Idea of a Deferred Referendum on the Status of Nagorno-Karabakh

History
Idea of a Deferred Referendum on the Status of Nagorno-Karabakh

Former Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and Representative of the President of Russia, Ambassador V. Kazimirov, on Concerns Related to the Idea of a Deferred Referendum on the Status of Nagorno-Karabakh

February 10, 2006

Consultations between Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan, as well as their foreign ministers, remain confidential, yet the public has long discerned the outlines of a possible agreement. It is neither the step-by-step approach favored by Baku, nor the “package” solution sought by Yerevan—where the status of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) would be determined immediately. Rather, it appears to be a hybrid of the two.

Now, instead of the formula “territories for status,” the Armenians agree to hold an additional referendum in NK, allowing the population itself to determine its status. In other words, they advance the formula “territories for security + referendum.”

However, many Armenians, fearing that Azerbaijan will not fulfill its obligations, have dubbed this the formula “territories for promises.” They are reluctant to relinquish the occupied territories (the “NK security belt”), even if they retain until the referendum the districts lying between Armenia and NK (Kelbajar and Lachin).

Baku, meanwhile, perceiving the referendum as a loss of NK, points to the Azerbaijani constitution, which provides for referendums only on a nationwide scale—though it is hardly unfamiliar with the precedents of Quebec, Eritrea, and East Timor. Much debate and criticism on both sides has also been sparked by the still very raw idea of deploying peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone.

Alongside intransigence, mutual distrust between Baku and Yerevan remains the chief obstacle to settlement. This distrust is not unfounded: in 18 years of conflict, the parties have concluded only three agreements, and of these, only one—the ceasefire—is observed.

If Baku and Yerevan prove unable to resolve the NK status issue at the negotiating table, then a referendum remains the sole civilized path. And it should not be postponed for 10–15 years, leaving “banana peels” for future presidents. A referendum could be held within five years, thereby bringing closer a resolution to the Kelbajar and Lachin problems.

The return of Azerbaijani residents to NK would inevitably provoke incidents, complications, and perhaps even disrupt the vote (incidentally, their remote participation was tested during elections to the Milli Mejlis). Another matter is their legitimate right to return to NK once its status has been determined.

The idea of the inviolability of the Azerbaijani constitution is unconvincing. After all, Heydar Aliyev drafted it with the Karabakh conflict already in mind, as is evident when compared with the Constitutional Act of 1991.

(V. Kazimirov, “Karabakh Is Worth a Mass,” Moskovskie Novosti, February 10, 2006)

Former Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and Representative of the President of Russia, Ambassador V. Kazimirov, on the Impossibility of a Military Solution to the Conflict and the Negative Consequences of Preaching Revenge

May 4, 2006

Around Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), debate is intensifying: is this most complex conflict amenable to peaceful resolution, or are Azerbaijanis and Armenians doomed to another bloody ordeal against each other and themselves? On the anniversary of the ceasefire, opponents will once again unleash propagandistic salvos. The cessation of hostilities, established on May 12, 1994 through Russia’s mediation, remains the sole tangible achievement of the peace process, later handed over to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Twelve years of negotiations have yielded little beyond the relative preservation of that ceasefire.

The year 2006, expected to be comparatively calm in the political life of Azerbaijan and Armenia, gave rise to illusions of a breakthrough. Yet the meeting of Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan at the Rambouillet castle in France on February 10–11 confirmed that inflated expectations lead to disappointment. Nevertheless, the search for a peaceful solution must continue.

The universally acknowledged hallmark of this protracted and bitter conflict is the profound mutual distrust between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Fear of deception—whether through brazen treachery or silent sabotage—has locked both sides into intransigence. Each strives above all to secure its own demands: for Armenians, the determination of NK’s status; for Azerbaijanis, the liberation of seven occupied districts. The result is a meager negotiation process that, instead of pragmatic “exchanges,” produces deadlock after deadlock.

How can such destructive distrust be reduced? Without it, agreements cannot be reached, and even their signing would not guarantee implementation. What is needed is leadership flexibility, tolerance, an end to the stoking of mutual hostility, and contacts between various structures of the two societies. Yet none of this exists—on the contrary.

