RESOLUTION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR On the Enactment of the Law of the USSR

History

“On the Procedure for Resolving Issues Related to the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR”

April 3, 1990

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR hereby resolves:

  1. To bring into force the Law of the USSR “On the Procedure for Resolving Issues Related to the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR” as of the date of its publication.
  2. To establish that any actions connected with raising the question of a Union Republic’s secession from the USSR, which contradict the Law of the USSR “On the Procedure for Resolving Issues Related to the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR,” undertaken either before or after its enactment, shall not give rise to any legal consequences for either the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the Union Republics.
  3. The Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics shall bring the legislation of their respective republics into conformity with the Law of the USSR “On the Procedure for Resolving Issues Related to the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR.”

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. Lukyanov

From the collection “Laws, Resolutions, and Other Acts Adopted at the 3rd Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR”, Moscow, 1990, p. 328. Published in Izvestia (Moscow), April 6, 1990, No. 97.

LAW OF THE USSR
“On the Delimitation of Powers Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Subjects of the Federation”
April 26, 1990

Article 1.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a sovereign socialist federal state. The USSR possesses the powers which have been jointly assigned to the jurisdiction of the USSR by the subjects of the Federation.

The Union republics are sovereign Soviet socialist states that have voluntarily united in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of the free self-determination of peoples and equality. The Union republics possess full state authority within their territories, except for the powers that they have transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR.

The autonomous republics are Soviet socialist states that are subjects of the Federation—the USSR. Autonomous republics and autonomous formations are part of Union republics on the basis of the free self-determination of peoples and possess full state authority within their territories, except for the powers transferred by them to the jurisdiction of the USSR and the Union republics.

Relations between autonomous republics, autonomous formations, and the Union republics of which they form part shall be determined by agreements and treaties concluded within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR, the constitutions of the Union and autonomous republics, and this Law.

Article 2.
Each Union republic retains the right to freely secede from the USSR. The decision of a Union republic to secede from the USSR shall be made by the free expression of the will of the peoples of the Union republic through a referendum (popular vote).
The procedure for resolving questions connected with the secession of a Union republic from the USSR shall be determined by a Law of the USSR.

Article 3.
The territory of a Union republic, autonomous republic, or autonomous formation may not be altered without their consent.
Borders between Union republics may be changed by mutual agreement, which is subject to approval by the USSR.
Territorial disputes between Union republics, between Union and autonomous republics, and autonomous formations which have not been resolved by agreement may, by mutual consent, be submitted to the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for resolution.

Article 4.
A Union republic, autonomous republic, autonomous oblast, or autonomous okrug shall independently decide questions concerning the placement of industrial and economic facilities and shall ensure the integrated economic, social, and cultural development of its territory, taking into account the interests of all peoples residing therein. In questions concerning the use of labor resources and the protection of the environment, the republics shall determine the conditions for the activity of enterprises, institutions, and organizations belonging to the USSR or to other Union and autonomous republics, in accordance with the legislative acts of the USSR, the Union republic, and the autonomous republic.

In the field of economic, social, and cultural development within its territory, an autonomous republic shall possess the same rights as a Union republic, except for those powers which, by agreement between them, fall under the jurisdiction of the Union republic.

Union republics, autonomous republics, and autonomous formations may enter into economic, social, and cultural cooperation with one another and conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements necessary for such cooperation, provided that these agreements do not contradict the interests of the USSR, other Union and autonomous republics, or autonomous formations.

Article 5.
A Union republic has the right to enter into relations with foreign states, conclude treaties with them, exchange diplomatic and consular missions, conduct foreign economic relations, and participate in the activities of international organizations.
The exercise of this right by a Union republic may not contradict USSR laws or the international obligations of the USSR.

