Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia

History

Regarding the Remarks of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group at the Permanent Council June 26, 2006

Taking into account the statement delivered by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna on June 22, as well as the subsequent interview given by the newly appointed U.S. Co-Chair Matthew Bryza, in which—albeit partially—the principles of a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were presented for the first time, and also considering Azerbaijan’s recent desperate calls to resort to a military solution and to accept autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh, we would like to make several observations:

  1. The Co-Chairs partially presented the principles of settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; they did not address the issue of the corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, nor the questions relating to the status of Nagorno-Karabakh prior to the referendum.
  2. The Co-Chairs confirmed for the first time that the people of Nagorno-Karabakh must determine their future status through a referendum.
  3. The issues on which the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan still fail to reach agreement do not include the holding of a referendum; both Presidents have accepted this concept. The disagreements concern the sequence in which the consequences of the military conflict are to be addressed.
  4. In an attempt to resolve these remaining disagreements, the Co-Chairs submitted a proposal after Rambouillet. This proposal was accepted by Armenia in Bucharest. Azerbaijan rejected it.
  5. Armenia considers that, overall, the basic principles proposed today constitute a serious foundation for the continuation of negotiations; Armenia is prepared to continue negotiations with Azerbaijan on this basis.
  6. Armenia believes that Azerbaijan’s refusal to accept these principles is a serious obstacle to progress in the negotiations. Should this policy persist, Armenia will insist that Azerbaijan conduct negotiations directly with Nagorno-Karabakh.
  7. Finally, we would like to remind Azerbaijan once again that, regardless of its military budget, it will not be able to force the people of Nagorno-Karabakh to renounce their freedom and their right to self-determination.

Former Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and Representative of the President of Russia, Ambassador V. Kazimirov On Azerbaijan’s Attitude Toward the Tripartite Agreements on the Peaceful Settlement of the Karabakh Conflict, UN Security Council Resolutions, and Other International Commitments September 6, 2006

Recently, political analyst Vafa Guluzade, who for many years was a close associate of three Azerbaijani presidents—A. Mutalibov, A. Elchibey, and H. Aliyev—made a rather reckless statement on the issue of political settlement in Karabakh.

He told the IA M agency that there were no documents in the negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement: “As someone who for several years was directly involved in the negotiations, I state with full responsibility: throughout the entire negotiation process, not a single line was created by the parties… Neither side can accuse the other of any undesirable actions.”

Translated into plain language: since the parties failed to reach any agreements, they cannot accuse one another of failing to fulfill obligations. One can only sympathize with such a lapse of memory. It would have been better had V. Guluzade not touched upon such a sensitive issue. Not only did he expose himself, but the Azerbaijani side as a whole acquired a rather “disastrous” reputation. It is worth revisiting the documents, as well as recalling what I personally know from my mediation work in 1992–1996.

It is long overdue to publish the autographs of authorized representatives of the Republic of Azerbaijan on a number of documents. Among them: S. Abiev, N. Sadykhov, M. Mamedov, A. Jalilov, R. Guliev, H. Aliyev.

In 1993, the signatures of these individuals repeatedly appeared under commitments to hold, within specific deadlines, meetings between the top leaders of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet Baku sought to “stall” their implementation. These commitments were reiterated in writing at every ceasefire. On September 12–13, 1993, representatives of the leadership of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh (A. Jalilov and the current Minister of Defense S. Abiev—A. Ghukasian) extended the ceasefire and adopted a joint communiqué.

Interested in halting military actions before Azerbaijan’s presidential elections, H. Aliyev, in violation of all deadlines, met with R. Kocharyan only on September 25, 1993, demanding that the meeting not be publicized and promising further contacts.

Time and again, the same individuals pledged to cease fire on Azerbaijan’s side. Yet, despite their signatures, Azerbaijan violated the ceasefire four times, hoping to gain advantage on the battlefield. Particularly memorable was the breakdown of the ceasefire on December 16, 1993, ahead of a counteroffensive by Azerbaijani forces on various sectors of the front.

Vafa Guluzade could not have been unaware of this series of agreements and their violations. If he meant only those documents “created” by the parties themselves, without mediators, then here are his own words regarding a document signed by all three sides in July 1994:

“The wording on the ceasefire—‘until the conclusion of a peace agreement’—was achieved in a roundabout way, by telephone, bypassing Moscow and Paris, thanks to the constructiveness and cooperation of Jirair Libaridian, former advisor to former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, with whom I conducted direct negotiations. This wording, along with other factors, undoubtedly contributed to the ceasefire acquiring a lasting character. A peace process began, and people stopped dying.” (Zerkalo, December 26, 1998).

