Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council

Sofia, 6–7 December 2004 Statement of the Ministerial Council on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

We welcome the progress achieved in 2004 in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in particular the three meetings between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan under the auspices of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. We also welcome the establishment of the so‑called “Prague Process,” within which, during four meetings of the Foreign Ministers of both countries, all parameters of a future settlement were once again methodically examined. We note that, building on the results of the “Prague Process,” the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group presented to both Presidents in Astana in September a framework document capable of serving as a basis for settlement. We call upon the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to take this framework document into consideration and to continue work on its basis. We strongly urge the parties to redouble their efforts toward a speedy settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.

OSCE website: http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2005/02/4307_ru.pdf

Resolution 1416 (2005) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe “The Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference” 25 January 2005

1. The Parliamentary Assembly regrets that, more than ten years after the outbreak of hostilities, the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region remains unresolved. Hundreds of thousands of people are still displaced and live in dire conditions. A significant part of the territory of Azerbaijan remains occupied by Armenian forces, and separatist forces still control the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
2. The Assembly expresses concern that the hostilities and the widespread ethnic clashes preceding them led to large‑scale ethnically‑based expulsions and the creation of mono‑ethnic areas, reminiscent of the dreadful notion of ethnic cleansing. The Assembly reaffirms that independence and secession of a regional territory from a state may only be achieved through a lawful and peaceful process, based on the democratic support of the inhabitants of such a territory, and not as a result of armed conflict that caused ethnically‑based expulsions and the de facto annexation of such territory to another state. The Assembly stresses that the occupation of foreign territory by a member state constitutes a grave violation of that state’s obligations as a member of the Council of Europe, and reaffirms the right of persons displaced from the conflict zone to safe and dignified return to their homes.
3. The Assembly recalls UN Security Council Resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993), and 884 (1993), and calls upon the parties concerned to comply with them, in particular to refrain from any military action and to withdraw armed forces from all occupied territories. The Assembly also joins the demand expressed in UN Security Council Resolution 853 (1993), and thus calls upon all member states to refrain from supplying any weapons or military equipment that could lead to escalation of the conflict or continuation of the occupation of territory.
4. The Assembly recalls that both Armenia and Azerbaijan, upon their accession to the Council of Europe in January 2001, undertook commitments to use only peaceful means for the settlement of the conflict and to refrain from any threat of force against their neighbors. At the same time, Armenia undertook to use its considerable influence over Nagorno-Karabakh to promote settlement of the conflict. The Assembly calls upon both governments to honor their commitments and to refrain from using armed forces against each other, as well as from promoting military action.
5. The Assembly recalls that the Council of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) agreed in Helsinki in March 1992 to convene a conference in Minsk to provide a forum for negotiations aimed at peaceful settlement of the conflict. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the former Czechoslovak Federative Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States of America agreed at that time to participate in this conference. The Assembly calls upon these states to intensify their efforts toward achieving a peaceful resolution of the conflict and invites their national delegations in the Assembly to report annually on the actions of their governments on this issue. To this end, the Assembly requests its Bureau to establish an ad hoc Committee, which would include, among others, the heads of these national delegations.
6. The Assembly pays tribute to the tireless efforts of the Co‑Chairs of the Minsk Group and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman‑in‑Office, particularly for achieving the ceasefire in May 1994 and for monitoring its observance since then. The Assembly calls upon the Co‑Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group to take urgent measures to accelerate negotiations with the aim of concluding a political agreement to end the armed conflict. The implementation of such an agreement would eliminate the main consequences of the conflict for all parties and allow the convening of the Minsk Conference. The Assembly urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to make use of the OSCE Minsk process and to submit constructive proposals to each other through the Minsk Group for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, based on the relevant norms and principles of international law.
7. 7. The Assembly recalls that Armenia and Azerbaijan are signatories to the Charter of the United Nations and, in accordance with Article 93(1) of the Charter, are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Therefore, the Assembly suggests that, should negotiations fail despite the efforts of the Minsk Group Co‑Chairs, Armenia and Azerbaijan consider recourse to the International Court of Justice under Article 36(1) of its Statute.
8. 8. The Assembly calls upon Armenia and Azerbaijan to foster political reconciliation between themselves by developing bilateral inter‑parliamentary cooperation within the Assembly, as well as in other forums such as meetings of the Speakers of the Parliaments of the Caucasian Four. The Assembly recommends that both delegations meet during each part‑session of the Assembly to review progress in such reconciliation.
9. 9. The Assembly calls upon the Government of Azerbaijan to establish, without preconditions, contacts with political representatives of both communities from the Nagorno‑Karabakh region concerning its future status. The Assembly stands ready to provide facilities for such contacts in Strasbourg, recalling that it has previously done so in the form of hearings with Armenian participation.
10. 10. Referring to its Recommendation 1570 (2002) on the situation of refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, the Assembly calls upon all member states and observer states to provide humanitarian aid and assistance to the hundreds of thousands of people displaced as a result of hostilities and the expulsion of ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan and ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia.
11. 11. The Assembly condemns any expression of hatred in the media of Armenia and Azerbaijan. It calls upon both countries to promote reconciliation and to rebuild trust and mutual understanding between their peoples through schools, universities, and the media. Without such reconciliation, hatred and mistrust will obstruct stability in the region and may lead to renewed violence. Such reconciliation must precede any sustainable settlement and form an integral part of it.
