Clarifications by Former Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group

Clarifications by Former Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and Representative of the President of Russia, Ambassador V. Kazimirov, on the Mandate of the Minsk Group and Its Co-Chairs, and on the Role of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe October 3, 2005

As a “veteran” of the Minsk process, I am surprised by the discussions about the notorious mandate of the Minsk Group, which simply does not exist. Professionals know well that there were basic outlines of a mandate for the CSCE Minsk Conference, but it was never convened due to the position taken by A. Elchibey’s team. Instead, the Minsk Group emerged de facto, but there was neither a CSCE decision nor a formal document establishing a mandate for the Group (a rare case in the practice of a pan-European organization). What does exist are mandates for the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, as well as for the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. But not for the Group itself.

In any case, it should be clarified that in 1992–94 negotiations did indeed take place “within the framework of the Minsk Group,” but the attempt at operational mediation by as many as nine states was problematic from the outset. Therefore, the OSCE Budapest Summit entrusted the conduct of negotiations to the Co-Chairs, effectively leaving the Minsk Group with the role of a useful consultative mechanism. Thus, any new “expansion of the format” for negotiations is a very complex issue. Diplomacy can accommodate figurative language, but not vague reasoning.

As for the role of PACE, it could have a perfectly natural niche. Surely it is not the Co-Chairs (who have enough on their plate) who should monitor how Azerbaijan and Armenia fulfill the obligations they undertook upon joining the Council of Europe (above all, to resolve the Karabakh conflict by peaceful means). This is precisely where European parliamentarians could contribute—yet they fail to see it. If they merely drew the attention of the governments and parliaments of the two countries to actions that contradict their commitments, that alone would be an invaluable contribution to settlement.

What is most useful is cold rationality. How will the regular boasting about multiple increases in military budgets, and their inevitable consequences, help the two states fulfill their international obligations? Both in terms of peacefully resolving the conflict and in terms of respecting the ceilings on armaments established for them? It would be better if the entire budget increase went only to raising soldiers’ salaries, but inevitably some of it will go toward building up weaponry. Will this help international mediators in their search for an agreement between the sides? Will it reduce the deep mutual distrust blocking the path to settlement? Will it temper the dangerous escalation of hostility and even enmity between the two peoples, fueled by propaganda? One must also consider whether the arms race might provoke rash preemptive actions by one side or the other.

Do the parties to the conflict really have surplus funds left over after resettling the million people affected by the previous war? Must these resources now be invested in the cyclical reproduction of refugees and displaced persons? Such are the troubling thoughts awakened by the “normal business” of an arms race.

V. Kazimirov, On the Other Side of the Conflict. Let Us Clarify Further. “Real Azerbaijan,” October 3, 2005 http://vn.kazimirov.ru/k128.htm

Former Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and Representative of the President of Russia, Ambassador V. Kazimirov, on the Shortcomings of the Peace Process and the Need to Take Past Practices of Relations Between Azerbaijan and Armenia into Account in Negotiations (from answers to questions by the online newspaper Karabakh-online) December 1, 2005

Do you not think that too little attention is paid to demography in the Karabakh conflict? Who knows what the demographic balance of Armenians and Azerbaijanis will be in 15 years, when Karabakh is supposed to hold a referendum? – I believe the timeframe for holding a referendum is excessively stretched. If the parties agree on the sequence of territorial withdrawals, then five to seven years would suffice. As for demography, I consider it impossible to understand the Karabakh conflict without knowing what happened in Nakhichevan. This explains the heightened sensitivity of Armenians to demographic issues, to the artificial alteration of demographics in Nagorno-Karabakh. This understanding is precisely what is missing from ICG reports. Their authors could have grasped this better had they at least familiarized themselves with Heydar Aliyev’s statements in his interview to Azerbaijani media on July 22, 2002, where he openly said he sought to change the demographic situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Incidentally, ICG reports contain other omissions. How can one describe the current situation in Karabakh without taking into account the dynamics of the armed conflict? It matters greatly who was prepared to cease hostilities and resolve disputes politically and peacefully, and who insisted on a military solution and consistently avoided ceasefires, even at the cost of disrupting agreements repeatedly reached through Russian mediation. As a result, hostilities not only continued but expanded, engulfing new areas. This led to the occupation of several districts by the adversary’s forces—forces that had agreed to stop fighting and sit at the negotiating table.