Why then, “with full responsibility,” contradict oneself so blatantly? Did the parties themselves produce a “magic formula,” or did they not create “a single line”? On February 6, 1995, the agreement between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh on strengthening the ceasefire regime officially entered into force, defining procedures for resolving incidents along the line of contact. For this purpose, the three sides exchanged reliable telephone numbers for direct contacts at both political and military levels.

Almost every day Azerbaijan accuses the Armenians of violating the ceasefire along the “front line” (as it is called there), yet fails to comply with this agreement itself. Yerevan, back in March 2005, declared its readiness to resume implementation of these commitments. In May of this year, Stepanakert also called upon both Baku and Yerevan to do so. But Baku stubbornly remains silent. If this document is imperfect, Baku could have proposed to amend or refine it. Meanwhile, people continue to die, Baku “groans” in propaganda, yet refuses to implement the only agreement concluded under the auspices of the OSCE.

The obligations of the parties arose not only in negotiations but also from acts of international organizations and forums. Thus, the OSCE Budapest Summit, by consensus, decided to hold negotiations between the parties to the conflict. H. Aliyev raised no objections. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office explicitly stated that Nagorno-Karabakh is a party to the conflict. Nevertheless, for ten years Azerbaijan has excluded Nagorno-Karabakh from participation in negotiations.

A particular issue is the obligation of UN member states to comply with Security Council resolutions. After the fall of Kelbajar, the UN Security Council, at Azerbaijan’s initiative, adopted Resolution 822. Yet Baku evaded its implementation, ignoring for more than a year the central demand—to cease hostilities. This demand was repeated in Resolutions 853, 874, and 884.

After Resolution 884, Azerbaijani forces continued active military operations for another six months. Baku agreed to a ceasefire only under the threat of complete collapse, not out of any belated intention to comply with UN Security Council decisions. Moreover, none of the other requirements of these resolutions were ever fulfilled.

One may ask why, since November 1993, the UN Security Council ceased adopting resolutions on Karabakh, despite ample new occasions. Precisely because one of the parties to the conflict failed to comply with their central demand. Azerbaijan was the first, and most persistent, in ignoring the Security Council’s resolutions on the most essential point—ending bloodshed. By insisting only on the implementation of provisions concerning the liberation of occupied territories, Baku assumes that the course of the war has long been forgotten, and that no one will notice the falsity of such selective zeal for UN resolutions.

Azerbaijan’s current tactic is to display a striking picture of occupation, completely detached from how it arose and why it persists. It is characteristic that any self-critical analysis of the military campaign, its costs and mistakes, is virtually forbidden there. Of course, occupation is an anomaly in the modern world. But it cannot be separated from the dynamics of military actions, from Azerbaijan’s repeated refusals to cease them, and from fears that, having regained its territories, it might once again violate agreements and strike Nagorno-Karabakh from more advantageous positions.

There are also obligations of another origin—those undertaken by Azerbaijan upon joining international organizations. For example, OSCE participants recognize all ten principles of interstate relations as equal, yet Baku insists on the supposed priority of the principle of territorial integrity. Upon joining the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan, like Armenia, pledged to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict exclusively by peaceful means. Yet scarcely a day passes without threats from its officials to resort to force. No one in Baku dares even to recall Article 9 of Azerbaijan’s own Constitution, which rejects war as a means of resolving international conflicts.

There are known cases of Azerbaijan abruptly revising its positions (in May 1994 it signed the “small agreement” of J. Eliasson, only to renounce it immediately). Official statements abound in contradictions (at times “patience is not unlimited,” at times “time works in Azerbaijan’s favor”; at times “nothing was agreed in Paris and Bucharest,” at times “only two points out of 8–9 remain to be agreed”). Tactical zigzags have become routine—appeals on Karabakh issues to various international bodies in pursuit of propaganda points, which only obstruct substantive consideration and resolution within the OSCE framework. These inconsistencies and evasions cannot be reduced merely to a lack of professionalism—something deeper lies behind them.

Let us be frank: there is too much fog and deception in Baku’s policy on Karabakh. Is not the militant campaign involving top officials a mockery of their own people? It is no surprise that what emanates from there is often met with caution or distrust. Propaganda clichés (the notorious “20% of occupied territories,” “over one million displaced persons”) could not have produced any other effect.

Of course, Armenians too resorted to various maneuvers. In early September 1993, the leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh publicly promised to withdraw from the town of Kubatly, occupied the day before, but failed to keep its word. Armenians often objected to predetermining the status of Nagorno-Karabakh before the opening of the OSCE Minsk Conference, yet were inconsistent in demanding that the issue of status be resolved first, within a package. But despite their inventiveness, in terms of non-compliance with agreements and acts of deception, they fell far short of their opponents.