12. 12. The Assembly calls upon the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to draw up an action plan to support Armenia and Azerbaijan in processes of mutual reconciliation and to take this resolution into account when determining actions concerning Armenia and Azerbaijan.
13. 13. The Assembly calls upon the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe to assist elected local representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan in establishing bilateral contacts and interregional cooperation.
14. 14. The Assembly intends to examine the existing conflict‑resolution mechanisms within the Council of Europe, in particular the European Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in order to provide states with improved mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of bilateral conflicts, as well as internal disputes affecting the interests of local or regional territorial communities or authorities, which may endanger human rights, stability, and peace.
15. 15. The Assembly intends to continue monitoring the peaceful resolution of this conflict on a regular basis and decides to review the matter again during the first part of its 2006 session.
16. Debate in the Assembly on 25 January 2005 (2nd sitting) [see Doc. 10364, report of the Political Affairs Committee, rapporteur Mr. Atkinson]. Text adopted by the Assembly on 25 January 2005 (2nd sitting). Website: http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/adoptedtext/ta05/erec/416.htm.. Unofficial translation from English.
17. No. 800 Statements by Foreign Minister V. Oskanian and Defense Minister S. Sargsyan at Hearings in the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia on the Nagorno‑Karabakh Issue 29–30 March 2005
18. Foreign Minister V. Oskanian “Azerbaijan – a victim of its own aggression” 29 March
19. The Karabakh issue cannot be resolved on the basis of international documents, nor through the intervention of third parties, nor under external pressure. The only way forward is to resolve the conflict through negotiations and compromise. The new authorities of Azerbaijan are “trying to turn back the wheel of history.”
20. From Lisbon to Key West, there was a significant shift in the content of negotiations—from a high degree of self‑government within Azerbaijan (Lisbon) to recognition of the fact of self‑determination at Key West. At that time, this progress corresponded to international developments and the level of global political maturity. However, Azerbaijan is now attempting to shift the settlement process into the framework of other international organizations that prioritize the principle of territorial integrity.
21. At the same time, Armenia has succeeded in demonstrating to the world that Azerbaijan is a victim of its own aggression. A major self‑deception of Azerbaijanis is the belief that if their demands are not accepted at the negotiating table, the Republic of Azerbaijan can always achieve concessions by force. Azerbaijan’s hopes that a blockaded Armenia will be unable to hold its positions for long and will eventually yield are unfounded. A people who endured a war imposed upon them and the hardships of the past fifteen years have proven their ability to resist. Policy cannot be built solely on a geographical map; it must be based on realities—both current and historical‑legal. The Karabakh issue is a rare case where historical‑legal realities coincide with contemporary ones. Artsakh cannot be incorporated into Azerbaijan; it must have a direct land link with Armenia and guarantees for the secure existence of its people.
22. Answers by V. Oskanian to questions from hearing participants
23. What will be the status of the Nagorno‑Karabakh Republic, and why does Stepanakert not participate as an observer in international discussions? Nagorno‑Karabakh has never been part of independent Azerbaijan. The position of the Republic of Armenia is unequivocal: it cannot be part of Azerbaijan. As to the precise status of Artsakh, I cannot say today—partly to avoid creating the impression that the Armenian minister is pre‑empting the outcome of negotiations. As a citizen of Armenia, I am inclined toward the reunification of Artsakh with Armenia. It is clear that Nagorno‑Karabakh, as a party to the conflict, must become a subject of negotiations and an observer in relevant hearings. I have raised this issue repeatedly, including at recent international forums. However, at present, these structures are not prepared for such developments, justifying their position by noting that Nagorno‑Karabakh is not a member of international political organizations and that there is no precedent in world practice.
24. Is it possible for the Artsakh issue to move from the OSCE Minsk Group framework into the political sphere of the Council of Europe? The possibility is small, but it does exist. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are members of the Council of Europe, which tends to treat such issues as almost internal matters. Moreover, Baku is aggressively trying to shift the problem into political arenas where the principle of territorial integrity is currently given priority.
25. In negotiations, what is meant by “Nagorno‑Karabakh”? Is it only the territory of the former NKAO? The international community currently perceives Nagorno‑Karabakh within the boundaries of the former NKAO. But this does not mean we agree with such a definition. I state with full responsibility that in negotiations we always raise the issue of occupied Armenian lands—Shahumyan, northern Martakert, and the southern part of Martuni.
26. Is the issue of Armenian lands such as Nakhichevan and Gandzak raised in negotiations? This issue is not raised. You may even reproach me for this, but I speak sincerely and consider it inappropriate to discuss that matter in the context of the Karabakh settlement.
27. Were we in a more advantageous position in 1998 regarding a quick resolution of the conflict? It depends on what the author of the question has in mind. If he prefers a step‑by‑step approach to settlement, then yes. I note that the step‑by‑step option still exists. Let us discuss it. I will only say that if Ilham Aliyev were awakened at three in the morning and offered to sign this option, he would immediately agree.
28. What concessions are we prepared to make? I will answer by negation. We will not concede Nagorno‑Karabakh to Azerbaijan, we will not concede an enclave‑like existence for Nagorno‑Karabakh, and we will not concede the right of the people of Artsakh to guaranteed security.
29. Comment on the well‑known statement of the Co‑Chairs that “the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan are ready to sign an agreement, but the peoples are not.” I am convinced this definition referred to Azerbaijan. After Key West, Heydar Aliyev indeed agreed to sign a document that, without infringing the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia, recognized the right of the people of Nagorno‑Karabakh to self‑determination. Later he retreated from this position, and the quoted statement is a consequence of that retreat.
30. What could we expect from Key West? The main point was the principle of self‑determination. I am inclined toward frankness and will say that the content of Key West was presented to parliamentary factions during closed hearings. Armenia did not suffer territorial losses under this agreement.