I repeatedly conveyed Russia’s peace proposals to the parties. Abulfaz Elchibey, Isa Gambar, and Tofiq Gasimov replied that halting military actions could freeze Armenian control of Shusha and Lachin, and insisted on continuing the war. The same occurred later under Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan’s leaders refused ceasefires until the last possible moment—and ended up losing control over seven districts. Would negotiating only over Lachin and Shusha have been harder than negotiating over all seven districts? The phenomenon of occupation is highly undesirable, but it did not fall from the sky—it arose “not without Baku’s help.”

Without this context, ICG report authors cannot adequately represent the situation in this conflict. Many of their conclusions underestimate the complexities of reality, being built instead on European goodwill and idealism, on a kind of missionary preaching by Europe.

They say mediators will soon present the parties with a package of proposals based on the work of the International Crisis Group. – More likely the opposite: the ICG collected and systematized what had already been proposed in various forms by mediators and independent experts. At present, there are no negotiations on the Karabakh conflict as such—only consultations. Real negotiations require a more substantive basis, a textual draft. People speak of a “Prague process,” but this is merely occasional meetings of ministers and leaders of the two states with the participation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs.

From the outset, Russia sought to define a realistic configuration of the conflict. We understood that Karabakh is a party to the conflict. We worked with Armenia’s leadership so that Yerevan would not hide behind Karabakh. All parties to the conflict must participate in negotiations.

Therefore, to resume substantive negotiations, a draft agreement in textual form (not explanations “on fingers”) is needed, as well as a full format with the participation of all parties. Moreover, for negotiations to be productive, all sides must unequivocally renounce the use of force and threats of force (even in resolving the most contentious issues), and a clear mechanism must be established to prevent renewed hostilities. Calls for an arms race, for achieving goals “by any means,” for new sacrifices in this conflict cannot be tolerated. It must be understood that this cannot be resolved “with little bloodshed.”

V. Kazimirov, “One Cannot Understand the Karabakh Conflict Without Knowing What Happened in Nakhichevan.” Interview with the online newspaper http://www.karabakh-online.com, December 1, 2005 http://vn.kazimirov.ru/k130.htm

Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Vartan Oskanian, at the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting Ljubljana, December 5, 2005

Thirty years have passed since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The world and the goals for which it was signed have changed. Nevertheless, the principles, norms, and values of that document have stood the test of time, even though the mechanisms and instruments that articulated, politically supported, and safeguarded those fundamental principles of human and peoples’ rights have adapted and evolved.

Today, and thirty years from now, the integrity of the Helsinki Final Act will be protected and preserved only if the integrity of the document itself is respected. The Helsinki Decalogue is akin to the Ten Commandments. Their validity, purpose, and effectiveness depend on a unified approach, not on selective or opportunistic interpretation.

That is why, when the right to self-determination of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh is crudely denied, we insistently remind the world that this is not a conflict between principles. It is a struggle of a people for self-determination.

Since the beginning of the conflict, international developments and processes of self-determination in various parts of the world have led to fundamental changes in global understanding of this issue. Relations between states—both new and old—have evolved. We have witnessed East Timor gaining independence through a referendum, and the signing of an agreement in Sudan that ended a decades-long conflict on the basis of a referendum held in one part of the country. Today, serious negotiations are underway regarding the future status of Kosovo. Among politicians, lawyers, and scholars, there is a growing recognition of the possibility and legitimacy of acknowledging the right to self-determination under certain circumstances.