Nothing fuels distrust more effectively than threats and incitement of hatred. Here Azerbaijan undoubtedly takes the lead. Yerevan and Stepanakert merely scramble not to fall behind Baku, where officials constantly threaten to resolve the conflict by force.

In reality, the “peace or war” dilemma is false—there is simply no rational alternative to a peaceful settlement. Not only for humanitarian reasons, but also by the stubborn laws of logic and the balance of forces in the region, which is hardly favorable to adventurism. The real correlation of forces promises no quick success, while a protracted war would be disastrous. Even a dubious success would merely pass the baton of confrontation to future generations.

Calls for revenge are unlikely to succeed. They will not compel Armenians to abandon the “security zone” around NK, nor will they secure external support for Azerbaijan—quite the opposite. War rhetoric not only deceives the people, sows enmity, and distorts the psyche of new generations, but for years has deepened distrust and delayed resolution of disputed issues.

Escalation is further fueled by incidents and casualties along the line of contact. Armenians insist they are ready to implement the February 6, 1995 agreement between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and NK, aimed at reducing incidents and losses. Yet Baku neither fulfills the agreement nor comments on it. Nor does the OSCE, which shows little concern for ensuring its sole Karabakh agreement is observed.

All these are artificial obstacles erected by ruling elites to avoid agreements, since even mutual concessions are unsafe for them. By evading settlement, elites seek to preserve their positions at the expense of both peoples.

Continuing the search for peace in Karabakh, it is crucial to identify the primary task of 2006: to bury the reckless notions of a military solution. Without this, no progress is possible. Having undertaken to resolve the conflict peacefully, the OSCE must act more decisively, confronting everything that hinders its mission: threats by officials, glorification of the arms race, and bloodshed along the line of contact.

Without abandoning the cult of force, even progress at the negotiating table would remain fragile. Both peoples need a breakthrough toward peace—at least by 2009 or 2010. Otherwise, the endless grinding will continue.

(V. Kazimirov, “Karabakh: Why a Breakthrough to Peace Is Still Impossible,” Vremya Novostei, May 4, 2006)

Former Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and Representative of the President of Russia, Ambassador V. Kazimirov, on the Underestimation by the Co-Chairs of the Commitment to a Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict and Their Tolerant Attitude Toward the Parties’ Retreat from Adopted Decisions

Sochi, June 23, 2006

During the Karabakh conflict of 1992–94, there were several mediators. Russia proved the most effective (achieving the ceasefire, shaping the format and basis of negotiations—all later inherited by the OSCE, the pan-European organization). Moscow possessed a number of objective advantages over other mediators, even over the CSCE. Yet Western partners—rather than supporting the efforts of the most successful mediator—suspected Russia of self-interest, even of neo-imperial ambitions.

Of course, mediation is never perfectly “sterile.” A mediator inevitably considers its own national interests. But the honesty of mediation is not difficult to test: one need only observe whether the mediator prioritizes the interests of conflict resolution, or other, self-serving goals—even at the expense of settlement itself.

When Russia began to achieve real progress, Western representatives actively obstructed it (these are facts, not conjecture—I could cite many concrete examples). They insisted on securing a “central role” for the OSCE Minsk Group. Even “only” that role.

And so, for twelve years now, it has held the central, virtually monopolistic position. Is it not time to draw conclusions, at least interim ones? The most valuable achievement remains the preservation of the ceasefire, but there is no other tangible benefit for the two peoples. Thus, even the OSCE’s exclusive role in mediation has not helped.

The core problem, of course, lies in the universally acknowledged deep mutual distrust of the parties, their polar positions, and inflexibility. Distrust has locked them into intransigence, each striving first to resolve its own demands, preventing equitable exchanges.

How does the OSCE influence the parties? Each demands that the OSCE exert pressure on the opposing side. The mediators refuse to apply pressure—and rightly so.