Article 6.
The exclusive jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, exercised through its highest bodies of state power and administration, includes:

  1. Adoption of the Constitution of the USSR, amendments and additions to it, and decisions on holding referendums on matters within the jurisdiction of the USSR;
  2. Admission of new Union republics into the USSR; approval of the formation of new autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs, and changes in the status of existing ones;
  3. Resolution of disputes between Union republics, between Union and autonomous republics, and autonomous formations upon their appeal to USSR bodies;
  4. Determination of the State Border of the USSR and the regime of the border;
  5. Organization and regulation of the activities of bodies of state power and administration of the USSR;
  6. Drafting, approval, and execution of the Union budget; establishment of the system of state banks of the USSR, the unified monetary system, and all-Union taxes and fees;
  7. Development of long-term social and economic plans for the country and drafting and implementation of all-Union programs;
  8. Granting by the USSR of state loans and economic assistance to foreign states; conclusion of agreements on state loans and credits received by the USSR from foreign sources;
  9. Management of railway, air, sea, and trunk pipeline transport; defense facilities; space research; the Unified Energy System of the USSR; all-Union communication and information systems; as well as facilities belonging to all-Union state property in accordance with USSR legislation and agreements between the USSR and the Union republics; regulation of the production, storage, and use of fissile materials;
  10. Determination of the foreign policy of the USSR and conclusion of international treaties of the USSR; representation of the USSR in international relations;
  11. Questions of war and peace; protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the USSR; protection of the State Border of the USSR; establishment of the principles of customs regulation on the basis of a unified customs territory, customs duties, and customs fees;
  12. Organization of defense, leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR, border, internal, and railway troops; ensuring state security of the USSR;
  13. Establishment of courts of the USSR and a unified system of prosecutorial supervision in the USSR.

Article 7.
The powers of the USSR specified in Article 6 of this Law may not be expanded without the consent of the subjects of the Federation.

Article 8.
In areas of joint jurisdiction of the USSR and the Union republics, the highest bodies of state power and administration of the USSR are vested with the following:

  1. Establishment of the basic principles of the legal status of Soviet citizens and their public associations; protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens of the USSR regardless of their place of residence;
  2. Establishment of the general principles of the legal status of autonomous republics, autonomous formations, and national administrative-territorial units; delimitation of powers between Union and autonomous republics and autonomous formations; determination of the general principles of local self-government and local administration;
  3. Establishment of the foundations of civil, land, forest, water, mining, criminal, penal, financial, and labor legislation; legislation on social security, public education, public health, environmental protection, administrative offenses, the judicial system, and judicial procedure;
  4. Establishment of the legal foundations ensuring the functioning of the all-Union market and its protection in the interests of all republics;
  5. Determination of general financial and credit policy and the foundations of price formation;
  6. Establishment of general principles of labor-resource use, labor remuneration, and labor protection;
  7. Direction, coordination, and promotion of the development of culture and education, scientific research, and scientific and technological progress;
  8. General leadership of public-order protection and the fight against crime;
  9. Establishment of the general procedure for relations of Union republics with foreign states and international organizations and the general leadership of foreign economic activity;
  10. Establishment of the legal status of foreign citizens and stateless persons in the USSR;
  11. Ensuring compliance with the Constitution of the USSR throughout the territory of the USSR.

Article 9.
The USSR may, by concluding an agreement with a Union republic, transfer to that republic the exercise of specific USSR powers on its territory.
A Union republic may, by agreement with the USSR, transfer to its jurisdiction certain powers belonging to the republic.

Article 10.
If a matter pertaining to the joint jurisdiction of the USSR and the Union republics has not been resolved by a USSR law, a Union republic has the right independently to regulate relations in the corresponding area through its own legislation. In such cases, matters falling within the jurisdiction of autonomous republics and autonomous formations shall be regulated in coordination with them.

