment of the Treaty of Gulistan, advantageous to Russia, and do not wish to abandon their native land coveted by Baku ‘democrats’? Do we not understand that after Karabakh will come Armenia, and nothing will remain of Russia’s interests in the Transcaucasus?”
“Incidentally, under the Treaty of Gulistan of 1813 and the Treaty of Turkmenchay of 1828, Russia received the Transcaucasus from Persia, not from Turkey. Why then should we give to the Turks what did not belong to them at the moment of annexation to Russia?”
“All former national-state entities of the USSR have one legal source—Soviet state law. Therefore, it is unlawful to guarantee the territorial integrity of one such entity (Azerbaijan) at the expense of another (the NKAO), merely because they had different statuses artificially imposed by a non-legal state to the detriment of national rights, recognized even by that state. If territorial integrity is elevated to an absolute, then it must be absolute also with respect to the territories of autonomous regions and districts, and even abolished but potentially revivable national areas.”
“As for contemporary international law, the absolutization of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, and especially attempts to establish the supremacy of these principles over the right of peoples to self-determination, is a legal and political absurdity, intended to justify petty imperial thinking and the development of nationalist instincts of which Chicherin spoke. It is an absurdity if only because the mentioned principles are nothing more than variants of formulations for the obligation of one CSCE participating state not to attack another, and they in no way intersect with the right of peoples to self-determination, since the self-determination of a people living within one state cannot harm the integrity or borders of another state. Not to mention that all the principles of the Helsinki Final Act are equal and valid in their entirety, and none is superior to the others. Incidentally, the inviolability of borders appeared among the principles of the Helsinki Act only in combination with recognition of the possibility of changing borders. And one more point: a declaration of intent, such as the Helsinki Act, cannot override an international treaty—the UN Charter, human rights covenants, etc.—where the right of peoples to self-determination is enshrined, and there is not even a hint of any absolutization of the principle of territorial integrity.”
“Nagorno-Karabakh has the same right to self-determination as all other countries compactly inhabited by a single people, moreover one dwelling on its land since time immemorial. To assert that there is no conflict between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan is to sin against elementary truth: the people of Nagorno-Karabakh have never reconciled themselves to the domination of Azerbaijani Turks, and the question of liberation from this domination was raised under N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, and M.S. Gorbachev. And since 1990, subjected to violence, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh have carried out armed self-defense, never abandoning hope for liberation from Azerbaijani colonialism.”
“Here, in the Transcaucasus, around Karabakh and other ‘hot spots’ that have arisen as a consequence of petty imperial thinking trampling on the national rights of peoples resistant to forced assimilation, the fate is being decided not only of Russia, but of common human values. Europe has a vital interest in compelling the Turks to respect these values, to respect international law, to respect the moral foundations of the international community; otherwise the pan-Turkist plague will once again begin to spread across the world, and neither Europe, nor Russia, nor Ukraine will escape its consequences <…>”
After this, I briefly outlined Russian-Armenian relations and formulated several conclusions. In particular, I asserted:
“Armenia is no less necessary to Russia than Russia is to Armenia. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are of key importance for Russia’s positions in the Transcaucasus. Withdrawal from there would inevitably lead to the loss of the North Caucasus and the advance of the Turks (and the United States behind them) in all directions <…>”
“There is an urgent need to develop a concept of Russian foreign policy in the Transcaucasian direction. In doing so, it is necessary to proceed from the fact that Russia has special interests here; this is its zone of influence, not that of the United States or Turkey. Russian interests do not necessarily coincide with American ones, since the United States supports Turkey with its pan-Turkist ambitions toward Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and many other regions of the former USSR and present-day Russian Federation. For Russia, this very pan-Turkism is a serious threat.”
“Therefore, we must consider how to resist it, making clear to the Americans, the Turks, and their Azerbaijani friends that Russian interests here must be taken into account if they wish to have good relations with Russia.”
In that memorandum I tried to impress upon my superiors that:
“There cannot and should not be identical, ‘parity’ relations with all countries, if only because each has its own policy and its own degree of interest in good relations with Russia. It should not be the case that remaining outside the CIS and ignoring Russia’s interests proves more advantageous than wishing to be its ally. For in the best case we place an ally on the same level as a rather unceremonious neighbor, or even subject the ally to a public reprimand, while the grossly aggressive actions of the neighbor pass without any serious reaction on our part.”
“If we do not need the components and finished products of Armenian industry, if we do not need the scientific and technological achievements of Armenian astrophysicists and other scholars, if we are indifferent to the shared spiritual heritage of cultures intertwined until quite recently, then let us at least not be indifferent to Russia’s national security interests, which can and must be safeguarded on Armenian territory and in cooperation with Armenian allies.”
At that time I also proposed:
“To take under Russia’s protection the people of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, bearing in mind the prospect of their reunification with Russia on the basis of the Treaty of Gulistan of 1813, which has never been annulled. Such a step on our part would give a strong impulse to the centripetal tendencies among the peoples of the Caucasus and Transcaucasus, which, thank God, have not only not died out, but are awaiting their moment.”
It seemed to me that any moves were worthwhile, so long as they removed Karabakh from under the Azerbaijani-Turkish threat. 757
Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”
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