What, then, is lacking in the OSCE? Consistency. In order merely to preserve the peace process, to keep it afloat in any form, the OSCE sometimes makes unjustified concessions to the parties, displaying conformity and opportunism. It does not so much lead them toward peace as trail behind them, yielding even to unfounded whims. The peace process is indeed vital, at least for maintaining the ceasefire, but it cannot become an end in itself. The goal must be resolution of the conflict by peaceful, negotiated means.

Two blocks of problems arise here.

First. The OSCE lacks fidelity to its commitment to resolve this conflict peacefully, and firmness in defending that course. Having undertaken the peaceful resolution of the conflict, it must resolutely oppose everything that obstructs it. And since the parties themselves assumed the same commitment, consistency must be demanded of them as well.

The OSCE’s remarkable tolerance of several highly negative phenomena is inexplicable. Among them:

  • the escalation of militant campaigns by the leadership of either party to the conflict,
  • periodic series of incidents along the line of contact,
  • inflated military budgets and arms races—especially intolerable in such a sensitive, explosive region.

All three trends serve to heighten tension, entrench, and even increase mutual distrust, paralyzing the peace process.

The Minsk Group Co-Chairs speak on these issues too delicately, even timidly. This may be understandable given hierarchy. But where are the senior officials of the OSCE? They do not seem to draw the attention of the conflict parties’ leaders to the unacceptability of such actions and statements for a pan-European organization.

The OSCE has invested considerable effort in seeking a peaceful resolution and must not allow the parties to treat these efforts with disregard. This is not pressure on the parties, but a natural defense of the peaceful path to settlement—the path endorsed by all parties, the OSCE, and the international community.

Second. The OSCE lacks fidelity to its own earlier decisions and documents—adopted, moreover, with the consent of the parties. Many OSCE decisions have long been abandoned, and the organization now acts contrary to what was agreed.

  • The Budapest Summit mandated the Co-Chairs to conduct negotiations between the conflicting parties, not only between recognized states. The Co-Chairs’ mandate also refers solely to the parties to the conflict, not to states. Yet one of the parties has long been effectively excluded from the negotiation process.
  • On NK as the third party to the conflict, Acting OSCE Chairman László Kovács spoke unequivocally on March 31, 1995. The Minsk Group Co-Chairs likewise proceeded from this in numerous proposals in earlier years. The current position is far less clear. Instead of adhering to adopted decisions, the OSCE has slid into a stance of “better to negotiate somehow, than not at all.”
  • In 1992, the CSCE took note of elections in Nagorno-Karabakh (inviting “elected and other representatives of NK”). In recent years, however, the OSCE, its structures, and the Co-Chair states have condemned elections in NK. Yet these elect authorities only for their own population—even if on a temporary and not fully legitimate “de facto” basis, given the unresolved conflict. Is rule by militarists or authoritarian figures preferable? And who is better to have in the peace process—a usurper of power, effectively a pretender, or someone with at least a limited mandate from the region’s population?
  • The OSCE conducts monitoring of the ceasefire along the line of contact but cannot ensure its observance. It completely ignores the sole OSCE agreement signed by all three parties—on strengthening the ceasefire regime, which established procedures for resolving incidents along the line of contact and prevented escalation of tension. In that agreement, the top military commanders of all three parties, by direct order of their leaders, assumed a number of permanent obligations that are simply not being fulfilled.

Among the most absurd curiosities of today’s multilateral diplomacy is the fact that the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Ambassador Kasprzyk—who has conducted monitoring along the line of contact since 1996—learned of this agreement only from my newspaper article in 2003. And this was not his fault, but rather a reflection of the sloppiness with which matters are handled in the OSCE. Yet even after that, the situation did not change. To this day, the OSCE has not demanded that the parties to the conflict fulfill their obligations, although Yerevan and Stepanakert appear ready to resume compliance, provided Baku does the same.

This raises the almost sacramental question: is there any point in seeking new agreements between the parties if they too will not be implemented, and if the OSCE will still fail to secure reliable compliance with commitments already undertaken?

But all this criticism is not aimed at finding new mediators to replace the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, nor at adding others alongside them. It is naïve to believe that changing mediators would solve the problem. Many have simply been unable to withstand the burdens of Karabakh mediation. Italy “tired” after 17 months, Sweden after 16, Finland pleaded exhaustion after 11 and barely lasted 20 months. Enough experiments with mediator selection!