Today it was said in this chamber that society, unlike a few officials, does not possess the necessary information. This is a debatable point, for how could an entire people conduct the negotiation process? Society can be informed gradually, as the time for a possible settlement matures.

– Azerbaijan now takes a more aggressive stance than several years ago. What can you say about this? Ilham Aliyev, unlike his father, simply does not acknowledge the very possibility of concessions on the part of Azerbaijan and is, of course, less realistic than his father. It should be noted that in recent times Baku’s aggressive rhetoric has been accompanied by the movement of militarized units of the Republic of Azerbaijan toward Nagorno‑Karabakh. Naturally, this redeployment occurs on territory controlled by Azerbaijan, but even so such a fact is cause for concern. We are troubled by this development, but by no means intimidated. We are always capable of delivering an adequate response, and perhaps this mistake will ultimately prove to be Azerbaijan’s last. Nevertheless, we remain vigilant regarding such developments and will certainly make this known, for we are convinced that the problem must be resolved exclusively by peaceful means.

Defense Minister S. Sargsyan 30 March

First of all, I consider it necessary to note that the preparation of a list of questions, which the Commission had previously sent to participants of today’s hearings, is a useful initiative. However, I do not think it makes sense to follow this list verbatim—otherwise my report would turn into an interview. I will attempt instead to present my answers in the form of a military‑political analysis of the genesis of the Karabakh armed conflict and the key factors shaping its dynamics.

I. Brief assessment of the situation on our foreign policy front

In the sphere of advancing the interests of the Karabakh settlement, we can note certain successes as well as familiar difficulties. Overall, however, there are no grounds for panic. That said, while acknowledging achievements, it is more useful to focus attention on problems and lessons learned, the proper understanding of which can help us better advance the Karabakh settlement in line with the security interests of Armenia, Karabakh, and the Armenian people as a whole.

At this stage of the settlement, I believe we must concentrate on systematizing our resources to counter a cunning, cynical adversary that does not hesitate to employ the most base methods of discrediting the international image of Armenia and Nagorno‑Karabakh. We must recognize the reality that Azerbaijan is assisted in its anti‑Armenian political offensive by specialized institutions in Turkey and other allies. Therefore, in participating in the Karabakh process, it is of paramount importance to consolidate efforts in the foreign policy sphere across all governmental institutions of Armenia—including the National Assembly, the Government, ministries and agencies, as well as foreign missions. This requires proper selection and professional training of representatives of state organizations, whose voices must present our highest national interests to the international community. They must be provided with professionally prepared information on what our national interests and priorities are on the most important issues, and how to defend them by political and diplomatic means at international forums, during visits, or in meetings with foreign delegations.