Article 11.
The Constitution of the USSR, the laws of the USSR, and other acts of the highest bodies of state power and administration of the USSR are mandatory throughout the territory of the USSR. In the event of a contradiction between the constitution of a Union or autonomous republic and the Constitution of the USSR, the Constitution of the USSR shall prevail. In the event of a contradiction between the laws or other acts of the highest bodies of state power of the Union or autonomous republics and the Constitution of the USSR, the laws of the USSR, or other acts of the highest bodies of state power of the USSR, the acts issued by the corresponding USSR bodies shall prevail.
The laws of the USSR and other acts of USSR bodies shall be issued only within the powers of the USSR and may not infringe upon the rights of Union or autonomous republics.

Article 12.
Disagreements between the highest bodies of state power and administration of the USSR and the Union or autonomous republics concerning the legality of their acts shall be resolved in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution of the USSR and the Law on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR.

Article 13.
The highest bodies of state power of the Union and autonomous republics have the right to protest decrees and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR if they infringe upon the rights of the Union or autonomous republic. The disputed issue shall be resolved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
The highest bodies of state power and administration of the Union and autonomous republics have the right to suspend on their territory the effect of acts of ministries, state committees, and departments of the USSR in cases where such acts violate the legislation of the USSR or of the corresponding Union or autonomous republic, notifying the Council of Ministers of the USSR thereof. The disputed issue shall be resolved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR if the act of the corresponding USSR body is suspended by the Supreme Soviet of the Union or autonomous republic, or by the Council of Ministers of the USSR if the act is suspended by the Council of Ministers of the Union or autonomous republic.

“Code of Laws of the USSR,” vol. 1, pp. 44–12, 1990; “Gazette of the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,” 1990, No. 19, p. 329.

FROM THE CIPHER MESSAGE SENT TO THE USSR MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
BY THE HEAD OF THE NKAO INTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT,
GENERAL V. KOVALEV,
AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE INVESTIGATIVE–OPERATIONAL GROUP
OF THE USSR MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, V. KRIVOPUSKOV
December 1990

In 1990, 160 operational-military actions were conducted in the territory of the NKAO to verify citizens’ compliance with passport regulations, 156 of which were carried out in towns and villages populated exclusively by Armenians. In many cases, with the tacit consent of the command of the internal troops, these operations were accompanied by destructive searches in homes, looting of personal belongings, and theft of livestock and poultry from residents of the inspected settlements. During street patrols in towns and villages, unjustified detentions, beatings, and degrading treatment of citizens occur.

Cases of theft of personal and collective livestock from Armenian villages by Azerbaijanis have sharply increased. In 1988 and 1989, 682 cattle and 990 sheep were taken from Armenians, with robberies being isolated incidents. In the first ten months of 1990, 1,252 head of cattle and 2,150 sheep and goats were stolen. Twenty-three armed attacks on Armenian-populated settlements were registered, along with a large number of shootings at Armenian homes. Among the attackers were Azerbaijanis wearing police and OMON uniforms and carrying automatic weapons. These incidents were recorded on 26 October 1990 during an attack on the Armenian village of Janyatag, and on 2 November 1990 in the forested area of the village of Kazanchi targeting a group of Armenians working there.

At the same time, police personnel of Armenian nationality effectively lack the means and capacity to prevent crimes and counter armed robberies and livestock thefts. As is known, under an order of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs issued at the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic, all automatic weapons were withdrawn from Armenian police officers in the NKAO beginning in autumn 1989.

According to numerous reports, including the results of an operational inspection carried out by personnel of the Investigative–Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, particular tension is created by the presence in the NKAO and adjacent districts of additional OMON units under republican jurisdiction that are not provided for in the official staffing structure. In the Azerbaijani Republic, attempts are being made to create and legalize new militarized formations not approved by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, which are subsequently deployed to the NKAO supposedly to maintain public order and ensure the safety of the population. In reality, their actions create even greater tension, causing legitimate outrage among local residents. By decision of the Council of Ministers of the republic, the NKAO police staff has been additionally increased by 460 persons, from whom 12 police detachments were formed and deployed in Azerbaijani-populated settlements.