These circumstances almost precisely describe the situation of Nagorno-Karabakh today. Azerbaijan exercises no control over Karabakh, which has acquired the attributes of full sovereignty over the past fifteen years. Beyond the duration and completeness of self-determination, Nagorno-Karabakh’s position has been further consolidated and brought to completion by the following facts:

• First, it separated in accordance with applicable law.
• Second, its territory has never been subject to the jurisdiction of independent Azerbaijan.
• Third, Azerbaijan, by committing violence against a people it claimed as its own citizens, forfeited the moral right to act as their guardian.
• Finally, there exists a de facto political reality—the proven ability of Nagorno-Karabakh to hold elections, govern its people, defend its borders, and maintain international contacts.

In other words, in exact accordance with the terminology of the Helsinki Final Act, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh are exercising their right “to determine, whenever and as they wish, their internal and external political status without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social, and cultural development.” This is their right. This is the promise made by the international community to the peoples who lived on the other side of the Iron Curtain, some of whom, like us, now sit at this table. The people of Nagorno-Karabakh are no less deserving of that promise.

OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting Ljubljana, December 5–6, 2005

Statement of the Ministerial Council on the Conflict under Consideration in the OSCE Minsk Group

We welcome the progress achieved in 2005 in the negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh within the framework of the “Prague Process,” in particular the two meetings of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Warsaw and Kazan under the auspices of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. We believe that the parties have now reached a stage where they can move from negotiations to decision-making, and that there are real opportunities for significant gains for all. We call upon the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to seize the opportunities now open to them and to achieve substantial progress in the coming year toward the settlement of the conflict within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Process.

Dartmouth Agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh Moscow, December 8–10, 2005

Since October 2001, representatives of civil society from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh have held nine meetings together with American and Russian members of the Dartmouth Conference Working Group on Regional Conflicts. The purpose of their long-term dialogue has been to explore possible approaches to initiating a peace process that would end the conflict and establish peace among them. Co-Chairs Harold Saunders and Vitaly Naumkin reflected in this draft the consensus reached by the participants.

Draft Framework Agreement on the Peace Process

Preamble Having suffered too long from conflict, the people of this region, through their official representatives, by recognizing this Framework Agreement, commit themselves to develop and implement a set of agreements for a just and lasting peace among them. They acknowledge that achieving a comprehensive settlement, mutual respect, non-interference in each other’s affairs, and the development of mutually beneficial economic, political, and social relations constitute the foundations of the peace they seek. For this purpose, they turn to the assistance of representatives of the international community to facilitate the necessary negotiations and to support the implementation of signed agreements. In doing so, they pledge to work within the principles and negotiations described below.

The Peace Process

The parties agree that their goal is to establish peaceful and constructive relations among all inhabitants of the region. They recognize that peace will only be possible as all sides work to end the current hostile relations between them. They view the peace process described here as the means to achieve such change.

Developing these new relations will require effective negotiations between the parties and mutually reinforcing steps by both authorities and citizens to build trust and enable full implementation of agreements. A comprehensive peace process is a continuous interaction at all levels of society and across many spheres of social, political, and economic life. Its purpose is to transform adversarial relations into peaceful and constructive ones.

The drafting and implementation of agreements presented in this Framework Agreement, along with coordinated actions by citizens to support them across all spheres of inter-community relations, will constitute concrete steps in the peace process. These steps may serve as confidence-building measures contributing to the gradual transformation of relations. Ultimately, the task of the peace process is to develop fruitful relations and create an atmosphere everywhere conducive to cooperation in addressing today’s problems.

Involvement of the People:

Explanation of Principles The involvement of people is critically important to give momentum to transforming relations. Each step in the peace process must begin with a mutually agreed declaration addressed to the public by the negotiating participants. Such a declaration should include the following points to link the step to the logic and principles of the comprehensive peace process:

1. All parties to the armed conflict reaffirm their commitment to the existing ceasefire regime.
2. All parties declare their obligation to renounce the use of force or threats of force and to resolve disputes by peaceful means.
3. All parties are prepared to resolve any conflicts and problems between them through negotiations in bilateral and multilateral formats. They reaffirm their commitment to the Minsk Process and international involvement.
4. All parties whose participation is necessary for the implementation of agreements will take part in negotiations and will be signatories of the agreements reached.
5. All parties agree that building mutual trust requires ending hostile activities, especially propaganda.
6. Achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace requires not only agreements reached in negotiations but also the cooperation of all inhabitants of the region.
7. All parties are committed to developing peaceful relations that allow them to preserve and develop their identity, determine their way of life, and secure their future.
8. All parties undertake to ensure the rights and needs of refugees and internally displaced persons with the participation of international organizations.