At the same time, we ourselves must periodically “synchronize our watches” on the Karabakh settlement. Today’s Commission session is a good example of such clarification of assessments, principles, and approaches, taking into account the dynamics of the Karabakh foreign policy process.

II. On the relationship between “history” and “politics” in defending Armenia’s positions

The roots of the modern phase of the Karabakh problem lie in the catastrophic change of Karabakh’s state status as part of Russia and the USSR. At the time of the collapse of the Russian Empire after World War I, these roots can be traced in the political and armed resistance of the Armenian population, the National Council of Karabakh, and the Government of the Republic of Armenia to attempts by the authorities of Turkey and the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan to incorporate territories of the Elisabethpol Governorate of the Russian Empire, with a predominantly Armenian population, into the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in 1918–1920.

The second stage of the Karabakh problem can be traced in the Soviet period, namely in connection with the imposed creation in 1923 of the Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast within the Azerbaijan SSR, and the resistance of Armenians to Baku’s policy of deliberately expelling the Armenian population from Nagorno‑Karabakh. Until 1987, the conflict remained latent, expressed in Baku’s policies of stifling the economic and social development of the Armenians of the NKAO, suppressing their ethno‑cultural identity, and deliberately altering the region’s demographics in favor of Azerbaijanis.

The exposure and escalation of Armenian‑Azerbaijani confrontation over Karabakh occurred during the transitional political processes of perestroika in the USSR, including in the union republics themselves, and the contradictory transformation of union and republican legislation. There are grounds to believe that the mass pogroms and killings of peaceful Armenian civilians in Sumgait, Kirovabad, and Baku, as well as the ethnic cleansing of Northern Artsakh, were carried out with the knowledge of the CPSU Central Committee.

In conclusion of this section, I would note that Western specialists in their political and analytical practice often date the history of regional conflicts in the former USSR from the moment of its collapse. From this practical standpoint, particular attention must be paid to a professionally impeccable political‑legal assessment of the creation of the Nagorno‑Karabakh Republic during the dismantling of the USSR in 1991.

This should limit our recommendations on the historical aspect of argumentation in Karabakh settlement events. Yet such limitation in professional politics does not mean that Armenian scholars, writers, publicists, and artists should not create and present to the world works demonstrating the greatness of our glorious millennial history. It is very important to counter Azerbaijan’s falsifiers of history, who embellish their own past and culture at the expense of the Armenian people’s heritage. This would undoubtedly help maintain the positive image of our ancient and progressive nation. Leaving this sphere to scholars, cultural figures, and the media, let me focus on several other issues of contemporary political practice.

III. On established approaches and principles of settlement

In the course of 13 years of negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group, four main approaches to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict have been considered:

• reunification of Nagorno‑Karabakh with Armenia;
• recognition of the independence of the lawfully self‑determined Nagorno‑Karabakh Republic;
• creation of a single state based on Azerbaijan and the NKR;
• institution of a high degree of autonomy for Nagorno‑Karabakh within the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Accordingly, the Armenian side’s approach is based on the concept of self‑determination of the people of Nagorno‑Karabakh. The Azerbaijani approach is invariably based on the principle of recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders.

Within the Minsk negotiation process, the Armenian side evaluates these models according to principles of guaranteeing the physical security of the Karabakh Armenians and conditions for their stable democratic development.

These principles are well known. Yet in my view, the current development of the Karabakh process suggests the advisability of including in these formulations the fact of Nagorno‑Karabakh’s orientation toward global processes of progressive development.

Thus, the three fundamental principles in their present form may be stated as:

• the impossibility of subordinating Karabakh to Azerbaijan;
• the impossibility of Nagorno‑Karabakh existing as an enclave, and the necessity of a land border with Armenia together with international guarantees enabling Nagorno‑Karabakh’s participation in global progressive processes;
• the necessity of clear international guarantees against the resumption of war and for the security of the population of Nagorno‑Karabakh.

It is important to achieve national consensus in the fundamental argumentation of all three principles. Only with such agreement—around the conformity of these principles to the national interests of the Armenian people, and regarding their justification—can we expect effective teamwork from our representatives at foreign policy events concerning the Karabakh settlement.

1) I will begin with the justification of the main arguments related to the impossibility of subordinating Karabakh to Azerbaijan. This principle is grounded in the lawful creation in 1991 and the subsequent functioning, for nearly fourteen years, of two equal states on the territory of the former Azerbaijan SSR: the Nagorno‑Karabakh Republic (NKR) and the Republic of Azerbaijan (AzR). Effective defense of this principle requires harmonization of its professional political‑legal argumentation, and therefore I consider it my duty to present to the Commission the essence of the proposed basic justification.