The real issue, I repeat, lies in the positions of the parties and in the OSCE’s opportunism. The pan-European organization must be pressed to act with greater clarity and consistency, to show intransigence even toward mere notions of a military solution, and persistence in implementing adopted decisions.

Let me also touch on some other problems of the Karabakh settlement:

During the war, there were many abhorrent phenomena: deportations, bombings and shelling of towns and villages, prisoners rarely taken, and so forth. Among these problems was the occupation of foreign lands. Much has been said about occupation, often equating it with aggression—though the two are far from identical. The confrontation began back in the Soviet Union (an internal conflict, not aggression), and flared after its collapse. Only Moscow spoke directly to Yerevan at the time, insisting that Armenia was a direct participant in the conflict. The West tolerated Armenia’s involvement in military actions (in four UN Security Council resolutions there was not a word about Armenia’s participation in the war). Evidently, inertia from supporting the Karabakh movement as a means of weakening the USSR played a role.

The origins of the current status quo and occupation are deliberately obscured. Not everyone likes to examine how it came about. The conflict did not begin with occupation, but with deportations and violent actions. Occupation was the consequence of military operations and their continuation over two and a half years. We condemned every seizure, but in the course of combat, military logic rarely submits to political, legal, or moral logic. The Armenians sought to shorten and straighten the front line in the face of Azerbaijan’s potential superiority, and continued their advances. Yet the “co-author” of Armenian occupation was the side that stubbornly tried to resolve the conflict by force, evaded peace initiatives, and repeatedly disrupted ceasefires. In this, official Baku bears no less, and indeed even greater, responsibility than others. Mourning the consequences of one’s own militarism is insufficient—it is more useful to recognize one’s considerable responsibility for what occurred and to draw lessons for the future.

Of course, the occupation of districts around NK is an anomaly. It must be eliminated as soon as possible. After the fall of Agdam, this was even an unconditional demand of the UN Security Council. But after repeated failures of peace efforts in 1993–94, it became a subject of negotiation: one could not reward the side that for more than a year had failed to meet the central demand of all four UNSC resolutions—an immediate cessation of hostilities. The winter offensive of 1993–94 was undertaken after all four resolutions had already been adopted. Because they were not implemented, the Council ceased adopting further resolutions on Karabakh.

For years, mutual distrust has fueled disputes over whether settlement should be “package” or “step-by-step.” Which should be addressed first—the causes or the consequences of the armed conflict?

In reality, the highest priority (above both causes and consequences) is to block the path to renewed military action.

A package settlement automatically includes guarantees of peaceful resolution, excluding a return to war as a means of addressing disputed issues. It is more difficult in this respect with the step-by-step approach, which Azerbaijan seeks in order to prioritize the liberation of territories around NK and the return of displaced persons.

But there is an internal logic to settlement. The fundamental condition of any phased approach must be a clear renunciation of the use of force and guarantees thereof. This is the “zero cycle” of the step-by-step method. Without it, the first stage cannot be reached. The greatest obstacle to the liberation of occupied territories is precisely the attempt to cling to illusions of military revenge. This prevents disputed issues from being fully transferred into the political sphere, leaving many in the military dimension. And who would surrender advantageous, long-fortified positions if the threat of renewed hostilities has not been completely removed?

Conversely, eliminating the military threat would deprive Armenians of any clear pretext for maintaining occupation of Azerbaijani districts, even if NK’s status remains unresolved. That would represent, in large measure, a victory of reason and law over force.

Therefore, the year 2006 must be devoted not so much to principles of settlement as to removing all military threats, which would more readily open the way to practical steps. Refusal to do so is tantamount to rejecting a peaceful, negotiated resolution of the conflict. This must elicit an unequivocally negative reaction from the OSCE, the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, other states, and international organizations.

(V. Kazimirov, “Critique of the OSCE’s Role in the Settlement of the Karabakh Conflict,” Seminar “Russia–NATO: Security Issues in the South Caucasus,” Sochi, June 23, 2006; Realny Azerbaijan, June 25, 2006)

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

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