Explanation of the Logic of the Peace Process

1. The logic of the peace process is to offer new thinking about establishing peace. This new thinking recognizes that until relations between the conflicting peoples change, governments lack the consent of their peoples to reach agreements through negotiations. The peace process must change these relations through a series of interconnected agreements reached in negotiations. Careful implementation of each agreement creates conditions for negotiating the next one. Implementation builds new starting points for negotiations and increases confidence in the peace process as a whole.
2. The first round of negotiations could, for example, define a set of interactive steps to address a significant problem that can be resolved in the interests of all parties at this stage. Further steps would advance the resolution of this problem.
3. The participation of authorized representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh in negotiations as a party signing agreements, assuming obligations for their implementation under conditions of renunciation of force or threats of force, and concrete steps to implement these agreements, would create conditions regarded as an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh. Agreements reached and implemented by Nagorno-Karabakh would constitute de facto recognition of this status.
4. Representatives of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh would negotiate mechanisms for determining and legally formalizing the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
5. A full and final settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue presupposes resolving all aspects that constitute the essence of the problem and the conflictual issues arising from it. A comprehensive settlement of the conflict also requires phased implementation of agreements reached and their further development.

Questions for Negotiations

Authorized representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh, in accordance with the format of the Minsk Conference, will conclude agreements on a wide range of issues. Participants in the negotiations and signatories to the agreements will be those who assume obligations for their implementation.

Negotiations will be conducted in two stages. The first phase will conclude with interim steps, which constitute confidence-building measures involving reciprocal concessions by the parties in agreed spheres. These measures should demonstrate progress toward peace and create the conditions for resolving final issues. At this stage of interim steps, matters relating to the ultimate settlement are to be excluded. In the concluding phase of negotiations, unresolved issues will be addressed.

In both phases, negotiations will consider, in particular, the following questions:

1. Restoration of communications, economic and cultural cooperation, synchronized with the progress of the peace process.
2. The issue of territories and borders. By mutual agreement, synchronized with the peace process, withdrawal of forces from controlled territories may be carried out, along with demilitarization to a level determined in negotiations, secured by agreed measures.
3. The issue of refugees and internally displaced persons. Within the peace process, the return of refugees and displaced persons to territories agreed upon by the parties will be arranged. At the same time, international participation will be ensured in reconstruction and in safeguarding minority rights.
4. The issue of the legally defined final status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the conclusion of a peace treaty.
5. Establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

All agreements reached will include implementation schedules. Informal agreements will be reached on informing the public and on measures to strengthen societal confidence in the success of the peace process.

Conduct of the Peace Process

As noted above, the peace process is a set of agreements embedded within a broader political framework. Negotiating delegations and political leaders will draft declarations and initiatives designed to create incentives and encourage citizens to contribute to building relationships that will form the foundation of lasting peace.

The involvement of people at all levels of social, economic, and political life is precisely what distinguishes the peace process from negotiations alone. Actions that stimulate public participation in the peace process and alter the perceptions of former adversaries toward one another are confidence-building measures.

Political leaders are called upon to explain to their societies how each action is connected to the goal of a comprehensive peace process. The very act of initiating and explaining steps—whereby all citizens can see that their concerns are on the agenda of the peace process—can help secure public support for the practical implementation of difficult agreements on a phased basis, and for using early agreements to support subsequent steps. Commitment to the peace process can create a compromise between the “step-by-step” approach and the “package agreement.” A comprehensive settlement is itself the “package.”

The choice made by the direct participants in the conflict in favor of a comprehensive peace process, and the first positive reactions to such a choice from leading states, supported by the international community, may help the people of the region realize that a way out of deadlock is possible, and that constructive changes in relations can indeed be achieved. 806

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

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