The argument rests on the legal fact of the adoption in April 1990 of the USSR Law “On the Procedure for Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR” and the unfolding process of dismantling the Soviet Union. This law granted autonomous entities the right to determine themselves as independent subjects of the federal union, up to and including secession from the union republics to which they belonged (in cases where those republics themselves raised the question of leaving the USSR). The concretization of international‑legal and constitutional norms on the right of peoples to self‑determination in the mechanisms of this law gave the people of Nagorno‑Karabakh, for the first time in the USSR, lawful grounds to express and institutionalize their political will—taking into account the previously declared intention of the Azerbaijan SSR to leave the USSR (its Supreme Soviet adopted a constitutional law on sovereignty in September 1989, and in October 1991 passed a constitutional act on state independence).

In early December 1991, on constitutional grounds and under the supervision of international observers, a referendum was held in the NKAO on declaring independence, establishing the NKR, and forming its legitimate authorities. In October 1991 the Republic of Azerbaijan was established, and in December 1991 the USSR was dissolved. Thus, as a result of constitutional expression of will, two independent and equal states—NKR and AzR—were formed on the territory of the former Azerbaijan SSR, and the administrative‑political subordination of the people, territory, and authorities of NKR to the now‑abolished Azerbaijan SSR and USSR was lawfully terminated. Consequently, the people of Nagorno‑Karabakh, in accordance with the legislation in force, overcame administrative and political obligations to apply the “principle of territorial integrity” with respect to both the Azerbaijan SSR and, later, the USSR. At the same time, the NKR, as a legitimately created state, acquired an international‑legal basis for applying the principles of “territorial integrity” and “inviolability of borders” in the interests of its own national security.

A key political‑legal feature of the NKR is that, unlike other states self‑proclaimed during interethnic conflicts, its independent statehood was formed within the timeframe of applying the USSR Constitution and the above‑mentioned law. This feature provides a significant political resource to avoid parallels with other regional conflicts in the former USSR. Skillful use of this basic argument by Armenian envoys can help soften the positions of Georgia, Moldova, and Russia regarding the Karabakh settlement.

1a. Another important element of our argumentation for the first principle is the political‑legal assessment of Azerbaijan’s avoidance of a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh crisis on the eve of the USSR’s dismantling.

At the end of 1991, real legal and political preconditions existed for the peaceful resolution of an “internal non‑international armed conflict” between the people of Karabakh and the now‑defunct authorities of the USSR and Azerbaijan SSR. However, subsequent military resistance by Azerbaijan to the national‑state formation of the NKR prevented this historic chance for peacemaking from being realized. The failure of Azerbaijan’s authorities to use this unique opportunity transformed the “internal non‑international armed conflict” into an “international armed conflict” between two newly formed equal states—NKR and AzR. Moreover, relying on overwhelming superiority in military equipment and weaponry, Azerbaijan undertook large‑scale military operations, during which the entire population of the Getashen sub‑district (1991) and the Shaumyan district (1992) was deported, a significant part of the Hadrut district (1991) and most of the Martakert district (1992) was displaced, and peaceful towns and villages were subjected to massive bombardment.

1b. Finally, a compelling argument against Nagorno‑Karabakh being part of Azerbaijan is the real threat of its complete de‑Armenization.

A cruel lesson and warning for the Armenians of Karabakh is the fact of the complete ethnic cleansing of the Nakhichevan ASSR of its indigenous Armenian population, carried out by the authorities in Baku—even during the period when Azerbaijan was still part of the USSR—without the right of return to their places of residence.

2) On the principle of ensuring the impossibility of Nagorno‑Karabakh’s enclave existence, the necessity of a land border with Armenia, and Karabakh’s participation in global progressive processes. The explanation for the impossibility of Nagorno‑Karabakh existing as an enclave state is based on the fact that, in the absence of a land border with Armenia and under conditions of total blockade, the population of Nagorno‑Karabakh would be deprived of the means of survival. At the same time, guaranteed elimination of Karabakh’s enclave status is a necessary condition for the realization of the NKR’s will to participate in global progressive processes.

3) On the necessity of guarantees by the international community against the resumption of war and for the security of the Armenian population of Nagorno‑Karabakh. In this regard, it is of paramount importance to skillfully and objectively convey to the international community the fundamental argument of Azerbaijan’s aggression against the NKR.

The self‑defense of the people of Nagorno‑Karabakh was organized in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, in response to armed aggression by Azerbaijan against the lawfully established Nagorno‑Karabakh Republic. The violation of the principle of “territorial integrity” as applied to the Republic of Azerbaijan occurred as a result of the necessary repulsion of its aggression against the NKR, as well as the establishment of security zones on Azerbaijani territory captured from the aggressor during the elimination of its firing positions and defensive lines.