I sympathize with the current Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, who in the arduous process of conflict settlement constantly lack reliable guarantees of the parties’ positions. Do they realize, in their work on “principles” (and later agreements), that the Damoclean sword of fidelity—or infidelity—even to signed commitments always hangs over them?

Of course, anyone daring to voice the above will be scolded (that is always the easiest). But refuting these regrettable facts or producing reasonable counterarguments is simply not possible.

As is well known, the chief obstacle to a Karabakh settlement remains the deep mutual distrust of the parties to the conflict. This drives them to seek, first and foremost, satisfaction of their own demands. It is the legacy of long-standing disputes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, a deep scar of the recent war, the fruit of zealous propagandists of division, and one of the outcomes of the vicious circle of many years of negotiations. Failure to keep one’s word, non-fulfillment of commitments, and deceptive maneuvers vividly highlight the pattern of broken trust, and ultimately reproduce and deepen that distrust.

It would seem that the leadership of any state—especially a young one, facing the difficult tasks of establishing itself on the international stage—should above all be concerned with its reputation as a serious partner in negotiations and in fulfilling the commitments it has undertaken. It should itself feel burdened by any lack of clarity in fulfilling them, and should strive to avoid any recurrence that undermines its image and credibility.

But there are no rules without exceptions. Alas, even the fashionable aspiration toward Europe does not free everyone from standards that are far from European.

Vladimir Kazimirov. “Too Much Fog and Deception in Baku’s Policy on Karabakh.” – ARMENPRESS, No. 8–9, Russian-Armenian Independent Socio-Political Newspaper, September 2006; REGNUM News Agency, September 6, 2006; http://vn.kazimirov.ru/k141.htm. . (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.).

First Ambassador of Russia to the Republic of Armenia V. Stupishin on the Urgent Necessity of Armenia’s Recognition of the NKR October 2006

Among the utterly false arguments of opponents of the right to self-determination is the widely circulated opinion—common among legally illiterate politicians, political scientists, and journalists—that there exists an irreconcilable contradiction between the right of peoples to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity. From this, they claim, one must proceed from the priority of state sovereignty, which allegedly implies the absolute inviolability and indestructibility of territorial integrity.

In reality, no international legal document recognizes such a priority, and the Helsinki Final Act unequivocally emphasizes the equal value of all ten principles integrated into its text. Moreover, these two principles cannot in fact clash with one another. They are “legally non-contradictory” for the simple reason that the obligation of states to respect each other’s sovereignty, inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity lies in the sphere of external, interstate relations, whereas the right of a people to self-determination lies in the sphere of internal state relations—concerning the relationship between a state and a segment of its population, whether a national minority refusing to continue living under the rule of a dominant nation, or a constituent people in a free federation.

By exercising its natural and inalienable right to self-determination, a subordinate people—or a federated people on equal terms—may withdraw from the common state with its own territory, whether usurped by an occupying state or voluntarily joined in a federation with another people’s territory. By recognizing the right to self-determination, the international community also recognizes the territory inhabited by the seceding people as its own.

The Declaration on Principles of International Law links respect for territorial integrity with the indispensable respect for the right to self-determination. Loss of territorial integrity under such conditions usually provokes no objections from the international community today. The most striking examples are the partition of India into two, then three states (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), the dissolution of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and the reunification of the FRG and the GDR. Thus, the principle of territorial integrity is by no means a “sacred cow” and must not serve as an obstacle to the realization of the right to self-determination of any people—a principle of fundamental natural law, without which no other human rights can be secured.

“Self-determination is the preliminary and indispensable condition for the realization and observance of all other human rights and fundamental freedoms,” affirms the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (UN Doc., 1981, 641. E./CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1). The assertion is self-evident: without the realization of a people’s right to self-determination, it is practically impossible to defend the rights of those who compose it. Yet this indispensable condition must be repeatedly recalled and defended—not only against those who seek to abolish this right for peoples who have not yet exercised it, but also against statesmen, politicians, and analysts who stubbornly refuse to recognize it for peoples who have already cast off foreign domination and achieved statehood.

This is precisely what we observe in the case of Artsakh, which has freed itself—though not yet completely—from Turkic domination entrenched during Soviet times and still nourished by revanchist nostalgia, abetted in large measure by mediators who, by absolutizing (on what grounds, one wonders) the territorial integrity of the former Soviet Azerbaijan, reinforce boundaries arbitrarily drawn by Bolshevik fiat, which cannot claim any historical legitimacy.