The inspection established that in Azerbaijan, without coordination with the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, extra-staff OMON units are being formed. These unlawful formations are stationed unofficially, without registration in local internal affairs departments or in the commandant’s offices of the zone under the state of emergency, typically near Armenian-populated settlements. Recruitment is carried out among Azerbaijanis, primarily refugees from Armenia, many of whom lack the required education and do not meet the necessary professional criteria; their training is limited to a 20-day course, focused mostly on handling weapons.

Members of the Azerbaijani OMON have repeatedly been detained by military patrols without identification documents, permits for automatic weapons, or for vehicles, many of which were used without license plates. Following directives from the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs, OMON units do not cooperate with local internal affairs bodies, commandant’s offices of the state-of-emergency zone, or the command of the internal troops; cases have been noted in which they have clashed with military units.

The continued presence of republican OMON units in the settlements of the NKAO and adjacent districts leads to unpredictable consequences and discredits the internal troops, the country’s law enforcement agencies, and the Law of the USSR “On the State of Emergency in the NKAO and Adjacent Districts of the Azerbaijan SSR.”

V. Krivopuskov. Rebellious Karabakh. From the Diary of a USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Officer. 2nd edition. Moscow, 2007, pp. 124–125.

RUSSIAN PUBLICIST A. NUIKIN ON THE EVENTS IN SUMGAIT AS A CONTINUATION OF THE TRADITIONAL TURKO-AZERBAIJANI POLICY OF GENOCIDE AGAINST ARMENIANS,
AND ON THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN THE DEPORTATIONS OF THE ARMENIAN POPULATION
February 28, 1991

Stalin, however, approached the division of Armenia from a far more pragmatic standpoint.
By linking Azerbaijan with Turkey at the expense of Armenian Nakhichevan and handing over Karabakh to Azerbaijan (in defiance of an already adopted decision), he was, first, following the ancient principle “Divide and rule!”, and second, calculating that the Bolsheviks would be compensated for this by Baku kerosene.

The young Soviet republic indeed received kerosene, while Armenians in the “gifted” regions were gradually forced out by old but reliable methods — through humiliation of their national dignity and the creation of unbearable living conditions. Let us not waste time describing these methods (they are commonplace); let us go directly to the results, which speak for themselves.

In 1917, Nakhichevan was home to 53,900 Armenians (40% of the population); by 1979, barely more than a thousand remained (1.4%). Only two of the forty-four Armenian villages survived.

In 1923, Armenians constituted 94.4% of Nagorno-Karabakh; by 1979 their share had fallen to 75.9%. Over those years, dozens of Armenian villages in the region were eliminated. If this is not a “quiet” genocide, then what is it? Yet the pace of this gradual eradication of a “foreign” people — a process proudly alluded to by A. Aliyev at a recent session of the republic’s Supreme Soviet — seemed insufficient to someone. And so…

The Sumgait Warning

The Sumgait massacres were not a spontaneous outburst of popular anger in response to the Karabakh Armenians’ openly declared desire to reunite with their historical homeland, nor a random eruption of brutality. Both the brutality and the “outburst” were coldly planned and skillfully organized.

Armenian residents were counted in advance (their addresses handed directly to the attackers); telephone lines to Armenian households were pre-emptively disconnected; containers of gasoline and piles of stones were prepared; networks of provocative rumors and inflammatory disinformation were put into motion; criminal groups were brought in from various places; and measures for quickly “covering the tracks” were carefully devised.

The Sumgait massacres were not an attempt to eliminate specific Armenians of a specific city. They were an operation designed to eliminate Armenians throughout the republic — above all the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Eyewitness accounts testify to extreme cruelty and public humiliation. These acts were carried out openly, almost demonstratively, as if for the purpose of sending a message. Professional criminals do not typically commit grave crimes in full view of witnesses — yet here the most heinous acts were deliberately brought into the public eye. Why? I have already explained why.

For Armenians slow to grasp the message, there followed the “events in Baku” (not to mention numerous more localized “warnings”). Everyone understood — except the most determined, who entrenched themselves in Nagorno-Karabakh. Many Russians understood, and Georgians too, and Jews. But these were almost “bonus” outcomes, an additional satisfaction “at no extra cost.”