In essence, we do not intend to return territories from the “security belt” without meticulous consideration of the security interests of Karabakh’s population. We are prepared, through negotiations, to make certain mutual concessions provided that the Azerbaijani side offers firm guarantees of the physical security of Karabakh’s population, reinforced by guarantees from authoritative international organizations. The Armenian side is genuinely ready to discuss possibilities of mutual compromise precisely within these pragmatic limits.

IV. Prospects for the Status of Nagorno‑Karabakh It is clear to me that resolution of the Karabakh conflict is possible only by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual concessions. What concessions, in my view, can the Armenian side make?

We consider as a fundamental compromise Armenia’s abstention from recognizing the NKR, despite the lawful creation of the Nagorno‑Karabakh Republic and the fact of its many years of continuous functioning as a democratic independent state. We present this as an act of goodwill to sustain the process of peaceful settlement within the Minsk Group framework.

Secondly, we must, in line with our national and pan‑European interests, take into account certain formulations from Resolution 1416 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (25 January 2005)—including the Assembly’s reaffirmation that independence and secession of a regional territory (i.e., Nagorno‑Karabakh) from a state (i.e., Azerbaijan) may be achieved only through a lawful and peaceful process, based on democratic support from the population of that territory. In this context, of particular interest is the proposal published by NATO Parliamentary Assembly President Pierre Lellouche, suggesting the advisability of holding another referendum among the population of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast on democratic self‑determination.

We believe that our second fundamental compromise can be based precisely on this proposal: the Armenian side, despite the lawful creation of the NKR and its continuous functioning as a democratic independent state, may agree to an additional referendum among the residents of the former NKAO at their current places of residence, provided the referendum is organized under the auspices of the OSCE and the UN. In this case, we must professionally study the constructive experience of the UN Mission in Kosovo and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.

Speaking of Karabakh’s future status, I wish to emphasize the logic of the NKR’s development and Armenian statehood as a whole. The vital interests of ensuring national and international security for Armenians dictate the strategic preference for parallel membership and active cooperation in international organizations by the two brotherly Armenian states—the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno‑Karabakh Republic. At the same time, basing ourselves on the lawful creation of the NKR as an independent state, this approach can soften the Council of Europe’s claims against Armenia regarding alleged “annexation” of Karabakh. In other words, the model of “one Armenian people, two Armenian states” is strategically advantageous for the Armenian nation.

In this sense, the arguments of certain Azerbaijani figures that Karabakh’s self‑determination cannot be recognized because the Armenian people have already exercised self‑determination by creating the Republic of Armenia do not withstand scrutiny. Former and current presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey have publicly declared that relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey are built on the model of “one people, two states.” In fact, history shows that after World War I, with the collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, the Turkish people living in Anatolia, Turkish Thrace, and the South Caucasus exercised self‑determination by creating two states: the Republic of Turkey and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. There are many such examples in international practice.

In our political practice, we must recognize that the United States, Russia, France, other Western states, the OSCE, and other international organizations distinguish the NKR, acknowledging the legality of its creation. Therefore, it is important not only strategically but also tactically that democratic processes continue to develop in the NKR. We must soberly recognize that otherwise the NKR could lose much of its international support.

We are convinced that in the context of the Karabakh settlement, the perception of the Armenian side can be significantly improved if the NKR demonstrates readiness to implement EU recommendations on direct contacts with Azerbaijan, and if Armenia proposes involving Azerbaijan in programs, projects, and activities of international organizations aimed at establishing regional cooperation.

Naturally, our efforts toward peaceful settlement are considered within the framework of Armenia’s national security strategy, the main provisions of which we have formulated and which are already being refined. I inform you that Armenia’s national security strategy, in the form of a draft law, will be submitted to the National Assembly in 2007. Before that, in order to receive proposals and comments, the document will be tested by relevant state bodies and academic circles.

Preparation of the draft national security strategy has once again confirmed that, in the process of the USSR’s dissolution, the principal political achievement of the Armenian people was independence. Alongside this, another major achievement was the lawful referendum held in Nagorno‑Karabakh on 8 December 1991—prior to the Alma‑Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991 formally ending the USSR—within the timeframe of applying the 1990 USSR law. This specificity of the Karabakh referendum allows us, in foreign policy practice, to distinguish the Karabakh issue from regional conflicts in other states and to deter those states from opposing Armenia in international processes directly or indirectly affecting the just settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Consolidation of political, diplomatic, and informational use of this fact is one of the most important guarantees of Armenia’s national security, as well as the physical survival of Armenians on part of their ancestral homeland.