Despite this de facto situation, the NKR has failed to achieve de jure recognition even from its ally Armenia, which has moreover assumed negotiations with the Republic of Azerbaijan over Karabakh’s fate—substituting itself for Karabakh as a party to the talks, thereby inadvertently reinforcing Baku’s position of refusing direct negotiations with those who defeated its forces in 1992–94, and with international mediators who prefer to portray the conflict as one between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This inadequate stance contradicts what has long been recognized in OSCE documents, as Ambassador V. Kazimirov—himself a mediator in 1992–96 and author of the relevant provisions—has rightly reminded. Thus, a grave error is committed, leading negotiations into a dead end and rendering them utterly meaningless.

Armenia’s non-recognition of the NKR provides an alibi for other members of the international community, who likewise evade recognition, thereby acting as accomplices to Azerbaijan’s mini-empire, which still nourishes hopes of absorbing Artsakh with foreign assistance.

V. Stupishin. “A Formula of Justice for Karabakh. 1. Recognition of the NKR—An Urgent Necessity.” Noev Kovcheg, Moscow, No. 14 (109), October 2006.

Former Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and Representative of the President of Russia, Ambassador V. Kazimirov On the Necessity of Implementing the Tripartite Agreement on Strengthening the Ceasefire Regime and Ensuring Compliance with Future Agreements October 21, 2006

In connection with the publication on October 20 in your newspaper of the article “Is a Meeting Between Abiev and Sargsyan Necessary?”, I would like to share some essential information about the situation along the line of contact between Azerbaijani and Armenian-Karabakh forces.

Since the indefinite ceasefire of May 12, 1994 was concluded without the withdrawal of forces, without the deployment of neutral peacekeepers or even observers, there soon arose the need to strengthen the ceasefire regime through an additional agreement. This agreement defined procedures for resolving incidents along the line of contact, preventing their escalation on the ground and their exploitation in propaganda. Such an agreement was concluded on February 4, 1995 under the auspices of the OSCE by the Defense Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Commander of the Nagorno-Karabakh Army, with the direct approval of Heydar Aliyev, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and Robert Kocharyan.

This agreement provided, in particular, for immediate direct contacts between the political and military leadership of the parties and the adoption of urgent concrete measures to prevent the escalation of incidents, to clarify and resolve them.

However, this agreement has long ceased to be implemented by the parties and has effectively been consigned to oblivion within the OSCE. This is despite the fact that soldiers and civilians alike continue to die along the line of contact. Hardly a week passes without reports from the sides accusing each other of ceasefire violations and casualties. Therefore, the initiative of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Ambassador A. Kasprzyk, proposing a meeting of the defense ministers of the parties to the conflict, appears highly useful. These issues contain much military specificity, which makes their consideration by foreign ministers particularly difficult.

The military leadership of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh has openly expressed support for fulfilling the commitments undertaken in the February 1995 agreement. Official Baku, however, stubbornly remains silent. Perhaps, despite Heydar Aliyev’s approval, certain shortcomings have been identified in this agreement? Yet such shortcomings could easily be remedied—agreements are often revised or supplemented with the consent of the parties.

It is difficult to believe that the commanders of one side value the lives of their soldiers, officers, and civilians more highly than the commanders of the other side value the lives of their own citizens. One cannot simply tally statistics of violations and casualties without taking action to save compatriots. No political or diplomatic games or maneuvers are worth human lives. Ask the mothers of those who have fallen victim to the criminal inaction of their leadership.

There is another, truly fundamental aspect of this matter. Compliance with agreements is one of the important criteria of a state’s maturity and predictability as a member of the international community. For more than ten years, the parties, with the assistance of international mediators, have sought ways to achieve a peaceful political resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Moreover, the work has so far focused only on “principles” of settlement, with much effort still required to formulate the texts of agreements. But if the parties already demonstrate an inability to fulfill commitments undertaken in agreements formally concluded and approved by their leadership, then what is the point of all these efforts?

It is clear in advance that no agreement will fully satisfy one of the parties—such an agreement simply cannot exist. Losses and disappointments against the backdrop of expectations are absolutely inevitable. Why then spend years deceiving oneself, one’s people, and the entire international community? Peace for both peoples cannot be achieved without compromise agreements and without guaranteed compliance with them.

One may remain silent for a long time, but complete silence on these issues is impossible—everyone will ultimately have to answer before their people and before history.

V. Kazimirov. “Complete Silence is Impossible.” – Echo (Baku), October 21, 2006. http://vn.kazimirov.ru/k164.htm (Emphasis ours – Yu.B.). 813

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

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