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OF AZERBAIJAN UNDER THE TRILATERAL AGREEMENT ON STRENGTHENING THE CEASEFIRE REGIME IN THE FORM OF RESPONSES BY EACH PARTY TO THE CONFLICT TO THE PROPOSED IDENTICAL TEXT February 4, 1995

Co-Chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Conference To Ambassador V.N. Kazimirov To Ambassador A. Bjurner

I hereby confirm Azerbaijan’s consent to fully assume the obligations set forth in your proposal of February 3, 1995.

Upon receipt of your confirmation of general agreement with these obligations, we shall consider this arrangement to have entered into force as of February 6, 1995.

M. Mamedov Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan

Note: On the same day, February 4, 1995, identical letters of response were received from the Minister of Defense of Armenia, S. Sargsyan, and the Commander of the Nagorno-Karabakh Army, S. Babayan. http://vn.kazimirov.ru/doc12.htm

FROM THE SUMMARY OF THE ACTING OSCE CHAIRMAN

March 31, 1995

The first meeting of the Steering Committee was opened by the Acting Chairman, Mr. László Kovács. (The statement of the Acting Chairman was circulated as document REF.SC/3/95/Rev.)

In his remarks on the situation in the CSCE region, the Acting Chairman noted that OSCE participating States continue to face situations that threaten OSCE principles, including the preservation of territorial integrity as well as the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

During the ensuing discussion, delegations exchanged views on such situations in relation to various regions. Particular attention was devoted to the circumstances in Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh…

Delegations expressed concern over the “neither peace nor war” situation that had developed during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and emphasized the importance of efforts to strengthen the ceasefire agreement. They voiced disappointment at the lack of progress in negotiations on this conflict.

The Acting Chairman reaffirmed earlier OSCE decisions regarding the status of the parties, i.e., the participation of the two states involved in the conflict, as well as the third party (Nagorno-Karabakh), in the entire negotiation process, including the Minsk Conference. In addition, interested parties may be invited to the Minsk Conference and its preparatory events for consultations.

Delegations issued a strong appeal to the parties to resume political negotiations without preconditions and to give, without further delay, their consent to the presence of the OSCE in the region.

The parties were strongly urged to respond to appeals concerning the release of prisoners of war and hostages. Many delegations expressed concern that failure to act immediately would result in the loss of the positive momentum generated by the Budapest decision. At the same time, preparations for a peacekeeping operation should be intensified in order to create conditions for the OSCE to adopt key decisions.

The Acting Chairman called upon participating States to take concrete steps to allocate personnel and financial resources and to ensure funding for the operation.

OSCE, Steering Committee, Prague. 1-SC/Journal No. 2, March 31, 1995, Appendix.

MEETING OF THE OSCE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Budapest, 8 December 1995

Decision on the OSCE Minsk Process

The Council of Ministers:

  • reaffirms that the OSCE Minsk Process remains the sole forum for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;
  • welcomes the determination of the parties to the conflict to continue to observe the ceasefire established on 12 May 1994;
  • calls upon the parties to immediately release all prisoners of war and persons detained in connection with the conflict, and to ensure the ICRC unimpeded access to all places of detention and to all detainees;
  • supports the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Conference, in coordination with the Acting Chairman, to achieve without further delay a political agreement on the cessation of armed conflict. The implementation of such an agreement would eliminate the main consequences of the conflict for all parties and allow the Minsk Conference to be convened in the shortest possible time. The signing of the Agreement would create conditions for the Permanent Council to decide on the deployment of an OSCE peacekeeping operation, based on the valuable recommendations of the High-Level Planning Group, whose work should be continued;
  • welcomes the firm intention expressed to establish direct contacts, in coordination with the Co-Chairmen, in order to reach agreement on the principles of conflict settlement, and strongly urges that this be done swiftly; and
  • takes note of the readiness expressed by the parties to consider key issues with a view to achieving compromise as soon as possible.

LISBON SUMMIT MEETING

Lisbon, 2–3 December 1996

Lisbon Document 1996

Annex 1

Statement by the Acting Chairman of the OSCE

As you are all aware, over the past two years no progress has been achieved in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the issue of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. I regret to note that the efforts undertaken by the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Conference to reconcile the positions of the parties regarding the principles of settlement have not been successful.

The Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group have recommended three principles which should form part of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These principles enjoy the support of all member states of the Minsk Group. They are:

  • the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan;
  • the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, defined in an agreement based on self-determination, granting Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-governance within Azerbaijan;
  • guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its entire population, including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all parties with the provisions of the settlement.

I regret to state that one participating State did not agree with these principles. They are supported by all other participating States.

This statement will be included in the documents of the Lisbon Summit.

FROM THE REPORT OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND

T. Halonen to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on Finland’s Activities as Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Conference 11 February 1997

4.2. Status of Nagorno-Karabakh The most serious procedural dispute concerns the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to the conflict. Although in March 1995 the OSCE recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as the third party to the conflict, Azerbaijan still refuses to acknowledge this status. It maintains that the conflict is between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and that the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of Karabakh are merely “interested parties.” For example, Azerbaijan succeeded in preventing visits by ministers (except Russian ministers) to Stepanakert by threatening to block any representatives from traveling to Nagorno-Karabakh through Baku.

Relations between Yerevan and Stepanakert are a key issue in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although Karabakh, with a population of nearly 150,000, depends in every respect on Armenia, Stepanakert is not under Yerevan’s control. The war created a hardened and self-confident community in Nagorno-Karabakh. The people of Karabakh have become a symbol of the centuries-long struggle of the Armenian nation, especially in the eyes of the Armenian diaspora.

The ultimate outcome of the Nagorno-Karabakh war—unrestricted access for Armenia through the Lachin corridor, clearly defined front lines, and complete ethnic cleansing carried out by both sides—enabled Nagorno-Karabakh to reject any settlement that would return the region under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction. Both Yerevan and Stepanakert publicly voiced their fears of sharing the fate of the Kosovo Serbs: an externally imposed settlement that would force an unprotected population to abandon their homes.

4.4. After Lisbon The dramatic turn at the Lisbon Summit left its mark on the negotiation process. Lisbon completely undermined the balanced atmosphere of the talks, and the trauma caused by the summit will continue to be felt for some time. Roles shifted; by agreeing with the position taken by the mediators, Azerbaijan exposed Armenia’s complete lack of freedom of action.

By demanding that the OSCE summit recognize its territorial integrity and by agreeing to grant Nagorno-Karabakh broad but unspecified self-governance, including security guarantees, Azerbaijan cornered Armenia in the eyes of the international community. Even the absence of a decision was a victory for Azerbaijan. Armenia withdrew into itself like a snail, to reflect on the situation. Nagorno-Karabakh declared that it was now even more convinced that negotiations with Azerbaijan were useless. It was prepared to wait.

A Cyprus-type settlement has already taken place. The parties have partly grown accustomed to the status quo. There is no real will to reach compromise, and settlement has been postponed by each side, believing that time works in its favor. In reality, time works against all.

“Finland as a Mediator in the Karabakh Conflict.” Report by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Ms. Tarja Halonen to the Foreign Committee of Parliament on the activities of Finland as Co-Chairman of the OSCE Minsk Conference, 11 February 1997. Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki 1997, pp. 11–15.

STATEMENT

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION B. YELTSIN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WILLIAM J. CLINTON, AND THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE JACQUES CHIRAC ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH Denver, 23 June 1997

On the occasion of our meeting in Denver, we, the Presidents of the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and France, as heads of state and Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh, express our deep concern over the continuing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It has seriously undermined economic and social development and well-being throughout the Caucasus region. It has claimed thousands of lives. More than one million refugees remain displaced from their homes.

We welcome the continued observance of the ceasefire. However, the ceasefire alone is not sufficient. Without progress toward a lasting settlement, the ceasefire may collapse. The international community has repeatedly called for a settlement, and we are convinced that a durable and permanent peace in the region must be established without delay.

To this end, we have undertaken, on behalf of our countries, the commitment to work closely together to support the efforts of the parties in achieving a negotiated settlement of the conflict. The Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Conference from Russia, the United States, and France have presented a new proposal for a comprehensive settlement, taking into account the legitimate interests and concerns of all parties. It provides a sound basis for achieving mutual agreement. The primary responsibility, however, lies with the parties and their leaders. We urge them to adopt a constructive approach and, on the basis of this proposal, to reach through negotiations the earliest possible settlement. 786

Yuri Barsegov “Nagorno-Karabakh in International Law and Global Politics”

Artatsolum

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