Returning to the main idea of my report, I emphasize that the implementation of the above strategic tasks for resolving the Karabakh conflict requires us to improve our knowledge and skill in combining the public and non‑public aspects of Armenia’s participation in the settlement. The effectiveness of our collective actions in the Karabakh settlement demands the consolidation of all Armenian participants in the political process around these fundamental principles and approaches.

National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia. Parliamentary Hearings, 29–30 March 2005. Collection “The Nagorno‑Karabakh Problem: Paths to Settlement.” Antares Publishing, Yerevan, 2006, pp. 9–25, 37–50. 801

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

Read Also:

• Ancient and Medieval Sources on Artsakh (Karabakh) as Part of Armenia’s State Territory
• Message from Gandzasar Catholicos Esayi to Peter I August 10, 1716
• Memorandum Issued to Ivan Karapet Along with the Imperial Letter to the Armenian People Regarding Russia’s Readiness to Take the Armenians of Karabakh Under Its Protection June 3, 1723
• Decree of Peter I to the Armenian People Regarding Russia’s Willingness to Offer Protection to the Armenians of Karabakh
• On Armenian Hopes for Russian Assistance
• Report of Minas Vardapet to Peter I
• Contents of the Secret Letters from the Armenian Assembly and the Armenian Army of Karabakh to the Russian Emperor and Chancellor August 1724
• Contents of the Secret Letters from the Armenian Assembly and the Armenian Army of Karabakh to the Russian Emperor and Chancellor August 1724
• State Charter of Peter I On the Acceptance of the Armenian People Under the Protection of the Russian State and Their Resettlement from Karabakh to Newly Acquired Persian Provinces November 10, 1724
• Letters from the Catholicos and the Meliks of Karabakh
• Charter of Catherine I Addressed to the Armenian Assembly
• Message General Mkhitar—to the Russian Government
• The Armenian Assembly’s Request for Military Assistance June 19, 1727
• Result from Russia’s failure to fulfill its promises of assistance to the Armenians March 1736
• On the Issuance of the Decree Appointing Panah Khan
• Letter from General Potemkin to Prince Argutinsky with questions about the liberation of Armenia
• Appeal of Gandzasar Catholicos Hovhannes to Catherine II
• Letter from Melik Apov Iosifov to Provide Assistance to Russian Military Forces for the Liberation of Enslaved Karabakh
• Report of Prince G. Potemkin to Catherine II
• Request of General P. Potemkin to Prince G. Potemkin
• Letter from Archbishop Joseph Argutinsky to General P. Potemkin
• Memorandum to Catherine II on the Project for the Restoration of the Armenian Kingdom
• Decree of Paul I to General Count I. Gudovich
• Letter from Archbishop Joseph Argutinsky
• Report by State Councillor P. Kovalesky
• The Khan’s Vizier, Mirza Jamal Javanshir Karabakhsky
• From the Report of General Marquis Palluci to Alexander I
• The Gulistan Treaty – An Interstate Act of Iran’s Cession of the Karabakh Territory to Russia
• Report of General A. Yermolov to Alexander I Requesting the Waiver of Tax Arrears for the Karabakh Khanate
• LETTER FROM GENERAL A. YERMOLOV TO MEHTI-KULI KHAN
• Directive from General A. Yermolov to General I. Velyaminov
• Letter of Metropolitan Sarkis Hasan-Jalalyan To General A. Yermolov
• Letter from General I. Paskevich
• TREATY CONCLUDED BETWEEN RUSSIA AND PERSIA AT TURKMENCHAY
• Russian Military Historian V. Potto on the Essence of the Treaty of Turkmenchay
• Order of General I. Paskevich to Colonel L. Lazarev
• STATEMENT ON THE DIFFERING ATTITUDES OF ARMENIANS AND TATARS TOWARD THE ANNEXATION OF KARABAKH TO RUSSIA
• REPORT By the Acting Uezd Chief of the Dzhevanshir Uezd, D. Baranovsky
• From the Memoirs of a Member of the Russian National Council in Baku (1918–1919)
• “TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP” Between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Armenia
• Letter from A. Mikaelyan, Representative of the Karabakh and Zangezur Fellowship
• Note of Protest from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia
• Appeal of the Karabakh Armenian National Council To the Commander of Allied Forces in Baku
• LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE KARABAKH ARMENIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL
• Turks in Shushi
• Letter of Welcome from the Karabakh Armenian
• LETTER FROM GENERAL BAGRATUNI
• FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE ARMENIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY
• REPORT FROM THE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE OF ARMENIA IN GEORGIA
• Resolution of the Fifth Congress of Armenians of Karabakh
• Report by Prime Minister Hatisov to the Council of Ministers of Armenia
• FROM THE MEMORANDUM OF THE KARABAKH ARMENIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL
• 🇬🇧 ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION IN SHUSHA
• From the Memorandum of the Armenian Representative to the British Military Mission in Shusha
• Report from the Office of the Governor-General of Karabakh