For the stubborn, more surprises were prepared: a full blockade of Karabakh, culminating in OMON forces seizing the airport and effectively cutting off all supply routes; administrative attacks; and more.

One example: the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet decided to eliminate the Shaumyan district, home to twenty thousand people (82% Armenians), and to “merge” it with the Kasum-Ismayil district, home to nearly fifty thousand Azerbaijanis. A carefully crafted plan, is it not? What will follow is not difficult to predict.

By the way, the definition of “genocide” includes the creation of conditions making life impossible for a national, racial, or religious group.

And What of Our Central Government?

What is the “Russian army” doing in Azerbaijan?

We know what it did when it stormed Baku a few days after Armenians were massacred there: it protected the Azerbaijani Communist Party from the Azerbaijani people. And what was it doing the rest of the time? Apparently the same.

Eyewitnesses describe soldiers refusing to intervene while civilians were attacked, or participating in abusive searches, looting, and detentions under the pretext of “disarming illegal formations.” Meanwhile, armed Azerbaijani units — thousands strong — encircled Armenian villages with impunity.

A state of emergency was declared in Karabakh ostensibly to separate the conflicting sides. In practice, however, Soviet internal troops were effectively placed at the disposal of one of those sides — hardly the more peaceful or compromise-seeking one.

At a recent session of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet, V. Polyanichko — second secretary of the republic’s Communist Party and head of an extralegal organizing committee — declared: “1991 is the Year of Karabakh. It will be the last year of Azerbaijan’s hardships. The land of Karabakh is our land, and we must seize it for our children. The airport is already ours. But we must increase the number of OMON forces…”
The Minister of Internal Affairs, Asadov, promised to raise their number to 600. Around Nagorno-Karabakh there was already a force of ten thousand. “So entering Karabakh and taking it is merely a technical matter.”

And what will our army do if the republican leadership begins solving the Armenian question in the Stalinist manner — you remember the saying: “No person, no problem”? Will it do as it did in Sumgait — protect itself and the organizers of the violence?

On the Side of Conscience

When we recounted our experiences in Stepanakert on Armenian television, one viewer began calling her friends: “Turn on the TV! The Russians are speaking… They’re on our side!”

Yes, I am “on their side,” if one may put it so simply regarding such a complex historical tragedy. Not because I have many friends in Armenia — I also have many in Azerbaijan. I am “for” the Armenians in this case because they are victims, victims of genocide. Standing with the victims is not some pinnacle of moral heroism; it is the basic duty of any civilized human being. If the Armenian side were the one committing genocide, I would stand with the Azerbaijanis — regardless of religion or personal acquaintances.

For three years we Russian intellectuals, the “democratic public,” told ourselves and others that this was an “interethnic conflict,” and that the main thing was not to “make matters worse.” And what came of this noble restraint? Did the fire die down? Did passions cool? On the contrary — by trying to be equally kind to both sides in a conflict between an axe and a neck, we emboldened those who orchestrated the “interethnic conflict,” convinced of their impunity.

There are no “evil peoples.” But there are peoples who commit aggression (whether by choice or because of criminal indoctrination), and peoples subjected to aggression — who therefore have the moral right to defend themselves. Each people is responsible for the crimes committed in its name.

And here is something else that troubles me. In condemning “instigators” and “destructive forces,” we have somehow shifted the object of condemnation: displays of unity, organization, and readiness to sacrifice in defense of national dignity and cultural survival are condemned more loudly in our press than the bloody acts of the pogromists themselves. This is not how fires are extinguished. This is how they are fanned.

And indeed, the fire has been fanned. Blood in the Caucasus is already flowing in streams. Soon it may run in rivers — accompanied by our toasts to “friendship among peoples.”

— A. Nuikin, “What Karabakh Is Silent About,”
Megapolis-Express Weekly, February 28, 1991 739

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

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