• NOTICE FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION IN SHUSHI
• 🇬🇧 Doubts Expressed by British Delegate Eric Forbes Adam
• LETTER FROM THE ARMENIAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE
• Assessment by the Karabakh Armenian National Council
• “The Caucasian Word” on the Confirmation by a British Command Representative
• Letter from the Acting Governor-General of Karabakh
• OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE CAUCASUS
• Proclamation of the Zangezur Armenian National Council
• Telegram from the Prime Minister of Armenia to the British High Commissioner
• MESSAGE TO THE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE
• Photographic Evidence of the Annihilation of Shushi’s Thirty-Thousand Strong Armenian Population
• Appeal of the Karabakh Soldiers and Officers of the Armenian Army
• Territorial Dispute Between the Azerbaijan SSR (as part of the RSFSR) and the Republic of Armenia
• Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia
• Telegram from G. Ordzhonikidze to V. Lenin, I. Stalin, and G. Chicherin
• LETTER FROM MEMBERS OF THE CAUCASIAN BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(B): A. AVANESOV, R. KATANYAN, AND AYKUNI
• Report of the Karabakh Community Delegation of Tiflis
• From the Report of People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR
• Letter from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, to V. Lenin
• EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE POLITBURO
• LETTER FROM MEMBERS OF THE CAUCASUS BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(B)
• LETTER FROM MEMBERS OF THE CAUCASUS BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(B) 11TH RED ARMY
• Telegram from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin
• Appeal from the Commander of the Armenian Expeditionary Detachment
• TELEGRAM OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RSFSRIN ARMENIA B. LEGRAND
• Letter from Armenian Foreign Minister A. Ohandjanian to the Head of the French Military Mission
• Telegram from Member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee
• Telegram from Member of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)
• First Addendum to the Draft Peace Treaty between the RSFSR and the Republic of Armenia
• Telegram via Direct Line from RVS Member of the Caucasian Front V. Trifonov
• THE ATTITUDE OF THE ALLIED HIGH COMMISSIONER IN ARMENIA, COLONEL GASKELL, TOWARDS THE ARBITRARILY ESTABLISHED BORDERS OF THE TRANSCAUCASIAN STATES
• The Question of Armenia’s Borders at the First (Preliminary) Conference of the Allied Powers in London
• 🇺🇸 U.S. SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 359
• LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA REGARDING THE AGGRESSION OF BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA, SOVIET AZERBAIJAN, AND KEMALIST TURKEY
• DISCUSSION ON THE PROTECTION OF ARMENIA FROM AGGRESSION AND THE THREAT OF EXTERMINATION OF THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE
• Telegram from the Council of the League of Nations to the President of the United States
• Telegram from Lloyd George (sent via Curzon)
• SOVIETIZATION OF ARMENIA
• Letter from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, G. Chicherin, to V. Lenin on the Danger of Kemalist Realignment with the Entente
• LETTER FROM THE PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AZERBAIJAN SSR TO THE RSFSR
• Statement of the Chairman of the Nominal Armenian Delegation at the Moscow Conference
• THE ANNEXATION OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH BY AZERBAIJAN
• From the Report of the Information-Statistical Subdepartment of Azerbaijan’s Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
• From the Letter of S. Shadunts to the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, Comrade Ordzhonikidze
• Maps of the Geographer’s Office of the U.S. Department of State
• CHANGE IN THE POPULATION OF THE NKAO
• A New Stage of the Karabakh Conflict, 1988
• DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR
• EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY OF THE MASSACRE AND DEPORTATION
• LAW OF THE USSR
• RESOLUTION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR On the Enactment of the Law of the USSR
• TESTIMONY OF USSR MVD OFFICER V. KRIVOPUSKOV
• THE KARABAKH CONFLICT
• Resolution of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR
• FIRST ADDITIONAL MEETING OF THE CSCE COUNCIL IN HELSINKI
• UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 822 (1993)
• RESOLUTION 853 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council on 29 July 1993
• MESSAGE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
• INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMITMENT
• INFORMATION NOTE ON REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
• CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE OSCE MINSK GROUPAGREEMENT ON THE CEASEFIRE OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH ARMED CONFLICTDecember 1997
• CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE OSCE MINSK GROUP
• ISTANBUL SUMMIT MEETING
• From the Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia Vartan Oskanian